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A HISTORY OF PARTNERSHIP AND COLLABORATION IN THE BALKANS

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FOREWORD BY PROF. DR. MAHMUT AK,  
RECTOR OF ISTANBUL UNIVERSITY

International Balkan Annual Conference (IBAC) series started by Istanbul University in 2011 has since been organized every year in a different Balkan city. Istanbul University considers that it is a scientific responsibility to collect the papers presented at an IBAC conference in a separate book and offer it to the access of the world of science. In this regard, the fourth book of the series has now come out after the authors checked out and give the last touch to their papers which they presented at fourth IBAC conference in Bucharest entitled “Turkey and Romania: Historical Ties and Future Collaborations in the Balkans” successfully organized by Istanbul University together with the University of Bucharest between 15 and 18 October 2014. Moreover, the articles contained in this book were also read for a final time by a group of editors from the two universities. Eventually, we are pleased to see that after an intensive preparation period which lasted nearly two years, the book has now been published and that one of the aims of IBAC conferences has been realized.

_Turkey and Romania: A History of Partnership and Collaboration in the Balkans_ is the title of this fourth book which contains 41 articles. I would like to congratulate the honourable science people and independent researchers from all around the world who greatly contributed to this book with their articles, first of all science people from the organising institutions of the conference, i.e. Istanbul University and University of Bucharest; and valuable scientists from University of Zadar in Croatia; Eleutherios Venizelos Institute of History in Greece; University of Szeged in Hungary; European University Institute in Italy; University of Tokyo in Japan; Adam Mickiewicz University in Poland; St. Petersburg State University and Pavlov First Saint Petersburg State Medical University in Russia; Romanian Academy, Nicolae Iorga Institute of History, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Romanian-American University, Aexandru Ioan Cuza Police Academy, “Lucian Blaga” University of Sibiu, Ovidius University, Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History in Romania; Hacettepe University, Mimar Sinan University of Fine
Turkey and Romania: A History of Partnership and Collaboration in the Balkans offers, in the first instance, an inside into the relations between Turkey and Romania as well as other issues concerning the Balkans region particularly through history, literature and linguistic, political science, economy, international relations, biographical and cultural studies. Furthermore, it presents new and different views in terms of evaluation and diagnosing the issues and in many case puts forward scientific suggestions. Thus, with a very challenging content the book has the intent to make a great contribution to the existing literature, which also confirms that authors are very expert in their field of study.

There are some public and private institutions in Turkey without their priceless support organising the conference in Bucharest and publishing the book as an outcome could not have been succeeded. First of all, I would be very glad to express my sincere gratitude to Lokman Çağırıcı, Major of Bağcılar Municipality and to Murat Aydın, Major of Zeytinburnu Municipality in Istanbul as well as Dr. Fahri Solak, Secretary General of Union of Turkish World Municipalities, all showed a very intimate support in attending to the opening ceremony of the conference and afterwards carried out a visit to the some district municipalities in Dobruja region which comprise a good number of Turkish and Tatar residents. Furthermore, two important institutions which, among their various initiatives, play very crucial roles in the promotion of Turkey also had great share in successfully organising the conference, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) and Republic of Turkey Promotion Fund, and it is a pleasure to thank their directors for their support. Once more, it is worth to thank all the leaders and institutions mentioned above for putting their effort behind such a scientific event which aims to bring Turkey to the world stage through the Balkans.

I am particularly thankful to his Excellency Mr. Osman Koray Ertaş, Ambassador of Turkey in Romania for the support, hospitality and close interest he showed during the conference by attending to the opening ceremony of the con-
ference and by hosting a reception for the science people from different countries of the world.

Finally I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Mircea Dumitru, the Rector of the University of Romania especially for his friendship, hospitality, collaboration and very warm scientific atmosphere during the IBAC-Bucharest conference. Besides, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Magdalena Iordache-Plat, the Vice Rector, Prof. Dr. Adrian Mihai Cioroianu, then Dean of Faculty of History and Prof. Dr. Florentina Nitu the current Dean of the same Faculty for their effort in the conference organization and preparation of the book. In particular, I also have to thank Prof. Dr. Adrian Mihai Cioroianu for making the presentation personally at the opening ceremony. This was a magnanimous act which is above all appreciation.

I am sure that this book which is a substantial outcome of the close scientific collaboration of the two universities and a promising pioneer for more collaborations in various other fields in the coming days will receive the attention it righteousness deserves.

Prof. Dr. Mahmut AK
Rector
The earliest encounters between the Romanian peoples and the Turkic tribes can be traced back to the pre-Ottoman period. That is to say, Cuman-Kipchak and Pecheneg groups flooded into the region around the Carpathian Mountains and the northern bank of the Danube River, where the indigenous population was still majorly speaking Romanian. However, it was only starting after the 15th century that the Romanian peoples established a more enduring contact with the Turkish culture, represented by the Ottoman dynasty.

A series of struggles between the Ottoman dynasty and the Romanian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia came to an end when Wallachia recognized Ottoman sovereignty and became a tribute paying voivodate in 1470s. Moldavia followed the same path around a decade later. The two principalities, referred to as memleketeyn by the Ottomans, were autonomous in their domestic affairs but dependent on the Ottomans with regards to their foreign policies.

Their autonomy implied payment of annual pecuniary tributes to the Ottoman treasury, liability to send provisions and merchandise (salt, sheep, birds of prey, etc.), gathering intelligence for the Ottoman political centre, providing auxiliary forces to the Ottoman army and, at times, sending valuable gifts to the Ottoman authorities. In return of these, they were given the liberty to choose their voivode from among themselves although the ultimate ratification was reserved for the sultan. This also brought along a pattern of patron-client relationship between prospective princes and Ottoman ruling cadres. Moreover, since the office of kapıkahya (resident diplomat) was generally used as a step to jump on to princely throne, the Romanian aristocrats found sufficient opportunity to learn about Turkish culture in Constantinople. At least until the 18th century, the political system seemed to function without major problems. For the economic life, the constant need for Romanian livestock at Constantinople and the presence of Turkish merchants in Romanian cities point out to a similarly smooth relationship in this period.
The relative freedom recognized by the Ottoman Porte was, however, renounced after the devastating Carlowitz Treaty (1699) imposed upon the Ottomans. Starting with the 18th century onwards, the two Romanian principalities became a conflicting area between the Russians and the Ottomans. The Ottoman Porte started following a deliberate policy of appointing Greek Phanariot families as voivodes of Wallachia and Moldavia. The Ottoman efforts to keep the principalities under their rule were, however, doomed to fail after the raging wave of nationalism following the French Revolution. Added to this, the Great Power rivalry between the Western European states and Russia was to take its toll on the Ottomans, too: Following the Crimean War (1854-1856), the buffer zone status of the two principalities became more official than ever by the unification of the two under a common Romanian Princedom. The independence demand of this new princedom from the Ottoman government was denied until the outbreak of the Russian-Ottoman War (1877-78) provided a suitable opportunity for the Romanians to declare their independence. This development duly marks a large scale immigration of Turks living in Romania to the Ottoman Empire, even though some dozens of thousands chose to stay, where they have still been living to our day, concentrated majorly around the southeast of the country (Dobruja).

Notwithstanding the loss of territory the Ottoman government suffered by the independence of Romania, no hard feelings seem to be felt: Both states were quick to establish their reciprocal diplomatic representatives in each other’s territory: In November 1878, D. Bratianu was appointed as plenipotentiary Romanian representative in Istanbul. His Ottoman counterpart Süleyman Sabit Bey started his duty in Bucharest in the following month. This bilateral recognition was preserved under the Turkish Republic and both diplomatic posts were promoted to embassies in 1938.

This book entitled *Turkey and Romania. A History of Partnership and Collaborations in the Balkan*, as its name indicates, deals with a broad period of the relations outlined above between Turkey and Romania. It is a great intention and initiative of both universities i.e. Istanbul University and the University of
Bucharest to jointly organize 4th International Balkan Annual Conference (IBAC) from which this book at hand resulted. I would like to congratulate and thank respected Rectors of both universities, Prof. Dr. Mahmut Ak, Rector of Istanbul University and Prof. Dr. Adrian Mihai Cioroianu, Rector of the University of Bucharest for their successful scientific collaboration. As the president of the Union of Turkish World Municipalities (TDBB) I have to express that it is a pleasure to support such a conference and publication which soon will definitely became a reference book for the students of Balkan history particularly history of Turkish-Romanian relations.

İbrahim KARAOSMANOĞLU

President of Union of Turkish World Municipalities
Turkey and Romania: A History of Partnership and Collaboration in the Balkans has now been published as the fourth book of the International Balkan Annual Conference Book Series. It contains articles of a very expert group of authors on various aspects, first and foremost on the relations between Turkey and Romania in the Balkan context as well as some different issues in regard to the Balkans. There are four chapters in the book which contains forty one articles. Majority of the articles closely look into the various issues and subjects of Turkish-Romanian relations starting from pre-Ottoman times. Besides, there are a couple of articles in the book which focus on other important areas of research in terms of Balkan history. Therefore the chapters in the book were arranged thematically and each chapter more or less has a chronological order.

It starts with the chapter, Pre-Ottoman and Ottoman Balkans in which there are eight articles. The first one by George Alexandru Costan deals with the development of Rif’aiyya order in Romania, particularly in Dobrudja, Temesvar and Varat starting from the 13th century soon after the order itself was established one century earlier. Ottoman interests in South-East Europe that also includes the Balkan regions; they are evaluated by taking into consideration their role as an interference space between the Ottoman Empire and Venice, by the means of trade between Morlachs (Dana Caciur). Culturally and politically speaking, the hallmark of Dubrovnik’s first embassies to the Sublime Porte (1430–1431) is discussed by Valentina Zovko. The struggle over Erdel and its impact on the conduct of the diplomatic relations between Ottomans and their rival Habsburgs was analyzed from a diplomatic view point (Uğur Kurtaran). Radu-Andrei Dipratu discusses the subject of travel accounts by referencing three English travelers from the first half of the 17th century, who describe Catholics living in the Ottoman Empire. Despite the will to become a gate of Europe, Romania still presented many oriental features by the end of the 19th century. A large amount of sayings and habits were common for the Romanians and the other Balkan peoples as Luminiţa Munteanu identifies the role of Anton Pann, the writer of a sort of border literature, which expressed the uniqueness of the Balkan space. Tufan Gündüz looks at the Turkish and Muslim image in Bosnia through the eyes of a Croatian traveler. Last article in this chapter perfectly illustrates the social, economic and military extent of the relations between Vidin and Wallachia extensively using so-far neglected Vidin Court Registers of Ottoman period.

Second chapter completely focused on Romanian Principalities with twelve articles. The relations between the Ottoman Empire and the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia in the late Middle Ages and in pre-modernity are addressed via several perspectives and are described in their evolution.
hand, we benefit from the analysis of the manner in which the Turkish suzerainty over the two principalities generates Enlightenment reflections and cultural constructs in Western travel accounts from the 18th century (Rodica Butucel). An interesting historical source, the account of Russian ambassador Repnin, on his way to Constantinople during 1775 – 1776, is analyzed by Mehmet Alaaddin Yalçinkay in the context of the role played by the two Romanian principalities in Ottoman foreign affairs. Likewise, Ilona Czamanska examines the evolution of Moldavia’s political and juridical status in the 15th – 18th centuries under the impact of Polish and Ottoman policies. Besides, Hacer Topaktaş gives some concrete examples of official correspondence to show the role played both by voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia in the Ottoman effort of surveillance over Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in last quarter of the 18th century. Akitsu Mayuzumi contributes to this chapter with an article focused on Ottoman reaction towards the foundation of Russian consulates in the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia following the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca.

The role of the Danubian Principalities in the wars between Ottomans and Austria, Russia were questioned in two articles. Bekir Gökpınar well documents the logistic support delivered by Wallachia and Moldova during the Ottoman-Austrian War of 1716 by consulting Ottoman archival sources in the first place. Also intensively using the Ottoman archival sources and some chronicle, Filiz Bayram in detail illustrates crucial service of Nikola Mavroyani, Voivode of Wallachiha during the Ottoman and Russian-Austrian War in 1787-1792.

The economic aspects also constituted an important element of the relations with the Ottoman Empire. As such, Damian Panaitescu encapsulates the manner, the means and the extent to which the Wallachian fiscal system was influenced by the Ottomans. The Ottoman language and civilization slowly infiltrated north of the Danube and Lia Brad Chisacof’s analysis aims to evaluate how familiar the population of the principalities was with the Turkish language in the 18th century, on the basis of historical manuscripts.

All these facets, as well as other outlooks on issues of history of partnership, can be discussed and assessed more efficiently by virtue of a collaboration between Romanian and Turkish historiographies. Correspondingly, Michał Wasiucionek’s study is a call for the integrated use of resources with the purpose of edifying issues such as uprisings against the Ottoman Empire or the rise of the Phanariots.

The role of the Romanian principalities was prominent for the breaking points of the Balkan equilibrium. Feyzullah Uyanik underlines the shift of power recorded in Wallachia and Moldavia as the Russian empire approached the Ottoman world. The level of autonomy in the Romanian lands has facilitated
the dissonance between the three empires of Oriental Europe. Moreover, the increased influence of the Russian power is highlighted by Ana-Maria Lepăr in the study dedicated to Bucharest during the peace treaty between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1812.

Wars constitutes time periods during which the opposing sides not only extensively engaged in war plans and military actions but also intensive diplomatic correspondences, meetings particularly during the peace process and audiences for a possible alliance. The third chapter in the book deals with *Military Encounters and Balkan Wars*. Military encounters also represent a period of time which sometimes offer a chance for the rival sides to discover their opponents closely, apart from the military strength, in terms of culture, diplomacy, national characteristics and so on. Mehmet Akif Erdoğru explores the details of the Ottoman military campaign against Voivode Petru Raresh of Moldavia in 1538 through a manuscript at the National Library in Vienna. Szabolcs Hadnagy gives the details of the Ottoman campaign of 1658 with scrutiny while setting forth the reasons that pushed the Ottoman decision-makers to make a final decision whether to direct the expedition against Transylvania or Venice. In his article Özgür Kolçak provides a good analysis of the rationale, methods, and means of the policy of Küprülü Mehmed Pasha towards Transylvania after he was appointed Grand vizier in 1656, also the date of the beginning of the famous Köprülü era in the 17th century Ottoman history.

Framing the elite in 1877-1878, during one of the most important wars for modern Romania, Irina Gafiţa focuses the attention on Nicolae Ionescu, a neutralist who enjoyed a considerable degree of influence in the country. After it won the independence during the war of 1877-1878, Bucharest built strong ties with Constantinople and Romania favored the salvation of the Ottoman Empire. Victor Creţu and Emil Racoviţan documented a deep interest for the Romanian diplomacy to impose itself as a mediator between Italy and the Ottoman empire during the war between 1911-1912. The following wars fought by the Ottoman empire in 1912-1913 against the Balkan states only increased the pressure on the mixed populations of the region. Paul Cotirleţ analyses the situation of a minority population, the Aromanians, caught between the opposing states.

Cosmin Ionita perfectly uncovers the decision making process effecting the Romanian side in their evaluation for a possible alliance with the Ottoman state in the upcoming Balkan war. Using a good mix of archival and secondary sources, he covers the whole stages of the process and maneuvers mostly shaped by the military developments on the ground until the end of the First Balkan war. This article sets a good model of research for the students of both late Ottoman and Romanian military and diplomatic history.
The fourth chapter of the book was devoted to the studies on *Turkey, Romania and the Balkans*. In this regard fourteen articles enlightens various points of modern Turkish and Romanian history as well as their contemporary relations. An expert on the subject Emil Suciu shows the extent of the influence that Turkish had on Romanian language. One of the many thing we learn from his study is that today the number of Romanian words having Turkish origin amount to 1250. The representation of Turkey in the Romanian travel books is the subject of Armand Guta’s extensive research, which surveys six travel accounts covering a century from 1840 to 1940. The Romanian capital moved away from the oriental influence and embraced the change, aiming to present itself as a European city. The task has been consistently pursued by the Romanian elite and Cosmin Minea depicts the representation of Romania at Paris exhibitions.

The article by Igor V. Zimin and Aleksandr Sokolov illustrates the importance and value of the historical documents at the Russian State Historical Archive for the research of Romanian history. While most studies of the volume are constructed on primary sources from archives in several countries, a very important contribution has been the identification of such documents concerning Romania. Being very little explored until now, the identification represents a major support for the historians interested in the Romanian history.

With new borders in the Balkans after the World War One, Romania and Turkey cultivated good diplomatic relations, both identifying Soviet Russia as the main threat to the national security. Şerban Pavelescu defines the strategic interests of the Great Romania and the quest to maintain the new borders. Turkish factor in the Romanian foreign policy is depicted by Emanuel Plopeanu as a constant of the interwar period for the common interests for the Black Sea, the Straits regime, the Soviet threat as well as the Balkan security. Vladimir Gutorov makes an analysis on the changing role of the political education in the construction of an effective identity and citizenship for the post-Soviet Balkan nations.

Ana Mihaela Istrate analyses the representations of oriental femininity, the Western European discourse on beauty, exoticism and the meaning of the veil worn by women in the Turkish harem. Hayrunisa Alp discovers the details of the visit of Maria Tănase, famous Romanian tango artist to Turkey, offering an example of cultural encounters between the two countries in the last century. In his article Metin Ömer deals with the scope of the influence of Atatürk’s reforms on Dobrudja Turkish community. This Turkish community in Dobrudja also the focus of Arzu Kılınç’s article but through a different historical aspect. Applying primarily to the documents from the Ottoman archive she gives an account of their settlement in the region during the mid-nineteenth century and migration to Turkey following the Ottoman withdrawal from the Balkans just starting 1878. Ada-Kaleh is an area
which receive great attention and interest in terms of cultural and social intercourse and influence both in the modern histories of Turkey and Romania. Iulia Cheșcă explains the formation and administrative structure and socio-cultural life on the island based on archival documents as well as the personal testimonies. Dimitris Michalopoulos argues about the origins of Gagauz community while underlining the interest that Hamdullah Suphi Tannıöver showed in Gagauz Turks during his service in Romania as the Turkish Ambassador between 1931 and 1944. In their article, İrfan Akyüz, Ahmet Tuzcuoğlu and Emrah Cengiz identify the levels of consumer ethnocentrism in Turkey, Bosnia–Herzegovina and Sandžak and compare the results to define the relationship between their ethnocentric levels in order to see the role of demographic variables in the given countries and region.

We have to make couple of explanation about the way followed during the preparation of the book for print. Our most important concern was the unity and standard of English used in each article. Articles had been read at least two times and if necessary returned to the author for highlighted changes. In most cases, we respected specific choices by the authors provided no mistake in grammatical point of view. As an instance, we allowed the different choice of spelling in different articles such as vaivode and voivode since both are in use and correct. Besides, we did not force the authors to provide a separate list of bibliography at the end of their work if they did not prefer so. With a close collaboration with the authors we believe the book got a standard both in language and in shape.

As to the ideas and views in the articles, we should point out that there was no interfere in this regard so that all the authors has the full responsibility of their articles. It took us a bit longer than expected by many contributors to complete the present book for print and we have to thank the esteemed authors for their patience and great contributions. They should know that the delay resulted from our concern to provide a book in academic standards. Whether we succeeded is a decision to be made by both the students of Balkan history and scientific world.

Last but not the least, we have to express our gratitude to Prof. Dr. Ahmet Yeşil, president of IBAC conference series for his support and patience during the preparation of this book. There are couple of more names that we are thankful for their great help, respectively Nurbanu Duran, PhD candidate, Semih Sefer, M.A. student and Yavuz Bülbül also a PhD student all at History Department in Istanbul University.

Editors
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CHAPTER I

PRE-OTTOMAN AND OTTOMAN BALKANS
THE RIFA’IYYA ORDER AND THE ROMANIANS DURING PRE-OTTOMAN AND OTTOMAN TIMES

George Alexandru Costan

The present discussion addresses the question in what manner did the Sufi tariqa (Order) Rifa’iyya interact with the Christian populations in Dobrudja and the mainly Romanian inhabited eyalets of Temesvar and Varat, previously held by the Kingdom of Hungary, in the 13th-14th and the 16th-18th centuries, respectively. We know that the order was created towards the end of the 12th century and achieved worldwide popularity ever since, due to its social appeal and extreme rituals, but we don’t really know much about its core beliefs and attitude towards Christianity in the late Middle Ages. Therefore, it will be discussed below the impact of its staying in the Lower Danube region after the Byzantine colonization of the Turkopouloi from 1264 and the reasons of its disappearance towards the middle of the 14th century. In addition, there must be said something about the importance of acculturation and the relevance of modern ethnographic testimonies in the absence of sufficient first hand written documents and archaeological evidence. The same goes with the case study of the now-called Banat and Crișana provinces, occupied by the Ottoman Turks between 1552 and 1660 and ruled up until 1699 and 1718, respectively.

For the sake of coherency of our analysis, we decided that it will be useful to discuss the two historical periods separately. The oldest mention of the presence of the Rifa’iyya order in Dobrudja is the compilation of stories made by Kamaludd Muhammad as-Saraj al-Rifa, from 1315, and edited by Yusuf ben Ismai’il an-Nabhâni (1849-1932). No toponyms are specified until the end, when describing the residence of Sheikh Saltuk, the author names Saqci (now, Isaccea) and another vil-

1) Alexandre Popović, Un ordre des derviches en terre d’Europe. La Rifa’iyya, Lausanne: L’Âge d’Homme 1993, pp. 29-43.
2) For the latest bibliography on the topic, see Alexandru Madgearu, Asăneşti. Istoria politico-militară a statului dinastiei Asan (1185-1280), Târgovişte: Cetatea de Scaun 2014, pp. 220-221 (and notes 99-103, pp. 220-221).
lage where his neophytes studied and lived, somewhere three hours walking distance from the city.\textsuperscript{4} Some believe that the distance was actually about three days of walking and the other settlement was Babadag, a fact somewhat confirmed by famous explorer Ibn Battuta, who arrived there in 1331.\textsuperscript{5} Other medieval writers spoke about a Wallachian Muslim Saqci (Abou’l Feda)\textsuperscript{6} and a masjid where, a little while later, shepherds have placed their pigs inside (Yazijioghlu Ali).\textsuperscript{7} Finally, Evliya Çelebi mentions Kara Harman, a village later absorbed by Babadag, where Sari Saltuk was farming with “his poor”\textsuperscript{8}.

The archaeological evidences seem to contradict the written sources, because plenty discoveries point to the fact that Dobrudja was Byzantine, such as the four coins from Niculițel (Tulcea co.), with only one of them being Tartar.\textsuperscript{9} Many of the burials cannot be dated, but only the two from the 14\textsuperscript{th} century indicate the presence of Greek missionaries at Niculițel, probably priests or monks influenced by hesychast ideas, who ministered at the old cross-in-square Eastern Christian church now called “St. Atanasie”.\textsuperscript{10} All the pottery fragments from the aforementioned village are also of Byzantine influ-

\textsuperscript{4} Ibidem, p. 264.
\textsuperscript{7} Mihail Guboglu (ed.), Crestoamație turcă, București: Universitatea din București 1978, p. 38: “în Moldova se găseşte încă mecedul său (mescedi), dar se spune că ghiaurii pun întrânsul porci (donuz koyuverirler).”
\textsuperscript{8} Călători străini, VI, p. 386: “Sarî-Saltuk bei făcuse aici agricultură cu sărmanii lui.”
ence, while the later dated hoard from Bădila, a neighbouring hill, suggests only the inhabitancy of the settlement.\textsuperscript{11} Isaccea was the only known place where we can firmly attest a Tatar presence, due to Nogais' own coinage.\textsuperscript{12}

The only proof that might suggest the presence of a former pre-Ottoman Muslim community is the mausoleum (türbe) from Babadag, rebuilt in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{13} Indeed, there is an oddly ignored oral tradition in Dobrudja, with a history that far precedes many Balkan Turkic communities, with the former toponym of the village Niculițel, Monastir, being tributary to a former monastic community that was established in the 11\textsuperscript{th} century, and ended probably because of the great Mongol invasion.\textsuperscript{14} There is also Valea Episcopiei or The Valley of the Bishop from its vicinity, reminding of a former 6\textsuperscript{th} to 11\textsuperscript{th} century bishopric called Axiopolis.\textsuperscript{15} We believe that these testimonies survived throughout years due to Christian Turks and Eastern Christian missionaries (of Greek or Turkish origin) who knew the local history very well, but more evidence is still needed.\textsuperscript{16}

From a historiographical point of view, the association of the Islamization of Dobrudja with the Rifa'iyya tariqa is still quite fresh, with only Machiel Kiel, Harry Norris and me having some viewpoints on the topic.\textsuperscript{17} The former shared the first conclusions regarding the role of its leader, Sheikh Sari Saltuk, and its dissolution, sometimes after the Bulgarian conquest of the region, in 1304.\textsuperscript{18}\textsuperscript{19} The conclusion is that the order was one extremely versatile, a fact confirmed by the researches of Spencer Trimmingham, Ahmed Karamustafa and Alexandre

\begin{itemize}
\item \[11\] Bătrîna, Bătrîna, “Contribuții la cunoașterea”, pp. 544-545.
\item \[16\] Costan, “Contextul ridicării bisericii”, pp. 119-120.
\item \[18\] Kiel, “Sari Saltuk”, p. 266.
\item \[19\] Norris, Sufi Brotherhoods, p. 142, note 19, Costan, “‘Islam popular’”, pp. 88-94.
\end{itemize}
In fact, the latter’s ethnographic observations from the former Communist Balkan space best reflect this statement.

Before we move on, we desire to insist a bit on the leadership of the Rifa‘iyya order, meaning on the character of Sari Saltık, a person who, in our eyes, really underlines the nature of the tariqa. Born as Mehmed in Bukhara, he arrived in Seljuk Anatolia after 1219, the year of the Mongol invasion of Inner Asia. Somehow he managed to visit the tomb of the founder of the tariqa, Ahmed al-Rifa‘i, in Iraq, joining the order afterwards. During his stay in Anatolia, he was also known as a shepherd and, in Dobrudja, as a beggar and diviner. After arriving in the Lower Danube region in 1264, he established a Sufi community in probably four villages where he lived: Isaccea, Niculîtel, Babadag, and Kara Harman, with the former being known as Nogais’ centre of power. He died in 1297, having a successor in the person of Talâk, about whom we know nothing.

There is also a political role given to Sari Saltık by historians, from an important warlord in the political games between Byzantines and Tatars from the second half of the 13th century, or a religious figure with a double social role as a chief. Others speak of a prolific dervish who spread Islam in the Golden Horde, as a sheikh of Haydar’iyya, Bektashi’iyya or Rifa‘iyya tariqats. The warrior-like

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figure evokes a ghazi theme, but can also mean that he was one of those dervishes who could also have fought for Nogai Tatars or even the Byzantines, if we take into account Yazijioghlu Ali’s mention regarding the Turks who fought against the Bulgarians.\textsuperscript{28} There is truth in all those points of view, and we will not insist on them, but on the traits stressed by the primary sources and historians and extrapolated from Sari Saltık’s portrait – the mobility of the Rifa’iyya \textit{tariqa} and its social appeal and political significance.

Ahmed al-Rifa’i’s order appeared after his death, in southern Iraq, and was known for the extreme rituals that the neophytes were performing, such as the mortification of the flesh, taming wild animals, and eating live snakes\textsuperscript{29}. It spread from Maghreb to India, Eastern Europe and Inner Asia.\textsuperscript{30} It was established in the Golden Horde after Nogai’s invasion of the Balkans in January 1265, ended with the effective occupation of north-western Dobrudja.\textsuperscript{31} But the Islamization of the \textit{ulus} began a few years earlier, during Berke Khan’s reign, with the assistance of Egyptian scholars, muezzins, imams, Sufis, architects etc.\textsuperscript{32} The end result at the moment of completion of the hagiographical stories by as-Saraj was the lack of religious uniformity in Tatar lands, but Christians

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\textsuperscript{30} Popović, \textit{Un ordre des derviches}, pp. 29-43.


(Nestorians, Western, and Eastern), Buddhists, Animists/Tangriists, Muslims and others.

As-Saraj’s stories seem to be dedicated to each of the main religions and confessions mentioned, having also, a strong political sub-message for the Tatar elite at Sarai under the simplistic writing and moral-filled narrations for which Sufi writers are known for.\textsuperscript{33} Due to the length of the narrations, we will only paraphrase them, with the original material being previously translated and edited by Machiel Kiel and Bernd Ranke.\textsuperscript{34} The first one is about a group of neophytes who, in the heat of a fictional losing battle with more numerous Christians, Sheykh Sari Saltık saved them and driven the enemy troops away just like an 11\textsuperscript{th} century Nestorian saint called Mai Sergius transported a king to safety, in order to protect him from wild beasts.\textsuperscript{35} The second describes the miracle performed by Ibrahim ben Adham, an early Sufi from Balkh, who acquired fish for his neophytes by communicating with the sea, commanding it to retreat, reminding of Jesus.\textsuperscript{36} But Ibrahim was originally a prince coming from a Buddhist region, so we can conclude that there was a competition between Buddhists and Muslims in the Golden Horde.\textsuperscript{37}

The third and fifth stories strongly imply the powerful connection between the Rifa’iyya order and the Tatar elite and are related to some of the most significant political events from the second half of the 13\textsuperscript{th} century and the beginning of the next one. The former tells of a jar from the steppe of unspeakable riches that was contested by Sari Saltık’s “chosen companions”, with the Sheikh condemning their behaviour and greed.\textsuperscript{38} The latter is about the Sari Saltık’s vision of his impending death seven years from then, with a king coming to take his rosary, during a dark time.\textsuperscript{39} The third narration is a parable regarding the war between the Mongol domains which had waged since the reigns of Berke and Hulagu, the priceless jar is somewhat synonymous with the commercial town of Tabriz, for which they fought for many years, while Sari Saltık appears as a me-

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\textsuperscript{33} Costan, Problema creștinării tiurcilor, p. 39. Previously, I thought that the stories were meant for a rural audience because of the aforementioned causes. See Costan, “Islam popular”, p. 92.

\textsuperscript{34} Kiel, “Sari Saltuk”, pp. 262-264.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibidem, pp. 262-263. For the Christian Nestorian version, see DeWeese, Islamization and Native, p. 267, note 74.

\textsuperscript{36} Kiel, “Sari Saltuk”, p. 263. For the Christian interpretation, see Norris, Sufi Brotherhoods, p. 142, note 19.

\textsuperscript{37} Costan, Problema creștinării tiurcilor, p. 41.

\textsuperscript{38} Kiel, “Sari Saltuk”, p. 263.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibidem, p. 264.
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Finally, the Sheikh’s death and the king’s arrival happened in 1297 and 1304, respectively, with the fall of Nogai in a civil war with Tokhta, a severe drought, and the Bulgarian appearance at the Lower Danube happening in-between.

The fourth story is less metaphorical, presenting an episode of the kidnapping of a Christian and the confiscation of his merchandise by the “Franks”, which ended with the dervish transforming into a hawk, killing the wrongdoer, saving the victim and converting both him and his brother. The latter also expressed his frustration in the same context, speaking of Christians with different methods of persuasion. This statement has at the first glance, a naïve edge, but it really suggests a probable *divide et impera* type of strategy of conversion employed by missionaries, taking advantage of the aggressive slave trade taking place in the Golden Horde and the privileges of the Western Christian religious orders, by associating the Genoese with Franciscan and Dominican missionaries. Additionally, the dervishes used Christian symbols and stories from the Testaments, such as Jesus’ miracles, a carpenter considered as “king of Jews”, just like the prince Ibrahim, the later worker from Syria, and, in the sixth story, the leader Sarı Saltuk, a man legitimized by God through direct communication, to teach the people the divine law, just like Moses did in the times of the Exodus.

We did not ignore the use of animist symbols, implied or not, such as the trance as a mean to save souls, like in the first story; the transformation into specific animals like a hawk (symbol of a powerful shaman), like in the fourth; the recurrent use of the numbers 3 and 7 with its arithmetical games, the water as the source of the creation of the world and of the First Man, the rock/mountain (or the centre of the world and the link between the earth and the sky), and the cult of ancestors (see again, the case of Ibrahim), all of which I have discussed in my prior efforts, so there is no need of insisting on them. More important for the current discussion are the first and fourth stories presented, because they represent a very accurate status of the Romanians in the Golden Horde, as merchants, shepherds, agriculturalists and slave subjects. As-Saraj managed to synthesize a reality present in the political, religious and economical life of the ulus for decades already.

40] For the Mongol dispute over Tabriz, see note 32.
43] Ibidem, p. 263: “[... ] obwohl wir alle Christen sind, aber es gibt deren ja verschiedene!”
so the compilation can be considered a symbolic end of an ethnographical work. This statement is confirmed by other travellers, such as William of Rubruck, who mentions a certain chief called Sartach surrounded by Nestorian priests, while he was on the road to his father’s ordu and met “Blacs” who were giving him a tribute, among other people.46 In addition, Genoese registers reveal that Romanians were mainly sold as slaves, most likely to Egypt, and Dennis Deletant managed to identify one Romance-speaking merchant at the mouths of Danube.47 As for the case of the agriculturalists and shepherds, Romanians, just like the Turks and Tatars, were transhumant pastoralists, mainly the sedentary kind48 and maybe farmers,49 so, if we accept the idea that not only Sarı Saltık, but many more dervishes in the Golden Horde were shepherds (besides being beggars), the tariqa’s “investigations” were thus, eased by their and the Romanians’ mobility.

Of course, the data was actually intended to be used by the Rifa’iyya order to convert people to Islam. The problem was that, particularly in Dobrudja, it failed, first, because of Nogai’s fall and of the Bulgarian conquest, which denied any support from the state.50 Isaccea was already a Muslim city if we take into account Abou’l Feda’s testimony, but only its centre, and it was most likely that the “Wallachians” were moved to peripheral quarters (mahalla),51 not easily observed by a foreign traveller just passing by. As-Saraj suggested that the tariqa was on the verge of dissolution seven years after the death of Sarı Saltık, and his successor, Talâk, was the Sheikh of a shrinking community for almost two decades, even as the Byzantines regained the lost province and prohibited any missionary activities, just to initiate their own.52 By the time of Ibn Battuta’s arrival in Baba

46] W. W. Rockhill (ed.), The Journey of William of Rubruck to the Eastern Parts of the World, 1253-1255, Londra: Bedford Press 1900, p. 116: “Of Sartach I know not whether he believes in the Christ or not. [...] For he is on the road of the Christians, to wit, of the Ruthenians, Blacs, Bulgarians of Minor Bulgaria, Soldaians, Kerkis and Alans, all of whom pass by him when going to his father’s ordu carrying presents to him, so he shows himself most attentive to them. [...] He has Nestorian priests around him who strike a board and chant their offices.”


Salthouk, the old name of Babadag, Sarı Saltık was presented merely as a heterodox Muslim and not as the Sheikh of an order that fascinated Ibn Battuta on his travels in Africa, Asia and Europe.

After as-Saraj, there were no more mentions to be made regarding the presence of the tariqa in Dobrudja, and the political context did not favour their missionary cause. The local despots Dobrotici and Ivanko extended their domains in the northern area inhabited by Turks, followed by the Wallachian prince Mircea I.\(^{53}\) After 1420, the Ottomans seized the region and started their own Islamization process, but we don’t have any information regarding the reappearance of the Rifa’iyya order. By 1500, Isaccea was fully Christian, while Babadag, after sultan Bayezid II’s colonization policies, attracted numerous Muslim Tatars and Turks, so the Christian population dropped to a figure below 20\(^{54}\). It seems that the order wasn’t really prolific in maintaining the Mohammedan religion even among the Turkopouloi and was forgotten by time and the local folk, who managed to transform the old türbe of Sarı Saltık into a garbage dump by the sultan’s arrival in the area, in 1484\(^{55}\).

The reasons may reside on the very nature of the tariqa, one intimately observed by ethnographer Alexandre Popović. He travelled throughout former Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria in the 1970’s and 1980’s, and underlined its dogmatic legerity/legacy that bared strong loans from the Bektashi’iyya, its friendly attitude towards Christians, and its presence in extremely diverse communities, from cities, agricultural villages, and semi-nomadic communities\(^{56}\). Another significant trait is the relative ease of one local group to dissolve itself, in the absence of strong leadership or because of a vacant spot, with the dervishes being able to


\(^{55}\) Călători străini, VI, p. 394: „[...] Când <Baiazid al II-lea> a pornit la cucerirea cetăților Chilia și Cetatea Albă și a sosit la Babadag, atunci unii dintre cei demni de încredere, venind la el, i s-au plâns astfel: <Padișahul nostru, aici se afla un mausoleu strălucitor cu numele de Sarî-Saltuk, // dar cei care îl reneașă, aruncând peste el gunoi și bălării, au făcut să dispară mormântul său venerat>.”

join or establish other orders\textsuperscript{57}. Finally, the institution of \textit{zaviya} can be present in various types of establishments, such as a mosque, a dervish’s private home, an abandoned building or even in a random person’s home, almost incognito\textsuperscript{58}. Of course, Popović’s notes deal with the 20\textsuperscript{th} century context, but one can not overlook the highly adaptive, but also unstable nature of the Rifa’iyya \textit{tariqa}, especially in politically unfavourable climates.

These observations are useful clues when dealing with the lesser known case study of the eyalets of Temesvar and Varat, especially in the parts inhabited by Romanians. Unfortunately, the only detailed written source that we know is Evliya Çelebi’s testimony; other than that, there are some Ottoman registers which can provide some indirect answers, but that is all at this point. Not even the historiography is generous with us, with only Cristina Feneşan and Adrian Magina having an interest in the interaction between Muslims and Romanians in the regions now called Banat and Crişana.\textsuperscript{59} Archaeologists still have not discovered any \textit{zaviya} or \textit{tekke} and, taking into account what Popović observed, chances of finding them are slim, especially when it comes to a \textit{tariqa} like Rifa’iyya. Finally, as Cristina Feneşan pointed out that the two provinces were somewhat neglected by the Ottomans, by not committing sufficient resources like in occupied Hungary; thus, Islamization really intensified only after the war of 1683-1699, and for a short period of time, before the effective Austrian occupation of the eyalet of Temesvar in 1716.\textsuperscript{60}

The occupation of Banat and Crişana occurred in three main stages, first in 1552, then in 1658, and later, in the case of the latter province, in 1660.\textsuperscript{61} In both, the cities were transformed into Ottoman fashion,\textsuperscript{62} with imams and \textit{ulama} being brought in, as an effort to establish a strong Muslim population, mainly composed of colonists and the administration.\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Tekkes} were built outside the cit-

\textsuperscript{57} Popović, \textit{Un ordre des derviches}, p. 68.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibidem, pp. 50, 67-70.
\textsuperscript{60} Feneşan, \textit{Cultura otomană}, p. 189.
\textsuperscript{61} For the latest effort regarding the conquest of the now called Banat and Crişana regions by the Ottomans, see Cătălin Felezeu, ”Principatul Transilvaniei și relațiile habsburgo-ottomane în a doua jumătate a secolului al XVII-lea. Schimbările survenite în statutul politic”, \textit{Anuarul Institutului de Istorie „George Barițiu” din Cluj-Napoca 52, Supliment} (2013), pp. 297-304.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibidem, pp. 57-58, 104-105; Magina, \textit{De la excludere la coabitare}, pp. 119-121.
ies, on the roads to the cities, as a complementary missionary force for the rigid
and dogmatic ulama in places inhabited by people with little religious instruction
and attracted by dhikr and their emotional and accessible Sama.\textsuperscript{64} Evliya Çelebi
mentions only four dervish establishments in the eyalet of Temesvar,\textsuperscript{65} comprised
of agriculturalists and beggars, but we are sure that there were more: the türbe of
Halveti’iyye Sheikh Hüseyin Baba, on the northern road from Timișoara to Lipo-
va; another one on the road back, this time of the presumed Bektashi’iyye Yagmur
Baba; a tekke with a mausoleum of Selim Dede, and the last one, of Mustafa Paşa.\textsuperscript{66}

Indeed, the Romanians in the lands occupied by Ottomans suffered from
poor religious instruction and had sorts of folk beliefs, and researchers have not
reached on a consensus regarding the reason. Some, like David Prodan, even if he
studied the neighbouring, but valid Transylvanian case, enumerates factors like
the abuses of noblemen in subjecting the serfs to increased field labour, the de-
cline of financial resources after the fall of Byzantium and the spread of reform
for education, and the degrading state of the Romanian priesthood, treated also
as serfs.\textsuperscript{67} Doru Radosav agrees with the latter statement, but does not provide
answers or arguments regarding Prodan’s point of view that these causes led to a
spiritual refuge in a local form of orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{68} Instead, he describes the impact of
the establishment of Ottoman administration and the Patriarchate of Ipec in 1557,
with the implementation of a tax for religious freedom for Catholics on Romani-
ans since some of them were Western Christian, and of the interactions between
Muslims and Eastern Christian Romanians during the pilgrimages at Partoș mon-
astery, at the grave of former Patriarch Josef II, called Josef the New from Partoș,
known for his miracles, even on Muslim Turks.\textsuperscript{69}

The absence of any reference regarding the Rifa’iyya tariqa in both eyalets
inhabited by Romanians and of any mentions concerning dervish establishments
in Varat leads us to the following conclusion. In the light of more researched topic
of the existence and dynamics of the order in Dobrudja, some more concrete in-

\textsuperscript{64} Feneşan, \textit{Cultura otomană}, p. 187. See also Magina, \textit{De la excludere la coabitare}, pp. 126-129, 140-145.
\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Călători străini}, VI, p. 499: “Mai sunt […] patru lăcașuri pentru derviși […]”
\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 508: “Pe drumul spre Timișoara e locul de pelerinaj al lui Yagmur Baba, care se
odihnește în propriul său lăcaș.” See also, Feneşan, \textit{Cultura otomană}, pp. 158-163, 165-166.
\textsuperscript{67} David Prodan, \textit{Supplex Libellus Valachorum. Din istoria formării națiunii române}, Bucharest:
39. For David Prodan’s theory, see Prodan, \textit{Supplex}, p. 128.
\textsuperscript{69} Radosav, \textit{Cultură și umanism}, pp. 40-41, 49.
formation about its missionary activities in the mentioned area and its vicinities are needed and also, about its core beliefs in the times of the Golden Horde. Apart from that, nothing is known about its archaeological mark at the Lower Danube region or about its probable reappearance after the Ottoman conquest in the early 15th century. Finally, the potential of a research of its presence and activity in the eyalets of Temesvar and Varat can be high, seeing that the religious context favoured the existence of tariqats, including the Rifa’iyya. We thus must find the physical evidence to support the hypothesis.
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în a doua jumătate a secolului al XVII-lea. Schimbările survenite în statutul poli-


Cristina Feneşan, Cultura otomană a vilayetului Timișoara (1552-1716), Timișoara: Editura de Vest 2004.


George Arnakis, “Futuwwa Traditions in the Ottoman Empire. Akhis,


1. Introduction

In 1430s, Ragusa (hereinafter: Republic of Dubrovnik) entered a conflict with Bosnian duke Radoslav Pavlović. Historiographically, this conflict became known as the War of Konavle (1430-1433). Its course is an example of how medieval intellectual and political frames surrounding a system of dependency that featured various jurisdiction levels were not set in stone\(^1\). Institutionally recognized balances of power co-existed with numerous and overlapping informal relationships within social and ideological context of the time. Thus, for instance, duke Radoslav was vassal to both king of Bosnia and Ottoman sultan\(^2\). Dubrovnik Republic recognized Croatian-Hungarian king as their sovereign since 1358. On the other hand, in times of crisis the conflicted parties used diplomacy to win over not only those who co-depended on them but also everybody they thought could speed up realisation of their pragmatic goals. Murat II (1421-1444; 1446-1451) was key arbitrator in the War of Konavle, which made the earlier attempts of the Town to delay an official diplomatic representation to the Sublime Porte untenable\(^3\).

\(^1\) Rumours about alliance between Sandalj, Radoslav Pavlović, and certain other Bosnian noblemen against the Bosnian king Tvrtko II recorded in March 1431 confirm this theory the best, National archive in Dubrovnik (hereinafter: DAD), Lettere di Levante (hereinafter: Lett. di Lev.), ser. 27/1, vol. XI, f. 21r, (10 Mar 1431).

\(^2\) The sultan was referred to as \textit{imperator Turcho} in sources from Dubrovnik. Although Turkey as a political and geographical entity exists only from the end of the World War I, Europeans called Ottomans as “Turks” in the Middle Ages. However, Ottoman government perceived the term “Turk” in a pejorative sense. See: Antun Nekić, “Europske predodžbe o “turskoj” prijetnji 14. – 16. stoljeća” [\textit{European perceptions of the Ottoman ‘threat’ between the fourteenth and the sixteenth centuries}], Povijesni prilozi, 43/43 (2012) p. 81-82.

2. Previous contacts

Although in historiographical literature Dubrovnik’s mission from 1430 is frequently referred to as the first official mission to the Porte, contacts between Ottoman Empire and Dubrovnik have a much longer history. I. Božić points out that perception of the Turks in the records of Dubrovnik’s Councils developed from *timor Turcorum* to *praticha cum Turchis*. Various information that circulated thanks to numerous merchants, pilgrims, war prisoners, spies, ambassadors, and foreigners who happened to be in the town contributed to their knowledge of each other. Therefore, the ambassadors in charge of this particular mission, Petar de Lucari and Đuro de Goçe, had certain expectations and images of what awaited them once they came to their destination. They received precious information from people from Dubrovnik who had already been at the Porte and information they received just before their journey were particularly important. As far as we know, these ambassadors were the first who were authorized to represent the Republic of Dubrovnik in front of the sultan, viziers, and other Ottoman noblemen and, therefore, their contribution to creation of Dubrovnik’s identity and forming an image of their host is particularly significant. They knew that it would be hard for them to fulfil their diplomatic mission without knowledge of diplomatic ceremony at the Porte, which, by the way, was not completely formed at the time. During their service, they faced choices that could potentially cost them their reputation, career, wealth and even life. On the other hand, their efforts contributed to development of the Ottoman society’s mental image in Dubrovnik.

3. Preparatory activities

After the government had adopted the proposal to send a mission, they also had to select the representatives and their entourage, decide on their salaries and fines they had to pay if they declined the mission without a valid reason. They also had to decide about the value of the presents for the hosts, set the departure date and deal with a number of other details. The Small Council and the Rector

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were in charge of purchasing presents\(^7\) and horses\(^8\), and drafting the instructions document\(^9\), which the Senate then revised and confirmed. It was an extensive task, which sometimes lasted for few days\(^10\). The authorities put in a lot of effort into preparatory activities, which resulted in the fact that more than a month had passed between the decision to send a mission to the Porte\(^11\) and the ambassadors’ actual departure from the town\(^12\).

Preparatory activities resulted in a number of decisions, which contained strong symbolic message about the balance of power between the both sides in the negotiations. The mission's ceremonial formula was a product of calculation, which considered the importance of the mission’s task and status and merits of the hosts to be relevant factors. The mission was quite a challenge for the town fathers, who were very concerned about how their decisions would be interpreted.

3.1. Election of Ambassadors

3.1.1. Political and social status

The government would entrust their diplomatic missions to those ambassadors they believed would complete the tasks successfully, based on their previous experiences in the diplomatic core, their political and social reputation and their familiarity with customs, languages, and history of the countries they were accredited to. It was rather difficult to find the candidates who were willing to take on missions that were difficult and hard to accomplish, required a lot of time and money, and took the candidates away from their everyday lives. That is why it might be surprising that the first attempt to select ambassadors who would go to the Porte was actually successful\(^13\). The mission was entrusted to noblemen Petar Mihov de Lucari (approx. 1379-1430)\(^14\) and Đuro Klementov de Goçe (approx. 1383-1462)\(^15\), who were elected by secret balloting (per scrutinium). Ambassadors

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12] The government had first decided that the ambassadors had to leave the town by September 11, or they would be fined one hundred perpers, Cons. Rog. vol. IV, f. 231v, (9 Sept 1430), but then they were given two additional days, Ibid, f. 232r, (11 Sept 1430).
were elected in the Grand Council by throwing fabric ballots (balle, balottae) in a bowl (bussolo, vaso, urna, pixis) with two compartments, red and green, which contained the votes “for” and “against”\textsuperscript{16}. Using this procedure, the voters did not choose one candidate to give their vote to, but decided if they were for or against every candidate separately. After the balloting, the results of the voting were determined. The results consisted of three figures in front of each candidate’s name: number of votes for, votes against, and the number of exempted voters, who were members of candidates’ families and therefore had to leave the Town Hall during voting\textsuperscript{17}. Petar’s results were 37/33/15 and Đuro’s 45/28/12. Newly elected ambassadors had until the following Friday to decide whether they wanted to take the position\textsuperscript{18}. Only when the candidates gave their affirmative answers, the electoral process was considered finalized. A salary of 300 perpers for the first three months of service, i.e. a fine as high as 800 perpers if they declined the service without providing a valid reason\textsuperscript{19}, went in favour of such an outcome\textsuperscript{20}. While considering their material gain in the service, the candidates could not have omitted their hosts’ awards\textsuperscript{21}. Islamic culture paid a lot of attention to exchanging presents, having in mind the principle of reciprocity while doing so\textsuperscript{22}. Furthermore, diplomatic service provided the opportunity of acquiring other public services, personal contacts and acquaintances, which were prerequisites for further political and social ascent of an individual. Finally, one of the reasons for accepting such position could have been social reputation the ambassadors had in public,


\textsuperscript{17} The Council attempted to prevent this by issuing a decision that banned the voters to appoint or vote for the person they were related to “Ordo attinentium non nominandorum seu elligendorum”, Branislav M. Nedeljković, Liber viridis, chapter CXLV, (30 Oct 1414), Zbornik za istoriju, jezik i književnost, book XXIII, Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti (hereinafter: SANU) 1984, p. 103.

\textsuperscript{18} Cons. Maius vol. IV, f. 98r (9 Aug 1430).


\textsuperscript{20} The Senate voted the fine of 600 perpers, Cons. Rag. vol. IV, f. 212r (8 Aug 1430) but the Grand Council raised it for additional 200 perpers, Cons. Maius vol. IV, f. 97v (9 Aug 1430).

\textsuperscript{21} A concise provision from 1439 and a strict regulation from 1467 forbade ambassadors to keep the presents, except for food products, Nela Lonza, Kazalište vlasti, ceremonijal i državni blagdani Dubrovačke Republike u 17. i 18. stoljeću, Zagreb-Dubrovnik: Zavod za povijesne znanosti Hrvatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti (hereinafter: HAZU) u Dubrovniku 2009, p. 218.

\textsuperscript{22} In that sense, a literary genre called Kitāb al-Hadāya was developed for the sole purpose of presenting the practice of exchanging gifts, Emire C. Muslu, „Ottoman-Mamluk relations: Diplomacy and Perceptions“, unpublished doctoral thesis, Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts; 2007, p. 184.
especially if they were successful\textsuperscript{23}.

Candidacy and election procedures were based on well-thought proposals and, in theory, guaranteed the election of the most suited candidate. Motives hidden behind the trust the councillors gave to selected ambassadors can partially be explained by the ambassadors’ political position at the time of the elections. Archival records give us an opportunity to follow the courses of their careers. It is enough to mention that, by the year 1430, both elected ambassadors had already performed the most respectable public duty – that of the Rector of Dubrovnik\textsuperscript{24} [knez, t/n] – more than once. If we compare the age of the ambassadors, we can determine that there was no significant age difference between them and that, at the time of the election, they were both in their middle ages. Although Petar was younger, he had more experience as an ambassador and therefore this example presents an exception to the rule that a young diplomat should learn secrets of diplomacy from an older and more experienced colleague ambassador\textsuperscript{25}. Previously, he was a diplomat in the courts of Bosnia\textsuperscript{26} and Croatian-Hungarian\textsuperscript{27} kings. He was sent on a mission in Bosnia to duke Sandalj Hranić in 1420\textsuperscript{28}, while in 1423\textsuperscript{29} and 1429 he stayed with Duke Radoslav Pavlović\textsuperscript{30}. He had diplomatic experience in resolving conflict situations that preceded an open conflict with duke Radoslav in 1427\textsuperscript{31} and 1429\textsuperscript{32}. Moreover, Petar’s great-grandfather Marko, his grandfather Nikola, father Miho, and uncle Stjepan were also diplomats, who served for many years, especially in the Serbian royal court, where they had acquired very powerful contacts, but also in Bosnia and Hungary. Their reputation might have contributed to choosing Petar as an ideal candidate for this service\textsuperscript{33}. On the

\textsuperscript{23} It is obvious that they were quite popular, which is why poets celebrated them in their works, Zdenka Janeković-Römer, “O poslaničkoj službi i diplomatskom protokolu Dubrovačke Republike u 15. stoljeću”, Zbornik diplomatske akademije, No. 2, Zagreb: Diplomatska akademija Ministarstva vanjskih poslova Republike Hrvatske 1999, p. 197.

\textsuperscript{24} Petar de Lucari was the Rector of Dubrovnik in 1424, 1426 and 1428, Cons. Maius vol. III, f. 21v (28 Jun 1424); Ibid, f. 124v (24 Aug 1426), f. 222v (28 Sep 1428) and Duro de Goče in 1426 and 1429, Ibid, f. 134r (27 Nov 1426); Ibid vol. IV, f. 57v (28 Nov 1429).

\textsuperscript{25} Such practice was, for instance, customary in Florence at the end of the 15\textsuperscript{th} century, Richard C. Trexler, Public Life in Renaissance Florence, New York: Cornell University Press 1991, p. 292.

\textsuperscript{26} Cons. Maius vol. I, f. 149v (20 Apr 1419).

\textsuperscript{27} Cons. Rog. vol. IV, f. 142r (5 Apr 1430).

\textsuperscript{28} Cons. Maius vol. II, f. 22v (12 Jan 1420).

\textsuperscript{29} Lett. di Lev. vol. IX, ff. 7rv (13 Jul 1423).

\textsuperscript{30} Cons. Maius vol. IV, f. 54r (24 Oct 1429).

\textsuperscript{31} Lett. di Lev. vol. X, f. 2v (4 Jan 1427).

\textsuperscript{32} Cons. Rog. vol. IV, ff. 122v-123r (21 Oct 1429).

\textsuperscript{33} Nenad Vekarić, Vlastela grada Dubrovnika, 2. Vlasteoski rodovi (A-L), Zagreb-Dubrovnik:
other hand, Đuro de Goće had less diplomatic experience than his colleague. He acquired his experience indirectly, by drafting instructions for ambassadors in the Small Council\textsuperscript{34}. Besides, in 1429 he was elected Chief Ambassador to duke Sandalj\textsuperscript{35}. Although he was not very experienced, he inherited good preconditions for development and advancement in diplomatic service from his great-grandfather Klement, whose diplomatic skills enabled Dubrovnik’s expansion to Pelješac peninsula\textsuperscript{36}, and his grandfather Marin, who played a key role during the 1358 negotiations regarding Dubrovnik’s entrance in the \textit{Archiregnum Hungaricum}. Apart from the aforementioned, they performed a number of important diplomatic missions for their town, in which Đuro’s father Klement also participated\textsuperscript{37}.

In electing these ambassadors, members of the Council probably relied on successful collaboration that Goće and Lucari had had for many years. It is known that Petar’s grandfather Nikola and Đuro’s great-grandfather Klement joined forces to enable the expansion of Dubrovnik’s territory to Pelješac peninsula in 1333, negotiating with Serbian king Stefan Uroš IV Dušan. Connection between the two families was not only diplomatic but also business. Thus, for instance, Petar’s grandfather Nikola cooperated with Đuro’s grandfather Marin, who ran a customs office in Rudnik\textsuperscript{38}. In 1343, they expanded their joint venture to trading with Serbian king’s salt in Dubrovnik\textsuperscript{39}. After Klement’s death, his son Marin, Đuro’s grandfather, and his brothers took over the business that encompassed most of the customs in Serbia. Traditionally good connections between the two families created solid preconditions for further successful cooperation of the ambassador duo at the Porte.

Powerful symbolic capital the ambassadors had inherited and confirmed with their own efforts, secured them a position recognized beyond Dubrovnik’s town limits. Their reputation, connections, and acquaintances they either acquired by themselves or could refer to, were a solid foundation to build their mission’s success on. Therefore not even certain crimes they had committed could jeopardize their election\textsuperscript{40}. At the same time, their election was a symbol that reflected


\textsuperscript{34} Cons. Minus vol. IV, f. 116r (2 Nov 1427); \textit{Ibid}, f. 173r (1 Jul 1428); \textit{Ibid}, f. 175r (12 Jul 1428).

\textsuperscript{35} Cons. Maius vol. IV, f. 29v (1 Apr 1429).


\textsuperscript{38} Nenad Vekarić, \textit{Vlastela grada Dubrovnika}, II, p. 319.

\textsuperscript{39} Irmgard Manhken, \textit{Dubrovački patricijat}, I, pp. 239-240.

\textsuperscript{40} In 1410, Petar de Lucari ran away with a significant amount of money that belonged to Venetian traders: Šime Ljubić, \textit{O odnošajih medju Dubrovčani i Mletčani za ugar.-hrv. vladanja u Dubrovniku}, book 17, Zagreb: Rad Jugoslavenske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti.
the importance of a person on a diplomatic mission. All of the above leads to the conclusion that the elections for Dubrovnik’s ambassadors, who were to represent and advocate their Republic’s vital interests at the Sublime Porte, was not at all random, but an optimal choice within given circumstances.

3.1.2. Qualities, knowledge, and skills
In choosing the best candidates for diplomatic service, the authorities wanted them to possess certain qualities, loyalty in particular. Preferably, the candidates would have known the language and traditions of the country they were going to be sent to, which created preconditions for accurate and unambiguous transfer of messages from their instructions. Ambassadors who had already lived in the country they were assigned to could hope to complete their missions more easily since they had already built their contact networks and even shared experiences and interests with the person whose palace they had stayed in.

Instructions Dubrovnik authorities gave their ambassadors reveal a wide spectrum of virtues they had to possess. The authorities expected them to be wise, hardworking, cautious, curious, prudent, persistent, convincing, and have their homeland’s well-being on their minds at all times. Even the Statute proscribed serious sanctions for those who went against the text of instructions or failed to complete their tasks without a valid excuse. Before leaving the town, the ambassadors solemnly swore not to let anything or anybody, including them, jeopardize the course and outcome of their mission. To disrespect the Senate’s
orders and arbitrary actions would mean facing a number of consequences, from warning and reprimand, fine and cancelling of salary, to litigation, which sometimes resulted in the loss of right to perform public services and even banishment from the country\textsuperscript{50}. In that sense, although Petar de Lucari and Đuro de Goçe had already received permission to come back home\textsuperscript{51} and made it within easy reach of the town\textsuperscript{52}, they could not influence the authorities’ decision that one of them should return back to the Porte and start another round of negotiations\textsuperscript{53}.

If we compare ambassadors’ salaries during the first and the second phase of their mission, we can see that it was identical and amounted to 100 perpers a month\textsuperscript{54}. What catches the eye is the amount of the fine, which was 200 perpers more, i.e. the ambassador who was given a mission was to pay as much as 1000 perpers if he declined it without a valid reason\textsuperscript{55}. This kind of obedience required personal sacrifice and, in that sense, Petar de Lucari gave up his most valuable possession – his life. During the second phase of his mission, he fell ill in Hadrianopolis\textsuperscript{56}. From his correspondence with the town’s government, we can see he received medical help after which his state improved significantly\textsuperscript{57}. However, the symptoms

\textsuperscript{50} Statut grada Dubrovnika, book VIII, Chapter 48 “De pena illorum qui faciunt contra commissiones”, pp. 450, 452.  
\textsuperscript{51} Lett. di Lev. vol. XI, f. 30r (7 Jul 1431).  
\textsuperscript{52} Lett. di Lev. vol. XI, f. 31r (21 Jul 1431).  
\textsuperscript{53} Cons. Rog. vol. V, f. 23v (22 Jul 1431) They were given the freedom to decide among themselves d’acordio or per forte who that was going to be, Lett. di Lev. vol. XI, f. 48r (23 Jul 1431). Perhaps Petar de Lucari took on the task because he was younger than Đuro de Goçe but, as it turned out, such calculation was not necessarily proof of his greater physical fitness. The Senate released Đuro of his duty 26\textsuperscript{th} of Jul 1431, Cons. Rog. vol. V, f. 28v.  
\textsuperscript{54} Petar de Lucari got 200 perpers for the first two months of his service, Cons. Rog. vol. V, f. 23v, (21 Jul 1431)  
\textsuperscript{56} It is hard to determine how a long and exhausting journey and living conditions in the Ottoman capital contributed to that. We know that he was allowed to spend up to eight perpers a day, Cons. Rog. vol. V, f. 24r (21 Jul 1431), with recommendation from the government to keep the sum even less if possible, Lett. di Lev. vol. XI, f. 49r (23 Jul 1431). In comparison, during their first mission him and Đuro de Goçe were allowed to spend 12 perpers a day to cover their daily expenses, Cons. Rog. vol. IV, f. 212r (8 Aug 1430); Cons. Maius vol. IV, f. 97v (9 Aug 1430). The government sometimes failed to calculate costs of a mission correctly. For instance, when Nikola de Zivolin returned to town, he requested additional 170 perpers. He explained that he had spent that sum from his private resources to pay services of two couriers, Cons. Rog. vol. IV, f. 273v (21 Feb 1431). Although there was a motion that he should be paid only 100 perpers, it was not voted and the government refunded him the whole sum, Ibid, f. 279r (13 Mar 1431).  
\textsuperscript{57} Lett. di Lev. vol. XI, f. 54v (5 Oct 1431).
returned in a while and got worse rapidly, which finally resulted in his death.

The ambassadors’ appearance was a powerful weapon used for achieving important foreign policy goals. The government never underestimated the power of words and always encouraged their ambassadors to use well-chosen phrases to support their acts whenever they saw fit and justified. Occasionally, the ambassadors used various rhetorical speech figures to leave a greater impact on their listeners. Under the influence of predominantly humanistic culture, the ambassadors became skilled manipulators of words, which they used to provoke emotional reactions and create favourable atmosphere that contributed to positive outcome of negotiations. They had to possess the skill of psychological penetration. They aimed to create friendly environment using the verbal segment of their appearance and, at the same time, they knew when to use it, since it was usually an introduction to presentation of their opinions or requests.

Verbal arguments used for obtaining certain privileges revealed both the ambassadors’ beliefs and the value system of their culture. The ambassadors’ referral to tradition of Epidaurus, which gave Dubrovnik the right to claim Konavle as part of their legacy, met with no response at the Porte. Leaving aside the issue of historical truthfulness of that argument, we can conclude that it had enabled Dubrovnik’s territorial expansion and that numerous transformations it underwent during time made it even more persuasive and permanent. On this occasion, it is more important to point out that the system of values behind this concept did not have to be accepted as “true” in other cultures. Primarily, these values played an important role in promoting the ideology Dubrovnik’s government had formed in accordance with their own practical needs. Repetition of their argument,

58] Lett. di Lev. vol. XI, f. 35v (without date).
61] On one occasion Petar de Lucari says: “... ever since I’ve been carrying my head on my shoulders” as guarantee that his statements are true, Lett. di Lev. vol. XI, f. 49v (28 Jul 1431).
62] For instance, the ambassadors did not miss the occasion to congratulate Ishak-bey on his newest victory against John Castriot, which they used as an introduction to their specific requests, Lett. di Lev. vol. X, f. 210v (13 Sept 1430).
even in front of Louis I of Anjou and Sigismund of Luxembourg\textsuperscript{65}, resulted in an overlap of personal and social knowledge and it became the only possible and correct concept within their specific social group. In the end, it remained a part of a narrow social mentality and, as such, not recognized outside its boundaries. The use of this concept reveals Dubrovnik ambassadors’ insufficient knowledge of the values at the Porte. Ambassadors were unable to use certain other verbal arguments permanently featured in Dubrovnik’s diplomacy because of real cultural obstacles at the Porte. For instance, they were accustomed to appeal to friendly relations between the town and the family of the person whose court they were sent to, which they used to cultivate further friendly relations\textsuperscript{66}. Even if conditions to actualize this approach to the Porte had been created, it would remain unrecognized since Muslim societies favoured individual competences over one’s social background. On the other hand, the ambassadors’ referral to current friendly relations between Murat II and their sovereign was a wise choice, since the Ottomans cared very much about the current balance of power\textsuperscript{67}. Murat II informed Mamluk sultan Al-Ashraf Bars-bay (1423-1438) that he had signed a three-year treaty, which he initially was not willing to sign in spite of Croatian-Hungarian king’s pleas. In 1428, he gave in since both countries were exhausted from the war and unable to trade their goods. The letter is written in a humble tone and leaves an impression that Murat wanted to justify his decision in front of a Muslim ruler of a higher rank\textsuperscript{68}, especially because ever since the times of the prophet Mohammad both sultans were obliged to fight against non-Muslim countries\textsuperscript{69}. Similarly, the ambassadors would adapt the narrative part of their appearance to correspond with their listeners’ reputation and position within government hierarchy. For instance, they would make changes to a speech prepared for Murat II to correspond to his viziers’ position if the sultan was not there to hear it\textsuperscript{70}.

To people of Dubrovnik it was very important how others perceived them. Therefore, bearing in mind their growing foreign policy self-consciousness, they were concerned with various aspects of their ambassadors’ appearances, since it


\textsuperscript{66} Lett. di Lev. vol. VIII, f. 130r (1422, without date); Ibid vol. XI, ff. 63v-64v (25 Nov 1431).

\textsuperscript{67} Lett. di Lev. vol. X, f. 211v (13 Sept 1430).

\textsuperscript{68} At that time the Mamluks, being heirs of the Abbasid Caliphate and rulers of Egypt and Syria, became leading protectors of Islam against Crusaders and Mongols (especially after they had stopped their progress at Ain Jalut in 1260).

\textsuperscript{69} Emire C. Muslu, Ottoman-Mamluk relations, p. 119.

\textsuperscript{70} Lett di Lev. vol. XI, f. 48v (23 Jul 1431).
contributed to building the Republic’s image. Verbal part of their appearance was especially important since it carried messages about the identity of the subject the ambassadors represented to the extent that they could identify themselves with it, i.e. be perceived as its counterpart. This was particularly important at the time Dubrovnik and the Ottoman Empire began creating certain opinions of one another but there was still space in their relationship’s “collective memory” to fulfil. On several occasions, the ambassadors defined their town’s political status as a republic that recognized sovereignty of Croatian-Hungarian king71. They have described the land they came from as infertile (petrosi e sterile cum puochissimo frutto)72 and peaceful73, and its people as kind, quiet, and hardworking merchants with wide trading connections from Babel, Damascus, and Alexandria in the east, over Albania, Bosnia, Slavonia, and Italy and France in the west74. Using wisely chosen words, the ambassadors sent messages regarding Dubrovnik’s social, political, and economic status, which contributed to definition and development of relations between Dubrovnik and the Ottoman Empire75.

3.1.3. Social network

Whenever they saw an opportunity, Dubrovnik’s government requested help, advice, and recommendations from anyone that had influence, connections and knowledge which could contribute to their mission at the Porte. Duke Sandalj, who cultivated good neighbourly relations with Dubrovnik for almost his entire life, particularly contributed to the aforementioned. He had rich personal experience in dealing with the Ottomans, which Dubrovnik’s government did not fail to use76. Through an ambassador that stayed at his court, he advised the government in Dubrovnik to send ambassadors to the Porte, for which they thanked

71 Lett. di Lev. vol. X, ff. 208v; 211v; 213r (13 Sept 1430).
73 Lett di Lev. vol. XI, f. 17v (22 Feb 1431).
74 Lett di Lev. vol. X, ff. 211v-212r (13 Sept 1430).
75 Thanks to its favourable geographical position at the border between the East and the West, Dubrovnik was an intersection of information that reached the town via its merchants, ambassadors, and other citizens, along with the foreigners who resided in their town temporarily or permanently. The authorities communicated certain information to the Ottomans and, as result, faced accusations from other Christian countries, especially Venice. See: Lovro Kunčević, „The Rhetoric of the Frontier of Christendom in the Diplomacy of Renaissance Ragusa (Dubrovnik)“, Dubrovnik Annals, 17 (2013), p. 38.
76 The duke made first military contact with the Ottomans as early as the end of the 14th century. He had been a vassal perhaps even since 1415, and definitely since 1418. For further reading see: Esad Kurtović, Veliki vojvoda bosanski Sandalj Hranić Kosača [Sandalj Hranić Kosača – great duke of Bosnia], Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju 2009, pp. 211-212.
him and called him their intimate friend. His incentive resulted in a number of well-thought decisions regarding diplomatic missions. It appears the councillors had had certain dilemmas since they decided to ask his advice. He even helped with the ambassadors’ journey. Namely, immediately after they had left the town, Petar de Lucari and Đuro de Goče headed towards Sandalj’s court, where they were to be joined by one of his own ambassadors as part of their entourage. Their superiors from Dubrovnik wanted their escort to be pratico a costumi e modi se observano alla porta del imperator Turcho. During their visit to the duke, the ambassadors requested his written recommendation to refer to during their audience with Ishak-bey, duke of Skopje, which was their next destination. Since 1398, Dubrovnik had cultivated contacts with his predecessor, Jigit-bey (in Dubrovnik known as Pašait), who became Ottoman regent in Skopje after Vuk Branković lost his control over the town in 1392. V. Foretić even refers to them as “friends” since the bey forgave their third share of the customs and guaranteed that anyone who bothered them should be beheaded, whether he was Turkish or Serbian.

Apart from duke Sandalj, Dubrovnik’s traders from Novo Brdo and Prishtina were also key-supporters of diplomatic activities. Tying diplomatic and trading activities in order to achieve foreign-policy goals was usual in medieval Dubrovnik. What interests us on this occasion is the case of a merchant from Novo Brdo, Nikola de Zivolin, who in June of 1430 was instructed to appear at the Porte with Stjepan de Bichelli, an ambassador of Croatian-Hungarian king. De Lucari and de Goče continued his work, and this cooperation, in the autumn of the same year. Furthermore, this example is interesting since it was not customary for Dubrovnik to involve merchants in important diplomatic tasks. On the other hand, the government recognized successful symbiosis of diplomats and merchants, which allowed them to achieve vital goals of the Republic. The merchants had the competence and skills acquired during their long-time presence in Ottoman countries that could contribute to diplomatic missions, while the ambassadors worked on ensuring better conditions for merchants using diplomacy. This

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80 This is something the ambassadors did gladly, whenever they saw an opportunity, Lett. di Lev. vol. X, f. 210v (13 Sept 1430); Ibid vol. XI, f. 49v (28 Jul 1431).
81 Vinko Foretić, Povijest Dubrovnika, I, p. 184.
84 It is possible that certain merchants knew Turkish language and used their knowledge to assist the ambassadors in their work. Whether de Lucari and de Goče knew the official language of
practice can be confirmed by the example of a meeting De Lucari and de Goçe held with Dubrovnik's merchants in Prishtina, where they agreed to have one of them, *homo expert e praticho*, join their audience with Ishak-bey, who, among other, the ambassadors asked for a written document that ensured free movement for merchants. This request was particularly important in the context of the bey’s recent successful military operation in Albania, after which Murat II awarded him with rule over a part of the conquered territory. Apart from the merchants, De Lucari and de Goçe relied also on other ambassadors in the Ottoman capital. Of course, Sandalj’s ambassador, with whom they had *bona e domestica conversacion*, had an important role as well as their sovereign's ambassador, whom they even offered a pay of 200 ducats to prolong his stay at the Porte. They also managed to connect successfully with certain influential people in the Ottoman Court. For instance, they informed their government that they had secretly met with the Grand Vizier Mehmed Nizamüddin-pasha (1429-1438), who promised them to support their goals.

3.2. Entourage

Dubrovnik's government individualized all their missions and determined their scope according to their estimate of the missions’ appropriateness and successfulness. Their decisions concerning the number of representatives are very significant. People in the representation were voted for taking into consideration their position and importance of the person they were to be sent to, state of the treasury, and assessment of successfulness in achieving their goals. In addition, in deciding about the number of representatives, the authorities considered a number of practical details, such as length and conditions of the journey, which were influenced by the terrain, seasons, weigh of their cargo, along with political and medical circumstances in the area. Ambassadors selected as entourage were given

Ottoman administration still remains unknown. It seems rather that they used the services of a dragoman, *Lett. di Lev. vol. XI, f. 58r (2 Dec 1431).* It is interesting that Murat II gave them the privilege to trade freely written “in sclauo”, which was delivered to the government in February 1431, *Ibid, f. 17r (22 Feb 1431).* Correspondence between Dubrovnik authorities and duke Pašaše was also in Slavic language and Cyrillic script, Ljubo Stojanović, *Stare srpske povelje i pisma*, vol. I/2, Beograd-Sremski Karlovci: Srpska kraljevska akademija nauka i umetnosti (hereinafter: SKA) 1934, p. 219.

86] *Lett. di Lev. vol. XI, f. 11r (22 Nov 1430).*
88] *Lett. di Lev. vol. XI, f. 18r (22 Feb 1431).* Motives behind his promises are another story. Possible interpretations are offered in the chapter about presents Dubrovnik’s ambassadors gave to their hosts.
10 servants on horses and 16 horses\textsuperscript{89}, while Petar de Lucari, in the second phase of the mission, had six horsemen and 10 horses\textsuperscript{90}. This decision not only corresponded with the real needs of the mission but also sent message that this mission was somewhat less significant. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that de Lucari was not entrusted with important diplomatic tasks\textsuperscript{91}. As far as the entourage's salary is concerned, their pay was the same in both phases of the mission and amounted to four perpers a month\textsuperscript{92}.

Since our sources are silent, we were not able to answer the question who the people selected for the ambassadors' entourage were or analyze their previous engagements, which would surely contribute to understanding the motives behind their selection. Only one servant, Gojislav Boljević (Goissauo Boglieuich), is mentioned by name because the authorities sent him 20 perpers\textsuperscript{93}. This leads to the conclusion that Slavs from Dubrovnik's hinterland were selected for entourage and that the sum was the pay for transfer of information between the government and the ambassadors. Namely, there was no permanent courier service in Dubrovnik but courier services were contracted when needed. The amount agreed upon was usually paid in two instalments – first portion in advance and the rest after the courier had returned\textsuperscript{94}. During the mission of de Lucari and de Goçe, a number of people were hired to transport their correspondence. Among them, certain professional couriers, whose services were usually used as far as Prishtina or Novo Brdo, were mentioned. There they would meet with merchants of Dubrovnik, who would see to it that the message was quickly sent to Dubrovnik via a \textit{good messenger}\textsuperscript{95}. In addition, sometimes they would send their servants on horses to deliver the messages\textsuperscript{96}. On one occasion, the ambassadors informed the

\textsuperscript{89} Cons. Rog. vol. IV, f. 211v (8 Aug 1430); Cons. Maius vol. IV, f. 97r (9 Aug 1430).

\textsuperscript{90} Cons. Rog. vol. V, f. 23v (21 Jul 1431).

\textsuperscript{91} Although the ambassadors at the Porte managed to double the town's area in May 1431, the Ottoman ambassador who was supposed to ensure peaceful implementation of Dubrovnik's rule over the acquired territories, returned to the Porte without completing his task. Petar's new mission in the Ottoman capital was to ensure practical implementation of that decision. For further reading see: Ćiro Truhelka, „Konavoski rat“, pp. 191-194.

\textsuperscript{92} Cons. Rog. vol. IV, f. 212r (8 Aug 1430); Ibid vol. V, f. 23v (21 Jul 1431).

\textsuperscript{93} Lett. di Lev. vol. XI, f. 19v (22 Feb 1431). In comparison, average pay of couriers sent from Dubrovnik to Constantinople in the first half of the 14\textsuperscript{th} century was 26 perpers: Bariša Krekić, “Courier Traffic between Dubrovnik, Constantinople and Thessalonika in the First Half of the Fourteenth Century”, Dubrovnik, \textit{Italy and the Balkans in the Late Middle Ages}, XI, London: Variorum reprints 1980, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{94} Vladimir Čaladarević, “Srednjovjekovni Dubrovnik – značajan centar obavještajne službe”, \textit{Narodna milicija}, 7-8 (1958), p. 82.

\textsuperscript{95} Lett. di Lev. vol. X, f. 215r (13 Sept 1430); Ibid vol. XI, f. 50r (28 Jul 1431).

\textsuperscript{96} Lett. di Lev. vol. XI, f. 10v (22 Nov 1430); Ibid, f. 17r (22 Feb 1431); Ibid, f. 48r (23 Jul 1431).
government that they had sent their report via despot’s ambassador Bezubića. The greatest problem in exchanging correspondence was the physical distance between the ambassadors and their hometown. According to archival sources, it would take between 15 and 29 days to deliver the reports from ambassadors in Hadrianopolis to Dubrovnik. The couriers’ speed depended on the importance of information they carried. If the information were particularly important, they would travel day and night to deliver them as soon as possible. Correspondence was very difficult during plague epidemics. Stealing messages was not rare during wartimes and the authorities were afraid that the ambassadors’ reports could be stolen in the areas around Novo Brdo, Prishtina or Trepče, which is why they advised their ambassadors to find a reliable man who would deliver the reports to the town at their expense. The question of safe delivery also interested the ambassadors themselves since they sent a letter to the government asking how they should approach certain issues. The government replied that they had already received an answer to that. Although the government used to discuss the text of instructions by carefully searching for best possible solutions, which sometimes prolonged sending of new instructions, during this mission their answer was prompt. There was only one occasion on which the government had sent instructions five days upon receiving a report, which is the longest recorded number of days it took them to write instructions.

3.3. Present, bribe, or future taxes

One of the most coherent parts of the diplomatic protocol was measuring tokens of appreciation and value of presents the ambassadors took with them from Dubrovnik. Presents were supposed to create an atmosphere of trust, satisfaction, and affection, facilitate negotiations, and enable realization of mission objectives. The ambassadors delivered the presents in person. Presents were, in fact, carefully wrapped diplomatic messages, which their recipients could interpret in various ways, and therefore it is not surprising that the government was careful...
and sometimes indecisive about who to present with what and what the value of
the presents should be\textsuperscript{105}. If a present was too modest, it could offend the recipi-
ent. If it was too abundant, it could become an unnecessary burden. Moreover,
the questions that bothered the government were should the ambassadors deliver
the presents privately or publicly, all in one go or over a period of time, to the sultan
personally or the person representing him if he was absent. The ambassadors did not
have clear instructions regarding the ceremony of handing presents so they had to
act according to their own judgement after consulting with the viziers\textsuperscript{106}.

There were various forms of bribe, according to the rank of the person to
bribe. The government carefully kept track of type and value of the presents. Be-
fore our ambassadors left the town, the Small Council selected the noblemen in
charge of acquiring presents\textsuperscript{107}. They bought the presents in Dubrovnik and Ven-
ic\textsuperscript{108}. In the first version of the list of presents, the presents were distributed into
categories. In the final list, the presents were distributed into six categories
with names of recipients added according to their rank in the Ottoman govern-
ment, from higher to lower ranks: 1 - the Sultan, 2 - the Grand Vizier, 3 - the three
viziers, 4 - the Grand Chancellor and two commanders of the court guard, 5 - oth-
er officials who participated in the audience or otherwise came in touch with the
ambassadors during their mission, 6 - Isa-bey. When we compare the first and the
second version of the present list, it is obvious that the value of certain presents
increased. Although Dubrovnik’s government did not flaunt gifts, they knew that
presents could influence the course of negotiations\textsuperscript{109}.

Dubrovnik’s government presented Murat II with a number of luxurious
gifts, but not money. His present consisted of one piece of red (crimson) velvet
atlas fabric and one piece of yellow velvet atlas fabric, 1,000 fine chivalrous
and the same number of ermine skins, along with some silver dishes (two platters
and two chalices, weighing 20 marks\textsuperscript{110} together, and two plates, each weighing

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}
1⅔ litres\(^{111}\). The ambassadors presented the Grand Vizier also with dishes (a goblet weighing four marks and a plate weighing 1⅔ litres) and 300 golden ducats. Presents for the three viziers were the same as for the Grand Vizier but with 100 golden ducats less. The following group of present recipients consisted of the Great Chancellor Đurađ, Sagi-bey, and Murat-bey, who got presents that were more modest (a plate of 1½ litres and 50 ducats each). All the plates were gilded. The ambassadors also took 100 ducats, which they divided among dignitaries and officials with whom they met at the Porte. They presented Isa-bey and his sons with 4 pieces of fabric worth 70 ducats and 4 gilded plates. In the first instructions document, all objects to be presented were recorded: 6 chalices, 2 plates, 13 platters, 4 pieces of fabric, and 2,000 ducats. The ambassadors used 850 ducats that were left after all the presents had been delivered to cover their personal expenses, expenses for issuing privileges, and correspondence with Sigismund’s ambassador\(^{113}\). Presents for the hosts are only one among many items in total expenses of the mission. The ambassadors had permission to promise certain sums of money to certain people and on certain occasions they thought called for it (abiate liberta de promettere de piu...doue e come vi parera fina a ducati 5\(^{40}\))\(^{114}\).

During the second phase of Petar de Lucari’s mission, the government was more decisive regarding the choice of presents. The comparison of recipients, type and value of presents voted in August 1430 and July 1431 is quite interesting. There were changes regarding the recipients, who were divided into four groups: 1 – the Sultan, 2 – the Grand Vizier and other viziers, 3 – Rumelian pasa, 4 – commander of the court guard and other dignitaries. There were also changes regarding the types and value of the presents. The value was less than in 1430. The same as the former year, the Sultan got two chalices and two silver plates of unknown weigh, along with 4 silver dishes and three luxurious robes made of 250 different skins. The Grand Vizier Mehmed-bey and two other viziers, Calul-bey and Sargi-pasa, got equal presents, which included two gilded silver plates, one kavec\(^{115}\) of scarlet fabric, one robe made of 250 different skins and 50 golden ducats. Petar de Lucari gave the Rumelian pasa four gilded silver plates, and commander of the

\(^{111}\) Dubrovnik’s measurement for silver was \textit{litra tanka} [thin litre, t/n], which amounted to 301.23 grams, Milan Rešetar, \textit{Dubrovačka numizmatika}, 1, Beograd: SKA 1924, p. 83.

\(^{112}\) See: Table-2 \textit{First and second version of the list of presents for the mission of Petar de Lucari and Đuro de Goče}.


\(^{114}\) \textit{Lett. di Lev.} vol. XI, f. 18v (22 Feb 1431).

\(^{115}\) 1 \textit{kavec} = 11-12 \textit{lakats}, which is approximately 6-6.6 metres, Vesna Miović, \textit{Dubrovačka diplomacija}, p. 51
guard and other dignitaries 120 golden ducats\textsuperscript{116}. The Senate decided that the total value of presents must not exceed 800 ducats\textsuperscript{117}. Ratio of the value of presents and the money he was entrusted with was 2:1, but 75\% of the money he got went to the present for the Ottoman ambassador\textsuperscript{118}. It seems that Dubrovnik’s government did not intend to spend any more than that since they gave de Lucari permission to come back home if he ran out of money\textsuperscript{119}.

4. Itinerary
Petar de Lucari and Đuro de Goće began their travel by land, which was considered safer than sailing. Days became shorter in the middle of September, and conditions at sea were not as favourable as in the spring or summer. The ambassadors rode, which was uncomfortable and exhausting, and had to walk certain parts of the way\textsuperscript{120}. In their first instructions document, the government pointed out that the journey ahead of them was to be highly uncertain and that they should choose the routes that would take them to their destination and back home safely\textsuperscript{121}. Indeed, the ambassadors were heading towards numerous potential troubles, plague epidemics, inhospitable terrain, uncomfortable lodgings, and robbers on their way. The government could not help them very much and sometimes did not even know their current position\textsuperscript{122}. Still, they saw to it that some merchants from Dubrovnik, an ambassador of duke Sandalj, and a Turkish ambassador joined them on their journey and thus made it more comfortable.

After they had left the town, the ambassadors headed to meet with duke Sandalj\textsuperscript{123}, who was probably in Nevesinje at the time\textsuperscript{124}. Afterwards, they were instructed to meet with his and Turkish ambassadors in Brijesnica or Prijepolje, or, if they did not find them there, to meet up with them in Prishtina, where they

\textsuperscript{116} See: Table-4 List of present for Petar de Lucari’s mission, Lett. di Lev. vol. XI, ff. 50rv (28 Jul 1431).

\textsuperscript{117} Cons. Rog. vol. V, f. 25v (22 Jul 1431).

\textsuperscript{118} Ali-bey was supposed to receive 300 ducats if he joined him on the journey, and the rest was intended to cover his salary, his entourage’s salary and daily expenses. He was obliged to return all the excess money. Lett. di Lev. vol. XI, f. 49r (23 Jun 1431).

\textsuperscript{119} Lett. di Lev. vol. XI, f. 31v (21 Jul 1431).

\textsuperscript{120} For further reading see: Vesna Miović, Dubrovačka diplomacija, pp. 40-41.

\textsuperscript{121} Lett. di Lev. vol. X, f. 208v, 211r (13 Sept 1430).

\textsuperscript{122} Lett. di Lev. vol. XI, f. 30r (7 Jul 1431); Ibid, f. 48r (23 Jul 1431).

\textsuperscript{123} Lett. di Lev. vol. X, f. 209 (13 Sept 1430).

\textsuperscript{124} Valentina Zovko, “Metode i tehnike komunikacije između vlasti i poslanika u pregovorima oko proširenju dubrovačkih granica”, Analı Zavoda za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Dubrovniku, LII/1, Zagreb-Dubrovnik, 2014, pp. 46-47.
probably arrived via Novi Pazar\textsuperscript{125}. Petar de Lucari and Đuro de Goče sent their first report to the government from Lipjane, where they arrived on October 4\textsuperscript{126}, and they confirmed they had arrived in Skopje five days later\textsuperscript{127}. The government replied that from Skopje they should choose the route they heard was \textit{piu destra e sicura al saluamento vostro}\textsuperscript{128}. This goes to show that being well informed was crucial for their safe journey. We can assume that they listened to the advice and took the shortest route that went through Skopje, Kumanovo, Kjustendil, Dupnica, Samokov, Tatar-Pazardžik, and Plovdiv. However, there are no preserved written documents that confirm this assumption. They reported from Plovdiv on October 22, and arrived in Hadrianopolis on December 9\textsuperscript{129}. Petar de Lucari and Đuro de Goče’s journey from Dubrovnik to the Ottoman capital lasted 87 days. Length of the journey depended mostly on the tasks the ambassadors had to complete while travelling. Since this mission was circular, it automatically meant that the journey to their destination would last longer.

The first mention of their journey home can be found in the instructions document dated February 22, 1431\textsuperscript{130}. The ambassadors reported they would postpone the journey for a while because of a Muslim holiday Bayram, which quite amazed the government\textsuperscript{131}. They reported from Prishtina not sooner than June 26, 1431, a day before they left it for home\textsuperscript{132}. They wrote to the government from Kukanj on July 6, 1431\textsuperscript{133}. This means that they went to see duke Sandalj on their way back. Soon after that, Petar de Lucari and Đuro de Goče went their separate ways. They were both dismissed from the service in July 1431. Đuro went back to Dubrovnik, while Petar went on a new diplomatic mission he was obliged to begin until the following Saturday or pay the fine of 100 perpers\textsuperscript{134}. The motive for this new mission lay behind Dubrovnik’s unsuccessful attempt to rule over the territories Murat II had given them previously. Therefore, Petar had to go to the Porte and assure this decision was implemented \textit{de facto}. At first, the government decided that he should go back the same way he came\textsuperscript{135}. They suggested going

\textsuperscript{125} Ćiro Truhelka, „Konavoski rat“, p. 181.
\textsuperscript{126} \textit{Lett. di Lev.} vol. XI, 7v (15 Oct 1430).
\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Lett. di Lev.} vol. XI, 8v (27 Oct 1430).
\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Lett. di Lev.} vol. X, 211r (13 Sept 1430).
\textsuperscript{129} \textit{Lett. di Lev.} vol. XI, 17r (22 Feb 1431).
\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Lett. di Lev.} vol. XI, 19v (22 Feb 1431).
\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Lett. di Lev.} vol. XI, 30r (7 Jul 1431).
\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Lett. di Lev.} vol. XI, 30r (7 Jul 1431); Ćiro Truhelka, „Konavoski rat“, p. 193.
\textsuperscript{133} \textit{Lett. di Lev.} vol. XI, 30v (12 Jul 1431).
\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Cons. Rog.} vol. V, 29r (27 Jul 1431).
over to Sandalj’s friend Grgur Nikolić’s estate to Cernica, where someone would bring him his instructions and money to cover the expenses. The government spurred him to search for a help of duke Sandalj, Grgur Nikolić and Rajko Prpčić Mrdenović. Except that duke Grgur was asked to give him one of his man as a part of a retinue. As early as the next day, the government changed their mind and ordered him to sail from Slano to Lješ. The government asked the Turkish ambassador’s help through both routes because they expected him to join their ambassador in Prishtina or, at least, send one of his men to Petar’s entourage. It is impossible to determine the course of his journey from this point on since none of a few of his letters that reached Dubrovnik contains names of the places from which he reported. We can say with certainty that he reached Hadrianopolis at the beginning of September.

The first phase of our ambassadors’ mission officially lasted for 304 days. Petar de Lucari did not live to be dismissed from the second phase of the mission. The last time he contacted the government was on 18th September from Hadrianopolis.

5. Opening ceremony

A carefully planned ceremony had the task to make the invisible visible and discover the deeper meaning of the visible, the meaning that shaped social relations, resolved issues of power and authority and identified sides in negotiations. Diplomatic ceremony expressed (and constructed) a complex social and political framework of mutual dependence relations and balance of power, which Dubrovnik’s government took care of by carefully reflecting their ambassadors’ appearances.

Communication problems appeared due to different perceptions of the world, with certain countries speaking in different languages when diplomatic ceremony is in question. The first ambassadors who represented Dubrovnik at

the Porte faced certain difficulties since they were not familiar with the etiquette there because there were no common ceremonial rules for such occasions\textsuperscript{145}. For instance, seating schedule was extremely important because it reflected a person’s power, position, and reputation\textsuperscript{146}. If the ambassadors forgot or were not familiar with the fact that the person sitting on the left was the one with the highest honours at the Porte, opposite to diplomatic ceremony they knew, it could cause misunderstanding, complications, and make their job difficult\textsuperscript{147}. At the time of Petar de Lucari and Đuro de Goče’s stay at the Porte, the Ottomans were just shaping their administration and diplomatic ceremony, which was codified in the second half of the 15\textsuperscript{th} century during the rule of Mehmed II (1432-81)\textsuperscript{148}. Certain diplomatic rituals existed even before he took the rule, but it was not systematized, and therefore it is not surprising that in their work the ambassadors from Dubrovnik encountered certain ambiguities. In evaluation of Petar de Lucari and Đuro de Goče’s success, their contribution to the knowledge of customs, structure, and functioning of the Ottoman court should be pointed out, especially regarding circulation of ideas and cultural transfers\textsuperscript{149}. Their insight facilitated the work of the ambassadors who came to the Port after them so the government did not need to seek advice elsewhere\textsuperscript{150}.

5.1. Reception of visiting ambassadors

Reception of ambassadors from Dubrovnik depended on the Sultan’s estimate of their significance and the importance of the town they represented. The mere fact that Dubrovnik was a Catholic town, gave its representatives secondary importance compared to the treatment of ambassadors from Islamic countries. Our opinion is confirmed by the actions of Bayezid II in 1484, who received Mamluk ambassador to an audience first, although he was at war with his sovereign in Anatolia at the time, and waited until the following day to receive ambassadors of Croatian-Hungarian king\textsuperscript{151}. Petar de Lucari and Đuro de Goče were not treated


\textsuperscript{147} Nela Lonza, \textit{Kazalište vlasti}, p. 178.

\textsuperscript{148} Emire C. Muslu, \textit{Ottoman-Mamluk relations}, p. 165.

\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Lett. di Lev.} vol. X, f. 211 r (13 Sept 1430).

\textsuperscript{150} \textit{Cons. Rog.} vol. IV, ff. 211v-212v (8 Aug 1430); \textit{Cons. Maius} vol. IV, ff. 97r-98r (9 Aug 1430).

\textsuperscript{151} Emire C. Muslu, \textit{Ottoman-Mamluk relations}, p. 167.
any better\textsuperscript{152}. When they arrived in Plovdiv, they received information that Murat II was there and that he had told them to wait for him in Hadrianopolis. Still, Ćiro Truhelka writes that the sultan was \textit{kind} and was \textit{embarrassed} because the Turkish ambassador had not followed them to the end of their journey.

Analysis of how Turkish ambassadors were received in Dubrovnik for the duration of Petar de Lucari and Đuro de Goçe’s mission, would undoubtedly have very interesting results. Since it would lead us well beyond the research subject of this paper, we will only mention that Dubrovnik authorities sometimes went all the way to Slano to meet Ottoman ambassadors and met them with noblemen and servants on horses and on foot. Selected noblemen were at their service during their stay in the town. The government presented them and their servants with rich gifts and saw that they were provided with luxurious accommodation and food within the town walls\textsuperscript{153}.

\textbf{5.2. Opening speech and use of titles}

Negotiations usually began with an opening speech, which was a permanent feature in such situations. It corresponded with the status of the person who was addressed. For instance, the ambassadors greeted duke Sandalj with due respect\textsuperscript{154}, and Murat II with \textit{bello magnifico et excellente salute}. How important greeting was is shown by the fact that sometimes it was used as means of expressing dissatisfaction or, even, to offend a person deliberately. For instance, on one occasion the government complained that ambassadors of duke Radoslav, with who they were at war, left the town without greeting them\textsuperscript{155}. Wrong use of titles could trigger a war\textsuperscript{156}. Questions regarding a ruler’s health were also a permanent feature of opening addresses, except if everybody knew his health was poor. Therefore Petar de Lucari and Đuro de Goçe remembered to ask Sigismund’s ambassador about their sovereign’s health and wish him future prosperity\textsuperscript{157}.

Greetings included correct use of titles, which was a symbolic gesture. The title of the person the diplomats communicated with revealed his/her position. Dubrovnik ambassadors kept track of the position a person took in the hierarchy of power and tried to note any change in that respect. The ambassadors were sup-

\textsuperscript{152} Ćiro Truhelka, „Konavoski rat“, p. 184.
\textsuperscript{153} Cons. Rog vol. IV, f. 216v (12 Aug 1430); Ibid, f. 232r (11 Sept 1430); Ibid, f. 262r (9 Jan 1431); Ibid vol. V, f. 25v (22 Jul 1431); Ibid, f. 27v (26 Jul 1431).
\textsuperscript{154} Lett. di Lev. vol. X, f. 208v (13 Sept 1430).
\textsuperscript{155} Lett. di Lev. vol. X, f. 159v (18 Jun 1430); Ibid, f. 212v (13 Sept 1430).
\textsuperscript{156} Emire C. Muslu, \textit{Ottoman-Mamluk relations}, pp. 136-137.
\textsuperscript{157} Lett. di Lev. vol. XI, f. 27r (7 May 1431).
posed to greet duke Sandalj using the title that corresponded with his status¹⁵⁸. They addressed Murat II as gloriosissimo et excellentissimo imperator, i.e. a person honorati da I dio et tenuto dal mondo, principe e corpo e fonte de rason e de iusti-
cia¹⁵⁹. On another occasion, Petar de Lucari called him illustissimo, famosissimo et potentissimo imperator¹⁶⁰, and his referred to his viziers as magni baroni consiglieri recetori e governori del imperator amorat¹⁶¹. It is obvious that the ambassadors from Dubrovnik put a lot of effort in choosing adequate titles, which they used as verbal tools for realization of their goals. In such a way, the ambassador conveniently emphasized Murat II’s fairness when the latter was to make the rule in their litigation with duke Radoslav.

Diplomatic relations between the Ottomans and the Mamluks in the same period were also quite interesting. By use of titles, they confirmed that they were united by the same faith but also that the Mamluk sultan had higher place in Islamic hierarchy. When addressing Murat II, his ambassadors usually titled him “amir”, which was a rank lower than “sultan”. The name “sultan” was reserved exclusively for Mamluk sultans, and even Murat II uses titles Islam wa Al-Mwlimm (sultan of Islam and Muslims) and Sultan al-Haramayn (sultan of holy cities)¹⁶².

6. Communication

Frequency of correspondence depended on how far from home the ambassadors were, war and peace times, importance of the issue at hand, and punctuality of people involved. Reports of the ambassadors who led important missions with the task to expand Dubrovnik’s territory are not preserved. From archival fund Lettere di Levante – Litterae et commissiones levantis, which contains instructions for the ambassadors, we can partially reconstruct their reports because they are registered according to it. Ambassadors’ reports were not a common practice until the 13th century, except for Byzantine diplomacy and other diplomacies it had strongly influenced, such as Venetian diplomacy¹⁶³. Written reports about course and results of diplomatic negotiations were accepted rather late in Western Europe. The fact that there had been hardly any written documents until the last quarter of the 14th century is the result of administrative and bureaucratic priorities of the time. Only the documents that confirmed long-term rights, such

¹⁶⁰ | Lett. di Lev. vol. XI, f. 48r (23 Jul 1431).
¹⁶² | Emire C. Muslu, Ottoman-Mamluk relations, pp. 117-118.
as bills and privileges, were kept permanently, but not those of questionable value and short time of use\textsuperscript{164}. All the instructions for Petar de Lucari and Đuro de Goče are not preserved but we know they existed because the Senate’s decisions regarding their sending on certain dates are kept, although they cannot be found in the \textit{Lettere di Levante} series\textsuperscript{165}.

The most important purpose of correspondence was transfer of information. The ambassadors reported to the government about the progress of their mission and the government gave them instructions for their further actions. Since the government brought those decisions taking into account wider social and political context, their instructions contained a number of information that would reflect on the ambassadors’ work\textsuperscript{166}. Moreover, their letters to the government represented source of news not exclusively connected with the embassy’s goals. For instance, the town’s government wrote about the passing of Venetian naval forces under the command of Pietro Loredano (Piero Lorian) (1372-1438) on his way to confront Genoa in order to preserve Venetian sea trade\textsuperscript{167}. They also mentioned that their sovereign was in Constanta at the time, where he took part in a synod that decided about a number of important religious issues\textsuperscript{168}. Information the ambassadors got in the texts of their instructions were potential tools they could use for realization of their specific goals at the Porte.

On the other hand, the government expected detailed and analytic reports from its ambassadors regarding anything that might influence the Republic’s foreign policy\textsuperscript{169}. The government wanted to know if Venice and the Ottoman Empire had made truce and for how long\textsuperscript{170}, and if Sigismund of Luxembourg and Murat II did the same\textsuperscript{171}. The ambassadors used their stay at the Porte to find out as much as they could about Tamerlane’s son Shâhrukh (1405-1477), who pretended to expand his rule at the expense of the Ottoman Empire\textsuperscript{172}.

Some information were valued as rumours. For instance, the government

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{164} John K. Hyde, ”The role of diplomatic correspondence and reporting: news and chronicles”, \textit{Literacy and its uses: Studies on Late Medieval Italy}, Manchester-New York: Manchester University Press 1993, p. 237.
\item \textsuperscript{165} Cons. Rog. vol. IV, f. 265v (19 Jan 1431); \textit{Ibid}, f. 271r (14 Feb 1431).
\item \textsuperscript{166} For instance, the government informed de Lucari that Tvrtko II had reconciled with Radoslav Pavlović, \textit{Lett. di Lev.} vol. XI, f. 55r (5 Oct 1431).
\item \textsuperscript{167} \textit{Lett. di Lev.} vol. XI, f. 30v (12 Jul 1431).
\item \textsuperscript{168} \textit{Lett. di Lev.} vol. XI, f. 19v (22 Feb 1431).
\item \textsuperscript{169} \textit{Lett. di Lev.} vol. X, f. 209v (13 Sept 1430); \textit{Ibid} vol. XI, f. 30r (7 Jul 1431); \textit{Ibid}, f. 55r (5 Oct 1431).
\item \textsuperscript{170} \textit{Lett. di Lev.} vol. XI, f. 11r (22 Nov 1430).
\item \textsuperscript{171} \textit{Lett. di Lev.} vol. XI, f. 49r (23 Jul 1431).
\item \textsuperscript{172} \textit{Lett. di Lev.} vol. XI, f. 11r (22 Nov 1430).
\end{itemize}
wrote that they had heard that duke Radoslav had sent certain people to the Porte, who the ambassadors had to help set free\(^{173}\). Certain information could be used for manipulation, i.e. deliberately use deception in constructing news\(^{174}\). Although, the ambassadors knew that public confirmation of their false testimonies would be a great blow to their credibility and reputation of the entire community they represented. That is why it is not surprising that they attempted to cover up certain information. There were situations in which material assets could trigger claims of their dissatisfied creditors and the ambassadors had to pretend they knew nothing about them, i.e. lie. For instance, Petar de Lucari and Đuro de Goçe told duke Sandalj they were allowed to spend 12,000 ducats for acquisition of new territories although at that moment they knew they could promise as much as 20,000 ducats\(^{175}\). Similarly, when during his visit to Dubrovnik Ali-bey wanted to know what the town presented to the sultan and viziers, he was denied the answer\(^{176}\). These and certain other delicate issues made the ambassadors rely on secret diplomacy in their work. Certain meetings were held behind closed doors\(^{177}\) and sometimes they had to decide whether they would be held privately or publicly\(^{178}\).

**7. Conclusion**

Petar de Lucari and Đuro de Goçe played important roles in 1430/1431 negotiations at the Sublime Porte, which is confirmed by their selection and carefully planned preparations for their journey, their tasks and results of their mission. They justified the trust their government had given them not only by successfully realizing foreign policy goals (trading privileges and territorial acquisitions) but also by exchanging knowledge, values, opinions, and ideas between two civilizations that differed in terms of religion, customs, holidays, and habits. Petar de Lucari and Đuro de Goçe built the image of their hometown and symbolically embodied the community they belonged. They reflected the image the government wanted to have in crucial moments of determining Dubrovnik’s position towards the Porte. On the other hand, they brought back home everything they had experienced and learned at the Porte (probably along with certain material objects). To conclude, first ambassadors from Dubrovnik did not only achieve foreign policy goals, they were also cultural ambassadors, whose knowledge was precious, especially for Dubrovnik’s tribute ambassadors, who came after them.

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9. Addenda

Table 1 Letters to Petar de Lucari and Đuro de Goçe and their answers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place from which the ambassador writes</th>
<th>Date of sending</th>
<th>Received in Dubrovnik</th>
<th>Days the letter was on the way</th>
<th>Instructions and replies from Dubrovnik</th>
<th>Days spent waiting for reply</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Lett. di Lev. vol. X, f. 208v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lipgljan</td>
<td>4 Oct</td>
<td>14 Oct questi di passadi</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15 Oct</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lett. di Lev. vol. XI, f. 7v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uschopie</td>
<td>9 Oct</td>
<td>22 Oct</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27 Oct</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ibid. f. 8v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ploudiv</td>
<td>22 Oct</td>
<td>20 Nov</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22 Nov</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ibid. f. 10v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrianpoli</td>
<td>9 Dec</td>
<td>questi di passadi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22 Feb 1431</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ibid. f. 17r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrianpoli</td>
<td>9 Dec</td>
<td>questi di passadi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22 Feb 1431</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ibid. f. 27r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrianpoli</td>
<td></td>
<td>questi di passadi</td>
<td>terza vostra lettera auer data a Besubiça</td>
<td>7 May</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ibid. f. 27r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrianpoli</td>
<td>26 May</td>
<td>10 Jun</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7 Jul</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ibid. f. 30r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pristina</td>
<td>26 Jun</td>
<td>3 Jul</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ibid. f. 30r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochagan</td>
<td>6 Jul</td>
<td>10 Jul</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12 Jul</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ibid. f. 30v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>ieri</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21 Jul</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ibid. f. 31r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23 Jul</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ibid. f. 48r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28 Jul</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ibid. f. 49v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrianpoli</td>
<td>4 Sep</td>
<td>3 Oct</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5 Oct</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ibid. f. 54v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrianpoli</td>
<td>18 Sep</td>
<td>6 Oct</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ibid. f. 35v</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table-2 First and second version of the list of presents for the mission of Petar de Lucari and Đuro de Goçe, Cons. Rog. vol. IV, f. 219v, (17 Aug 1430);\(^1\) Ibid, f. 224v, (25 Aug 1430)\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Present(^1)</th>
<th>Present(^2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Imperator</strong></td>
<td>Peza una de zetenino a velutato carmesino</td>
<td>Una peza de zetanin a veluta cremezi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peza una de zetenino zelestro a velutato</td>
<td>Peza una de cetanin zelestro a veluta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miliaro uno de dossi fini caualareschi</td>
<td>Miliare uno de dossi fini caualareschi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miliaro uno de armelini fini</td>
<td>Miliare uno de armelini fini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bacili duo con doi bochali grandi de peso in tuto circa marcas 20</td>
<td>Bacili duo con duo bochali grandi de peso in tuto circa marcas 20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Machmet beg(h) signor de questo ladi Sargi bassa Chalul beg(h)</th>
<th>Machmet begh</th>
<th>Machmet begh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A zascadun d`essi a un bochal de zercha marchas 4 e tre taze de zercha uncias 18 la taza che serano in tuto bochali 4 e taze 12</td>
<td>uno bachal de circha marchas III una taza de libra 1⅔ ducatorum d’oro 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a zascun de questi tre ad uno bochal de circha marche 4 taza una de libre 1⅔ ducati d’oro 200 per zascuno</td>
<td>signor de questo ladi sargi bassa chalul begh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guiragh canzaler grande a doi capazibasse zoe Sagi beg e Omorat beg</th>
<th>A zascun d`essi a una tazza de uncias 18 che sono taze tre</th>
<th>a zascun d`essi una tazza de libra 1⅔ ducati d’oro cinquanta per ognuno</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E tute le taze sopra dette siano indorate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protogeri Portari</th>
<th>Taze due del XX del pexo da uncias otto fin a 9 l`una e indorate</th>
<th>non si debia far taze ducatorum d’oro cento</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ysach voiuoda</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>quatro peze di panno a valuta de ducatorum 70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^1]: Ibid, f. 219v, (17 Aug 1430)
### Table 3. List of presents from the first instructions to ambassadors Petar de Lucari i Đore de Goçe, Lett. di Lev. vol. X, f. 215v, (13 Sept 1430)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imperador de Turchi</td>
<td>duo li piu belli et mazori bocalli&lt;br&gt;duo bacili&lt;br&gt;duo taçe le piu belle e piu grande</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machmet beg viser</td>
<td>uno bocaro&lt;br&gt;una delle mazor taçe&lt;br&gt;ducati CCC d’oro</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signor de questo ladi&lt;br&gt;Sargi bassa&lt;br&gt;Chalul beg viseri</td>
<td>uno bocaro&lt;br&gt;una taza&lt;br&gt;ducati CC d’oro per zascun</td>
<td>zoe bochali sei belli d’arzento&lt;br&gt;duo bacili belli&lt;br&gt;taze XIII’p</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sagi beg&lt;br&gt;Amorat beg&lt;br&gt;Cuirach cancelar grande</td>
<td>una taza&lt;br&gt;ducati L d’oro per zascuno da loro</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protogeri&lt;br&gt;Portari e altri</td>
<td>in tutto fin a ducati C d’oro</td>
<td>panni 4 de lana&lt;br&gt;ducati due milia d’oro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voyuoda Isach</td>
<td>quatro panni de lanna&lt;br&gt;quattro taze delle menor a circha libra uno a zascuna</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preostatak</td>
<td>ducati 850 per vostre spese e per scriuer lo ambassadore de nostro signor, per spesi de li privilegi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Dubrovnik government made a mistake here since, according to the list in the Senate’s records, the ambassadors were presented with 13 plates.
Table-4 *List of present for Petar de Lucari’s mission, Lett. di Lev.* vol. XI, ff. 50rv (28 Jul 1431)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Imperator amorat   | bochali duo  
                      bacili duo d’argento  
                      confetere quatro releuate d’arzento  
                      guarnaze tre de dossi de vari che sono a dossi 250 per guarnaza |
| Magmet bech vixer  | taze due d’arzento dorate signate de n°3  
                      cavezo uno di scarlato de grana  
                      varnaza una de dossi de vari che sono dossi 250  
                      ducatorum d’oro L° |
| Calul-bech vixer   | taze due d`arzento dorate signate de n°2  
                      cauezo uno di scarlato de grana  
                      varnaza una de dossi de vari che sono dossi 250  
                      ducatorum doro cinquanta |
| Sargi bassa vixer  | taze due d`arzento dorate signate de n°1  
                      cauezo uno di scarlato de grana  
                      uarziaza una de dossi che sono dossi 250  
                      ducatorum doro cinquanta |
| Bassa di Romania   | taze III° d’arzento dorate signate de n° 4 e non altro                                                                                   |
| Capizabassa e altri| ducatorum d’oro CXX                                                                  |
A HISTORY OF PARTNERSHIP AND COLLABORATION IN THE BALKANS


Silvia - Dana Caciur*

After almost one century and a half since the Venetian administration was established in Dalmatia (since 1409 when Zadar/Zara is conquered), the Dalmatian cities exist as an autonomous entity strictly controlled by Venice. The instruments used by Venice to impose its monopoly over the territorial resources of the coastal hinterland of Eastern Adriatic and also over their administration are represented by the officials (as regional public rulers) mandate by the Republic. On the other side, to maintain its popularity among the local nobles, Venice also invites them to be a part of the administrative process, of course without access at the most important offices\(^1\). Thus, the will of Venice is applied and closely obeyed, as far as possible, by the various *provveditori*, *syndics*, *rettors*, counts and captains elected by Serenissima. This is way most of the documents issued beginning with the middle of the 15th century have an administrative content, being letters addressed to the central authorities in which the officials ask for advice, for approval or report different decisions or events, specific for a border region.

For Venetian Dalmatia the 16th century represents the era of the first direct contacts with the Ottoman Empire. Even though the interest of the Venetian Republic mainly oriented to the coastal cities, and the mountainous geography of the region postponed the establishment of a physical border between these two powers. The negotiations for a physical border are initiated in the context of the Cyprus war (1570 – 1573), when Venice lost too much from the Dalmatian hinterland, and reached an end almost one century later with *linea Nani*, established at the end of Candian war in 1671. The fact that in Dalmatia, Venice doesn't have a border defined in a political way with the Ottomans is important for our argument because it sets the basic lines of the regional relations between the local authorities of the two powers. The many forms in which the Ottoman pressure is

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exercised in Dalmatia during the peace period between the 1540 and 1570 challenged the abilities of the Venetian officials, enrolled there, to keep a good and peaceful neighborhood with the Ottoman officials\textsuperscript{2}. However, the various counts, captains, general governors and the inspectors proved to be skillful enough since they managed to conclude some contracts and agreements convenient for both parties and most important without affecting the Republic's interests. The dexterous administrative policy requested by Venice in Dalmatia can be exemplified with the Morlachs involvement in the commercial activities of the main Dalmatian cities.

In Dalmatia, the Morlachs are a common presence, as long as they are mentioned since around the year 1322 during the conflict between the Ban of Croatia, count of Zara, Mladen Subić of Bribir and the Ban of Bosnia, Ioan Babonić\textsuperscript{3}. Even if the ruling powers changed a few times in the Western region of the Balkans until the establishment of the Venetian administration, the fact didn't manage to change too much the character of these communities and theirs specific activities. The change appeared though, up to some point, at the ethnic level: the gradual inclusion of the Vlach ethnics in the social group of the Morlachs. The Venetian documents issued during its first and a half century of direct administration in Dalmatia (with the inclusion of Zara in 1409) allow us to observe the actions which by then already involved the Morlachs the most and the type of relations they build with the Venetian officials and the city inhabitants. A particularity of the Venetian documentary discourse is its accent on the social character of the populations the Serenissima had to deal with and not on their ethnic specifics. This is why I will use only the Venetian name of Morlachs, even if some Vlach elements can be easily observed. Whether most of the Venetian documents reveal a negative image of the Morlachs, as savages, impossible to organize and willing to do all sorts of wickedness, the commerce they practice as Turkish subjects improve their acceptance trough the Venetian subjects. The Morlachs build their merchant profile with numerous mentions of the goods they carry in the Venetian cities or back in the inner Balkans and through the role they play in the regional

\textsuperscript{2} Giuseppe Praga, 
\textit{Storia di Dalmazia Varese: Oglio Editore}, p. 181: \textit{La pressione turca era continua e si esercitava con tale insolenza di forme che la Repubblica, decisa dopo Prevesa a non più impegnarsi col Turco, mal riusciva a contenere. Il trentennio dal 1540 al 1570 è certamente il più crudo e nero periodo della storia moderna di Dalmazia. Miracoli di abilità, di tatto, di distrezza, fecero i conti, i capitanii ad i rettorii delle città per venire a capo della rudezza dei sangiacchi, degli agà, dei cadi, dei dizdar, con i quali avevano ordine perentorio di “vicinare bene”}.

Veneto – Ottoman political relations. There are three aspects worth to be considered when we speak about Morlach commerce in Dalmatia. In the first place, the Morlachs are desired in Dalmatian cities for the exchange of subsistence products, difficult to obtain in other circumstances, not only by the city inhabitants but by the Morlachs themselves. Secondly, the Morlach bent for trade is used by Venice and the Ottoman Empire in the contract they concluded concerning the salt production in Šibenik’s mines and its selling process. The third aspect issues from the manner the Morlachs transport their products: the difficulties and danger the Morlach *caravans* hurdles.

**The Morlachs as merchants of subsistence goods**

As merchants of subsistence goods, the Morlachs answer to the needs of the inhabitants of Dalmatian cities, strongly affected by the territorial losses. The Ottoman offensive reduced not only the rural fields, but also the rural demography, the agricultural population that preferred to find new places to live in Venetian state, far from the un-Christian threat. Without this agricultural side of the region the supply of the cities with subsistence goods decreased considerably. The Morlach caravans were those who helped in reducing the deficit of animal products and cereals.

To support this idea it is necessary to record the description that Giovanni Battista Giustinian⁴, former inspector in Dalmatia, makes when he speaks about the commercial life of Trogir. At the end of his mandate, in 1553, when he presented in front of the Senate his report, Giovanni Battista observes that the commercial activities in Trogir are few and unimportant. Thus, the Morlachs are, as the inspector considers, those who with their caravans and goods support the comfort and the welfare of the province. Without their trade in Trogir will be as bad as in the rest of Dalmatia⁵.

A similar situation is described in Šibenik. Giovanni Battista Giustinian counts around 15 merchants, if so, which hardly make some commercial traffic⁶. Much more important is considered by the inspector to be the universal commerce *had with the Morlachs, Turkish subjects* that brings as income an annual amount of 50,000 ducats⁷. There are also remembered the days when the Morlach commerce

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⁶ Commissiones, II, p. 268.

⁷ Commissiones, II.
was blocked and Šibenik not only suffered but was completely ruined⁸. But what goods did the Morlachs use to sell in Šibenik and make this trade so important? From the report of the same inspector we can enumerate some of these products. In the first place, the Morlachs bring the town cheese, meat, cereals (grain), honey, blankets, wax (black wax) and other things, the inhabitants of Šibenik couldn’t buy from anywhere else. On the other side, the Morlachs buy oil, medicines, wine, bread, white wax, sugar and other similar things, exchange that proves to be very important for the local traders⁹.

Antonio Diedo¹⁰ presents at his turn the reality in the same key. According to its report we learn that the Morlachs bring constantly cereals, cheese, meat, honey, wax, wool, blankets, animal skins and other similar things¹¹. Leaving the town they buy salt, salted fish, flour, fabrics, oil, medicines, sugar, white wax and other merchandise useful for these people and their lives¹². Analyzing the economical situation of Dalmatia, the Venetian official offers to this commerce of Morlachs a significant importance when he says that in his absence the people from Dalmatia would die by starvation.

The exchange presented above is only the official version of the Morlachs trade with products. In fact, the Morlach merchants are involved in all kind of local trades, causing sometimes conflicts between the nobles (the one that produce the good to be sold) and the authorities (as representatives of the Venetian interest in the economic monopoly). To exemplify, is worth to be mentioned the case of Ioannes Ferro from Šibenik who is accused, in December 1540, of having sold some sorghum to the Morlachs (sorghum – cereal plant similar whit the corn, in Dalmatia is cultivated especially on islands and coastal region; is used for sugar, brooms, constructions). The first accusations against him are presented in front of the count and captain of Šibenik and of the Council of nobles. The report of the rettor is the one that informs Venice about the testimonies of the accusers and asks for its advice¹³. This ser Ioannes Ferro is proved to be guilty because he chose to sell a product that should have been used by authorities in various public activities. The witnesses present at his process confirm the fact that Ioannes

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⁸ Commissiones, II, p. 223.
⁹ Commissiones, II, p. 224.
¹⁰ Commissiones, tomos III (1553 – 1571), in Monumenta spectantia Historiam Slavorum meridionalium, XI, ed. S. Ljubić, Zagreb, 1880, p. 3.
¹¹ Commissiones, III, p. 3.
¹² Commissiones, III, p. 3.
¹³ Archivio di Stato di Venezia (following as: ASV), Capi del Consiglio di X. Lettere di Rettori e di altre cariche, Sebenico dall’ anno 1501 al anno 1797; Segna dall’ anno 1719 al anno 1747, box no. 280, doc. no. 54.
Ferro disregarded the count’s refuse to grant him a license to sell the sorghum to the Morlachs. Angry because of the trial and all the accusations the noble from Šibenik commits a second sin: he attacks the judgment of Venice when he shows himself desiring to live in a place where is no tyranny and everybody can do whatever he wants with his own goods (venira per un giorno che insistimo de tirania che potremo vender le nostre robbe).

Other times, the citizens that pay the tax for the right to sell the goods they produce ask for compensation or deferral of payment deadlines because they couldn’t sell the products to the Morlachs. In August 1546, Giacomo Radanovich, animal and fish seller, can’t pay its revenues because he wasn’t able to sell its products to the Morlachs. The reason Giacomo invoked is given by the 2 months prohibition established because of a plague (per la prohibitione publica non hanno possuto praticar morlachi). The Senate is aware of the possible difficulties and allows Giacomo to pay his debts in the following months.

About how the Morlachs sell their products in the city markets speaks a documents issued by the Venetian Senate in January 1550. The goods brought by Morlachs should be sold exclusively to the city inhabitants and poor peasants, the foreign merchants being excluded. This decision is necessary since the local population can’t assure their supplies, because of the foreign merchants which buy the Morlach products with a better price. This document provides us with new information concerning the Morlach commerce with goods inside the city. Apparently they sell the products in two circumstances: a posta, which is based on a prior agreement and payment (a posta cio e a quelli che gl’accomodano de dinari nelle suoi bisogni per qualche mesi avanti tratto), and an independent one, accepted by the authorities because it helps the poor inhabitants to buy the goods they need. Consequently, the Senate establishes that for three days all kind of products should be sold in markets, as well by the foreign merchants and the local ones, with the acquisition price so everybody can buy the things they need. This decision made for Trogir recalls an older one applied in Šibenik in 1497. According to it, those who buy goods from the Šibenik’s territory or harbor must sell the products in the city market for 3 days with the acquisition price.

14] ASV, Senato Deliberationi Mar, register no. 28, pp. 213v – 214r.
15] ASV, Senato Deliberationi Mar, filze 8, pp. 413 – 422.
16] ASV, Senato Deliberationi Mar: precipindo lo forestieri che et piu facile che l’horor terrieri quelle veramente robbe che non vengono a posta, sono exposte ad vendersi a menuto a cui ne vole et se alcuno non comprasse al ingrosso se obliga per giorni tre dar al menuto et in parte or in tutto per il madesimo costo
17] Guiseppe, Sabalich, La Dalmazia nei commerci della Serenissima, Zara 1907, p. 76.
The Morlachs as salt traders

Considering the second aspect of the Morlachs commerce in Dalmatia, the salt from Šibenik, it should be included in a larger context. During the 15th and 16th century Venice did everything to assure its monopoly over all salt markets of Stato da mar. The Republics policy was however applied in accord with the state, the productivity and the economic potential of the mines and commercial centers from their proximity are directly controlled by Venice through its officials. In Dalmatia the salt mines have a status similar to the other economic branches: the utility of the mines is rented, the agents of the local salt office supervise the activity of the patrons (the nobles who rent the mines) and the patrons supports with their taxes the regional profit of Republic. The Venetian policy of controlling the salt production and commerce was a success in Dalmatian territory (in case of Pago and Šibenik, the salt mines from Zadar being destroyed) for at least two reasons. Firstly, the quality and the quantity of salt (especially in Šibenik) were not good enough to support the Venetian interest and direct investments. Secondly, since the local investors are open to extract and sell the salt and pay a rent for this right, Venice must control their activity avoiding any type of commercial competition. In addition to that, if we think at the Venetian interest in conquering new markets in Ottoman territories from Balkans and in maintaining good relations with the Ottoman regional authorities we learn that the Morlach involvement in the salt trade from Šibenik appears as a solution to all Venetian problems; the salt is sold, the patrons must sell the salt exclusively to the Morlachs and the Morlachs are Ottoman subjects and carry it in Ottoman territories.

The case of salt mines from Šibenik might be the best example on how Venice controlled the salt markets even those well known, well developed or rich. Whether Venice rents the salt mines exploitation to some local nobles it imposes its control over the salt and sets with an accord concluded with the Ottoman Empire that the extracted salt must be sold exclusively to the Turkish subjects, the Morlachs. The Venetian Senate begins the negotiations with the Ottomans in August 1533 with its answer to the request presented in Venice by an Ottoman emissary from the border region with Dalmatia. At this date the Senate confirms the right of the Ottoman subjects to buy salt from Šibenik and the exemption from

20] ASV, Senato Deliberazioni Mar, register 22, pp. 203v – 210r.
taxes for the products these subjects sell in Zara. Moreover, the Senate accepts that an Ottoman representative, *eminino*, should live in the Šibenik to supervise the activity of his merchants. Referring to the tax exemption for the goods brought in Zara, since it existed before nothing new should be discussed, but it is strongly forbidden the settlement of an Ottoman representative in this city (*tale exenttione* nem quella fosse favorita et non impedita et che cosi si continuara con satisfattione di quanto al dover conviene). In other words, even if Venice allows the commerce with the Ottoman subjects, it cannot assume any risk and imposes a strict control on how the commerce is done by these merchants. To control this activity the central authorities sets that in Zara are collected all the taxes paid or the profits obtained from the goods sell, and in Šibenik, through the office of salt, the incomes from local salt trade (*gabela del sale*; for the middle of the 16th century) sent periodically in Zara, and further in Venice.

Officially the negotiations for the right to buy salt from Šibenik by the Ottoman subjects are held in Istanbul (Constantinople) by Pietro Zen21, somewhere during one of two mandates as Venetian ambassador in Istanbul hold between 1533 (when the local Ottoman ambassador asks the Venetian Senate for the right to buy salt) and 1539 (when the conditions of the accord seem to be already applied). About the terms of the accord concluded between the Porte and Pietro Zen speaks Giovanni Battista Giustinian in his report in 155322. According to this report Pietro Zen sets that the Ottoman subjects are required to make scale in Šibenik and to pay the established taxes, and the officials of Serenissima must give them the salt. The economic utility can immediately be observed, thanks to the same report: the Gabela del sale (the tax for salt) bought by the Ottoman subjects brings as income in the fiscal office of Šibenik around 4 000 ducats, which is more than the taxes for animal which is only 200 ducats and those for commerce which is 100 ducats23. The difference is not so important though, *since none of them will exist without the Morlachs caravans*.


23] *Itinerario di Giustinian* in *Commissiones II*, p. 205: che i sudditi turchesi siano obbligati far scala a Sebenico, et la Serenissima signoria al incontro è obligata a dar detti Sali, et a partecipar il tratto d’ esso con esso signor Turco, di maniera che la camera fiscal ne sente grande utilità, perché oltra i danari, che si cavano dei Sali, che sono tre in quattro mille ducati, affitta il dazio della beccaria per più di ducati mille, il dazio del commercio per ducati cento;
In 29th of March 1535, Adreas Gritti, count and captain of Šibenik writes to the Senate to present the negative consequences caused by the absence of the Morlachs, which should have been present in the city to buy their salt and to pay their taxes. The count explains to the Venetian authorities why he sends only 281 ducats and 4 soldi and not more obtained as income from salt selling. Before this explanation the count assures the Senate that the Ottoman responsible was not the reason for this small amount because he paid the taxes set for the salt mines exploitation and also for the amount obtained from the quantity of salt already sold, facts proven with receipts issued by the count. The real reason is represented by the fact that a large quantity of salt reserved to the Turkish subjects remained un-sold because of the bad weather. The wind and the snow fall in mountains prevented the arrival of the Morlachs and the salt selling process. On the other side, if the snow prevented the Turkish subjects to arrive in Šibenik, it didn’t spot them to buy salt from other places of Serenissima, like Trogir and Split. Whereas these two cities didn’t have an Ottoman official in charge with the tax collection, the Morlachs could buy the salt in the same conditions like the other commodities, affecting the local incomes. For the count of Šibenik this fact represents a new side of the problem: if the Ottoman subjects are allowed to buy cheaper salt from Trogir and Split and without any organization of the trade, increase the risk of losing its clients for the salt of Šibenik. This is the reason why the count asks the Senate to banish the salt selling to the Morlachs in Trogir and Split, invoking once more the absence of an emino to administrate the activity. Decreasing the salt trade from Šibenik the consequences would affect the local profit and also the amount of goods and merchandise brought for the inhabitants of the city from the land territories.

A new side of the Morlachs salt commerce in Šibenik speaks the former Venetian official in Dalmatia, Antinio Diedo. According to him the salt mines (gabella del sale) is the main nerve of the local economy, and this is so since the city doesn’t have anymore its lands. The Ottoman subjects, the main clients of the saline obtained the right of buying salt, like I mentioned before, thanks to an accord concluded between Serenissima and Signor Turco, through the diplomatic abilities of Petro Zen, of good memory, ambassador in Constantinople. In its report, Antonio Diedo presents a few new aspects of this contract bringing to

24] ASV, Capi del Consiglio di X. Lettere di Rettori e di altre cariche, Sebenico dall’ anno 1501 al anno 1797; Segna dall’ anno 1719 al anno 1747, box no. 280, doc. no. 52.
attention some technical details about how the salt must be sold to the Morlachs. In first place, he speaks about the Ottoman emino and its residence inside the city. This residence of an Ottoman official inside the city of the Most Serene Republic is not seen as something positive for the Venetian subjects. Why so? Because the emino is the one in charge with the administration of the salt reserved for the Morlachs and also with the collection of their payments for this salt, it appears to be inevitable the presence of the Morlachs inside the city, and since they arrive in great number (500 – 600 Morlachs rides, in caravans to take their salt) the damages hardly can be avoided. For this reason the inspector proposes to the Senate to change the place of the Ottoman residence somewhere outside the city, in the proximity of the salt deposits, near the salt mines. This innovation will prevent the presence of the Morlachs caravans inside the city, and they will take their salt from gabella which is outside of Šibenik, near the port, like they used to do in the past and it is strongly required by the registers of that commercial office. Once again, Anto-

nio Diedo stress the fact that the residence of the Ottoman responsible should be changed considering that it is not appropriate for such an important border city to have present this kind of functionaries and such a great number of their subjects.

At his turn Joannis de Quarzonibus, former count and captain of Šibenik exposes in his report in 1557 the importance of the salt fiscal office because it doubles the city incomes and supports almost all the inhabitans. In addition to that, Quarzonibus considers important this salt office because it attracts the Morlachs which exchange wool, cheese, animal skins and other similar things with the Šibenik’s salt, exchange that brings an annual profit of approximately 300 000 ducats and more. Similar facts, relate the former inspectors Michiel Bon and Gasparo Erizzo (around the year 1558). Aware of the fact that if the Morlachs would not come to buy salt and to bring cereals, wool, cheese and animal skins, the inhabitants of Šibenik will suffer even worse, because it land is even more barren than the rest of Dalmatia. Their affirmation is based on the state of the Šibenik previous of the territorial loses caused by the war with the Turks. If before Šibenik had under its administration 150 villages, during their mandate in Dalmatia this jurisdiction counted only 28 villages poorly inhabited.

31] Commissiones, II, p. 98.
The enthusiastic inspector Giovanni Batista Giustiniano believes in this salt trade with the Morlachs and finds as essential any measure to improve the commerce and to protect the interests of Republic. This is why, after he presents in his report the bases of the commercial relations between the Venetian officials and the Ottomans, Giovanni Battista proposes the Senate with an innovation concerning the Ottoman administrative office for the salt sold to the Morlachs. In this report he draws the attention of the Venetian Senate over the problem of salt trade in Šibenik’s region saying that this is the only one which keeps alive the city since it doesn’t have its territory anymore. The salt sales to the Morlachs, through the payment of gabella (tax on buying salt), represent the main nerv of this treasury. This trade assures plenty of things necessary for survival, bringing in Šibenik merchandise without which the Dalmatins would not be able to live in those territories. The loss of fields opened the officials eyes over the numerous and untouched salt resources that can be sold. Even if an Ottoman representative is required, given the facts, the emino shouldn’t be allowed to live in city, for the reasons of respect, but at Madallena, where is built a special house for him, avoiding this way the entrance into the city of 500 – 600 Morlachs on horses, coming to take salt and for the respect of the rules proper to a border city.

This problem of the Morlachs presence in great number in Šibenik after salt, mentioned also by Antonio Diedo and Giovanni Battista Giustiniano seems to solicit the attention of the central authorities of Serenissima. Because of that, Giovanni Battista Giustiniano has to present a new report in front of the central administrators of salt in charge with the control of the salt present in the entire Venetian state (Provveditori al Sal). In this new report Giustinian informs that half of the salt extracted from the Šibenik’s mines are given to an Ottoman minister named emin, who seems to collect all kind of taxes, brings the Morlachs, Turkish subjects in Šibenik and lives inside the city, contrary with all the saint rules of the Republic. The former inspector insists over the necessity of moving the Ottoman minister outside the city being inappropriate for an un-Christian minister-infidel.

33] Commissiones, II, p.35.
34] Commissiones, II, p. 35.
36] Commissiones, II, p. 36.
37] Commissiones, II, p. 36.
38] Commissiones, II, p. 38.
40] Commissiones, II, p. 43.
natural enemy of the Christians, to live in a such important border city, especially because at the moment of salt selling in city arrive around 500 – 600 horsemen\textsuperscript{41}. To avoid this inconvenient with caution the inspector proposes the idea to be built a house outside the city, one mile far from it. The place will be established as point specially dedicated for Morlachs, \textit{to come to take salt from the salt gabella, named Madalena, as it was done since forever}\textsuperscript{42}. Giustinian support the importance of this solution and asks for the approval of the central authorities.

The exclusivity of salt sales to the Morlachs are once again proved with a document issued in 1557\textsuperscript{43} by the Venetian Senate. According to this document, the salt extracted from the Sibenik’s mines can be sold in only two directions. The count and captain of Sibenik must be very carefull with the merchants who buy the salt, because it has to be sold only to the \textit{Morlachs caravans that came from the Turkish territories who owns the salines}. Except this trade and the salt sent in Azzuri for salting the fishes, any other intentions on selling salt, \textit{on land or on sea}, must be strictly punished: \textit{E sta sempre solito, che alle caravane delli Morlachi che vengono del paese del Signor Turco sia dato il sale da quella salera}. To stress the importance of the salt sales to the Morlachs, the Senate asks the count to inform the gabelot, the administrator of the saline, that he is risking his job if is caught selling salt to others than to those who bring it in Azzuri and to the Morlach caravans.

\textbf{The Morlachs caravans}

As one can easily observe the Morlachs practice a periodic trade with the caravans. They come from beyond the border between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire facing the difficulties of a long journey, the relief, the clime but also the danger of the imminent highway robbery caused in most of the cases by the Uskoks. About an event like this we learn from the letter (a copy) sent in 22\textsuperscript{nd} of January 1547\textsuperscript{44} by the Venetian Senate to the bailo in Istanbul. The Uskok attack, beside the common damage produced to the Morlachs caravan, it affects also an important part of the economic Veneto – Ottoman relations. The Uskoks attacked and robbed a Morlach caravan headed to Šibenik to take their salt. The Ottoman sanjak accuses the Venetian rettor of complicity with the Uskoks. This is why the Senate writes to Rusten Pasha to inform him about the innocence of the count, even though there are not few the occasions in which some of the Venetian

\textsuperscript{41}[ Commissiones, II, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{42}[ Commissiones, II, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{43}[ ASV, Senato Deliberationi Mar, filze 18 un-numbered.
\textsuperscript{44}[ ASV, Senato Deliberationi Secrete, register 65, pp. 84r – 85v.
subjects choose to plot with the Uskoks against the Turks. Through this letter the Pasha finds out about the orders received by the Venetian rettors, general governors of Dalmatia and the captain of Golf according to which they have to do everything is possible to punish the Uskoks and the Venetian subjects guilty for being accomplice with them.

Once again, six months later, in 7th July 1547\(^{45}\) the bailo from Istanbul receives a letter from the Senate with which he learns about a new Uskok attack over a Morlach caravan. According to this document, in 23rd of June a caravan of 40 Morlachs and as many horses transporting salt from Šibenik to their homes is attacked by Uskoks. The unfortunate event happened in a mountainous region 3 miles far from Šibenik, in the Ottoman territory. The caravan was accompanied by the Dalmatian guards till the border, though the attack must have took place beyond the border. As consequences, from 40 Morlachs, one was injured, 20 ran away, and the rest of them either died or became slaves\(^ {46}\). The Uskok attack over the Morlachs, Turkish subjects, on their way back in the Ottoman territory has first of all political consequences. Because of that, the Venetian ambassador from Istanbul is informed about the actions of the Venetian rettor from Šibenik, who took care to inform the Ottoman authorities from the region about the manner in which the attack took place, about the lack of involvement of the Republics’ subjects and that the caravan was accompanied till the border. The bailo must, at his turn, to inform Rusten Pasha and any other pashas interested about the events and to ensure them about the friendship of Venice and its desire in maintaining the peace on the Dalmatian border.

A third example is offered by the inspector Michiel Bon and the general governor of Dalmatia, Gasparo Eriyyo in their letter sent to the Venetian Senate in 16th October 1563\(^ {47}\). In their letter they recommend the captain of stratioti, Getta Renesi, from the Šibenik’s jurisdiction. Recently, Getta Renesi together with other 4 soldiers had in their hands the faith of some Morlachs from which one carried with him 400 cechini (ducats). The escorting guard and the Morlachs are attacked by 50 or more Uskoks in a rocky valley near the mount Radogan, 10 miles far from

\(^{45}\) ASV, Senato Deliberationi Secrete, register 65, pp. 133r – 33v.

\(^{46}\) ASV, Senato Deliberationi Secrete, register 65, pp. 133r – 33v: ritornando da Sibenico un caravana de circa 40 cavalli et altratanti murlachi con li sale che havevano levato per condurli alle case loro, essendo sta accompagnata la ditta caravana dalla nostri fino fuori del nostro territorio et quella arrivata ad uno loco ditto Pacleniza dela dal monte Tarme circa tre miglia in loci et territorio de Musulmani fi assaltata da uscochi circa 40 dalli quali i murlachi furono rotti et morti, uno ferito, 20 fugiti et il resto fatti schiavi.

\(^{47}\) ASV, Senato Deliberationi Mar, filze 26 un-numbered.
city. With this occasion Renesi proved to be very skillful since he managed to save the life and the money of the Morlachs and also to injure a few Uskoks and even to kill one of them, all of these even if his horse was also injured. As a consequence the Venetian officials from Dalmatia recommend him to be rewarded by the good and the generosity of the Republic.

Therefore, as inhabitants of a border region, Ottoman subjects tolerated in the Venetian hinterland, the Morlachs became victims of the Uskoks even if in most of the situations they are not involved in activities that support the policy of a state or another. The Uskok intrusion problem is specific for the entire territory of Dalmatia, being mentioned even more often once they established their new home in Segna. The damages they produce, their violent actions and the tacit protection they benefit from the Habsburgs will represent an internal challenge for many of the Venetian officials and an important role in the evolution of Stato da Mar.

Taking everything into consideration it can easily be observed that being involved in the regional commerce of Dalmatia the Morlachs are more that savage outsiders. In spite of the fact that this Morlach commerce does not monopolize the commercial activity of Dalmatia, it appears to be a reality of which take full advantage both the Venetians and the Ottomans. The opportunity seems to connect the two types of commerce practiced by Morlachs in Dalmatia. Coming to buy salt, which being not in the best quality had a small price (they used it for the animals, the various activities of sheep breading), the Morlachs bring various manufactured products and buy merchandise difficult to obtain in other circumstances. On the other side, the Venetian treasury in Sibenik gains a lot of advantages: a good income from selling significant salt quantities, subsistence products at small prices and land market for local products, all of these as a result of a free trade (no taxes for transport, etc.)

Moreover, as Ottoman subjects, the Morlachs and their caravans became key element in the policy of border region. The caravans must be protected and their transit has to be helped, for the sake of the commercial accords concluded between Venice and Ottoman Empire. This is why the officials from the Dalmatian cities not only must pay a special attention on the Morlachs caravans transiting the territory, but also to provide them with escorts, guards till beyond the border. The fact is so important especially because of the Uskok raids. In their attempt of stopping the Ottoman offensive (the Uskok’s official duty) the Uskoks

attack quite often the Morlach caravans, since they are Ottoman subjects, maybe the most inoffensive ones. Venice is involved in these border misunderstandings because there are not few situations in which Venetian subjects allies with the Uskoks and produce damages in the Ottoman territory. This is why the Venetian authorities from Dalmatia have always to make a proof of the protection they gave to the Morlach caravans. (for all three Uskok attacks over the Morlach caravans occurred in Dalmatia during the first 6 months of the year 1547, numerous letters are sent in Venice, in Istanbul, for the Ottoman regional authorities, for Sultan, for the Great Visir, and so on, all to prove that Venice provided the caravans with guards till beyond the border and did everything possible to save the damages when the guards were not enough).

If it is to question how much counts the income produced by the Morlach commerce the numbers mentioned in various sources are quite large. The biggest income I found is mentioned by Antonio Diedo in his report to the Senate and is approximated at 400 000 ducats per year (he puts together the Morlach commerce and the horse selling income). Whether or not the profit the Morlachs bring in the local fiscal offices is so big it can’t be denied the fact that the Morlach commerce is a reality based on opportunity. Venice accepts this commerce because it spares the Republic from the obligation to bring supply products from other regions (even though in Zara arrive periodically ships with grain from Levant) and allows it not to reduce its central profits and policy which demands that all important products should be sold in Venice. Equally, Serenissima keeps untouched the status of the Dalmatian cities well known as port cities or scale cities. Accepting the internal commerce practiced by Morlachs, with not so many expenses on its side, Venice assures itself with the fidelity of the Dalmatian cities, with the protection of the roads and border and with the bases for the desired peace with the Ottomans.

One last observation targets the Morlach behavior in this commercial practice. In general, the Morlachs accept and respect the commercial rules set by Venetian Republic and Ottoman Empire, establish prolific business relationships with the locals and ensure the continuity of the practice. The involvement of the Morlachs in the Dalmatian regional commerce represents a positive side profile for this population with still mysterious origins.
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DIPLOMATIC REFLECTIONS OF ERDEL PROBLEM ON THE OTTOMAN-AUSTRIA RELATIONS DURING THE 17th CENTURY

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Introduction

Erdel named as *Erdil* or *Erdelistan* in Turkish sources was the name of Transylvania region during the Ottoman Empire period. Today it is the northwest side of Romania. The origin of its name comes from the word *Erdely* which means “beyond forest” in Hungarian. However, it is used as Ardeal in Romanian language.

The first settlers of Erdel in which lots of states reigned throughout history, were the Thracians and Daks who lived in this region during the period 2000 B.C. Then, respectively Pecenek and Kuman (Kipchaks), Turkish tribes, were settled down this area which had been under the control of Huns, Slavs and Hungarians since 10th century. Later on time, the first Ottomans contact with this region which was then under Hungarian control, started as a result of Ottoman-Hungarian relation. After Hungarian state was terminated in 1526 with the Battle of Mohács, Erdel turned out to be a problem that would continue for many years between the Ottoman Empire and Austria. Erdel which was belonged to Ottoman Empire in 1541, became a voivodship with a tributary status. With this status, it was belonged to Ottomans for 150 years between 16th and 17th centuries. Erdel was left to Austria with Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) which was signed as a result of Battles of

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1] The region after coming under Romanian control in 1920, got the name Transylvania which means “city beyond the forests” (terra ultra silvas) in Latin, see: Kemal Karpat, “Erdel”, DİA, XI, İstanbul 1995, p. 280.
Holy Alliance started in 1683. It was ten turned into a principality and managed by a Habsburg governor. However, in this specified period, the issue of Erdel was always a challenge for Ottoman Empire and Austria, and this would reflect in diplomatic relations between the two parties. The main aim of this study is to identify how the Erdel problem had an impact on the diplomatic relations between Ottoman and Austria in the 17th century. To do this evaluation, treaty texts signed between the two state in the 17th century, has been examined and the articles in those treaties about Erdel have been underlined. As a second stage, the impact of Erdel problem on Ottoman-Austria relations have been described via the interpretation of these articles in details. Thus, not only the question of how political and military development influence diplomatic relations was adressed, but also how diplomatic and military developments affected the diplomatic relations between the two powers was answered. This answers made it almost possible to define the result of Erdel problem via official documents. At this point, one can say that the use of text of treaties are important in the studies on Ottoman diplomacy and foreign relations that they would help in diagnosing some issues in the history.

1. Erdel as a Problem in Ottoman-Austria Relations from the Beginning till the 17th Century

The first contacts between Ottoman Empire and Erdel started at the second half of 14th century. Starting from 1391 Ottoman organized lots of expeditions to Erdel which continued a long time until the end of 17th century. However the serious problems concerning Erdel began with the start of Ottoman-Hungary relations.Hungarians became the most important competitor against Ottomans who was expanding in the Balkans. Hungarians considering themselves as Christians and sitting on Europe's easternmost border due to its geographical position, undertook the task of defending Europe. However after they realized that it was not possible to wage against Ottomans by themselves, they formed a Christian alliance against the Ottomans (1396). But, the expedition launched with great hopes, was resulted with frustration and defeat on the side of Westerner alliance. Then with the conquest of Belgrade in 1521 a period of Ottoman penetration in

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Hungary commenced bringing the two powers in a state of closer relations\textsuperscript{11}. This new situation together with Hungarians’ heavy defeat at the battle of Mohács\textsuperscript{12} in 1526 resulting from the impact of developments in Europe, brought about the end of Hungarian kingdom\textsuperscript{13}. Just after the fall of the Hungarian Kingdom, since the north and northwest part of Hungary remained under Austrian control which was the main cause of the fights between Ottoman and Austria. This struggle between the two states continued during 16th and 17th centuries\textsuperscript{14}. The same resulted in a new process for Erdel. After the death of king Lajos of Hungary during the war \textsuperscript{15}, with no child, voivode Yanos of Erdel (Szapolya Janos, 1526-1540) was declared as king \textsuperscript{16}. So as a consequence of the battle of Mohács, Hungarian territories were divided into three portions; Ottoman’s Hungary, Habsburg’s Hungary and Erdel, the final was then owned by Otoman Empire as a voivodship\textsuperscript{17}. Finally Central Hungary up to the Tisza river that was the hearth of Hungary-right and left side of Danube River, was turned in an Ottoman border province. In Erdel (Tansyvania) situated beyond Tisza River, there was established a new vaivodship\textsuperscript{18}. This situation marked the beginning of the Ottoman domination in Hungary for a period of 150 years until 1686\textsuperscript{19}. Due to the claim of kinship with Habsburgs in Hungary by King Ferdinand of Austria\textsuperscript{20} and the selection of Ferdinand as the King of Hungary by Hungarian noblemen who were favored by the Habsburgs

\textsuperscript{11} Uğur Kurtaran, \textit{Osmanlı Avusturya Diplomatik İlişkileri (1526-1791)}, Kahramanmaraş 2009, p. 27.


\textsuperscript{18} Kurtaran, p. 33.


\textsuperscript{20} Ferdinand who got the management of Habsburg Empire’s Austria and Bohemya side after the death of Hungarin king II. Lajos, claimed right on Hungary due to the marriage of his sister with IInd Lajos, Emecen, “Süleyman I”, 64.
complicated the situation. Because of this situation, the new Hungary King who asked Ottomans for help, made the loyalty promise. Ottoman forces made two consequent expeditions in 1529 and in 1532. Upon the treaty signed as a result of these expeditions, the pressure on Habsburgs was abolished. However, in the following years, the fights between the town parties started again. After Szapolya Janos King of Hungary passed away in 1540 he was substituted by his son (Zsigmond Janos) as the new king by the Ottomans. So in 1541 Erdel region became a voivodship with a tributary status towards the Ottomans.

After becoming a voivodship under Ottoman suzerainty in 1541, Erdel acted freely in its internal affairs but under Ottoman control in terms of foreign affairs for the next 150 years. During that period and in accordance with treaty, Süleyman I promised not to leave Erdel, to protect liberty of Zsigmond and defend his country. In return, Zsigmond engaged to pay 10,000 gold as tax to Ottoman state beginning from 1541. Besides, it was decided that Hungary would give certain amount of gifts on yearly basis. In this way, Erdel's status under Ottoman suzerainty from 1541 had an impact on the diplomatic relations between Ottoman Empire and Austria. Accordingly, in the treaties of 1547,

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23] This treaty that signed June, 22 1533 but not written, was the first official treaty that signed between Austria and Ottoman Empire. According to the treaty; Ferdinand would left his rights on Hungary and would accept Zapolya as Ottoman's territory. And also, Ottoman Empire would accept the Ferdinand's domination on North Hungary and wanted to pay from them 30,000 gold, see: Kurttaran, p. 31-32.
1562, 1566, 1568 and 1576 between Ottomans and Hungary Erdel was accepted as part of Ottoman state, but in one of them there were articles about Erdel.

At title section of treaty that signed in, Erdel was seen as a territory that belonged to Sultan, see: “Ben ki sultân-ı selâtîn-ı şark u garb sâhib kırân-ı memâlik-i Rûm u Acem u Arab kahraman-ı kevn u mekân nerîmân-ı zemîn-i zemán Akdeniz-ün ve Karadeniz-ün ve Kabe-i mu’azzâmâ ve Medine-i müneiderverenin ve Kuds-i şerîf-ün ve taht-ı Mîsr-ı nadiretü’l-asrın ve vilâyet-ı Yemen u Aden u San’a’nun ve Darû’s-selâm-ı Bağdad u Basra ve Lahsa’nun ve Medâyîn-i Anuşirrevân-ün ve diyâr-ı Cezâyîr u Azerbaycân’ün ve Deşt-i Kipcak ve diyâr-ı Tâtâr-ün ve Diyar-ı bekr u Kürdîstân ve Lurîstân’ün ve külliyen Rum îli ve Anadolu ve Karaman ve Elâm ve Boğdan ve Üngûrûs memleketlerinin ve bunlardan gayrî nice memâlik-î diyâr-ı a’zimü’l-i’tibûrun pâdîşâhi ve sultânî Sûlêyman Hân ibn Sultân Selim Hânım”, Kurtaran, p. 53; At Treaty in sections about Erdel, Ferdinand would act in peace for 8 years with Erdel king Yanoş. And also Ferdinan had to act in peace in Hungarian cities and all side of Tîtsa river which was not in Erdel region. If he did not obey this treaty, it would be a hostility and the treaty was not valid, see: Kurtaran, p. 54; Again about this treaty, Palazi Mihal and Nikola Batori had to be accepted as Erdel governors. And two sides governors could not fight. And the people of two side had to inform their king if there was a problem, see: Kurtaran, p. 56.

Again, Erdel was not in the lands as Sultan’s territory in the treaty of 1566, see: “Ben ki sultân-ı selâtîn-ı şark u garb sâhib kırân-ı memâlik-i Rûm Acem û Arap kahraman-ı kevn û mekân nerîmân-ı meyân-ı zemîn u zamân Akdeniz-ün ve Karadeniz-ün ve Kabe-i mu’azzâmâ ve Medine-i mükerremenin ve Kuds-î şerîfîn ve taht-ı Mîsr-ı nadiretü’l-asrîn ve vilâyet-ı Yemen u Aden u San’a’nun ve darû’s-sedât-ı Bağdad u Basra ve Lahza’nun ve Medâyîn-i Anuşirrevân’ün ve diyâr-ı Cezâyîr u Azerbaycân’ün ve Deşt-i Kipcak ve diyâr-ı Tâtâr-ün ve Kürdîstân u Lurîstân’ün ve külliyen Rumîli ve Anadolu ve Karaman ve Elâm ve Boğdan’ün ve Üngûrûs memleketlerinin ve bunlardan gayrî nice memâlik-î diyâr-ı a’zimü’l-i’tibûrun pâdîşâhi ve sultânî Sûlêyman Hân ibn Sultân Selim Hânîn”, Kurtaran, s. 63; in other sections of agreement about Erdel; nobody could do any hostility both in Austria and Ottoman Empire and to this peace period Boğdan, Üngûrûs, Erdel and Bosna which were under control of Ottoman, had to be added, see: Kurtaran, p. 66.

At the treaty signed in1568, in the sections about Erdel; Erdel king who was under control of Ottoman, could not fight if there was not any attack from Austria side. And also in another section, it is seen that Erdel king’s claims about Austria were exminated. BOA, Nemçelî Ahidnamesi, nr. 57/1, p. 1-3.

At the Treaty of 1576 date, Voyvodas of Erdel (Transylvania) and Boğdan (Moldavia) were joint to the treaty with their lands and they pointed out that they would not hurt the people who moved to Ottoman., see: “memâlik-î mahrûsemiz muzafâtından tasarrufumuzda olan vilâyêt halkîndan ve Erdel memleketi ahâlisinden ve Ellak ve Boğdan voyvodalarından ve sâ’ir harâc-gûzar kefere kullûrûn ve âsitâne-i sa’a’det unvânûnû va ilîcî edenlerden aslâ size müte’âllîk olan memleket ve vilâyete re’yây ve berîyanîz ve taht-ı hükümûtûnîzde olan kal’a ve varoş ve kurânîza dahl û ta’arruz itdirîrîm”, BOA, Nemçelî Ahidnamesi, nr. 57/1, p. 4.

For transcripts and analysis of Agreement, see: Uğur Kurtaran, Osmanlı Avusturya Diplomatik
However Habsburgs did not give up their demands on Erdel and Hungary at any time neither give up to fight for Erdel. Ottoman statesmen comprehending this situation, maintained their domination on Erdel and Hungary until end of 17th century thanks to the administrative organization that they set up in the region with the practice of martial law. However there were some breaks due to some disturbance, Ottoman army succeeded in putting the region under the Ottoman domain specifically in 1551 in Erdel. During the reign of Istevan Bathory, King of Erdel between 1571 and 1576, the region played an important role for the equilibrium between Ottomans and Hasburgs. However his successors did not continue to pursue same politics, Erdel fell under control of Habsburgs at the beginning of 17th century.

2. Erdel (Transylvania) Problem in Ottoman-Austria Relations during the 17th Century

As explained above, the domination set up by the Ottoman Empire in Erdel in 1541, began to shake at the end of that century. As a result of faulty policies that were applied by Bathory Kristof (1576-1581) and especially Bathory Zsigmund (1581-1602) who replaced Istevan Bathory, King of Erdel who died in 1576, Erdel again fell under Habsburg control. With the Ottoman-Austria war of 1593-1606, Erdel King who were on Austria side, accepted the domination of King Rudolf of Austria. However the King of Erdel Bathory Andreas had to flee from the region since his allies Austrians had been defeated by the Ottomans in Hacova. As a result, Bocskay Ístevan was acceded to the throne as the King of Erdel by Ottomans in 1604. Austria which deprived of support during those situation, sought for a new agreement. After negotiations between the parties, Treaty of Zitvatoruk was signed in 1606 at the end of Ottoman-Austria Wars which is famous as

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38] Decei-Gökbilgin, p. 300.
“Long-Turkish wars”\textsuperscript{40}. This treaty signed at Zitve Strait in 1606 on a boat\textsuperscript{41} was a milestone for Ottoman diplomacy. With this treaty Rudolf II the King of Austria and Ahmet I the Ottoman Sultan gave up the struggle to gain territory. Again, according to the treaty, Ottoman Empire stopped taking tax from Austria and later on time they had 200 thousands duka gold only once. One of the most important clause int the treaty was that Ottoman Sultan agreed that Austria Casar was officially equal to himself\textsuperscript{42}. Consequently, for the first time the title of Casar of Austria was accepted and superiority of Ottomans that had continued since 16th century ended. This also resulted in loss of prestige in Ottoman diplomacy and “the understanding of not to see any state as equal with themselves” that Ottoman Empire had previously accepted as diplomatic principle terminated.

Additionally, there were articles in Treaty of Zitvatoruk about Erdel which was then main problem between Ottomans and Austria. After the introduction\textsuperscript{43}, the first article in this sense was that Austria could not make any attack to Erdel, Wallachia and Moldavia which were situated within the Ottoman borders\textsuperscript{44}. Another article about Erdel goes like the castles and palankas around Erdel were given to Bocskay Istevan and it was said that they had not been damaged or attacked\textsuperscript{45}. One of the articles about Erdel was about the captives and their status which were like classic ahidnâme articles. According to them, the captives including king of Erdel and Hungary Bockayi Iştevan and his Hungarian people had to be free\textsuperscript{46}.
Two years after the treaty, Bocskay who left the Ottoman lands made an agreement with Rudolf. According to this agreement, some of the territories were given to him but with his death in 1608 Bathory Gabor was placed to the throne. In order to eliminate unrest caused by the new King, Ottoman Empire sent an army under the command of İskender Pasha (1613). Gabor was captured and killed and Bethlen was selected as new king by the state board. In consequence Erdel came down, once more, under Ottoman control in 1613. However, Austrian Emperor by pointing out the treaty signed by King Bockay of Erdel in Vienna and approved by the Ottomans, claimed that region had to be given him after the death of Bockay in accordance with the treaty. In fact Erdel was a territory taken by sword of the sultan and it could not be left in such a way. Because of Ottoman Empire rejected the demand, the problem emerged again. The two sides could solve the issue without resorting to war. After Ottomans delegates visit of Vienna in 1615 an agreement between Ottoman Empire and Austria was signed (28 June 1615). This treaty approved the prolongation of (1606) Zitvatoruk Agreement for a certain time. Some 12 articles were added up to the Treaty of Zitvatoruk extending the validity of the agreement (1615). Ottoman Empire gave trade concessions to Australians, similiarly given to French and English earlier. Moreover

52] According to the 10th article of Treaty, see: “Roma İmparatorluğu vilayetlerinde ve Avusturya oçağında olanlar hükümetlerinde ve kralik yerlerinde tückär tâ’ifesî ki meta’ ve nakd ile memâlik-i mahrûseme gelmek istedikde Roma İmparatoru’nun bayrâğı altında ve ellerinde temessükâti olmayanca bu cânîbe gelmelerine icâzet virilmeye eğer bayrak ve temessükâtsız gelürlerse gemilerin ve meta’ ve nakdiyelerin ve Roma İmparatoru’nun kapu kethûdâsî ve konsoloslar girift idüp ol cânîbe bildürsünler ve Roma İmparatoru’na ve Avusturya (ocağına tâbi’ olan tückär tâ’ifesi) ve İspanya kralına ve Filandere vilayetine vesâ’ir vilayetlerine tâbi’ tückär tâ’ifesî Roma İmparatoru’nun bayrâğı altında memâlik-i mahrûsemize gemi ve nakd u meta’ ile sağ ve sâlim gelüp gideler vesâ’ir bey’ eyledikleri meta’lardan yüzden üç gümrük virûp ve satun aldıkları meta’lardan yine yüzden üç aççe gümrük vireler”, Nemçelü Ahidnâmesi,
Ottoman Empire officially gave the right to the Christians to repair their church and make religious celebration freely\(^{53}\). Savaş put the blame of Ottoman retreat accepted in the treaty of 1615 and its surrender almost without any military resistance on some political occurrences such as Jalali rebellions and Iranian war\(^{54}\). The Treaty of Zitvatoruk which brought peace in 1606, and Treaty of Vienna which sustained the peace period with Austria from 1615 to 1663 could not solve the problem of Erdel. As the second article of Treaty states\(^{55}\), all articles contained in Treaty of Zitvatoruk were likewise accepted. In this context, they did not add any new article about Erdel to this treaty which was predicted to last for 20 years\(^{56}\). All the new 12 articles were about trade\(^{57}\). A while after this treaty signed between parties the peace period was extended for another 20 years, Thirty Years Wars (1618-1648) started in Europe\(^{58}\). By the way, Ferdinand II succeeding Emperor Matyas of Australian upon his death in 1619 sent a delegate to continue the peace
period\textsuperscript{59}. After a meeting of Austrians and Ottomans on 12 September 1628 a new treaty containing 11 articles was signed that would be valid for 25 years\textsuperscript{60}. Signed after the Treaty of Vienna in 1615, this new treaty was also a prolongation of Treaty of Zitvatoruk (1606). This new treaty approved all articles both in Treaty of Zitvatoruk and Vienna\textsuperscript{62}. What is the most important outcome of this treaty of 1628 was that the previously uncertain issues such as trade\textsuperscript{63}, exchange of prisoners\textsuperscript{64} and reconstruction of Poland were completely solved. On the contrary, this treaty (1628) could not find a solution for Erdel problem either. There was not any new article about Erdel in the treaty, but only that the name of Lord Gabor Bethlen of Erdel was seen together with the names of other delegates that sent by

\textsuperscript{59} BOA. İ. HR. nr. 314/526.

\textsuperscript{60} See: “Sâbıkâ olan sulhün müddetinden ancak dokuz yıl kalmağa fukarâ-yı âsûde olmak ve serhâder ma’mur olmak için yeniden bu sulh u salâhün müddeti yirmi beş yıl olacaği tarafeynîn mübahâşir-i sulh olan vükelaşı mukul ve münâsib görmüşlerdir ve taraf-ı hümâyânuzda rızâ gösterilmiştir”, Nemçelî Ahidnâmesi, nr. 57/1, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{61} Uzunçarşılı, III, p. 193; See: “Merhûm Sultan Ahmed Han zamanında bin otuz yedi senesiinde taraf-ı hümâyûndan Nêmçê Çasari’na virilen ahidnâme-i hümâyûndur”, Nemçelî Ahidnâmesi, nr. 57/1, p. 10-14.

\textsuperscript{62} This situation was explained at 1st article of treaty, see: “Bilinmek lâzımdır bu vechle sulh-ı salâha ve hayûrlu barışığa münâsib olan maddelerki Jitve Boğazı’nda ve Beç ve Komaran ve Karmanda bitürümüşdür şimdiki halde tâ’bir olunmadıysa ve yeniden bir gayrî dürülü olmadıysa her biri yerî yerinde kalsun ve iki tarafdan bozulmayub muhkm tutulsun”, Nemçelî Ahidnâmesi, nr. 57/1, p.12.

\textsuperscript{63} See: “Bundan evvel olan bitürmelerde sulh ahvâli bunun üzerine karar virilmışdır, çetelere tenbihi te’kid olunmuşdur ki iki tarafin dahi vilayetlerinden bazargânlar vesâ’ir yolcular iki cânibinden emin ve emân üzere olub her kim buna muhâlâf şuç işlerse vükela-ı-yi devlet ve cezzâller ve kapudânlar tarafından haklarandan geçeler eğer bunlar haklarından gelmeseler buna muhâlâf iş idenlerin Budin’de olan vezîrimiz ve ol tarafda Macar vilayetinin palatinoşu haklarından geçeler”, Nemçelî Ahidnâmesi, nr. 57/1, p.13.

\textsuperscript{64} See: “Tutsâklar ahvâli bu vech üzere karar virilmışdır ki bu müşâvereye esnasında alınmıştır ol vire ki Budin muhafazâsında olan vezîrimiz ve Macar vilayetinin palatinoşu mabeynlerinde olmuşdur ol vire içinde alnan tutsâklar iki tarafdan bile behâsz koyuviirele ândan sonra evvel alnan tutsâklar bedel-i tutsâk ile verilip ve behâ ile çiçakak Budin muhafazâsında olan vezîrimiz ile Macar vilayeti palatinoşu tahsis etsünler”, Nemçelî Ahidnâmesi, nr. 57/1, p.13.
Austria\textsuperscript{65}. Here, the titles (elkab)\textsuperscript{66} and form of pray\textsuperscript{67} used for Lord of Erdel were the same classic type applied to the foreign emperors and officials. Once again, this treaty of 1628 extended the duration of peace to the year 1663, but it did not find out any solution to Erdel problem.

Meanwhile, following the death of Gabor Bethlen in 1529, his first son Rakoczi (1642) took the administration in Erdel\textsuperscript{68} and was followed by his second son Rakocyzi (1648-1660)\textsuperscript{69}. Owing to the bad management of Rakoczi II and of claiming some rights in Poland Kingdom, Ottoman army under the command of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha captured the region in 1658\textsuperscript{70}, deposed Rakocyzi and put Barcsay Akos in charge\textsuperscript{71}. However, stemming a developing problem in Erdel in 1661 Apafiy Mihaly was brought to the throne (1661-1690)\textsuperscript{72}. This peace period continued until 1663 when Mehmed IV decided to declare war over Austria because Australian Emperor causing troubles in Erdel according to the news coming from Austrian border\textsuperscript{73}. The reason why Ottomans broke the treaty and decided to wage a war against Austria was the occupation of Austrian army of two castles owned by Erdel on Austrian border named Sikellid and Kolojvar\textsuperscript{74}. Another major cause was that Austria had built a castle called Serinvar (Yenikale) in Western Hungary in defiance of Treaty of Zitvatoruk.\textsuperscript{75} During the war, Ottoman army
occupied Uyvar\(^{76}\), and Austria inflicted a defeat on the Ottomans at St. Gatthord\(^{77}\). Treaty of Vasvar signed on 10 August 1664 terminated the war\(^{78}\). This treaty contained 10 articles valid for 20 years\(^{79}\) which would exist until Vienna War of 1683\(^{80}\). The Treaty of Vasvar was about the security problems between the parties\(^{81}\) as well as demolition of the new castles\(^{82}\). In this treaty Erdel was depicted as a territory of Sultan\(^{83}\). Also the 7th article in the section concerning Erdel, it stipulates the return of the castles which had previously been given to Roman Emperor


77] Beydilli, p. 174; Hüseyin Şevket Çağıtay Çapraz, “XVII. Yüzyıl Macar Millet Anlayışının İdeolojik İçeriği Açısından Bir Örnek: Kuruz Hareketi ve Askeri Potansiyeli”, Karadeniz Araştırmaları, Kış 2011, p. 28, s. 67; Abdülkadir Özcan points out that Ottoman Army did not be defeated, but this situation was exaggerated by Western sources. But in Ottoman sources, it is pointed out as a small defeat, see: Abdülkadir Özcan, “Köprülünlü Fazıl Ahmed Paşa”, DİA, XXVI, İstanbul 2002, p. 261; Ayrıca Sn. Gothard Defeat see: Ahmed Muhtar, Sen Gotarda Osmanlı Ordusu, İstanbul 1326; Raif Ekrem, Sen Gotar Seferi (1662-1664), İstanbul 1934; Wilhelm Nottebohm, Motecelli und die Legende von St. Gothard (1664), Berlin 1887; Kurt Peball, Die Schlacht bei St. Gothard-Magersdorf, Wien 1664.


81] See:“ Tarafedde askeri bir türlü hile ve bahâne ile çeteye çıkmayub ve çete nâmiyle şerreten ve hileye sülük idenleri tarafının hâkimleri ve zâbitleri muhkem haklardan geleler”, (Article: 5), Nemçelü Ahidnâmesi, nr. 57/1, p. 18.

82] See:“ Varad kal’ası kurbunda Seykelhid ka’ası yaklub harâb ola tarafından ta’mir olunmaya”,(Article: 9), Nemçelü Ahidnâmesi, nr. 57/1, p. 18.

during the Erdel problem due to the rebellion of Rakoçi and Kemeni Yanoş, to Erdel. The same treaty was given to Austria which had 5 articles in relation with Erdel. The articles concerning Erdel were as followings:

Article 1: “Erdel memleketinde Nemçe askerinin ihraç olunması maddesidir evvelki ahidnâmede yokdur Roma İmparatorunun askerleri Erdel içinde zebt iyle-dikleri kal’a ve palankâları Erdel hâkimine ve a’yân vilâyetine teslim idüb ammâ ol tarafın askerleri ikisi bile bir vakıtte Erdel’den çıkub serhâdlerden çekildü andan zikr olunan kal’alar ves’ir Erdel memleketi üslûb-ı sâbık üzre âsûde-hâl olup Erdel hükümeti mahlül oldukda eskiden olan ahidname-i hümâyûnum mücibince aralârında hüsn-ı rizâlariyla hâkim olacak âdemi aralarında bulalar ve her vechle eski âdetleri üzre âzâd ve âsûde-hâl olalar”.

This article about the Austria army to desert Erdel did not exist in 1st ahid-name (treaty). According to this, the army of Roman Emperor and Ottoman army had to leave Erdel simultaneously, the army of Roman Emperor was to evacuate and return the castle and redoubts to Erdel, which were occupied formerly. And also, the parties agreed on the free elections for the throne of Erdel by the own will of the its inhabitants, as it already existed in the previous treaty.

Article 2: “Erdel’e müte’âllik ahvâldir evvelki ahidnâmede bu kadar hîn-i sulhde sulh için Erdel vilâyetinde ahidnâmeden ve Nemçe’ye virilen Ermeki didikleri yedi nâhiye yerendir ve Roma İmparatorunun Çatmar ve Cabuluk nâm iki nahiyesi ves’ir kendiye müte’âllik olan memleket ve vilayet ve nâhiyelerinde ve ânlar tâbî’ olan re’âyâ ve şehr ve kala’ ve palankâ husûsen kadîmden Nemçe Çasârı’na tâbî’ olan hayduşa tâ’îfesi ki Erdel’e tâbî’ olan Hayduşâganın gayrîden ânlara mahsus olan kal’a ve karyelere bir vechle ve bir bahâne ile rencide olunmayub def’ oluna”.

This article is about the status of territories that belonged to Erdel. According to this, the cities, provinces, castles and redoubts particularly Çatmar (Szatmár) and Cabuluk (Szabolcs) had to be returned to the Roman Emperor and the bandits inside to be allowed cavating them without any insult.

Article 3: “Ermekiden Roma İmparatorunun iki nâhiyesinde ve ol serhâd-lerde olan kal’a ve palankâlarımı husûsân Macar ve Karlu ve Kalu ve Ecid (?) nâm
This article is also about the status of territories that belonged to Erdel. According to this, the castles and redoubts that belonged to Romen Emperor from Ermeki, had to be protected by repairing them and Seykelhid castle would be destroyed forever and would not be rebuilt and either protected by army with any equipment in order to eliminate evil in the region.

Article 4: “Okcı Oğlı ve Kemin Yanoş oğlu veyâhûd Orta Macar bir gayrî ki mesne zabt olunub Erdel içine asker ile gelüb yeniden kil u kale ve fitneye sebep olma mak için ruhsât virilmeye kezâlık İslam ve Erdel tarafının Nemçe İmparatoru’nun memleketlerine ve nahiyelerine bu makûle kimesne gitmege ruhsât virilmeye.”

According to 4th article; no one including the family of Kemeni would not be allowed to send any army to and intervine in Erdel and Erdel side would not allow anyone to penetrate in the territories of Nemçe Emperor.

Article 7: “Erdel hareketi esnasında bu tara fa Paval cânîbine sığınan Erdellü ler’e gerü vilâyetlerine varub yurtlar nda olub emlâkların zabt idüb kendi håll erinde olalar kimesne rencide eylemeye ve hâkimlerine tâbi’ olup vilâyetlerine zarârî işler de bulunmayalar.”

This article stipulates that the people of Erdel who had escaped to Paval side during the Erdel problem could return their homes, and their properties had to be restored and they could live themselves.

In this way, during Mihaly period Erdel territory was peaceful, but a new problem was about to come up. This was the rebellion of Hungarian aristocrats who had pressure from Austria and after the suppression of the rebellion, the recourse of the Protestant population who came to Erdel from Ottoman lands. Ottoman Government responding to the demand positively, decided to support Thököly İmre who was the leader of Hungarian aristocrats. The title of Central Hungarian king and ahidname were bestowed upon Thököly İmre by Sultan

88] Nemçelü Ahidnâmesi, nr. 57/1, p. 19.
89] Nemçelü Ahidnâmesi, nr. 57/1, p. 19.
90] Nemçelü Ahidnâmesi, nr. 57/1, p. 20.
91] BOA. İE. HR. nr. 3/329; BOA. AE. SAMII, nr. 11/1193; And also financial assistance was made by Bab-î âli to Tökeli İmre, see: BOA. İE. Hr. nr. 3/306.
Mehmed IV\(^92\). King Leopold of Austria who followed the developments with concern, demanded peace from Ottomans. But, heavy conditions that put forward by Grand Vizier Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha who was in preparation for an expedition over Vienna, jeopardize the peace between the two states\(^93\). In the historical war that resulted in, badly organized Ottoman army had a terrible defeat\(^94\). By the way, King Apafy of Erdel who attended to 2nd Vienna war, changed his side in favour of Austrians and made an agreement with them after the defeat\(^95\). In this treaty he gave over the region to Austria (1687). So, it was the end of the Ottoman domination in Erdel which started in 1641.\(^96\). During a period of time when Ottoman Army was predominant against Austria, Erdel passed to Ottomans but Ottoman army could not stand the pressure of Austrian army and Erdel fell under Austrian control in 1699 with Treaty of Karlowitz legally\(^97\). Treaty of Karlowitz which were signed by Austria, Poland and Venice, was a milestone for Ottoman history. With this treaty, after having lost a huge territory for the first time in their history, the domination of Ottomans against western world came to an end. Also this treaty was the first treaty between the Ottomans and European Holy Alliance\(^98\). In this treaty forseen to be valid for 25 years, Ottoman Empire signed 20 articles with Austria\(^99\), and accepted to leave Hungary and Erdel to Austria\(^100\). So that Ottoman borders would be retracted from the end of Eflâk border to Morş river. Then, that new border would be accepted. In accordance with the treaty, it was decided to secure borders of Erdel and Austria and not to make any border vi-

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\(^{92}\) Kurtaran, p. 91.
\(^{95}\) Karpat, “Erdel”, p. 282.
\(^{97}\) BOA. IE. ML. nr. 34/3264; Decei-Gökbilgin, s. 302-305; Çeliker, s. 9; Karpat, “Erdel”, s. 282; David, “Macaristan”, p. 290.
lations. According to the second article of treaty\textsuperscript{101}; Temesvăr (Banat) city would pass to Ottoman Empire with all its provinces and rivers. The borders of this regions were Morş River in the North, Tisa River in West. Drinking water of cargo and passenger animals, fishing, traders’ transitions and transport from Morş and Tisa rivers would be allowed. The islands that located on Morş and Tisa rivers, would be left to Çasar side. Afterwards, Austria removed the status of autonomy in this region, and appoint a governor to Erdel. This new status of Erdel continued until the second half of the 19th century.\textsuperscript{102}

**Conclusion**

In 1541, Erdel (Transyvania) began to be governed in a vassal status by Ottoman Empire during the reign of Suleiman The Magnificent. Since then, Ottomans kept the region under their control by assigning a governor. On the other

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\textsuperscript{102} Deceî-Gökbilgin, p. 305.
hand, from this date, there was a constant pressure on Erdel by Austria. Especially, the struggle for the domination over Erdel continued between the two powers as a problem during 16th and 17th centuries. In this regard, in 17th century, some provisions concerning Erdel were added to the treaties signed following the wars between Ottoman Empire and Austria. Thus, Erdel Problem had a great impact on shaping the relations between the powers by influencing the diplomatic relations from Zitvatoruk to the Treaty of Karlowitz in 17th century. This shows us that the international diplomatic relations are subject to political and military developments. In this context, it was declared that rule of Erdel which was formerly added to Ottoman territory in Zitvatoruk Treaty of 1606, was given to a king who would be assigned by Ottomans. Later, in the treaty signed in 1615, there existed no article about Erdel, but this treaty was not efficient to solve the problem. At a second treaty in 1628, there was not any article about Erdel either. The continued peace period was broken in 1662. The Vasvar Treaty of 1664 added Erdel to the Sultan’s territory, and there were articles about future and protection its security. Also, in the document that given to Austria same year, there were 5 articles regarding Erdel. In these articles, there were stipulations of removing the Austria’s pressure on Erdel and repairing castles and redoubts in this region. Finally, after the Battle of Vienna in 1683, it was declared that Erdel would be delivered to Austria in Karlowitz Treaty of 1699. So, at the end of 17th century, formally accepting to leave the region to Austria Ottoman Empire lost his domination on Erdel. To underline, Erdel was one of the main problem between the two powers during the period from 1541 to 1699 and this always had some impacts on their diplomatic relations.
ANNEX-1: In 1609, Erdel (Transylvania)

ANNEX-2: In 1600, Borders of Erdel (Transylvania)
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CATHOLICS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE THROUGH
THE EYES OF ENGLISH TRAVELERS IN THE
17TH CENTURY

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In recent years there has been a growing interest in studying early modern English literature on Islam. Poems, pamphlets, theatrical plays, travel writings, and captivity accounts are being used as historical sources to show how the inhabitants of the British Archipelago interacted with the Muslim Mediterranean and how they viewed this rather strange new world. The main topics put up for analysis have been the Britons’ perception of Islam, their experience in the lands of Muslim rulers in North Africa and the Levant, and the (quite few) Muslim experiences in England. So far scholars have not been interested in using this type of sources to depict how Catholics (and Protestants) lived and traveled in the Ottoman Empire. In this paper I intend to show how early modern English travel literature can be used as a historical source for the status of Catholics in the Ottoman Empire.

Of course the status of non-Muslims in an Islamic state is now, perhaps more than ever, a delicate and most intriguing subject of discussion, but why do I think that it is important to single out the western-rite Christians in the Ottoman Empire from the rest, and more numerous, of the non-Muslim communities living there? For this we have to keep in mind the special status that was given to non-Muslims in the Ottoman legal system. A Christian could be either zimmî – subject of the sultan, paying a tax (cizye or harac) in exchange for the right to practice his faith, or müstemen – a foreigner who could live and travel in the Ottoman domains for a limited amount of time, usually one year, without having

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1] One notable exception can be found in the classic work of Charles A. Frazee, Catholics and Sultans. The Church and the Ottoman Empire 1453-1923, (London, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambrige University Press, 1983), which uses information from travel accounts, but still on a limited scale.
to pay the special tax. Furthermore we encounter the term *frenk* or *frandj*, representing a Catholic or Protestant, basically a westerner or a western-rite Christian, subject or not of the sultan. This is the term that the Ottomans most widely used to describe our subjects of interest and was also used by English travelers (in the form ‘Frank’), even for themselves. Thus, Catholics (or better said Franks) in the Ottoman Empire could be both *zimmi* and *müştemen*, a special feature only rarely encountered in the case of Orthodox Greeks or Jews, for example. Studying the Catholics in the Ottoman Empire gives us a wide view on the status of non-Muslims in an Islamic state in the early modern period.

If documents such as capitulations (‘*ahdname*) and legal opinions (*fetva*) give us the official view on the non-Muslim question in the Ottoman Empire, by studying western travel literature, in this case English, we can observe how foreign Europeans perceived the matter. I will focus on three travel accounts from the first half of the seventeenth century. I have several reasons for selecting this time frame as being appropriate for the present analysis.

First of all, in 1604 the French king became the official protector of the Catholic clerics and pilgrims in the Holy Land. Although such privileges were regularly given to the Franciscans at the Church of Holy Sepulcher (*Kamame*) this was the first time a European Christian power received this sort of privilege from an Ottoman Sultan. Another capitulation in 1673 would extend France’s protectorate on the whole territory of the Ottoman Empire.

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Second of all, this a period of relative peace compared to the troubled turn of the century, when the Ottomans and the Habsburgs were engaged in a bitter war in Central Europe, and to the period from 1645 onwards, when the long war over Crete brought certain anti catholic sentiments. As Molly Greene observed in her first book, the Ottoman-Venetian war signaled the end of an era, “a Mediterranean rivalry with its roots in the late medieval period”. Although a truly impressive study on the social and economic history of Crete before and after the Ottoman conquest, the author doesn’t give much attention to the Catholic community on the island after 1669. This is another reason why I think that studying the particularity of Catholics in the Ottoman Empire is still an important field of research. Religious zeal was determining some Englishmen to consider this conflict as a Holy War between Christendom and Islam. On the other hand, armed conflicts against Catholic States could be perfect opportunities for the Orthodox Greeks to accuse the Franks of spying and sabotaging for the enemy. Studying


7] We must note that as a general trend, Italian clerics lost territory to the French Capuchins and Jesuits. Even so, the Ottomans were aware of the informal French aid to the Venetians, and the French ambassador Jean de la Haye was imprisoned in 1660. Charles A. Frazee, Catholics and Sultans, p. 100. Early on in 1609 when the French ambassador was trying to establish a Jesuit mission in Galata, the Venetian bailo complained to the Ottoman officials that the monks were actually Spanish spies whose mission was to make the Greeks subjects of the Pope. Francis Rey, La protection diplomatique et consulaire dans les échelles du Levant et du Barbarie, avec des documents inédits tirés des Archives du Ministère des affaires étrangèrs Paris: L. Larose & Forcel, 1899, p. 163. Since Catholic missionaries could still work amongst Eastern Christians, even during the war, we can not agree with Basile Homsy’s affirmation that in such times Ottoman Franks were automatically considered rebels. Basile Homsy, Les Capitulations & la protection des chétiens au Proche-Orient aux XVIe, XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, Harissa-Lebanon: Imp. St. Paul, 1956, p. 315.


10] In 1664 an Orthodox bishop accused the Catholics from the island of Chios of working for the Venetians. Charles A. Frazee, Catholics and Sultans, p. 119. These kinds of accusations were being made frequently, not only in times of war. François Alphonse Belin, Histoire de la latinité de Constantinople, préparée et considérablement accrue par l’auteur, revue, augmentée et continuée jusqu’à notre temps par le R.P. Arsène de Chatel, avec deux plans et des gravures, deuxième édition, Paris: Alphonse Picard et Fils, 1899, pp. 176, 244 etc. To point out the
a period of peace can be more revealing, considering we can eliminate from the start the excesses brought on by a state of war.

And third of all, this is the time when English travelers really started to discover the Ottoman Mediterranean, before the Civil War back home. We have testimonies of English ships transporting pilgrims to Jaffa from the fifteenth century, while the sixteenth century saw a large increase of English trade in the Mediterranean, but the only genuine accounts from this period are found in Richard Hakluyt's collection. Translations from foreign authors such as Nicolas de Nolay were the sources from which Englishmen usually collected information about the Ottoman Empire. Starting with the first decades of the seventeenth century Englishmen started to travel to the Orient with the expressed purpose of producing accounts of those foreign lands. Simply put, in the sixteenth century Britons produced very few first-hand accounts about the Sultan's Well Guarded Domains, and after the Restoration of Charles II in 1660 there has been more and more travel literature, leading to the classic Orientalism from the second half of the eighteenth century. As some authors suggested the early seventeenth century Britons didn't have yet an empire and were looking at the Ottomans for a model of Imperial Rule, not as a backward state waiting to be conquered and colonized. Gerald MacLean uses the term 'imperial envy' to describe the attitude of pre-

foreignness of Ottoman Catholics, Orthodox Clergymen were talking about “the Frankish Religion” and insisted that they were the true heirs of Christianity in the East and loyal subjects of the sultan. To indulge Islamic religious fervour, Greeks insisted that Franks represented the sin of innovation. Bruce Masters, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World*, p. 85. Madeline C. Zilfi, 'The Kadizadelis: Discordant revivalism in seventeenth-century Istanbul', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, 45/4 (1986), p. 251.


12] Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques & Discoveries of the English Nation: Made by Sea Or Overland to the Remote & Farthest Distant Quarters of the Earth at Any Time Within the Compass of These 1600 Years*, London: George Bishop and Ralph Newberie, 1589-1600.


lonial Englishmen towards the Ottoman Empire\textsuperscript{16}, while Nabil Matar affirms that England's "relations with the Muslims of North Africa and the Levant were of anxious equality and grudging emulation"\textsuperscript{17} and "even proud and enterprising Britons knew that England did not possess imperial might"\textsuperscript{18}. Fernand Braudel saw the English piracy in the Mediterranean during the last decades of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth century as a sign of weakness, showing that "their place was far from assured in this sea of rich cities and rich ships"\textsuperscript{19}. Englishmen, like the Dutch, were using piracy to increase their revenues from legal commercial activities in a time when they didn't dominate the seas of the Mediterranean\textsuperscript{20}.

For this paper I will use the travel accounts of George Sandys (1577-1644), William Lithgow (1582-1645) and Henry Blount (1602-1682). George Sandys's \textit{A Relation of a Journey begun An. Dom. 1610. Foure Bookees. Containing a description of the Turkish Empire, of Ægypt, of the Holy Land, of the Remote parts of Italy, and Ilands adjoyning} was first published in 1615. The author was later involved in the colonization of Virginia\textsuperscript{21}. William Lithgow's \textit{The Totall Discourse of the Rare Adventures & Painefull Peregrinations of long Nineteene Yeares Travayles from Scotland to the most famous Kingdomes in Europe, Asia and Affrica}, first published in 1632 contains the accounts of the author's three journeys from 1610 to 1621. This Scottish traveler's accounts of Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldavia were also translated and published in Romanian\textsuperscript{22}. Henry Blount's \textit{A Voyage into the Levant. A Brief Relation of a Journey, lately performed by Master H.B. Gentleman, from England by the way of Venice, into Dalmatia, Sclavonia, Bosnah, Hungary, Macedonia, Thessaly, Thrace, Rhodes and Egypt, unto Gran Cairo: With particular ob-

\textsuperscript{17} Nabil Matar, \textit{Turks, Moors and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery}, pp. 7-8
\textsuperscript{18} Nabil Matar, \textit{Turks, Moors and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery}, pp. 11.
\textsuperscript{19} Fernand Braudel, \textit{The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World}, I, p. 629.
\textsuperscript{22} Călători străini despre Țările Române, Volum îngrijit de Maria Holban (redactor responsabil), M.M. Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, Paul Cernovodeanu, Bucharest: Editura Științifică, 1972, IV, pp. 422-29. The Romanian editor of Lithgow’s text expresses doubt that the traveler actually visited this part of Europe.
servations concerning the moderne condition of the Turkes, and other people under that Empire, first published in 1636 contains the author’s travels from 1634-1635. The work consists of two parts, one narrative and the other analytic, which is quite innovative considering the other two authors mixing their story-telling with analysis of the Ottoman history and society. Blount’s Voyage is probably the best known English travel account of the Ottoman Empire in this period, and Gerald Maclean suggests that the second part of this work can be considered as a sign of the future Orientalism of the Enlightenment. All three travelers were educated in universities and were well trained in Latin, which they used to invoke the ancient poems and legends of the Roman Mediterranean. But for the present analysis, the most important fact that we must keep in mind about these authors is that they were Protestants, so a certain hostile attitude towards Catholics should be expected. Except Lithgow, who was tortured by the Spanish Inquisition in Malaga and criticizes the Roman faith and its followers as often as possible, the other two are less inclined to make negative comments, about individual Catholics at least. Catholicism and its “superstitions” are subject to harsh criticism and damnation. Travel writers were also notoriously known to exaggerate their accounts in order to better sell their books. This may be one of the reasons behind the contradictory depictions regarding the status of Christians in the Levant. In my opinion, a researcher can better rely on travel accounts to gather information about Catholics than facts about fauna for example, where the reader often encounters strange and imaginary creatures. Confronting these sources with others such as diplomatic correspondence or missionary reports, can confirm the travelers’ accounts.

The authors show a high degree of curiosity towards the many different religions which coexisted in the Ottoman Domains. One must remember that in this period Jews were still not allowed to settle in England and even if on paper some agreements between the English and Moroccan rulers permitted Muslims merchants to practice their faith freely in Britain that was certainly not the case in real life. Even at the end of the eighteenth century a Muslim in Britain was bound to be “an object of Christian ridicule, persecution, and violence.” Thus, Jews were quite exotic to Blount and Sandys reports on every eastern-rite Church (even on the Maronites who were technically Catholics). They were aware of the activity of Catholic missionaries who spread their faith amongst the Oriental Christians.

The Romane Church they [the Copts] hold for hereticall, and reject all generall Councls, after that of Ephesus. Yet a multitude of late have bin drawne to receive the Popish religion (especially in Cairo) by the industry of Friers, having had the Roman Liturgie sent them from Rome, together with the Bible, in the Arabicke language.26

In this brief passage Sandys captures the work of missionaries which started to intensify in the beginning of the seventeenth century, especially after the foundation of the Congregation _De Propaganda Fide_ in Rome in 1622. Catholic missionaries would attract factions from the Oriental Churches to their cause and establish unions with Rome in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In this particular case of Egyptian Copts, as in other cases throughout the Ottoman Empire, French religious involvement was intertwined with political interest27. By securing a religious tie with the Oriental Christians, the French monarchs, through their representatives in Istanbul hoped to get a firm foothold in the Levant. This was a very different situation from that of the English ambassadors, who were actually appointed by the Levant Company, and approved by the monarch, their role being only an economic and political one28. The few initiatives to open an Anglican church in the Levant were destined to be failures, considering the hostility of the Venetian and French envoys, upholding Catholic interest in the region29. Considering the relative small English community in Galata, consisting of about 25 merchant houses by 164030, one must not be surprised by the absence of an Anglican church there. In fact, our three authors are very silent about the frenks in Galata, and we have to rely on French and Italian accounts for information about the Catholic community of the Ottoman capital.

There is a contradictory attitude between tolerance and thralldom regarding Oriental Christians. On the one hand, the travelers appreciate the liberty with which Christians can practice their faith in the Ottoman Empire. Lithgow even accuses the Greeks of lying about being persecuted by the sultan:


27] The first French Capuchin mission was opened in Cairo in 1630. Charles A. Frazee, _Catholics and Sultans._


True it is, there is no such matter, as these lying Rascals report unto you, concerning their Fathers, their Wives, and Children taken Captives by the Turke: O damnable invention! How can the Turke prey upon his owne Subjects, under whom, they have as great Liberty, save onely the use of Bels, as we have under our Princes. [...] There being a free Liberty of Conscience, for all kinds of Religion, through all his Dominions, as well for us free borne Frankes as for them, and much more them, the Greekes, Armenians, Syriacks, Amoronits, Coptics, Georgians, or any other Oriental sort of Christians.  

The Scottish traveler makes an interesting remark in this passage: in his vision, the non-Muslim subjects of the sultan and foreigners alike enjoyed the same level of religious freedom from the Ottoman authorities. This is particularly interesting since one of the explanations given for the word ‘Frank’ was that it signified the freedom of these Christians, compared to the slavery which described the sultan’s subjects. Indirectly praising the Ottoman religious tolerance, Blount mentions the people of Sicily complaining “that the Greekes lived happier under the Turkes, then they [the Sicilians] under the Spaniards.” In a similar fashion, at the funeral of ambassador Glover’s wife in Istanbul in 1612, the preacher William Forde posed the following question: “The Turke permitteth Christs Gospel to be preached; the Pope condemneth it to the racke and inquisition; who is the better man?” Thus, our Protestant travelers admired the way in which different Christian denominations could practice their faith in the Muslim Well Protected Domains. Compared to the intolerance shown by the Pope or some Catholic Monarchs towards Protestants and even towards eastern Christians, the Ottoman sultan could be viewed by the travelers as a champion of religious tolerance.

On the other hand, Lithgow states that the Turks have no more regard for

35] Braudel observes that when being faced with Catholic Proselytism, the Greeks always preferred the Turks because of their tolerance. The very “survival of the Greek people”, and the Orthodox faith, was linked to the peaceful coexistence with the Ottomans. Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World, II, p. 769.
Christians than for dogs and frequently speaks about the “poore afflicted Christian people under the tenour of these Infidels”. In the same manner, Blount affirms that:

_The Turke takes a more pernicious way to extinguish Christianitie, than ever the Heathen Emperours [of Ancient Rome] did. […] Hee [the sultan] turns the Christian Churches into Meskeetoes, much suppressing the publicke exercise of Religion, especially of the Romish, though not utterly, so that each generation becomes lesse instructed than the other, in so much that at this time (as by tryall I found) many who professe themselves as Christians, scarce know what they meane by being so._

We must remember that, even though Christians could live and practice their religion in the Ottoman Empire, by Europeans Islam was still viewed as a big threat and the discourse on Holy War was still very fashionable in London during the seventeenth century. Every positive statement about the place of Christianity inside Islam had to be counterbalanced by reports of suppression and slavery. This is a common feature of all three travel accounts. They praise the fact that the sultan allows the practice of different religions throughout his vast domains, but not necessarily the method employed. This paradox is found even in Islamic-Ottoman thinking, where the attitude towards Christian foreigners ranged between indifference and hostility.

As we have seen before, Lithgow is very interested about the status of zimmis and müstemen, although he never calls them so. Traveling with an Armenian caravan through Palestine, they encountered a group of mounted Arabian tribesmen:

_Immediately there came riding towards us, sixe naked fellows, well mounted on Arabian Geldings, who demanded what wee were? and whither we were bound with such a multitude; and if there were any Franks of Christendome in our company. To whom the Janisaries replied, we were purposed to Jerusalem, and that there was but one Franke with them. Upon which they presently sought me, demanding Caffar, Caffar; that was tribute for my head […] And yet were they discontented, because there were not more franks in our company, for from the Armenians, they could not, nor would not seeke any tribute, because they were tributary slaves and subjects to the great Turke; neither also of any other Christiane borne in his domin-

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38] Henry Blount, _A Voyage into the Levant_, p. 110.
40] Viorel Panaite, ‘Being a Western Merchant in the Ottoman Mediterranean’, p. 91.
ions, when they shall happen to fall into their hands.  

In the remote deserts the wild Arabian horsemen, as the travelers frequently describe the Bedouins, were partially respecting the sultan’s laws. One could not harass an Armenian, a tribute-paying subject of the sultan, but could impose a tax upon the Scottish traveler even though his monarch James I Stuart had just received renewed capitulations from sultan Ahmed I in 1610, by which English subjects could travel freely through the Ottoman Empire. We should also notice how the Arabians were searching only for “Franks of Christendom”. Presumably other Franks, subjects of the sultan who were paying the cizye like the Armenians, were not being harassed. Local authorities frequently made abuse of their power on foreign travelers. Similar cases can be found in the Balkans, where subjects of the Danubian Princes were often demanded to pay tribute south of the Danube, even though they were considered zimmis of the sultan. Being a Frank was certainly dangerous in an area where local tribesmen were looking to profit from the influx of pilgrims going through their territory.

But thousands of miles away in Bosnia and some years later, Henry Blount had a very different experience with Ottoman local authorities:

I must eternally remember the Turkish justice for honourable to Strangers, whereof I have twice had experience. First at Saraih [Sarajevo], in Bosnah, where I was forced to Justice by a Christian, whom I had sore wounded, for threatening to buy mee for a slave; when the Cause was declared by two Turkes my companions, the Judge not only freed mee with words, and gesture very respective, but fined my adversary at fortie Dollars, and menaced him with death, if any mischief were plotted against me.

Here we have an example of Ottoman judicial equality at its finest. The quarrel between two Christians, one a müstemen the other most likely a zimmi, is brought forward to a kadi of Sarajevo, who accepts the testimony of two Muslims in favor of Blount. Days and weeks of traveling together had formed a bond between the English traveler and his Turkish companions more powerful than

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41] William Lithgow, The Totall Discourse, p. 201. The judicial difference between foreign Christians and those subject to the sultan was known also to the preacher William Biddulph, who named the tribute-paying Christians “slaves unto the Grand Turk”. Gerald MacLean, The Rise of Oriental Travel, p. 95.


the religious bound which should have not allowed a Christian (most probably a *zimmi*) to take another Christian into slavery. Considering the Holy War rhetoric it is ironical that Ottoman Islamic law was frequently used to resolve quarrels between fellow Christians.

Travel could also bring out examples of loyalty and duty in situations where religious enmity would have turned minor violence into crime, as George Sandys found out about a Janissary acting as a guide to another Englishman:

One of them [the Janissary] of late being strucken by an Englishman (whose swaggering would permit him never to review his countrey) as they traveled along through Morea, did not onely not revenge it, nor abandon him to the pillage and outrages of other, in so unknowne and savage a country, but conducted him unto Zant [Zakinthos] in safty, saying, God forbid that the villainy of another should make him betray the charge that was committed to his trust.  

The Janissary was the ever present travel guide of Europeans through the Ottoman Empire. By the seventeenth century the Janissary was no longer the elite infantry unit which stood as the back bone of the Ottoman army in its conquest of the previous centuries. Instead, more and more soldiers began taking up merchant activities, despite the initial ban. While Sandys and Blount had the fortune to encounter only dutiful ones, Lithgow had different experiences in the deserts of Egypt and Palestine, as the Janissaries who took money for his protection watched indifferently as locals robbed and beat him several times.

These being said, the first conclusion which we can draw from these travel accounts is that the actual status of non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire differed from region to region. A Frank was usually safer in the Balkans or in the big cities than in the deserts and known pilgrim routes. As expected, the laws of the sultan were more likely to be upheld by the officially appointed judges than by unruly local tribes. But the principles of the Holy Law, the *şeriat*, which traditionally specified the status of *zimmis* since the time of Caliph Umar were respected even by the desert Bedouins.

Second, one must keep in mind that even if these three travelers seem open minded when it comes to religious facts, they were people of the early modern pe-

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period and they lived and thought according to their times. Times when Protestants and Catholics were still warring in Central Europe and when they tried to take this battle even to Muslim lands. Catholics were trying to prevent the spreading of heresy to the Oriental Christians, while Protestants wanted to keep their eastern brothers and even North African Moors safe from Popish idolatry. Of course, besides the religious struggle, there was the fear that Catholicism came along with Spanish subjugation. Another religious war was being fought against Islam. Even though an actual Crusade wasn’t relevant anymore, the rhetoric on Holy War was still present. In this light, the Ottoman’s tolerance towards Christians had to be contrasted with accounts of mistreat and harassment. Certainly we can’t put on equal terms our present day understanding of religious tolerance with the Ottoman religious tolerance of the seventeenth century. Christians were allowed to practice their faith, although a number of restrictions such as the clinging of bells, the public showing of the crucifix, building new churches and so on and so forth were being imposed on them. But still, the Ottoman Empire showed a certain degree of freedom of religion which European travel writers found nowhere else.

The Spanish monarchs resorted to forced conversions after the Reconquista, and in the end they failed to integrate their former Muslim subjects. The Moriscos were notoriously deported from the Iberian Peninsula during 1609-1614. The Ottomans welcomed their Christian subjects and integrated them into their legal system. The Christians accepted and embraced Ottoman culture, whereas the Moriscos rejected Western European culture. From this point of view the concept of Ottoman religious tolerance is not only a valid one, but it also represents a success story.

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Eva Johanna Holmberg, ‘In the Company of Franks: British identifications in the early modern Levant c. 1600’, *Studies in Oriental Travel Writing*, 16 (2012),
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William Lithgow, *The Totall Discourse of the Rare Adventures & Painefull Peregrinations of long Nineteene Yeares Travayles from Scotland to the most famous Kindomes in Europe, Asia and Affrica* (Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1906).


In the terrible winter of 1812\(^1\), when the French army was literally freezing to death under the snowfalls in Russia, a young man of about eighteen years of age, accompanied by a middle aged woman, was reaching Bucharest, the capital city of the Romanian principality of Wallachia, at the end of a much distressful journey. The two, mother and son, were coming from Kishinev, where they had sought refuge in the aftermath of the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812, after having fled away from their native town (or village) in Bulgaria. The youngster referred to above was Antonie Pandoleon Petrov(eanu); he was to become celebrated in the years to come in Bucharest under the penname of Anton Pann.

The ancestry of the family of Anton Pann remains questionable until today: his mother, Tomaida, was almost certainly of Greek descent, while his father, who was a cauldron maker, was either a bulgarized Romanian or a bulgarized Gypsy\(^2\). The Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga\(^3\) doubted the Romanian roots of the cauldron makers in Sliven, considering instead that they might have been of Aromanian or Vlach origin, since the Aromanian cauldron-makers were quite numerous.

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\(^{1}\) A year of disasters in Romania, among the many of whom we could mention the fire which destroyed, in the very night of the accession to the throne of Ioan Gheorghe Caragea (Caragea Vodă, 1812-1818), the new Royal Court built by Alexander Ypsilantis, a particularly violent outbreak of plague, thought to have been brought from Istanbul to Bucharest by the entourage of the new prince, which left behind more than 70.000 or 90.000 victims, two earthquakes, and an increase of the taxes paid by the population, especially the craftsmen. We should also make mention, along with the other adversities, the Russian occupation of Bucharest during the Russo-Turkish Wars of 1806-1812 (see, for more details, Constantin G.Giurescu, *Istoria Bucureștilor. Din cele mai vechi timpuri până în zilele noastre*, Bucharest: Editura pentru Literatură 1966, George Potra, *Din București de altădată*, București: Editura științifică și enciclopedică 1981, George Potra, *Din București de ieri I*, București: Editura științifică și enciclopedică 1990).


and famous in some Balkan countries, such as Bosnia.

Whatever the case may be, Sliven, the native place of our future author, was at the time a typical Balkan settlement, being inhabited by Bulgarians, Greeks, Romanians, and especially Turks, insofar as it was part and parcel of the Ottoman Empire. As a result, Anton Pann had the opportunity to learn, as a child, Turkish, Bulgarian, maybe also Romanian. The opinions of the literary historians who dealt with his life story are quite divergent in this regard: for example, according to G. Dem Teodorescu⁴, he knew Romanian from his father and from the numerous Romanians who inhabited Sliven, having, on the other hand, learned Greek from his mother; he had a good knowledge of Bulgarian and became familiar with Turkish due to his Turkish entourage; afterwards, while living in Kishinev (Chișinău), he became acquainted with Russian, sang religious music in the same language and began to practice Romanian, which he completed later, in Romania (Wallachia and Moldavia)⁵. The Greek he knew from his mother proved to be later useful in his close relationship with the Greek ecclesiastic circles in Bucharest, which offered him some means of subsistence. His knowledge of Greek is nonetheless considered doubtful by some scholars, such as Moses Gaster⁶, according to whom Anton Pann never knew Greek (or maybe literary Greek?), hence the books he pretended having translated from Greek into Romanian were, in fact, personal adaptations from Romanian translations which were already in use. He knew in exchange very well Turkish, which he had learned as a child in Sliven, the majority of the population of which consisted in those days of Turks. Ion Pillat⁷ also pretends, without putting forward any argument, that Anton Pann was not a Bulgarian speaker, which seems quite strange, on account of his possible Bulgarian roots or, at least, of the fact that he had spent a period of his early life in a region inhabited by many Bulgarians.

Irrespective of any disagreements or concerns regarding his polyglotism,

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⁴ G. Dem Teodorescu, *Viața și activitatea*, pp. 11-12.

⁵ According to Ion Ghica (*Scriori către Alecsandri*, Bucharest: Editura Librăriei Socec & Comp. 1887, p. 52), Anton Pann had learned to write in Romanian from some traditional schoolmasters like Chiosea, the pupils of whom became afterwards clerks, record keepers, etc. Ion Ghica mentions, among other personalities of the time who were taught Romanian in a rather unsophisticated way, boyar (logofăt) Greceanu, Văcărescu, Nănescu (a close friend of Anton Pann), Paris Momuleanu, etc. On the same other hand, Moses Gaster (“Introducere”, in Anton Pann, *Povestea vorbiti. Ediție nouă completă și ilustrată*, introd. by M. Gaster, Craiova: Scrisul românesc 1936, p. XXXV) finds the memory of Ion Ghica rather unreliable, therefore the information he offers need to be taken *cum grano salis*.

⁶ Moses Gaster, *Introducere*, p. XXXIII.

it seems unquestionable that he showed proficiency in at least two, if not three Balkan languages and he was very eager to make use of them in the hybrid, even cosmopolitan atmosphere of Bucharest at the beginning of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. He encountered here an easy-going, blithe, indulgent people, much inclined to conciliation and enjoyment, under the apparent laxity of whom lay buried a genuine curiosity for otherness. As an authentic \textit{homo balkanicus}, he got adapted very quickly to his new milieu and accepted its multiple challenges. The human type he represented was, in many respects, in close connection with the general frame of the Balkans, which were defined from an early age by their demographical complexity – as Gérard-François Dumont\textsuperscript{8} observes, none of the many nationalities in this geographical area is dominant; moreover several of its nationalities display a cross-border character, insofar as the national borders, which are quite recent, have been drawn without taking into account the intricate realities on the ground\textsuperscript{9}; last, but not least, the majority of these nationalities have significant diasporas and cultural ties in non-Balkan countries. As a result of the historical evolutions, the Balkans are defined by a strong difference between the territories of their states and those of the nationalities living within their boundaries. This peculiar situation might be managed by searching a \textit{modus vivendi}, a cohabitation formula or, on the contrary, might breed perpetual tensions and mutual violence. As this second scenario largely prevailed over the course of time, it gave rise to the geopolitical term of Balkanization, intended to describe any territorial fragmentation or brake-up process, accompanied by a subsequent humanitarian crisis\textsuperscript{10}. On the other side, one could not deny the influence of the Ottoman Empire and of the Ottoman-Turkish civilization in the Balkans, which succeeded and sometimes even replaced the Byzantine one. We could discuss, of course, the extent and the depth of this Ottoman ecumene, especially in respect of some periods of time, but it is impossible to refute that the Ottomans played a crucial part in the cultural and social shaping of this region until recent times. In other words, the Ottoman Empire was for centuries, in joy and in sorrow, its “Omphalos”; insofar as it set the tone and decided its destiny – it “played a crucial role as mediator in the course of several centuries, which permitted broad contacts, mutual influences, and cultur-


al exchange in a large area of the Eastern Mediterranean”\textsuperscript{11}, to which the Balkans are sometimes associated, as a sub-region of a broader Mediterranean area.

As for \textit{homo balkanicus}, we do not intend to use this notion in the pejorative acceptation given to it by Svetlozar Igov, its author, in order to point to a kind of “endemic genus”\textsuperscript{12}. In our standpoint, this locution describes a peculiar way of being in the world, which we deem highly representative for what one might call “the world of yesterday”, that is a traditional, patriarchal way of living, disliked by some, cherished by others, implying here and there conviviality, but also many a time mutual distinction and sharp hostility between “us” and “them”. Its typology prevailed for centuries and preceded by far that of the “imagined communities”, as defined by Benedict Anderson. For example, when speaking about the human type embodied by Anton Pann, Mircea Anghelescu\textsuperscript{13} maintains that “he comes from a very old tradition, both European and Oriental, that is pertaining to the Balkans, where the Greek clothing meets the Ottoman bazaar in a sort of propensity for brightness, for polychromy, for volubility.” Leaving \textit{nolens volens} in a multicultural, if not hybrid milieu, our \textit{homo balkanicus} is driven to be versatile, to acquire different communication skills, to master more than a language, etc., in order to face the challenges of the colourful world he lives in. He can be conceived in some way as a living bridge between the ‘Oriental’, \textit{i.e.}, Turkish world, and the European one.

Such is the case with Anton Pann, who knew two or three Balkan languages, was born in nowadays Bulgaria, finally settled in Romania and dealt, among other things, with translations from Greek (which, as we have already seen, are still subject of debate) and especially from Turkish into Romanian. We do not intend to tackle his musical and especially liturgical music works, as well as his translations of liturgical works from Slavonic into Romanian, for they fall outside our area of competence. We would like, in exchange, to point out some particular aspects of his personality and literary activity, which were, in our view, very typical of the cultural imbroglio which dominated Bucharest towards the middle of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, when the past and the future were, for a short while and in a quite disconcerting manner, almost simultaneous. Anton Pann, as a true man of his confounded times, acted as a traditional minstrel, addressing his public mainly in verses and using a guitar, that is a string instrument, as many traditional teller-singers(for example, the Turkish \textit{âşık}-s) use to do. The structure of his literary works, which


\textsuperscript{12} See, for further information, Maria Todorova, \textit{Imagining the Balkans}, pp. 39-43.

were, for the most part, versified stories, was adjustable, thus flexible, for they were interspersed with puzzles, proverbs, sayings, the number of whom could be multiplied endlessly. We can hardly imagine how his performances in fairs, summer gardens or coffeehouses took place, but the chapbook she published are more than eloquent of the idea he nurtured about literature and its utilitarian purpose.

Anton Pann was rather a disseminator than a proper creator and therefore included in his productions verses and even stanzas from contemporary Romanian poets\textsuperscript{14}, anecdotes, proverbs, jokes, riddles, short stories, folk poetry, which proved very useful in lengthening his narrations and serving his sapiential design, which is equally characteristic of the popular storytelling. On the other hand, he usually had resort to personal digressions concerning his own ideas, feelings, worries, personal problems, family troubles, ethical conceptions and offered advices about personal deportment and socially acceptable behaviour, since literature was attributed a functional goal. As any popular teller-singer, he persistently made use of repetition, for “verbal repetition is a distinct feature of orally-transmitted literature, prose and verse alike”\textsuperscript{15}. Being much interested in the reactions of his public, which was not very familiar with high culture standards and sophisticated prose composition, he naturally preferred narrative verse, in view of its mnemonic value and versatility. We should remark in this context that his account of the “great fire”, generally mentioned as such in contemporary sources, which burnt into ashes the eastern part of Bucharest in 1847\textsuperscript{16}, lasting for several weeks, was composed

\textsuperscript{14} Ovidiu Papadima (Anton Pann, “cântecele de lume” și folclorul Bucureștilor, București: Saeculum I.O. 2009, pp. 99-148) shows that many of the stanzas included in Spitalul amorului (The Hospital of Love) were borrowed from contemporary poets like Ion Heliade Rădulescu, Vasile Alecsandri, Grigore Alexandrescu, etc., being denatured, modified, or simplified, in order to satisfy the rules of oral literature. It is difficult to say, on the other hand, if some of his stories or anecdotes were not borrowed from other oral sources or minstrels, who were not so lucky as he was, as they had not the idea, probably not even the resources to put their creations in writing. To mention only one example among many others, the most celebrated Ciliș Moise was hardly able to read (George Potra, Din Bucureștii de altădată, p. 422).


\textsuperscript{16} Memoria focului mare, întâmplat în București în ziua de Paști, anul 1847 (The Memoir of the Big Fire which Occurred in Bucharest on Easter Day, Year 1847), a 96 pages pamphlet which was published in the same year; a second edition of this work, the title of whom was slightly modified, was put out in 1854. The blaze of 1847, which arose from the centre of the city and spread at the speed of light because of the wind, has swept out 1.142 shops, 686 houses, 12 churches and monasteries, and 10 inns, in total 1.850 buildings, having a detrimental effect on the eastern part of the capital city of Wallachia (Constantin C. Giurescu, Istoria Bucureștilor, p. 130).
in the same form. Furthermore, the first of his two wills, which was printed in his own publishing house\(^{17}\) in February 1849, was also expressed in verse and hence rejected by the metropolitan bishop as an unconventional testament, and also gesture, in a society where people were held to be much more deferential on such circumstances. As a result, his second will (1854) was written in prose, although the first twenty-four verses of its first version were not abandoned, but placed at its beginning and paginated as prose\(^{18}\).

A large number of the verses by Anton Pann were, on the other hand, intended to be sung either in private circles or in coffee houses, summer gardens and other meeting places in Bucharest, as their author was an authentic man of the world: according to George Potra\(^{19}\), he used to join the entourage of the prince Alexandru Dimitrie Ghica (1834-1842) and sing drinking songs to the accompaniment of a Gypsy band (Rom. *taraf*), during the parties thrown by the prince in honour of his guests in the Garden of Scufa. As maintained by Ion Ghica\(^{20}\), Anton Pann and his friends were “the delight” of the gardens of Deșliu, Pană Breslea, and Giafer, all of them being much appreciated for their performances by some representatives of the young Romanian elite. But the main audience of Anton Pann, who also toured the country in order to sell his books, chapbooks, and almanacs, in the same way as the peddlers, and maybe to sing his songs, was generally made up of craftsmen, petty shopkeepers and their apprentices, tradesmen, farmers, students, etc., – it was, therefore, a typical teller-singer audience. Anton Pann had ceased to be, however, a typical, authentic storyteller: he embodied a hybrid type, situated at the crossroads of the old and the new way of making literature. He acted both like a traditional minstrel and a penman, but also like a businessman, interested in selling his merchandise; he was fascinated by the idea of putting his works in writing and having a publishing house of his own, which suggests that he was plainly aware of, and firmly believed in the potential of printing.

In speaking of the works of Anton Pann and of his “Balkan” profile, one should also mention his pioneering works in the field of nowadays Turkology, regardless his unavoidable awkwardness and dilettantism, which he did not ignore, as it appears in his preface to *Fabule și istorioare* (*Fables and Anecdotes*), 1841: “Gentlemen! This fables and anecdotes are only heard by me from the others. I

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17] He took great pains to establish this modest publishing house, which was merely a typography, in 1843; all the books, chapbooks, almanacs he published afterwards have been printed here.


don’t know if there are some others of the kind printed in other languages, for I have not learned any of the [other] polished languages\textsuperscript{21}. Should there have been schools in the years of my freshness as now are, and should I have learned one of the languages which are so praised today, I would not have played with such petty things, but have translated [into Romanian] some noteworthy books, which would have been useful to me and to other people.”\textsuperscript{22} He might have thought to make use instead of the languages he already knew, especially of Turkish, and thus conceived his so-called “Turkish writings”\textsuperscript{23}, which were probably intended to make him earn some additional money, since he often complained about his material uncertainty.

The “Turkish chapter” of the works of Anton Pann consists of the Turkish translation of The Gospel of St. John, which is recited in the saint and bright Easter Day, while the Second Resurrection (Rom.: Evanghelia Sf. Ion, ce se zice în sfânta și luminata zi a Pâștilor, la a doua înviere, Sibiu, 1840), a chapbook inspired by an unidentified Greek model\textsuperscript{24} which was published in eight languages, of the Proverbs, Turkish into Romanian (Rom.: Proverbi turcește cu românește), a collection of twenty-eight Turkish proverbs, most likely gathered by A. Pann himself and published in Culegere de proverburi sau Povestea vorbii (Selection of Proverbs or the Story of the Word, Bucharest, 1847; 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition, 1853), together with their literal Romanian translations, and of the Dialogue in Three Languages: Russian, Romanian, and Turkish, each of them rendered in accordance with its idiom (Dialog în trei limbi: rusește, românește și turcește, fiecare întocmită în vorbire după idiotismul ei, București, 1848), a kind of conversation guide which was an adaptation from a similar work published in Moscow, as the author himself confessed.

We mention below the Turkish proverbs gathered by Anton Pann, which are, in our view, a good example of his mastering of vernacular Turkish:

1. Ectiini bicersin, etiini bulursân. (Pann 1936: 215)[Ektiğini biçersin, ettiğini bulursun.], i.e., “You shall reap what you sow, you shall find what you have done [to another].”–variant of Kişi ektiğini biçer (Püsküllüoğlu 2002: 126) / Ne ekersen  

\textsuperscript{21} We could conclude from this statement that he considered the languages he mastered, i.e., Turkish, Bulgarian, Russian, as rather coarse, maybe because they were spoken by many commoners, but also because he had mainly access to their vernacular aspects.  


\textsuperscript{24} The Turkish version of the gospel probably addressed the Karamanlis.


3. Fodul olan düşküün kalır. (Pann 1936: 215)[Fodul olan düşkün kalır.], i.e., “He who is haughty becomes needy / deprived.” – not quoted by Aksoy or Püsküllüoğlu.


7. Az sadaca cioc belea savdârâr. (Pann 1936: 215)[Az sadaka çok belâ savdırır.], i.e., “Little alms prevent much trouble.” – cf. Az bir sadaka pek çok belayı savdırır. (frequently cited as a Hadis-i Şerif – see, for example, the discussion on the subject in Sancaklı 2001: 49);not quoted by Aksoy or Püsküllüoğlu.


14. İşin iocse şeit ol, paran ciocse chefil ol. (Pann 1936: 215) [İşin yokse Şehit ol, paran çokse kefil ol.], i.e., “If you have nothing to do, be a witness, if you have much money, be a guarantee.” – İşin yoksa şahit ol, paran çoksa (borcun yoksa) kefil ol. (Aksoy 1965: 113; Aksoy 1984: 273); İşin yoksa şahit ol, paran çoksa kefil ol. (Püsküllüoğlu 2002: 111).

15. Dud iapraândan atla olur. (Pann 1936: 215) [Dut yaprağından atlas olur.], i.e., “The mulberry leaf becomes silk.” – possible or incomplete variant of Sabır ile (sabırla) koruk helva olur, dut yaprağı atlas. (Aksoy 1965: 127; Aksoy 1984: 340); cf. “Patience is power; with time and patience the mulberry becomes silk.” [Japanese proverb] (Stone 2006: 320) and “With patience and time the mulberry leaf becomes a silk gown.” [Chinese proverb] (Ibid.).


20. *Chendi iazâsnâ ocumaian eşee benzer*. (Pann 1936: 216) [Kendi yazısını okumayan eşeğe benzer.], i.e., “He who is not able to read his own writing resembles a donkey.” – not quoted by Aksoy or Püsküllüoğlu.

21. *Ichi reiz bir ghemii battârâr*. (Pann 1936: 216) [İki reis bir gemiyi batırır.], i.e., “Two captains will sink the ship.” – *İki kaptan bir gemiyi batırır.* (Püsküllüoğlu 2002: 108); cf. “Two captains will sink the ship.” [Turkish proverb] (Stone 2006: 447) and “The ship that has two captains will sink.” [Arabian proverb] (Stone 2006: 387).

22. *Bacşiş ia verese icoen ichi cheret sarhoş olur*. (Pann 1936: 216) [Bahşiş yaveresiye içen iki keret sarhoş olur.], i.e., “He who is offered drink or drinks on credit will get drunk twice” – apparent variant of *Veresiye (borca) şarap içen, iki kez (kere) sarhoş olur*. (Aksoy 1965: 134; Aksoy 1984: 372); *Borca içen iki kez (kere) sarhoş olur*. (Aksoy 1984: 176); *Veresiye şarap içen iki kez sarhoş olur*. (Püsküllüoğlu 2002: 177); *Borca içen iki kez sarhoş olur*. (Püsküllüoğlu 2002: 49).


25. *Iriugheara tiuchiuren iuzi une tiuchiriur*. (Pann 1936: 216) [Rüzgâra tüküren yüzyüne tükürür.], i.e., “He who spits into the wind spits in his face.” –


28. Anlayana bir sivrisinek sazdâr, anlamayana davul zurna azdâr. (Pann 1936: 216) [Anlayana bir sivrisinek sazdır, anlamayana davul zurna azdır.] – Anlayana sivrisinek saz, anlamayana davul zurna az. (Aksoy 1965: 84; Aksoy 1984: 135; Püsküllüoğlu 2002: 26), i.e., “For the one who understands, the mosquito is a saz, for the one who does not understand drums and clarions mean little.”; cf. “A word to the wise is sufficient.” [Roman proverb] (Stone 2006: 482); “Half a word to the wise is enough.” [Dutch proverb] (Ibid.: 475).

In Povestea vorbii (Story of the Word), Anton Pann makes mention of two other Turkish proverbs, not found by us in other similar sources. In the first case, he renders the Turkish proverb into Romanian as follows: “După proverbul turcesc:/ Sioileesem sioz olur, zioilemesem dert o lur, / Adică:/ De voi zice, vorbă să face, de nu voi zice, venin se face.” (Pann 1936: 12), i.e., “According to the Turkish proverb: / [Söylesem söz olur, söylemesem dert olur], / That is: / If I say it, it becomes word, if I don’t say it, it becomes poison.”

In the second case, the Turkish form of the proverb referred to is absent: “Cum zice un proverb turcesc: Eu dator și tu grijă duci? – Adică: Arde lumânarea noastră pe socoteala voastră.” (Pann 1936: 289), i.e., “As a Turkish proverb goes: Me in debt and you unease?! – That is: Our candle is burning at your expense.”

As established by Vladimir Drimba, the idiom of these Turkish texts was
almost certainly the Turkish dialect spoken in Sliven (Bulgaria) at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, the peculiarities of whom may be observed in several Turkish dialects. The Turkish idiom spoken in Sliven pertained to the Eastern Rumelia dialectal group, having also some features of the Western Rumelia Turkish. Beyond the Turkish idiom Anton Pann was familiar to, it remains to be established the source of these Turkish sayings: in our opinion, they were mainly gathered from oral tradition, since Durûb-ı Emsâl-ı Osmâniyye, the first book of Turkish proverbs, including about 1500 records, was published by Ibrahim Şinasi (1826-1971) in 1863. The oral sources of the proverbs of Anton Pann are equally suggested by author’s use of the vernacular (probably) spoken in Sliven, and not of the literary Turkish which was still seeking its way in order to reach the ordinary people.

One of the most enduring achievements of Anton Pann remains the collection of stories entitled Nezdrăvâniile lui Nastratin Hogea, culese și versificate de Anton Pann (The Mischiefs of Nastratin Hogea, gathered and versified by Anton Pann), a booklet containing 88 pages, which was published in 1853. According to Lazăr Şâineanu27, the famous Turkish character was not entirely unknown in Romania at that time, some anecdotes inspired by him being already popular and even regarded as indigenous anecdotes, as it was the case with those in the collection of Petre Ispirescu. The first Turkish book dedicated to the famed personage seems to have been issued rather late, around 183728, being soon followed by a Greek translation published in Izmir, in 184829, and by the Anton Pann’s translation into Romanian. G. Dem Teodorescu30 asserts that the translation authored by Anton Pann was “the first European translation”, being followed by the first French translation by Nassif Mallouf, which was, in fact, a bilingual edition, published a

27] Lazăr Şâineanu, Influența orientală asupra limbii și culturii române I, Bucharest: Editura Librăriei Socec & Comp. 1900, p. CXIV.

28] According to Pertev Naili Boratav (Nasreddin Hoca, Istanbul: Kirmizi Yayınları 2007, pp. 89-90), this popular edition, which was a lithographic print, was brought out in Istanbul; it was soon followed by another similar edition, issued in Cairo in 1841 and republished in 1847 and 1848 and by a second edition published in Istanbul, in 1850. Lazăr Şâineanu (Influenţa orientală, p. CXII) gives grosso modo the same information on the subject: according to him, the first Turkish edition was issued “towards 1837”, being followed shortly after by a translation into Greek and by Anton Pann’s translation into Romanian. The Turkish-speaking Ottoman Armenians had at their disposal two editions published in Istanbul in 1843 and 1848, in Armenian letters. The first Turkish “literary edition”, as P. N. Boratav qualifies it, was a versified one and appeared only in 1918, under the signature of Fuad Köprülü (Pertev Naili Boratav, Nasreddin Hoca, p. 93).

29] Pertev Naili Boratav, Nasreddin Hoca, p. 92.

year after the booklet of Anton Pann, and by the first German translation, which was published in Bremen in 1857. These versions are not mentioned by P. N. Boratav, who ranges, on the other hand, the translation by Anton Pann among the “literary”, not colportage products dealing with the Turkish character in Europe.

According to Lazăr Șăineanu, the “jokes” of Nasreddin Hodja have been translated by Anton Pann into a “folksy language”, which, in our opinion, may have been very similar to the informal language he used himself. We should not forget that Anton Pann was mostly a self-made and self-taught man, as he confesses himself – “a kind of adventurer”, in the opinion of Moses Gaster –, who was trying to make his living by singing songs, telling stories and, after a while, becoming a petty publisher of chapbooks and almanacs. He initially had no intention to venture himself in the little-known waters of translation, the principles and the status of which largely exceeded his background and his knowledge. He must have identified instead a niche market or a market in itself for the sort of literary products he was proposing to the public, which were situated at the border between popular and high culture. He made use, in order to achieve his goal, of the language he knew the best, namely Turkish, and resorted to his memories of childhood, but also, in our opinion, to some Turkish informers living in or visiting Bucharest, the identity and profile of whom is practically impossible to establish today. His obvious interest in Turkish language and culture must have been fed by close contacts with Turkish speaking people, were they Turks or not, in a period in which the Turks were gradually relinquishing their erstwhile role of masters, and also protectors, in favour of the new conquerors, namely Russians. Once again, Anton Pann was, in many respects, a man of his troubled age.

To conclude, we may say that in bridging several cultures, Anton Pann acted, unwillingly or not, under the pressure of circumstances, as a cultural mediator between them, becoming, on the other hand, by his pioneering works, one of the forerunners of oriental studies in Romania. His clumsiness and weaknesses were, in fact, symptomatic of the clumsiness and weaknesses of the place and the time he lived in.

31] The European public may have also become acquainted with the Turkish character from the English translation of the Ottoman history by Dimitrie Cantemir (Dimitrie [Demetrius] Cantemir, The History of the Growth and Decay of the Othman Empire, transl. into English: N. Tindal, London 1734, pp. 54-55, n. 22). D. Cantemir has quoted in his History three anecdotes regarding Nasreddin/Nasruddin Hodja (“the Turkish Aesop”) and his encounter, afterwards relationship, with Tamerlane; according to him, these anecdotes have been extracted, maybe during his exile in Istanbul, from a Turkish book, which remains unknown.

32] Lazăr Șăineanu, Influența orientală, p. CXIII.

33] Moses Gaster, Literatura populară română, p. XXX.
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THE IMAGE OF TURKS AND MUSLIMS IN BOSNIA
ACCORDING TO CROATIAN TRAVELLER MATIJA MAŽURANIĆ

Tufan Gündüz

The study discusses information about Bosnian Muslims, i.e. Bosniaks based on the work titled “A Glance Into Ottoman Bosnia” by Matija Mažuranić who travelled to Bosnia between 1839-40.

Matija Mažuranić is of Croatian origin and lived in Novi Vionodolski, a town along the Adriatic Coast. He was born in 1817 to a family who raised many intellectuals. One of his siblings was a philologist, the other was a poet. He did not receive good education, though. He engaged in arts like forging and joinery. In 1839, when we was 20, he came under the influence of the nationalism movement in Croatia and the Croatian nationalists, a group which he was involved in, acted to unite Southern Slavs under a single flag. They claimed that Bosnia belonged to the Southern Slavs. They thought Bosnia had to be relieved from the rule of the Ottoman Empire and struggled to unite Catholics and Orthodox in Bosnia to act together.

He made a visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina, under Ottoman rule at the time, guided by his siblings. The aim of this trip was to learn about what was going on in Bosnian lands, how Bosnian people and their leaders acted and whether anything could be done for the people rather than a curiosity about the lives of people in other countries of a romantic traveler. He probably had certain contacts in Bosnia. He needed to disguise his identity, did not tell his family and his wife where he was going and headed for the road without a passport.

Rambling around in Bosnia for two months, Matija Mažuranić took notes about what he saw and witnessed. When he returned to Croatia, his notes were collected by his brothers and printed under the title A Glance Into Ottoman Bosnia or A Short Journey Into That Land By A Native In 1839-1840 without the writer’s name. This book is considered to be the first and real travel book of Croatian romantic literature. Many researchers, acknowledging the authenticity of the information on Bosnia included in the book, articulate that it portrays the events and circumstances of the time highly realistically¹. Indeed, his realistic approach in pas-

¹ Matija Mažuranić, Bosna'ya Bir Bakış Bir Hirvat Vatandaşının 1839-40 Yılları Arasında O
sages where he told about the daily lives and traditions confirms the assumption.

Beginning his travel from Dubia, Mažuranić, without carrying a passport, had to go around Serbia and entered into Ottoman lands where he called Turkey from there. The most suitable location for this was the River Drina. He then walked to Visegrad; then to Sarajevo. When he was in Sarajevo, he incidentally met Mustafa Pasha Babic, administrative of the former city, and entered his service. Therefore, he had the opportunity to act with the men of Pasha. He travelled to Travnic with them and witnessed their contacts with the Ottoman statesmen. On return when he asked for withdrawal from his duty as he fell sick, Pasha allowed him only if he left Bosnia. Mažuranić had to leave the country and went to Serbia again. Thus, his travel to Bosnia that began with trouble and hardship ended with a fear of illness, hunger and death.

Mažuranić, with the effect of the romantic movement, considered Turkey a country which is somber, mystical, inexplicable, dull and hazardous between reality and illusion. He had a rather negative assumption about Ottoman lands when he began his journey.

The author refers to Bosniaks as Turks from the very first moment he sees them and uses the term Turk with the same meaning as a Muslim. In terms of ethnicity, the term Turk embraced all Ottoman citizens. Turks (Bosniaks) and Ottomans are only distinguished by the language. This difference also distinguishes Bosniaks from Serbs and Croats of the same race. Because there is a significant amount of Turkish/Ottoman words in the Bosniak language and it was easily noticed when a conversation began. But language was not the only difference. Mažuranić, when he tried to trespass the border without a passport, felt a deep fear of Turks for the first time. He was almost dumbfounded when he was told by people who seized him that the Sipahi would make a decision about him. He was thinking about meeting a cruel man. But, the terrifying Turk he pictured in his mind was “a man with bare and big feet despite winter, a torn shalwar, old clothing, a dirty vest, an old and worn out fur coat on his back, a turban in the head, sparse beard and moustache”. He learned while talking to him that he is not literate. He was a simple countryman; villager, unreliable, greedy and ignorant that fits well in his description of an ordinary Turk. When he offered them

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2] According to a story heard by Mažuranić, a Bosniak group said Selamun Aleykum to indicate they knew Turkish when ran into Ottoman soldiers, but they made the soldiers angry for not knowing much Turkish, they took shelter in the forest and said “we need to say much more than Selamun Aleykum”.

A HISTORY OF PARTNERSHIP AND COLLABORATION IN THE BALKANS

to ignore his trespassing and let him travel freely in Ottoman lands in return for a bribe, Mažuranić seriously advances on the typology he tries to define. He even tells about this bribery issue in other stories from time to time. For example, he tells he stayed at an Ottoman quarantine for three days while passing from Serbia because he was not able to give a bribe and some tradesmen passed freely without being stopped at the quarantine center by this privilege called “tradition”. But the real problem was the bribes collected by the Bosnian Pasha in the names of taxes, debts or penalties. Pasha was able to put the burden of any expenditure on a Christian or a Jewish wealthy man and did not pay his debts by imposing taxes or penalties on the creditors. The only thing creditors were able to do was to beg for not being imposed further penalties and to give up the money they ought to collect. After all, the Pasha had the right to kill without any justification to anybody. His greedy and impolite character was most apparent while eating. Turks, although carrying a spoon in their belts, he writes?, eat meat with their hands. To emphasize his definition, the author tells that Turks become so vandal and ugly while eating that the wildest hungry wolves cannot keep up with them and tells about an incident he personally witnessed. At a dinner at the mansion of Pasha in Travnic, Turks immediately filled the hall and ate all the meal on the table so fast that the author himself was left hungry when he was looking at other people. He adds that they can even kill for food.

In his work, killing and death are pictured as a normal behavior of the Turkish stereotype that Mažuranić consistently tries to create or as a condition from the nature of evil. This Turkish type holds the authority to kill freely not only Christians but also close friends and even his wife. He even walks like he is programmed to kill. The pasha of Bosnia, a chamberlain, a cavalry or an ordinary Muslim can easily kill another. A husband has the right to freely kill his wife at any time. Thus, Sarajevo is not safe at night. It is possible to find someone cut in the throat on the street every morning. Therefore, Christians always lived in danger. The fear of death and the torture by Muslims make the lives of Christians unbearable. They are forced to work by a Muslim or harassed by Muslim kids when they walk alone at the bazaar. Muslims see Christians as perverts on the wrong way. They were commonly called as infidel. As Muslims believe an unbeliever would directly go to hell, they did not bother about their religion.

Mažuranić explicitly defines the significant dominance of Muslims in social relations of Christians while explaining about adultery. “Adultery is a major sin among Turks. If a Turk is caught while committing adultery with the wife of another Turk, he is killed. If this man is a Christian, he immediately becomes a Mus-
lim, marries the woman or gets killed. If a Christian is caught while committing adultery with the wife of another Christian, he is killed. But a Turk can choose a Christian woman. There is no penalty for this”.

Mažuranić does not propound impolite definitions, as in the Muslim men, for women. On the contrary, he defines them pure and modest. He tells that they wear differently from Christian women and cover their face; the yard of Muslim houses are built high enough to prevent curious eyes seeing inside and men are jealous of their women. But Turks are more comfortable about marrying. Young men and women meet at the lovers’ district. If there are Christians among them, it is very hard for them. Because Turks always harass Christian women. It was so frequent that Christian men did not want to marry beautiful women for fear of harming their family. Therefore, these women need to marry Muslim men and become Turk⁴. But this time, they are pushed by the priests at Catholic Church. Catholic priests always talk against Turks at ceremonies and try to prevent their community turning into Turks. But a woman can become a Turk if she desires⁵. Muslims humiliate Christians at every opportunity and invite them to become Muslim. When Mažuranić did not manage to sit on the ground in a Muslim house, he was told: “Forget your doggy traditions for once, become a Turk and find peace. Otherwise, you will burn in hell” and was invited to Islam⁶.

Mažuranić emphasized that Bosniaks were bigoted Muslims. He was surprised to see their Ramadan and feast traditions. Mažuranić observed religious traditions of Muslims and took note of their prayer, fasting and feast rituals⁷. But this time, the Turkish/Muslim stereotype who was previously defined in his book as angry, unreliable, bribe taker, killer, dominant and arrogant is replaced by a Turkish stereotype who is just, soft hearted, welcoming, merciful, respectful, tolerant and vested with other humane characteristics. When he took shelter at a Turkish inn when he was about to die from illness, Muslims raced to treat him. Mažuranić learned how to win the heart of Turk only at the end of his journey.

He says: “Turks, when they are not touched by anyone, are easily conned and merciful. They need to be praised as much as possible and honored according to Turkish tradition. The more you praise them, the more they become proud and they

⁴ P. 25; A heard a sad story recently, An Orthodox baker in Sarajevo has a daughter. She cannot marry a Christian. She does not accept becoming a Muslim either. She dies from sadness. Turks were also very sad thinking that this girl wanted to become a Turk but her family did not let her to. ” P. 26.

⁵ Matija Mažuranić, p. 25.

⁶ Matija Mažuranić, p. 68.

⁷ Matija Mažuranić, p. 20-21.
like you. They never understand what you are telling is a lie. This way, you can have them in your pocket. But you need to be careful not to insult them. But they do not do this for humanity. They do not care about it. They are only happy to have the opportunity to do good. But God forbid, if they are angry, there is nothing to soften them.\textsuperscript{8}"

According to the author the most resentful matter for Turks was to lose Serbia. They call Serbia, Sumadija, a place in the forest. The reason for not using the name, Serbia, is that they do not want to see it as a separate country. All Turks are burning with the desire to take back Sumadija. They ask everybody who visits Serbia for trade or other reasons about the conditions in Sumadija and the lives of Muslims there. They dream about the day they take back Serbia. On the other hand, Serbs hate Turks and tells about a proverb common in Serbia, “Old man tells stories about war, young man burns for fighting”. He tells Black George cut the throat of Turks when Serbia gained independence and Turks chased after them, Turks beat Serbs in Kamianets and this fires the hatred against Turks, these people are even mad at their own state for not letting them to take revenge in Kamianets\textsuperscript{9}.

There are clearly two Turkish types for Mažuranić. The first is the “evil” Turkish type based on prejudice and a rather shallow view of Mažuranić. This “evil” definition is present in all stories many of which were witnessed by the author in person. There are “good” Christians on the other hand. They are welcoming, guiding and helpful families and have a special place from being of the same religion. But not all Christians are “good”. They threatened to kill him in Serbia.

Mažuranić also gives place to “good” Turkish type, on purpose or not. Therefore the definition of “bad” and “cruel” leaves its place to “good” and “merciful”. He was saved from death thanks to this “good” Turkish type. Therefore the distinction between good and bad does not cover an entire community from a religion. This indicates there are bad and good people in a society irrespective of their religion.

\textsuperscript{8} Matija Mažuranić, p. 62.
\textsuperscript{9} Matija Mažuranić, p. 75.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Wallachia and Vidin, located on two banks of Danube River in opposite positions, were territories of Ottoman Empire. Regarding flow directions, the area on the right was called Beri Yaka, literally meaning “near side” and the one on the left Karşı Yaka or “opposite side”. Beri Yaka also came to be known as Turk Side. That is because Beri Yaka was an outright part of the Empire tough, Wallachia on opposing side was a subordinate principality. Accordingly, in this article, we aim to dwell on relations of two neighbours mostly concerning 18th century. The argument of which source stems from Vidin Court Registers (Sicil Defterleri) develops into three subtopics; extent, scope and problems of neighbourhood between Wallachia and Vidin.

1) Extent of Relations between Wallachia and Vidin

In Ottoman firmans Wallachia is indicated as mülk-i mevrus or inherited land. In other words, Wallachia is a legacy of former sultans to ruling sovereign, bound up with the tax all along. Finally, what was stressed was Wallachia’s exemption in all aspects. Therefore, a Wallach can’t be forced to do anything. Scarcely is the exempt limited with domestic affairs. The aforesaid bound refers to cizye or head tax, in amount of 27 million of piastres.

This situation is not only for the interests of the empire. Farmers in Wallachia, a very efficient agricultural country, sell its products to the Ottoman Empire. This was a very large trade. Especially wheat and oil played an important role. Because it had a very vital role in meeting the basic needs of the Empire’s capital,

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Wallachia’s was also named as Istanbul’s pantry. In addition, their opposite side neighbour Vidin was the trade door of Wallach farmers. In the markets, butter, beeswax, honey, wheat flour, barley, maize and sorghum, were not a little over daily value.

Wallachia itself consisted of five districts and was referred to as Kara Eflak or literally Black Wallachia in the documents. Population was more than 125,000 according to a survey carried out after the conquest. Ruler of Wallachia was the voivode who used to live in their palaces, called kurte, in Bucharest, the administrative centre. They were helped by boyars as their deputies in terms of district management. One of the boyars which were noble Wallachians served as kapıkethüdası or official representative in voivodes relations with the capital. One of boyars in the capacity of a kapıkethüdası resided in his own mansion in Vidin fortress. Relations with Vidin was carried out with the boyar of Krayov district in the exact opposite position.

Voivode of Wallachia directly corresponded to the capital. His sealed petition that he sent was presented to Divan-ı Hümayun (Imperial Council) by his senior kapıkethüdası. In response, he was directly referred in the firmans. On the other hand, there was a very strong relationship between Wallachia and Vidin. What was determinant was both responsible status of Vidin and multitude of issues. Therefore, in the edicts sent from the capital to the town of Vidin, it was emphasized “make a decision conferring on together with Wallach voivode”. This unity also covered Braila in accordance with Danube River. However, Vidin was the focal centre for Wallachia.

Considering the fact that lack of knowledge is often equal to wrongness,
there seems to need an explanation for the concept “voivode”, which stems from the origin of voyevat in ancient Slavic, that is to say, “fight” and denotes “commander.” Major example in semantic shift is Wallachia and Moldovia. However, the diversification can be observed in many parts of the empire over time. Here are some examples: Voivode of Appanages (Haslar), Voivode of Muqataa, Voivode of Pius endowments (waqfs), Voivode of Varos (the area around a fortress).

There were cities in Anatolia where one could also encounter voivode such as Gaziantep, Diyarbekir, Aleppo, Malatya, Mardin. Damascus, Tokat and Urfa. Regarding Balkans, one could not even be able to count them. At least, along Danube River, from Sunne Strait to Belgrad, they create a long chain. Ali Aga, Voivode of Vidin Muqataa in April 25, 1698 can be counted as a concrete example

However, the word “voivode”, except in Wallachia and Moldavia, means very little in substance. It is mostly a landlord in local network but a principality in the brightest cases. In edicts about Wallachia, although voivode was usually utilized, we find the title “Eflak Beyi” Thus, edicts identify voivode as the leader and guarantor of Christian people. For Wallachia, mostly the word memleket, in other words country and sometimes vilayet or province was applied.

While Wallachia can generally be described as the above-mentioned way and stayed almost the same for a period of 200 years, Vidin has a completely different story. In 1690, Vidin was just an inner-city that is to say it was not a border land, namely as large as Baba Vida, which has no importance militarily or as a frontier. However, through a civil outlook, Vidin district has six sub-districts: Vidin, Polmiye, Fethülislam, İşferlik, Bane, Timok. Sahra or field for army gatherings was situated in Vidin. This sahra developed into a settlement in 1698 and became 6th district of Vidin. It was outlined above that annual tribute of Wallachia to the Empire was 27 million of piasters. Similarly, Vidin used to pay 22 million and a half annually.

15] VCR, no. 38, p. 113 (1698).
16] VCR, no. 305, p. 52 (1716); no. 41, p. 102 (1753); no. 49, p. 162 (1781).
17] For instance; “kudvetü’l-ümerai’l-milleti’l-Mesihiye umdetü’l-müberrai’l-takmiyyei’l-İseviyye” (VCR, no. 19, p. 78 (1728); “kudvetü’l-ümerai’l-milleti’l-Mesihiye ve zidet-kübrai’l-taifetü’l-İseviye” (VCR, no. 41, p. 102 (1753); “iftihari’l-ümera ve’l-milleti’l-mesihiye” (VCR, no. 310, p. 64 (1777).
18] VCR, no. 345, p. 12 (1697).
19] VCR, no. 13, p. 21 (1698).
22] VCR no. 305, p. 68 (1716).
During this period, Austrian frontier of the Empire were defended by the fortresses firstly Timișoara and secondly Belgrade. Vidin was a small fortress serving and attached to Timișoara. In this period, Vidin had almost no connection with Wallachia. They were two banks overlooking each other between Fethülis-lam and Olet.23 Vidin immediately found itself at the frontier when Belgrade was captured by Austria in 1718.

This meant first perception of defence for the Empire founded both on expansion and uninhibited manner. So, at the end of five-year struggle, Vidin turned out to be the largest fortress of the Empire. Hotin in East, Vidin in South assumed security of Wallachia. The information in Vidin Court Registers will be the source of dozens of scientific studies in subtlety and depth. In those registers, one can see eight names of Wallachian Voivodes. However, in exactly the same period, 75 guards were present Vidin is not an exaggeration. Since we aim to focus on Wallachia in this study, the amount of information given about Vidin seems well enough.24

2) Scope of the Neighbourhood between Wallachia and Vidin

Scope of Vidin and Wallachian relations was not only to divide the same thing but to assume responsibility in line with the needs of the other side. In this mutual responsibility Wallachia would offer product and labour and seek security. Vidin would provide protection, receive product and labour in exchange. In this provision, Wallachia was interested in salt, grains and animal products, durable wood, reaper and axeman. Vidin, the largest fortress of the Empire, was like a mill to grind Wallachian products.

Wallachia is not only the other side of the Vidin. This country stretches along Danube, extending to Braila. Beyond is Moldavia. Mostly, salt is extracted in these two countries of voivodeship, in the old use, *memleketeyn*. This vital product was being sold in quays of the Danube on the Turkish side. Taking the Braila as the borderline, the upper zone was saved for Wallachian salt and lower part for Moldavian salt.

According to a Mine *Muqatta Defteri* (Maden Mukataa Defteri) kept in the capital, in the Imperial Treasury, docks at which Wallachian salt used to be sold were Vidin, Lom, Rahova, Nikopol, Svishtov, Ruse, Totrakan, Silistra, Hirsov and Macia. Docks at which Moldavian salt sold were Braila, Isakcha, Tulca, Izmail and Kili.

23] VCR, no. 41, p. 226 (1752).
24] For more information on the subject, see Mahir Aydın, *Vidin Kalesi: Tuna Boyu'ndaki İnci*, Istanbul 2015.
This partnership; naturally happened in the shores of two voivodeship overlooking Danube. Moldavian salt is out of this paper’s interest. Wallachian salt was in the amount of 4,000 carts, of its sales would earn to the Ottoman Empire extra 15 million qurush. This amount was more than half of the tribute Wallachia would annually pay. However, these sales should be sustained freely and any other payment such as customs, tributes, transferring tribute, pole and pickaxe tax cannot be demanded.\textsuperscript{25} Appointment of officer by Wallachia to the relevant docks to negotiate this sort of sales was the case at least in Nikopol.\textsuperscript{26}

In addition to salt, Wallachia’s second and even greater partnership were in agricultural and livestock products. For the capital, was Vidin a sheep pen meeting meat demands\textsuperscript{27} and; Wallachia was the pantry of the capital city, Istanbul. Therefore, Istanbul was the only destination for all Wallachian products and it was the main rule to send them only to Istanbul.\textsuperscript{28} We already know that cadis of Istanbul were dismissed due to the problem of bread supply in the capital. Similarly, early in 1782 an imperial edict sent to Wallachia seems interesting: \textit{the raki produced by name of Hornika will diminish the amount of wheat exported to Istanbul, terminate it.}\textsuperscript{29}

Because other products needed for capital city were also supplied from other docks of Danube, furthermore from Black Sea coasts, Wallachia was mainly pantry. Grain sent from Wallachia to the capital was outside the focus of this study. However, tallow oil for illumination and butter for consumption were in great amounts. Followings were honey, beeswax, grease (cerviş yağı), wool, leather, dried meat, oxen, cows, bullocks and hargele (riding beast).\textsuperscript{30}

Wallachia were not only responsible for the largest consuming centre of the Empire i.e. Istanbul. Like Moldavia, all settlements along the Danube were also responsible. 48 merchants from Istanbul and Galata would carry out what is to be done for on-site trade.\textsuperscript{31} However, delivering what was purchased to the capital was not an easy task. In this regard, cadis, mütesellim (magistrate of a sancak), minister (nazır), voivode, kethüda yeri, janissary sirdar, and ayans starting from Vidin to Istanbul would be held responsible.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{25} VCR, no. 14, p. 80 (1697); no. 38, p. 47 (1705).
\textsuperscript{26} VCR, no. 305, p. 55 (1716).
\textsuperscript{27} VCR, no. 66, p. 54 (1815).
\textsuperscript{28} VCR, no. 46, p. 164 (1774).
\textsuperscript{29} VCR, no. 49, p. 64 (1782).
\textsuperscript{30} VCR, no. 52, p. 29 (1760); no. 52, p. 231 (1760).
\textsuperscript{31} VCR, no. 61, p. 250 (1764).
\textsuperscript{32} VCR, no. 10, p. 8 (1730).
Although it was forbidden to cross through Wallachia, this prohibition was out of question for Crimean Khanate, another dependent principality. But Tatar military was not in this context. Wallachian boyar would give a petition to the army, and would warn about Tartar soldiers in Bosnia: Winter is coming, while there are main roads, do not allow them to pass through Wallachia and attack people. Meanwhile an edict was sent to Tatar Khan Giray Kaplan: Whoever keeps a Wallachian prisoner in the hands of the Tatars, nobody detain any more. They be handed over to the men deployed at the passages by Wallachian Voivode.

However, the prisoners taken in the war, were amounted to 100 qurushes in exchange for delivering them to the state. This was then a remarkable amount. The Empire, tolerant here, was offensive in 1775: Pay 100 qurushes for each Russian, Polish, Potkalian Cosac prisoner to slave masters from the state. But, don’t pay any qurush for the folk of Wallachia, Moldavia and especially Danube.

Tatar Khan bought food by cash while passing through Wallachia in 1717. This information was essential for understanding the payment manner of needs and costs of the period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Input/kg</th>
<th>Unit Price/ para</th>
<th>Total/ para</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Butter</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>13.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>1.282</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>7.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rusk</td>
<td>17.500</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>74.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgur</td>
<td>21.936</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25.650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>121.050</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here what we aim to provide is food brought from Wallachia and sold in Vidin. However Vidin, was a small fortress in 1716 and wheat, barley and fodder was grown abundantly around its vicinity. Even Vidin, provided wheat to Belgrade Fortress and together with Wallachia, Timișoara, Svishtov and Giurgiu during Austrian War.

Vidin, was constructed as the largest fortress in the Empire. Even in 1725 it was not in need of Wallachian products. It was because the military-civilian

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33] VCR, no. 161a, p. 152 (1715).
34] VCR, no. 305, p. 66 (1716).
36] VCR, no. 305, p. 78 (1717).
37] VCR, no. 305, p. 66 (1716).
38] VCR, no. 305, p. 5 (1716).
population in the fortress did not amount to a high number. Then, soon after it became a large castle-town, Vidin merchant who were specially allowed called *defterli* showed up in Wallachia.\(^39\) Now Wallachia, like capital, became the granary for Vidin. In fact, during the wars from 1768 to 1774, when Wallachian products were imported by army, Vidin suffered seriously. In particular, butter was scarcely even its price soared to 50-60 para.\(^40\)

Excess of the staff, increasing population and lack of resources dragged Vidin into deadlock. Vidin once producing more than its need would face starvation without Wallachia. Those in the fortress expressed the same problem with a joint petition: *Wheat be brought to Vidin or a new market be established in Kalafat.* In Vidin, at a place called *kolluk,* *Wallachian Market* would operate. In the hands of farmers bringing products to this market, there was a written permission of Voivode, and steward (kethüda) boyar would accompany them. They would bring their products with their own wishes by their own boats. The people of the fortress were strongly warned: Buy the arriving products upon daily values in cash, and do not demand from them customs, tribute, city toll or extra payment for carts.\(^41\)

Thereafter, food from Wallachia to Vidin would rapidly increase. Vidin Court Registries include adequate information to conduct a separate research. Only for four months from March to July 1796, the products which were sold as follows:\(^42\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Amount/Kg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Butter</td>
<td>153,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honey</td>
<td>112,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beeswax</td>
<td>115,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour</td>
<td>423,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>295,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>513,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet</td>
<td>192,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>615,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>812 number</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This huge amount of consumption irritated cadis of Vidin. Through a notification in 16 July 1796, he demanded to be returned to the local sources: *Products*

\(^{39}\) VCR, no. 74, p. 111 (1767).  
\(^{40}\) VCR, no. 46, p. 164 (1774).  
\(^{41}\) VCR, no. 46, p. 165 (1775); no. 310, p. 53 (1777).  
\(^{42}\) VCR, no. 69, p. 121 (1796).
grown in Vidin are not self-sufficient all along. Once in every 10 days, 90-100 tonnes of grain is needed from Wallachia. If it goes like this, the order will be broken. As before, purchases should be made from the 16 districts in the Sanjak of Nikopol.\textsuperscript{43}

His solution will take place after eight years. In 1814 purchases will be made from districts in Vidin but not from Nikopol. 390.234 kg of grain was bought from the domestic market while much more would come from Wallachia.\textsuperscript{44}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Amount/Kg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wallachia</td>
<td>524.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polmiye</td>
<td>150.944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgradcik</td>
<td>112.582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Çernereka</td>
<td>71.890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahra</td>
<td>53.701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polmiye</td>
<td>1.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>914.315</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The last issue we would like to mention here is related to Wallachian Order. The word Nizam (Order) as the old saying goes, is somewhat about rules. Through imperial perspective, we consider this word owning an indispensable feature for the administration was among the commonly utilized expressions. So much so that, the famous expression Nizam-ı Cedid was in use fifty years earlier.\textsuperscript{45} Suffice to state the other suitable examples for the sake of the discussion; nizam of belde (town),\textsuperscript{46} nizam of memleket (country),\textsuperscript{47} nizam of menzil (courier),\textsuperscript{48} nizam of reaya (rayah),\textsuperscript{49} nizam of serhad (border),\textsuperscript{50} nizam of yağ kapanı (the butter market)\textsuperscript{51} and nizam of zahire (provisions).\textsuperscript{52} However the brightest examples are the Nizam of Wallachia\textsuperscript{53} and Nizam of Moldavia.\textsuperscript{54} By the way, original information for the

\textsuperscript{43} VCR, no. 69, p. 102 (1796).  
\textsuperscript{44} VCR, no. 243, p. 250 (1814).  
\textsuperscript{45} VCR, no. 39, p. 46 (1740); no. 41, p. 223 (1753).  
\textsuperscript{46} VCR, no. 41, p. 226 (1752).  
\textsuperscript{47} VCR, no. 55, p. 7 (1748).  
\textsuperscript{48} VCR, no. 40, p. 66 (1737).  
\textsuperscript{49} VCR, no. 38, p. 94 (1704).  
\textsuperscript{50} VCR, no. 62, p. 93 (1759); no. 6, p. 150 (1793).  
\textsuperscript{51} VCR, no. 49, p. 61 (1781).  
\textsuperscript{52} VCR, no. 44, p. 42 (1757).  
\textsuperscript{53} VCR, no. 78, p. 225 (1764); no. 78, p. 158 (1765).  
\textsuperscript{54} VCR, no. 52, p. 33 (1760).
fortresser are as followings *Nizam of Vizir Halil Paşa* in Bosnia and *Nizam of Kamanıçe*.  

Keyword of the Wallachian Order was *security*. This can be interpreted not to enter the country, not to interfere with the people and not to lay hands on the natural resources. That was because Wallachia, compared to other regions across the empire, was among one of the more favoured places. Defense of Wallachia in the war would be assumed, together with its own voivode, by a pasha with the title of *seraskier*. For instance, in 1787, Seraskier of Wallachia was the warden of Vidin. In peacetime, Beşli Aghas coming periodically from Vidin fortress would serve.

It was already forbidden for anyone not holding a special permission to pass through Wallachia. Those travelling to upper zone would have to go to the Izmail Pass. Those going to the direction of Hotin and Moldavia, must use the Isakcha Pass.

Danube is not a well-known river. Except the main riverbed *Main Danube*, there are tributaries, islands, lakes, weirs and mills. Their locations depend on the elaborate rules. It is even forbidden to bring animals to graze from external lands to Wallachia. Since conquest, Wallachian folk has not been levied; as well as land, real estate, hives, animals and shepherds not interfered either. As a detail, when the beehives were registered, a *mother hive* worth two piasters, but *cluster* was free.

Number of reliable traders entering Wallachia is clear; the most important rule is not to found winter quarters (*kişlak*), house and farm. The prohibition includes not to keep horse and cattle, not to have hives, not cultivate. In addition, traders should treat the local population properly. Such as cattle and horses to feed, to have a hive and make a farm, it is in the farm prohibited. Warning on this subject is that: not to buy the product from the low value, not to ask free food for animal feed, not to disturb women and children.

55] This information is from Basbakanlık Osmanli Arsivi, For Bosnia *D.BKL.D.* no. 32294 (April 1707) and for Kamanice, see *D.BKL.D.* no. 32342 (Ocak 1714).

56] There were sent many edicts for the residents in Wallachiha fort hem to be “zil-l-zihil-l hüsrevanemde masûn ve taht-ı râbîta-ı nizâma bend”. *VCR*, no. 41, p. 102 (1753).

57] *VCR*, no. 59, p. 23 (1787).

58] *VCR*, no. 41, p. 102 (1753).


61] *VCR*, no. 80, p. 30 (1758).

62] *VCR*, no. 52, p. 149 (1761).

63] *VCR*, no. 52, p. 58 (1760).

64] *VCR*, no. 78, p. 158 (1765).
Vidin Fortress was primarily responsible for rules about Wallachian Order. These responsibilities are specified in the edict: *you guards, cadi, executive janissary, other executives and notables*. Then, purpose is emphasized: *Establish rules about trade and protect the folk*. However, this responsibility is not only in Vidin dimension. Especially people scattered during war and reapers as seasonal workers leaving their hometowns spread over a wider area. Local administrations of this responsibility were Akkerman, Bender, Hotin, Braila, Isakcha, Izmail, Kili, Macin, Nikopol, Ozin, Rasvat, Ruse, Silistra, Totrakan, Vidin, Svishtov and Giurgiu.

As it has come to be concluded with the common things with Wallachia, one need to mention a couple of different colours. These are *Wallachian Dress* as garment, *Wallachian Dolama* as head dress, *Wallachian Tobacco* and *Wallachian Bell*. Most importantly amongst them is the *Wallachian tree* (elm).

As also seen in Moldavia, this *elm* was very durable and used especially in the construction of castle doors and as an artillery equipment. The relevance of the issue with Wallachia lies in its support for Vidin fortress. Cutting and carrying cost of the trees which demanded from Wallachian Voivode would be deducted from the Wallachian tribute. During this process, any sort of bargain or insecurity was beyond question. An edict with a roll sealed and signed would be sent and solely be ordered that *do what is necessary at once*.

The detail of the wood needed in 15 April 1741 for 169 gun carriages, of 338 wheels and of 100 axles of which would be used for the guns in Vidin Fortress was as shown in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose for</th>
<th>Amount (Number)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Axe</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planking</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handspike</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothes</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columnar</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheel</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

65] VCR, no. 74, p. 7 (1766).
66] VCR, no. 78, p. 131 (1765).
67] VCR, no. 46, p. 123 (1775); no. 68, p. 250 (1790).
68] VCR, no. 95, p. 108 (1787); no. 49, p. 66 (1781); no. 19, p. 31 (1728); no. 34, p. 45 (1818).
69] VCR, no. 1, p. 67 (1820).
70] VCR, no. 41, p. 177 (1752).
71] VCR, no. 65, p. 92 (1783).
72] VCR, no. 9, p. 178 (1741).
3) Problems in the Neighbourhood between Wallachia and Vidin

The first problem Wallachia encountered was about the sale of its own salt. That is because Moldavia salt which was shipped at the port of Kalas, would be sold in all upper ports up to Vidin. Voivode Stefan, in a petition sent to the Imperial Council complained that this practice had reduced his income. However, as mentioned above Wallachia, would pay 15 million piasters to the Empire for its salt. Upon his complaint; an edict was sent to the cadis, port managers and voivodes along the Danubian shores on August 10, 1695. Nevertheless, illegal sale of salt could not be stopped since the officials who were supposed to prevent such acts were involved.73

Two years later, an application of very similar content was made by voivode Constantine and a similar edict was received in response.74 However, this practice would be carried on to the detriment of Wallachia despite the edicts of 1705, 1716, 1718, 1720 and 1722 banning such practice.75

The second important problem that Wallachia experienced was disruptive and unruly behaviours harming the national unity. Illegal trespass of rascals coming from the opposite side harm the local folk. The first one happened in May 1699. Couple of armed men from Flordin which was attached to Vidin, sneaked into Wallachia two months earlier, They kidnapped some peasant families along with their sheep and brought away to Vidin. They were maltreated. Voivode Constantin sent a petition to the capital and asked for justice. The firman, addressed to the guard and cadi, dictated the occurrence to be inspected and information to be provided back to the capital city.76

Having a farm was a widespread reason to travel to Wallachia. Previously, there were three farms founded by the outsiders. These were farms of Rami Pasha, Kırıkçübaşı Cizyedari and Kara Mustafa Pasha. Later on time, some ayans (local notable landlords) and rich men from the “near side” of Danube founded around 200 farms under the name winter quarters (kışlak) over the empty territory. Moreover, cizye-obligated Bulgarian peasants from the “near side” would be located in those winter quarters, under the name teroğlan (assistant of cizye collector) and çoban (shepherd). In fact in 1706, in each winter quarter, there were 15,000 Bulgarians divided in forty, sixty and one hundred each.77 In the same year, Hasan Pasha,
deceased while still governor of Nikopol has got 2,000 sheep grazing in Wallachia. The extent of trespassing arrived to a degree which compelled the folk of Wallachia to submit a collective petition to Imperial Council in 1750. Because these intruders built kıślaks and houses as well as began cultivating the lands, seizing the crop, making local residents work forcefully, beating and harming them, exploiting the commodity, property and lands, attacking women and children. To deal with this situation, in which even sheikhu’l-Islam intervened, a special officer from the capital has been commissioned. Also cadı of Yergogu would help him. Following a comprehensive inspection, houses and kıślaks of those rascals were destroyed and they were banished from Wallachia.

However, as already seen in the salt case, this could not be finished off altogether. In that, bandits from Nikopol and Silistra and auxiliary (yamak) troops of Vidin Fortress will become a nightmare for Wallachian peasants in the ensuing years. On the other hand, the clause “ordered many times erenow” dated August 29, 1759 is an indicator which should make us consider the inadequate power of sanction.

This protracted problem gradually came to such an extent that concerned the entire Danube Bank from Vidin to Brăila. Once shores of safety and security, Danube was now a lair. Number of places and officers subject to the edicts about this issue are very numerous: Guards of Vidin, Nikopol, Kule and Brăila Fortresses, janissary executives of Silistra, Ruse and Giurgiu districts, elder of guild, agha, standardbearer, pensioner, veteran, auxiliary, commander-in-chief (sirdar), landlord and relevant officers.

Another problem Wallachia experienced was the reapers. But, when their work was done, it was supposed that they would be paid wage and then, released. Contrary to this, they were held in the villages and farms. In this case, reapers both fell behind their own schedules and were exposed to bullying. The edict dated June 20 1765, offers solution to this problem: Just before the harvest season, choose two deputies for each district and send them to voivode. Give the voivode bonds (senet) up to the numbers of reapers demanded. Reapers begin to work swiftly and when they are done with it, their wages be paid and they be sent back. If anyone detained, folk find him. This solution was declared to warden of Vidin Fortress, governor of Ochakiv (Özi), Voivodes of Wallachia and Moldavia, cadı and rel-

78] VCR, no. 38, p. 71 (1706).
79] VCR, no. 41, p. 226 (1752).
80] VCR, no. 80, p. 30 (1758); no. 52, p. 33 (1760).
81] VCR, no. 62, p. 113 (1759).
82] VCR, no. 52, p. 146 (1761).
evant officers of the places from which reaper go abroad every year.  

A final problem of Wallachia was a practice called salam (Turkish selem). It is simply an act of contract including lending money to somebody in return for a certain interest. At first glance, although it looks ordinary, there are two interesting aspects. Firstly, this money, in some cases was given forcefully by scaring, beating and even killing if the forced borrower resists. Secondly, the interest rates would be ultra-high so that the total money the lender received at the end was sometimes doubled.

All the above mentioned problems were tried to be solved in mutual agreement. To this end, in Giurgiu opposite Ruse, a cadi used to reside constantly. Additionally, meetings would frequently be organized with broad participation on opposing sides of the Danube. The meetings taking place in Vidin Fortress used to be presided by the warden of the fortress at the muhafız divanı (guardian council). Those meeting in Bucharest would be held under the presidency of Voivode of Wallachia at his palace called kurte. Elders of Wallachian people, notables, all boyars and representative from Vidin attend to this assembly. Sometimes Warden of Vidin pays just a visit for five days to Wallachia to solve certain problems.

At the meeting in Vidin, the pasha guarding Vidin represents the Near Side and so does the boyar, Deputy of the Voivode the Opposite Side. Also, of notables from Vidin, serturna agha (a high ranking officer in the jannisary corps) cadi, mufti, muameleci katip (a scribe for fiscal transactions), jannisary scribe, head of the gunners, and head of the gun carriagers attend to the meeting. 68 janissaries from different divisions among the corpses deployed in the fortress also join.

In addition, similar meetings would be held in Krayova, opposite Vidin. In this meeting Wallachia is presented by a group of deputies varying from a boyar as deputy of the Voivode to village headmen, including 12 monastic officers (gamno). Ottoman Empire is represented by a kapıcıbaşı agha (head of palace doorkeepers) sent from Istanbul, a serturna agha and two çavuş agha (sergeant) the last ones temporarily live Krayova to help with the affairs.

83] VCR, no. 78, p. 131 (1765).
84] VCR, no. 52, p. 146 (1761); no. 74, p. 111 (1767); no. 6, p. 102 (1793).
85] VCR, no. 52, p.62 (1760); no. 52, p. 146 (1761).
86] VCR, no. 19, p. 176 (1727).
87] VCR, no. 159a, p. 147 (1772).
88] VCR, no. 41, p. 102 (1753).
89] VCR, no. 52, p. 46 (1760).
This meeting and dozens of edicts\(^90\), to some of which the letter of chief of janissaries was attached, had only one purpose Wallachian Order. However, merchants had to step into Wallachia to purchase commodity. As a consequence, strict rules were established of which rules several has been mentioned above. Merchants were requested to rent a house, but not to buy it, not leave outside the market area, and finish their business quickly. Otherwise, his name would be removed from merchant registers.\(^91\)

Here an important detail relates to the Ottoman posting (menzil) system. Usually, this form of horse-drawn transport system provides services to the ones carrying a particular edict (menzil firman) confirming the bearer can use the system. To this system added the menzil boat in the Danube shores. However, there exists no trace of the practice of menzil system in Wallachia. To prevent intrusion to opposing shore, particularly dock keepers used to be alerted all the time.\(^92\)

Necessity of paying attention to this specific issue was already raised in 1705.\(^93\) But 50 years later, the problem grew bigger. Edict dated September 30, 1756 clearly states: militaries and non-militaries on both sides of Danube, deserters of Belgrade, jobless ones from Anatolia sneak into Wallachia with folk of Nikopol, Vidin and other Danubian people for disorder, satisfying their pleasure, and demand free bait and food, extort money and goods, wound and kill.\(^94\) Even in 1792, in an edict written to Vidin it was advised that passage boats should not be given to those who travel via Vidin Pass instead of Isakcha and Izmail.\(^95\)

Owing to the ones passing towards Wallachia, Wallachians were not content with the idea of a market intended to be found in Calafat for Vidin Fortress.\(^96\) Therefore, the market was established in Vidin itself. Towards the year 1793, market of Vidin gained a very substantial place in the trade relation between Wallachia and Vidin.\(^97\) The list showing quantity and type of products was firstly signed and sealed by the cadi of Vidin, then sealed once more by the agha of Janissaries. This list would regularly be submitted to the main chancery of the Imperial Council in the capital once in every six months so as to consult if necessary, and kept for later use.\(^98\)

\(^{90}\) VCR, no. 310, p. 64 (1777).

\(^{91}\) VCR, no. 52, p. 58 (1760); no. 52, p. 146 (1761); no. 74, p. 7 (1766); no. 74, p. 111 (1767).

\(^{92}\) VCR, no. 6, p. 208 (1794).

\(^{93}\) VCR, no. 38, p. 28 (1705).

\(^{94}\) VCR, no. 39, p. 46 (1767).

\(^{95}\) VCR, no. 160, p. 48 (1792).

\(^{96}\) VCR, no. 46, p. 164 (1774).

\(^{97}\) VCR, no. 6, p. 102 (1793).

\(^{98}\) VCR, no. 48, p. 61 (1781).
We omit to elaborate details of both quantity and monetary value of the sales in Vidin. The total weight of the supply of butter, honey, beeswax, wheat, barley, corn and millet, which exported from Wallachia to Vidin Fortress in four month time in the year 1796 went up to nearly as much as 2.500 tonnes. Moreover, this number is a *drop in the ocean* when compared to the supplies which would be exported from Wallachia to Istanbul. Undoubtedly this was an important *trade channel* through which Wallachian peasants would take the advantage to sell their crop and earn money. The opportunity of tax exemption for three years given to those people who had to dislocate during the wars should be added up to this.⁹⁹

There is no information in Vidin Court Registers either about incomes acquired by the people in Wallachia from these sales or their economic situation. However, much can be said for *Near Side*. From the point of view based on the idea that *neighbours, who die in the war, are more or less alike*, as an example we enclose at end of the article the heritage record (tereke) of Hayrettin Agha from Muradiye district in Vidin.¹⁰⁰

Number of edicts to protect Wallachian Order is not few.¹⁰¹ However, the real problem concerns the entire Balkans.¹⁰² That is because, starting from March 1742, once in a few years, familiar edicts used to be sent. In such edicts, any location was not specified, because it concerned everyone on both right and left side of right branch (kol) of Rumelia. It called out to pashas, gentlemen (bey) and masters (effendi) in a generalized and strong manner. Then, *spring arrived, the trees leafed. The time for bandits in the mountains to come out from where they hide. Clan, tribe and indigenous; bandits and strays, will come out*, it warned.¹⁰³

Now, the empire lost its old attraction. In the second half of the century; it was more cumbersome bureaucracy, a heavy tax burden and debtor management. This situation lagged behind the both understandings, which used to see Christians as *vediatullah*, literarily fiduciary of God, and *the greatest treasure was the people*. This dragged the *non-imperial*, moreover *emotional* state in a harder position. As a result, sense of trust, which was the only functioning sanction of the Empire vanished. These changes had an impact on Vidin likewise on Bosnia and Wallachia. Examples of Vidin is as follows:

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⁹⁹] VCR, no. 43, p. 78 (1723); no. 46, p. 164 (1774); no. 34, p. 108 (1819).
¹⁰⁰] VCR, no. 1, p. 83 (1822).
¹⁰¹] VCR, no. 41, p. 226 (1752); no. 41, p. 102 (1753); no. 62, p. 113 (1759); no. 52, p. 62 (1760); no. 52, p. 146 (1761); no. 346, p. 11 (1762); no. 37, p. 59 (1768).
¹⁰²] “Until the right and left up to the end of right branch” VCR no. 9, p. 131 (1746).
¹⁰³] VCR, no. 18, p. 12 (1742); no. 25a, p. 139 (1743); no. 9, p. 200 (1746); no. 56, p. 126 (1750); no. 64, p. 16 (1754); no. 80, p. 12 (1758); no. 62, p. 81 (1759).
In fact, the Balkans was *Kızıl elma* ("red apple") for the Turkish Empire. These lands, more challenging than Anatolia, started breaking its emotional bond with the capital in the first quarter of the 19th century. Thus, the empire after 1774 had difficulties in standing on its own feet.

In this article we tried to look at the Vidin fortress from Wallachia, the opposite side. Perhaps many things have been left missing or have not been emphasized enough. But we are hopeful that our esteemed colleagues in Bucharest mentioned the existence of many original documents. Hopefully one day these documents will be the sources of important researches as in the case of Vidin Court Registers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Revenue/Piastre</th>
<th>Expense/Piastre</th>
<th>Deficit/Piastre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1748</td>
<td>39.140</td>
<td>39.140</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760</td>
<td>40.000</td>
<td>109.332</td>
<td>69.332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1782</td>
<td>220.000</td>
<td>582.496</td>
<td>362.496</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[1] 19.750 kuruş was taken two times to consummate the year. VCR, no. 55, p. 31 (1748).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Cemaat, Bölük or Baș-eskisi</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Cemaat, Bölük or Baș-eskisi</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Elhac Hasan Alemdar</td>
<td>64. Cemaat</td>
<td>Salih Bese</td>
<td>55. Cemaat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
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<td>Mehmet Bese</td>
<td>56. Cemaat</td>
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<td>Derviş Bese</td>
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<td>Kara Osman Bese</td>
<td>58. Cemaat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Mustafa Alemdar</td>
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<td>İbrahim Bese</td>
<td>59. Cemaat</td>
</tr>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Mehmet Alemdar</td>
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<td>Mahmut Bese</td>
<td>60. Cemaat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Salih Aga</td>
<td>22. Bölük</td>
<td>İsmail Bese</td>
<td>61. Cemaat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Salih Aga</td>
<td>97. Cemaat</td>
<td>Hasan Bese</td>
<td>62. Cemaat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Hüseyin Aga</td>
<td>55. Cemaat</td>
<td>Mustafa Bese</td>
<td>63. Cemaat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Omer Alemdar</td>
<td>55. Cemaat</td>
<td>Elhac Ömer Bese</td>
<td>64. Cemaat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Mehmet Bese</td>
<td>64. Cemaat Baș-eskisi</td>
<td>Mehmet Bese</td>
<td>65. Cemaat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Mustafa Bese</td>
<td>62. Cemaat</td>
<td>Ahmet Bese</td>
<td>66. Cemaat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Mehmet Bese</td>
<td>33. Sekban</td>
<td>Osman Bese</td>
<td>68. Cemaat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hayrettin Aga’s Tereke Who Died in Wartime in Wallachia (1822)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Saat</td>
<td>88 kuruş</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bıçak</td>
<td>201 kuruş</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dağlı Tüfek</td>
<td>140 kuruş</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>En’am-ı Şerif</td>
<td>7 kuruş</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Şeşhane Tüfek</td>
<td>20 kuruş</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Yüzük</td>
<td>6 kuruş</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Piştov Kubur (çift)</td>
<td>55 kuruş</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Uzun Kebe</td>
<td>20 kuruş</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Kebe</td>
<td>10 kuruş</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Çuka Dolama</td>
<td>21 kuruş</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Şayak Çakşır</td>
<td>10 kuruş</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Heybe ile İbrik</td>
<td>6 kuruş</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Seccade ve Şal</td>
<td>6 kuruş 20 para</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Çuka Cübbe</td>
<td>7 kuruş 20 para</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Şal (yeni)</td>
<td>49 kuruş 30 para</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Ahmediye</td>
<td>16 kuruş</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Silah ve Kayış</td>
<td>12 kuruş</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Kemer</td>
<td>4 kuruş 4 para</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Don Gömlek</td>
<td>7 kuruş 9 para</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Kilim</td>
<td>49 kuruş 20 para</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Saat</td>
<td>42 kuruş 20 para</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>İnek ve Buzağı</td>
<td>24 kuruş</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Siyah At</td>
<td>100 kuruş</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Doru At</td>
<td>215 kuruş</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Biraz Hırdavat</td>
<td>18 kuruş 27 para</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Nakit Para</td>
<td>17 kuruş 12 para</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Eşinin üzerinde ev</td>
<td>1.601 kuruş</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Map-1: Location of Vidin Fortress
Map-2: Calafat (Opposite the Vidin Fortress)

Map-3: Wallachian Side

Map-4: Wallachian Side
CHAPTER II

ROMANIAN PRINCIPALITIES
PLACING THE DANUBIAN PRINCIPALITIES WITHIN THE COMPOSITE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Michał Wasiucionek*

In an article published in 2008, Caroline Finkel has posed an important question concerning the historical heritage of the Ottoman Empire. The main argument of the paper - appropriately entitled ‘Ottoman History: Whose History Is This?’ - was that modern historiographical traditions have considerable difficulty in dealing with the Ottoman past:

“[Ottoman history] is not just the elephant in the room but one wearing luminescent pajamas, impossible to ignore and harder still to deal with. [...] As a result, the Ottoman centuries remain at the margins in many serious writings about the past and otherwise-thoughtful analyses of the present. In journalistic shorthand a vast imperial history is condensed to a not-so-subtle pejorative, in which some six hundred years when the Ottomans held sway fall on the wrong side of an imagined good/bad dichotomy, and that is all that anyone needs to know about it.”¹

Categorizing the different frameworks within which the Ottoman experience should be incorporated, the scholar roughly divides different national traditions of history writing into the post-Ottoman successor states and the ‘Europe-beyond-the-frontier’². Quite interestingly, while she provides a comprehensive list of these traditions, Romania fails to enter either of these categories. While this could be an unintended omission on Finkel’s part, it is nonetheless quite telling about the perception of the position of the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia (which in the second half of the nineteenth century became the core of the Romanian national state). As satellites of the Ottoman Porte throughout the early modern period, they hardly count as ‘Europe-beyond-

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² Caroline Finkel, “Ottoman history: whose history is it?,” p. 6–8.
the frontier'; on the other hand, the lack of direct Ottoman administration on their territory contributed to the fact that they fall outside the purview of the Ottoman scholarship, being lumped into the category of ‘tributary states’ or – more appropriately – satellite polities of the Porte.  

This resulted in the relative disjuncture and reciprocal lack of interest between scholars on the Ottoman Empire and the Danubian principalities, as well as the main directions of research on the Ottoman-Moldavian-Wallachian relations. Two approaches can be discerned in this respect: firstly, the study of the legal status of the Danubian principalities vis-à-vis the Porte, with the focus on the existence or non-existence of the ‘capitulations’ granted to the rulers of Moldavia and Wallachia; secondly, the studies of ‘international history’, treating the Ottoman Empire as one of the actors in the diplomatic chessboard. As Viorel Panaite has pointed out, the question asked by the Romanian historians was ‘why the Ottomans never conquered the Danubian principalities’ rather than how did the principalities fit into the imperial edifice.  

This perception of the Ottoman Empire as a foreign country among the Romanian scholarship has contributed to the growing disconnection from the current trends in Ottoman studies. Even in relatively recent publications, the rhetoric of ‘decline’ or the ‘Turkish yoke’ are recurrent despite their rejection by the Ottomanist scholars. In short, the Ottoman Empire that emerges from the writings of historians of the Danubian principalities is strikingly out of touch with the revisions made by their counterparts dealing with ‘well-protected domains’ in the past three decades – and vice versa.  

However, the development of scholarship on the Ottoman Empire has pulled the rug from under the existing master narrative of the relationship between the Danubian principalities and the Porte. Apart from the rejection of

3] I prefer the latter term as more encompassing, including not only the states (itself a term subject to some doubt) that actually paid the tribute to the Porte (Transylvania, Dubrovnik, Georgian kinglets, Moldavia, Wallachia), but also the polities that were actually subsidized by the Ottoman center, the Crimean Khanate or Hejaz.  


the ‘decline’ narrative, the very clear-cut division between satellite polities and the Ottoman provinces has been subject to doubt. In his works, Viorel Panaite has brought attention that the alleged ‘non-conquest’ was a non-issue for the Ottoman officials, which considered Moldavia and Wallachia on par with other provinces, the preservation of their autonomy stemming from customary arrangements rather than ‘capitulations’\(^6\). At the same time, in his recent contribution to the topic, Dariusz Kołodziejczyk and has stressed that the division between the inside and outside of the empire was not a clear faultline, but rather a part of a spectrum within a composite imperial edifice: thus, the division between satellite polities and the ‘normal’ eyalets was far from clear-cut\(^7\).

This reconceptualization of the Ottoman Empire underpins the present contribution, which argues for the ‘bringing the Ottoman Empire back’ into the study of the early modern Danubian principalities – and \textit{vice versa}. As I will point out, this does necessitates changing the scales and implicit assumptions, with which we take on the study of both political arenas. Most importantly, it requires the move beyond the state-oriented approach in favor of a focus on practices, cultural transfers and social interactions in a cross-border perspective. In return, the proposed recalibration of our apparatus can bring us a deeper understanding not only of the political relations between the Porte and its tributaries, but also help us understand seemingly unconnected developments in both the Danubian principalities and the imperial center. In short, it can provide us with the new, positive master narrative of the Ottoman-Romanian entanglement of the early modern period.

Due to the limited space, the present paper focuses on the programmatic aspect of such a model. In broad strokes I present some hypotheses, which show the possibilities that applying \textit{histoire croisée} methodology to the developments occurring in the seventeenth and eighteenth century\(^8\). By contextualizing the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia within the context of the Ottoman imperial composite structure, we gain a clearer picture of the entanglement of their political actors into the power networks of the empire, as was in the case of

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rebellion. At the same time, the comparison between the phenomena occurring in the Ottoman eyalets serve as an object of comparison with the Moldavian and Wallachian developments.

In order to flesh out the idea, in the first section I will discuss the changing perspectives on the Ottoman Empire, which form the backbone of the argument. The two next sections will present their possible applicability for the Moldavian-Wallachian context and the possibilities such an enterprise offers us. Due to limited space, I will focus on two major phenomena – the interrelationship between the Ottoman and Moldavian-Wallachian political culture and the rise of the Phanariots. While at the first glance, these matters have little in common, they both inscribe into the wider context of Baki Tezcan’s ‘Second Ottoman Empire’.

As I have mentioned above, the last three decades have brought an overall re-evaluation of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the case of Ottoman Empire. Rather than the watershed, which marks the period of ‘decline’ and degeneration of ‘classical’ institutions, scholars increasingly perceive this period as a time of change and overhaul of imperial structure, stressing the adaptability and flexibility of the Ottoman edifice. The Porte suffered a number of upheavals throughout this period, with the weakening position of the sultan, the rise of the political households and the gradual phasing out of the timar system. However, the result was not a degraded, ‘worse’ version of the glorious days, but rather a completely new social, economic and political consensus that emerged.

Probably, the boldest attempt to provide a new narrative of the changes is the work by Baki Tezcan, who argued that the late sixteenth century was the beginning of the ‘second Ottoman Empire’, a polity strikingly different in comparison with the previous period. According to him, the underlying socio-economic changes, most of all the monetization of the economy and the influx of Muslim re'āya into the ranks of the elite, contributed towards the devolution of power from the imperial palace towards larger sections of the population. The effect was the emergence of what Tezcan boldly calls ‘Ottoman proto-democracy’, with the Muslim political nation (now largely incorporated into the askeri class) as a check on the imperial center.

These developments were by no means smooth; on the contrary, the seventeenth century was a time of violent upheavals, both in the political center

and in the provinces. At the Ottoman capital, the grandee households vied for power and for the positions; in the provincial context, the rise of banditry and the revolts of governors took their toll on the population. However, at no point were these tendencies dangerous to the very existence of the Ottoman state; as Karen Barkey points out, celali rebellions were not directed against the Porte; instead, they constituted just one step of the process of bargaining with the center\textsuperscript{12}.

The rebels were more maverick clients rather than opponents of the empire, and they were treated as such: rather than cracking on the rebellious governors, the Porte proved accommodating and often exonerated the rebel leaders, selectively incorporating them into the administration. As a result, the status of a ‘rebel’ or ‘bandit’ was reversible and some grandees crossed the line between legality and illegality numerous times\textsuperscript{13}.

As Tezcan points out, the new consensus of the Second Ottoman Empire took shape in the eighteenth century. The flow of economic resources between the center and the periphery – epitomized by the tax-farming arrangements of iltizam and malikane – brought the horizontal integration of the elite, the local notables cooperating with the imperial grandees\textsuperscript{14}. At the same time, the entrance of the Muslim \textit{re'aya} into the \textit{askeri} class contributed to the redrawing of the identity markers. As most Muslims were now \textit{askeri}, the very \textit{askeri}/\textit{re'aya} divide lost its importance in favor of confessional identities. The socio-economic changes followed, as numerous scholars pointed out to the growing phenomenon of ‘Ottomanization’ defined by Hülya Canbakal as:

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“[A] different and possibly stronger degree of integration between the imperial center and the provinces than had been the case under the 150-year-long ‘classical’ centralist regime. ‘Ottomanization’ has come to denote the emergence of an integrated elite through the incorporation of local people into the administrative and distributive networks of the central state and ‘naturalization’ of the members of the Ottoman officialdom into local societies.”  

As one can see, the Ottoman Empire of the seventeenth-eighteenth century was a different polity altogether and its basic power: much of the sultan’s power devolved to the other actors, the social hierarchies were redrawn, political culture changed and a cultural convergence occurred between the actors at the central imperial arena and local elites.

If we look through these lens on the interactions between the Porte and the Danubian principalities, in many respects we find striking similarities, although bearing their own, local imprint. One of such phenomena is rebellion and resistance to the Porte. Throughout the seventeenth century, the celali rebellions and banditry rocked the Ottoman provinces, most importantly in Anatolia; at the same time, we find a number of instances of rebellion against the Porte among the Moldavian and Wallachian voievodes.

While both groups of rebellion occupy a central place in respective historical traditions, the divergence between the Romanian and Ottoman scholarship has resulted in the lack of any comparative endeavor. On the one hand, the Romanian historiography has perceived Moldavian and Wallachian revolts within the context of the struggle against the ‘Turkish yoke’ and ‘national’ aspirations of the Romanians, the celali phenomenon usually mentioned just as a sign of purported Ottoman ‘decline’ and breakdown of public order. At the same time, the Ottomanists, while paying attention to explaining the rise of banditry in Anatolia, at the same time, usually relegate the revolts in the Danubian principalities as lying beyond their area of interest. In effect, the celalis and the rebel voievodes seem to have nothing in common.

However, there are striking similarities between the political strategies of applied by the rulers of Moldavia and Wallachia and the governors-turned-rebels. Since I have discussed this matter in a different contribution, I will provide just a small summary here only briefly.


16] The paper ‘Celali Voievodes? The strategies of rebellion and the transfer of political culture
Despite allegedly different motivations driving the *celali* and Moldavian-Wallachian rebels, there is a great degree of overlap in the political strategies these two groups adopted in dealing with the Porte. Just as was in the case of the bandit leaders, the rebellion did not necessarily mean a clear break with the Ottoman system, but was one step in the process of bargaining, not precluding the possibility of accommodation. For instance, one of the ‘national’ voievodes of Wallachia, Matei Basarab (1632-1654), while capturing the throne against the candidate supported by the Porte and nurturing contacts with the Christian neighbours, never broke up entirely with the imperial center. Rather, just as in the case of the prominent *celali*, they often swiftly reconciled with the Porte, contending themselves with the reconfirmation on the throne.

The conduits between the Ottoman and Moldavian-Wallachian were the patronage ties cultivated between the Porte grandees and the voievodes and boyars alike. As the conflict between Matei Basarab and Vasile Lupu in the 1630s makes clear, there was a clear interconnection between the factionalism in the Danubian principalities and that at the imperial center. While Vasile Lupu in his attempts to extend control over both Danubian principalities profited from the support of Tabaniyassi Mehmed Pasha and the Chief Black Eunuch, El-Hac Mustafa Agha, his adversary turned to the protection of the sultan’s favorite, Silahdar Mustafa Pasha.17 Thus, the developments in neither of these political arenas can be satisfactorily understood without taking into consideration the logic of factionalism in the other one.

However, this relationship between the Ottoman officials and Moldavian-Wallachian elites in the cases of rebellion went further. When Matei Basarab opposed the Porte’s appointee, Radu Iliș, in his bid for the Wallachian throne, his actions were not oriented against the Ottoman rule in general, aiming for obtaining the recognition of the imperial center instead. The particular consequence and the strategy of rebellion and subsequent accommodation was strikingly similar to that of the *celali* governors of that time. This was by no means an accident, as the voievode acted in concord with his patron, the beylerbey of Özü, Abaza Mehmed Pasha, who instigated him to rebel and offered protection at the Porte. The Ottoman official, arguably the most famous and successful *celali* leader

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himself, this time appeared as a patron of the Wallachian voievode, facilitating his communication with the Porte and without doubt largely influencing the strategy of Matei. Thus, in this case, we have a direct link between rebellion, cross-border factionalism and the transfer of political culture between the Ottoman elite and the one of Moldavian-Wallachian political arena.

Another topic that cries for such a perspective is the rise of the Phanariots, of crucial significance for our understanding of the eighteenth century for both political arenas. In traditional Romanian historical narrative, influenced by the political context of Romanian historiography and politics of the nineteenth century, the so-called ‘Phanariot system’ has been presented as a top-down measure imposed unilaterally by the Ottomans in order to ensure the loyalty of the principalities to the Porte and resulted in the virtual takeover of the principalities by Istanbul-based Greek families\textsuperscript{18}. However, this view was criticized by numerous scholars, starting from Nicolae Iorga, who pointed out that the Phanariots were not Greek ‘national’ clique, but rather a composite familial elite, which found consensus with the local elites\textsuperscript{19}.

These conclusions were further fleshed out by other scholars, like Paul Cernovodeanu, who pointed out that among the elite of the principalities, most of the top positions remained within the hands of the local families\textsuperscript{20}. At the same time, other scholars criticize both the chronology, as well as the very existence of the “Phanariot regime” as such\textsuperscript{21}. However, the Romanian historiography generally failed to produce a new master narrative of the Phanariot period and as a result, the status of Phanariots oscillates uneasily between the ‘despotic agents of the Porte’ and ‘enlightened reformers.’

The serious reconceptualization of the Phanariot phenomenon within the context of the Ottoman Empire and its developments in the same period, we devise a new way of thinking about Phanariots. As Christine Philliou, the Phanariots

\textsuperscript{18} For a recent example of such an approach, see: Petrică Dumitrache, “Instituțiile centrale ale Principatelor Române între sistemul politic european și cel otoman (1683-1756),” Anuarul Institutului de Istorie “A.D. Xenopol”, 44, 2007, p. 295.


were *par excellence* an Ottoman elite, and in many respects shared the lot of their polity, becoming another case of ‘an elephant in luminescent pajamas’, unclaimed by any successor historiography\(^\text{22}\). Thus, their history should be inscribed into their Ottoman context in order to understand their expansion to the Danubian principalities.

A key to understanding the process of ‘Phanariotization’ of the Moldavian-Wallachian elite lies to my mind in the changing shape of power networks operating between the center and the periphery, and more precisely, between central and peripheral elites. The studies of numerous scholars as Dina Rizk Khoury, Ariel Salzmann and Hülya Canbakal, have pointed out that the process of ‘Ottomanization’ of the Muslim notables was taking place exactly in that period\(^\text{23}\). This undirected development stemmed from the spread of tax-farming arrangements of *iltizam* and *malikane*, which brought closer the central and peripheral elites and created vested interests for the latter in the preservation of the Ottoman governance system. A cultural integration followed, which contributed to the emergence of the ‘Ottoman-local elites,’ peripheral, but culturally and politically oriented towards the imperial center\(^\text{24}\).

How does it relate to the rise of the Phanariots? As I would argue, the ‘Phanariotization’ of the Danubian principalities – and more generally, Christian peripheral elites – was in many respects a Greek Orthodox variant of ‘Ottomanization’ processes occurring with respect to the Muslim elites of the empire. As was the case with the Muslim elites of the empire, the cultural pull of the imperial center occurred, following the increasing entanglement of familial, economic and political ties between the center and the periphery.

According to Ehud Toledano, the Ottoman imperial culture was not an ethnic one, but rather a ‘highly articulated culture, which distinguished them from anyone who did not belong to the imperial elite’\(^\text{25}\). In the studies on the eighteenth century Orthodox identity we can find a strikingly similar theses. As Victor Roudometof and Christine Philliou point out, the spread of Grecophone


culture throughout the Balkans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was not an ethnic or national phenomenon, but formed a part of elite cultural capital, which allowed for upward mobility. What would that mean for our narrative of the Ottoman-Moldavian-Wallachian relations? Firstly, the reframing of the ‘Phanariotization’ as a variant of a more general trend of Ottomanization dismantles the vision of Phanariots as ‘agents of the Porte’ imposed on the Danubian principalities and of the ‘system’ as a pre-conceived measure by the Ottomans to keep Moldavia and Wallachia in line. Just as Ottomanization was an unintended consequence of new patterns of governance and revenue-extraction, so the integration of the Phanariot and local elites would seem as a result on the levels of social practice rather than a conscious policy. It would also force us to rethink chronology, a trend already present in the Romanian historiography, with many scholars introducing the concept of a ‘pre-Phanariot period’ in the second half of the seventeenth century, or moving the beginning of the phenomenon from 1711-1716 back to 1659.

However, if the road to a ‘Phanariot rule’ was an unintended process, driven by the underlying integration between the periphery and the center, one should then stress continuity of the seventeenth century of which the appointment of Nicolae Mavrocordat was just a conjecture, which eventually took root. Instead of signifying a dawn of new era, this event was one of the signs of the growing entanglement between a center and a periphery.

In the field of Ottoman studies, such a conclusion would also mean rethinking of one of the aspects of the new narrative proposed by Baki Tezcan. In his discussion of the changing markers of difference and the rise of the Muslim political nation, the scholar implicitly assumes that Phanariots were rather a relic of the old system than the part of the new one.

This seems grossly misguided, since it was the second half of the seventeenth century, which marked the rise of the Greek Orthodox elite to the prominence they were to enjoy in the following period, which makes them one of the crucial elements of the Second Ottoman Empire.

The narrative of the growing integration of the center and the periphery


and the rise of the Phanariots in the Danubian principalities provide a way to explain this phenomenon within the model of Tezcan. Just as the Ottomanization contributed to the emergence of a Muslim imperial nation, the same occurred with reference to empire’s Greek Orthodox elites. The process of Phanariotization and the growing integration between peripheral and Istanbul-based elites brought the emergence of a Greek Orthodox imperial shadow nation, which – officially separated from the top positions of governance – nonetheless found its niche within the Ottoman system of governance. While the Christian-Ottoman nation was barred from acceding the top positions of power, they nonetheless played a significant role in managing the fortunes of the empire – both in the center (as dragomans) and in the periphery (as the voievodes of Moldavia and Wallachia) – in this respect it was a shadow nation. It was imperial in the respect that its fortunes and very existence were closely tied to the fortunes of the Ottoman Empire itself and its history was rejected by the future national historiographies from the nineteenth century onwards and is only recoverable by thinking out of a national box.

As I tried to argue in the context of early modern interaction between the Danubian principalities, the Ottoman Empire in many respects is an ‘elephant in luminescent pajamas’, hard to deal with and hard to ignore. By looking at the empire through state-centered and often broken lens, many Romanian scholars fail to explain adequately not only the dynamics of relations between the Porte and the Danubian principalities, but also the internal developments of seemingly unconnected aspects of the respective internal arenas. The same applies to Ottoman studies, where interest in the internal workings of Moldavia and Wallachia and their place within the wider imperial context can provide significant correctives to the new master narrative of the empire as a whole.

In this respect, both scholarly communities can draw inspiration from the fountains near Sf. Spiridon church in Iași. The founder of the fountains, voievode Grigore Ghica III, placed three inscriptions commemorating his contribution to the urban landscape of Moldavian capital: in Romanian, Greek and Arabic. These three inscriptions refer to three identities of the voievode, later to be executed on the Porte’s orders: as a voievode of Moldavia and Wallachia, as member of the Orthodox imperial nation and as a member of the Ottoman elite. All of them were coexistent within one individual, and to present him as a fully-fledged person, and without any of them his picture would be incomplete. The same can be said about the entangled history of both the Danubian principalities and the Ottoman Empire – without serious engagement between the two fields something always will be lacking.
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On September 14th, 1387 the Moldavian Prince Peter Mușat paid homage to the Polish royal couple, Jadwiga and Jagiełło. The Principality of Moldavia officially became a vassal of the Polish Crown. The biggest challenger for supremacy over this country at the time was Hungary, which was earlier in control of the Moldavian territory. However, despite the continuous efforts of the Hungarian Crown, the Polish Jagiellonians managed to remain in control almost until the end of the 15th century.

In 1453, Sultan Mehmed II demanded a tribute from the Moldavian Prince Alexander II for the very first time. The Prince did not give any response, shortly afterwards lost his throne and died. Mehmed II repeated the demand in autumn 1455 from new Prince Peter Aron. He decided to ask Casimir Jagiellon for advice on how he should proceed, but the Polish King who was occupied with the Thirteen Years’ War with the Teutonic Knights, never gave him a response.

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4] There is no trace of the existence of such a document, assumptions of many researchers on the
Eventually, the Prince agreed to pay the tribute, while the Polish King pretended not to know anything about it. A small tribute, 2000 ducats, paid voluntarily, did not constitute a subordination of Moldavia to the Ottoman Empire.

Poland-Moldavia relations slightly deteriorated when Moldavia was taken over by Stephen III, who did not have the endorsement of the Polish King. The new Prince's willingness to pay tribute to the Ottoman Empire was poorly received in Poland. Two years had to pass before Casimir Jagiellon recognized and accepted the reign of Stephen.

With the passing of some time, Moldavia started to become a growing target of the political interests of the Ottoman state. Without a doubt, this was partly due to the undeniable interest Moldavia expressed in Vlach-related Wallachian matters and the conflict with the state as well as conflicting interests regarding the Black Sea. When the conflict between Moldavia and the Ottoman state escalated in 1475-1476, the Polish support given to the Moldavian Prince proved to be not as big and crucial as the Hungarian support, which resulted in close relations between Moldavia and Hungary. The King of Hungary, Matthias Corvinus, interpreted the alliance treaty with Stephen the Great, reached in

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6] Ilona Czamańska, Mołdawia i Wołoszczyzna wobec Polski, Węgier i Turcji, p. 119-121.

7] For example, in the famous Battle of Vaslui (10 January 1475) were involved, how to estimate calculates 5 000 Székelys, 1 800 Hungarians and 2 000 Poles – V. Ciobanu, Țările române și Polonia, p. 72.
1475, as a feudal contact. That was not part of the treaty, which clearly stated the supremacy of the Polish king over Moldavia. Nevertheless, a legal precedence was established by giving the Moldavian Prince two feudal territories in the territory of the Hungarian state: Csicsó and Küklő. With these territories, the Prince became an actual vassal of the Hungarian King, and since the feudal dependence was of a personal nature, it might have seemed as if Stephen the Great was also the vassal of Matthias Corvinus who was also from Moldavia. What made the matter even more convincing was the fact that the Prince had avoided paying formal homage to Casimir Jagiellon for 28 years.

The Ottoman Empire's subjugation of strategic ports belonging to Moldavia – Kiliya and Belgorod (Akkerman) – prompted an immediate diplomatic reaction of both Poland and Hungary. Poles, even before the tragedy of Moldavian Principality happened, tried mediation, however Polish envoy, Warsz Michowski, for an unknown reason, not arrived for sultan. Matthias Corvinus issued a strong protest to the Sultan, accusing him of breach of peace and a violation of the territory of the Hungarian vassal. Hungarian king received the answer that the Hungary-Turkey peace treaty of 1483 does not list Moldavia as a state of the Hungarian domain. Undoubtedly, this situation has given the Sultan Bayezid II
basis for the recognition of the Principality of Moldavia as a country without of a powerful protector.

War was the only way of regaining the lost territories. Matthias Corvinus could not be depended on, as he had made peace with the Sultan and gone to war with Emperor Frederick III. The support of the Polish king was conditioned on Stephen paying him homage, which he was forced to do on September 16th 1485\(^\text{13}\). This was viewed in Poland as a huge political success and was widely publicized\(^\text{14}\); however the actual results were short-term and unfavourable for both parties. Though the Polish military support was sufficient for the Prince to keep defending from his enemy’s attacks, it was far too meagre to even consider regaining the lost territories. Feeling disappointed with the modest Polish support, the Prince decided to venture into closer and unequivocal relations with Hungary. The Hungarian supremacy of Moldavia was immediately recognized by the Ottoman Empire, which agreed to include Moldavia in the renewed peace treaty with Hungary\(^\text{15}\). This facilitated Stephen in levelling the relations and establishing peace with the Ottoman Empire\(^\text{16}\). Such a state of affairs could not be


\(^\text{16}\) Ștefan Gorovei, “Moldova in ”Casa Păcii”. Pe marginea izvoarelor privind primul secol de relaţii moldo-ottomane”, AIIA” A. D. Xenopol”, XVII, 1980, p. 629-668; Ștefan Gorovei, Pacea moldo-otomană din 1486, passim; Ștefan Gorovei, ”La paix moldo-ottomane de 1486 (quelques
accepted by Poland and Lithuania, especially since there was a dangerous alliance between Hungary, Moldavia, Moscow and the Crimean Tatars developing around their borders. It was common knowledge that the key to ruling this region lied in the ports of Kiliya and Belgorod (Akkerman), but taking them was difficult without Hungarian cooperation, which is why efforts were put into achieving an anti-Ottoman alliance between Poland and Hungary. These plans though were thwarted by the death of Matthias Corvinus.

The fact of Ladislaus Jagiellon assuming the Hungarian throne did not solve the Moldavian issue in Poland’s favour. The rivalry between Ladislaus Jagiellon and his younger brother John I Albert for the Hungarian throne prevented them from cooperating even when John I Albert became the King of Poland. Furthermore, as Ladislaus did not have a strong position in Hungary, he could not make concessions towards his father or his brother. And so, the status of Moldavia remained unclear. Poland and Hungary both considered the Prince as their vassal, but the biggest claim belonged to the Ottoman Empire, which was in possession of the crucial strategic ports. The expedition of Jan I Albert, commencing in 1497 with the objective of seizing Kiliya, was supposed to tip the scale in Poland’s favour, but it was squashed by the Prince because he was collaborating with Hungary and so it never reached its destination. The Polish King’s defeat determined


19] After the election of Władysław Jagiellon on the Hungarian king and his coronation, Stefan renewed his vassal agreement with Hungary - Papacostea, De la Colomeea la codrul Cosminului, p. 539.

20] As for the views concerning the reason for John Albert’s campaign to Moldavia in 1497, there are considerable discrepancies among different historians. Historians such as Fryderyk Papée, Anatol Lewicki or Ludwik Kolankowski believed that the goal of the campaign, according to popular slogans of that time, was Turkey and that this goal had to be changed as a consequence of the attitude of the Moldavian hospodar Stephan – cf. F. Papée, Zagadnienie olbrachtowej wyprawy z r. 1497, Kwartalnik Historyczny (hereinafter referred to as KH), 1933, p. 17-30; Aleksander Lewicki, Jan Olbracht o klęsce bukowińskiej z r. 1497, KH, VII, 1893, 1, p. 5-15; Ludwik Kolankowski, Dzieje Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego za Jagiellonów, vol. 1, 1377-1499,
Moldavia’s status as an entity under the formal political patronage of Hungary with strong influences from the Ottoman Empire. In any case, the brothers and successors of John I Albert, Alexander and Sigismund, remained in good terms with their brother Ladislaus, while the peace treaty between Poland and Moldavia signed in Kamieniec in 1510 unequivocally confirmed Hungary’s supremacy over Moldavia.21

On August 29th 1526, in the region of Mohács, the young Hungarian king Louis II died. Poland interpreted it as a chance to once again take control of Moldavia, and in 1527 Poland made an unsuccessful attempt in installing its own Prince there. At the same time, the Hungarian king John Zápolya...
surrendered to the reign of the Ottoman Porte. This was a crucial moment for the Ottoman Empire in recognizing both Romanian states, Wallachia and Moldavia, as subservient states. I emphasize: subservient states, not vassal states, as vassal agreements were a mutual agreement, however vast the difference between the two sides of the agreement was. Meanwhile, in the case of the Romanian states, the mutuality rule with the Ottoman Empire was abolished and replaced by the Sultan’s berat. What is worth mentioning, however, is that both Romanian states, despite this status, kept almost full independence domestically and a considerable amount of freedom in external political activities.

Peter Rareș, the Moldavian Prince, at first tried to operate as a completely independent ruler, manoeuvring between John Zápolya, Sultan Suleiman and Ferdinand I while first and foremost attempting to seize the Polish territory of Pokuttya, which he finally seized militarily in late 1530\(^\text{22}\). Though there was a need for a Polish military intervention in order to regain control of Pokuttya, such actions were viewed by the Polish royal court with the fear of starting a conflict with the Ottoman Empire. To avoid such a possibility, the Polish deputy Jan Ocieski was sent to Istanbul with a complaint against the Prince, which practically sanctioned the Turkish political supremacy of Moldavia. In his letter to the Polish King, the Sultan wrote that he orders his slave, subject and tributary - the Prince - to return the seized territories, while clearly emphasizing the fact that the Prince was not at liberty to enter into international agreements on his own\(^\text{23}\). The last stipulation was a clear indication of the political-legislative situation of Moldavia, at least from the Sultan’s perspective.

Things were viewed differently in Poland, but the difficulties of solving the conflict of Pokuttya, despite Jan Tarnowski winning the battles of Gwoździec (19 August 1531) and Obertyn (22 August 1531), demanded subsequent diplomatic interventions in Istanbul. On 19 January 1533, Sigismund I signed an eternal peace treaty with Sultan Suleiman\(^\text{24}\). The treaty was supposed to ensure the status quo and peace around the Moldavian borders, however it de facto meant that the


\(^{23}\) Suleyman to Sigismund I, 15\(^{\text{th}}\) May 1531 – *AT*, vol. 13, no. 158, p. 150-153.

\(^{24}\) *AT*, vol. 15, Wratislaviae – Cracovie 1957, no. 44, p. 63-68.
Polish King would have to concede the Moldavian feudal fee, though no such stipulation was actually written down on paper. The dire consequences of this treaty on Peter Rareș is transparent in the fact that the expedition of the Polish deputy Piotr Opaliński sent to negotiate and sign the treaty in the King’s name became the target “hunt” of the Moldavian Prince\(^{25}\).

The year 1538 saw the simultaneous military movement of Poland and Turkey against Peter Rareș\(^{26}\). While the Prince instantly made peace with Poland and returned the once again seized lands of Pokuttya, he was not able to suppress the Turkish invasion. Peter’s escape to Transylvania led to the Sultan taking over Moldavia, which in turn resulted in Suleiman viewing this country as one that he conquered by sword and therefore as being completely subservient to him. For the first time ever, he installed a new Prince, Stephen V Locust, on his own. On his way back, Suleiman annexed the eastern territory of Moldavia, the so-called Budjak. The Poles were greatly surprised by the Sultans intervention in Moldavia, the result of which was interpreted as a growing danger for Poland. Nevertheless, the Polish King Sigismund I did not undertake any military action, as he valued peace with the Ottoman Empire and installing a new Prince indeed brought peace on the Moldavian border\(^{27}\).

Two years later, in December 1540, Stephen V Locust was murdered and the reign was seized by an usurper Aleksander Cornea. This situation enabled Peter Rareș to come back to his throne, this time with the full endorsement of the Sultan. Peter Rareș received an official investiture from Sultan Suleiman in Adrianople in December 1540, which became the venue where on 10th March 1541 he was granted full authority; the Sultan was represented by Agha Hussein\(^{28}\). Though the sons of Peter Rareș, Iliaș and Ștefan, were to inherit the throne, they still needed to receive the insignia from the Sultan. The principle of the Moldavian Prince having to be accepted by the Sultan became fully consolidated\(^{29}\).

\(^{25}\) AT, vol. 15, no. 142, p. 188-192; no. 151, p. 206-211.


\(^{27}\) Foedus inter Sigismundum primum regem et regnum Poloniae et Valachos Anno Domini 1539, Kraków 1539 – Biblioteka Kórnicka, ms. 218, AT, t. XVIII, Kodeks Opalińskiiego.


\(^{29}\) Leon Șimanschi, Petru Rareș, București: Editura Academiei RSR 1978.
Though the Turkish supremacy of Moldavia was fully evident, the Poland-
Moldavian relations still kept the relics of Polish supremacy in the form of
obligations of obedience to the highest ranking Polish envoys traveling through
Moldavia as well as oaths sworn by the Princes to Polish Kings and vice versa. The
oaths usually were not of a feudal nature and they most often simply regulated
mutual relations, but particular oaths could at times be interpreted as vassal
agreements or a forecast thereof. Such oaths undoubtedly include the oaths of
Alexandru Lăpușneanu, who was introduced to the Moldavian throne by the Polish
Hette mans Mikołaj Mielecki and Mikołaj Sieniawski. The first oath, delivered prior
to officially acceding to the throne in the village of Bakota in September 1552, was
not official and heralded the acceptance of the supremacy of the Polish King.
The official oath of the Prince of 22 June 1553 was formulated in a diplomatic way, and
though it did not mention the authority of the Polish King, the fact that it made
reference to the oath of Bakota combined with the historical agreements clearly
indicated the nature of mutual relations. There was a similar air to the oath of
Sigismund II Augustus from 19 August 1553, which also made reference to the
oath made by the Prince-to-be in Bakota. It is difficult to determine whether
Sultan Suleiman discovered the secret agreement of the Polish King and the
Moldavian Prince, but he nevertheless had no issues with recognizing the Prince
installed by the Poles. At that time, Poland and the Ottoman Empire had mutual
political interests pertaining to the problems with the Hungarian Queen Isabella
Jagiellon and her son John Sigismund Zápolya, and their endorsement given by
Alexandru Lăpușneanu consolidated his approval in Poland and Turkey. Still, this
did not protect him from briefly losing the throne to the Habsburg agent Ioan
Iacob Heraclides. However, the Polish King never gave support to Heraclides or
other enemies of Alexandru such as Albert Łaski or Dmytro Vyshnevetsky.

30] Instruction for Stanisław Tęczyński and Piotr Boratyński, polish envoys for Moldavia, April 11
1553 – Ilie Corfus, Documente privitoare la istoria românilor, sec. XVI, p. 164.
31] Ilie Corfus, Documente privitoare la istoria românilor, sec. XVI, p. 166-172.
32] Ilie Corfus, Documente privitoare la istoria românilor, sec. XVI, p. 183-186.
33] Encrypted reports from Turkey to the Emperor on the diplomatic intervention of Sigismund
Augustus in Istanbul for Alexander – March 5 1562, Haus Hof und Staats Archiv, Wien, Türk I,
Karton 15, konv. 2, k. 45-49; toż 52-57 i 25 03 1562, Haus Hof und Staats Archiv, Wien „,
Tür ke I, Karton 15, konv. 2, k. 73-78; toż 79-82. Polish diplomatic intervention was taken too
late, when the Heraclides has already been approved — Suleiman I to Sigismund Augustus,
March 7-16 1562, oryg. AGAD, Archiwum Koronne Krakowskie, Dz. turecki 190, no 364;
Z. Abrahamowicz, Katalog dokumentów tureckich. Dokumenty do dziejów Polski i krajów
ościennych w latach 1455-1672, Warszawa 1959, p. 165-166; Ferro Hieronimo to the Doge of
The Treaty of Speyer, which changed the status of the eastern Kingdom of Hungary, as well as the almost simultaneous death of John Sigismund Zápolya in March 1571 resulted in the dissolving of Poland’s and the Ottoman Empire’s mutual political interests. The close political cooperation between Poland and the son of Alexandru, Bogdan, led to his dethronement by Sultan Selim II and the strain of Poland-Turkey relations which brought forth the threat of war. The dreams of returning Moldavia under Polish supremacy were once again sacrificed for peace.

In 1595 there was another opportunity to change the situation. In Istanbul, a decision was reached to transform Moldavia and Wallachia into regular Turkish eyalets. This led to an instantaneous counteraction of the Polish Chancellor and Hetman Jan Zamoyski: leading his army into Moldavia and putting Ieremia Movilă on the throne. The new Moldavian Prince had previously lived in Poland and in 1593 he had been accepted into the Polish nobility and thus became a subject to the Polish King. Prior to entering Moldavia, in August 27th, 1595, he swore an oath of loyalty to the King and to Poland and acknowledged he would be the vassal of King Sigismund III Vasa once he began his reign. Unexpectedly, the Polish intervention resulted in an agreement reached with the Ottoman Empire, returning Moldavia to its former status and recognizing the reign of Ieremia Movilă, who in such circumstances could not fulfil his promise to the Polish King. Nevertheless, the King and the royal court always felt responsible to defend him, especially in 1600 when Michael the Brave attempted to dethrone him. The involvement of Polish military was expensive, which is why the Prince was asked to participate in the costs of maintaining the army. During a session of Parliament in 1602 the envoys of Ieremia Movilă and his brother Simion swore an oath of loyalty to Poland and promised to pay tribute, but only if the King released them from duty of paying the Sultan. The Parliament agreed to pay the expenses of


34 AGAD, AR II, nr 312; E. Hurmuzaki, Documente, supl. 2, vol. 1, p. 344-345.
the war with the Ottoman Empire, but the escalation of the conflict with Sweden suppressed the commencement of any military activities on a second front. The Ottoman Empire, which was in a difficult war with the emperor, was also unwilling to start a conflict, which is why it silently agreed to the Polish influences in Moldavia. The end of that war and the engagement of the Commonwealth in a conflict with Russia eventually allowed them to dismantle the Polish influence.

The 1621 Treaty of Khotyn saw Poland renounce all claims to Moldavia. This did not mean, however, that such claims actually ceased to exist. On the contrary, during the seventeenth century, many political and military attempts were made in order to seize Moldavia and put it under Polish control. Measures aimed at the renewal of the close relationship between Moldavia and the Polish took Moldavian Prince Miron Barnovschi. In 1629 Parliament passed a resolution to give indigenous status to the residing Prince Miron Barnovschi. As per the Parliaments recommendations, an envoy (Teofil Szembek), was sent to the Prince with the document and returned with a written oath of loyalty to the King and the Commonwealth:

I, Miron Barnovschi, the Voivode of the Moldavian lands swear to the one and only God, the Almighty Lord of the Holy Trinity, that I will remain loyal and faithful to His Majesty Sigismund III of Divine Grace and I subject myself to His Majesty My Lord; that I will never join forces with any foe of the Commonwealth and, indeed, for the health and grace of His Majesty and the entire Commonwealth, I will stand ground against any and all enemies and that shall I gain knowledge of any dangers or threats to His Majesty and the Commonwealth, I will not hesitate to inform His Majesty of His Majesty's officials and that in all my actions I will behave as a loyal and good subject of His Majesty as per the laws of the noble Polish crown. So help me God and the Holy Cross.

lui Ioan Zamoyski cu Movileștii, Arhiva Genealogica.


The fact of such an oath being sworn by a reigning Prince was not only a personal act, but a national one, as well, and could not remain hidden from the Turkish sovereign. The content of the oath was unambiguous and did not include any conditions or exceptions, so in practice it constituted the dawn of cooperation against the Ottoman Porte. Barnovschi was immediately dismissed and when he tried to return to the throne four years later, it resulted in the tragic execution of the Prince.

John III Sobieski was very transparent with his plans of a political subjugation of Moldavia, especially after the victories in the battles of Vienna and Párkány in September and October of 1683. His political preparations conducted mainly amongst the Moldavian emigrants in Poland, including receiving many oaths of accepting the authority of the Polish King, did not result in any apparent outcomes, other than the short-term instalment of Ştefan Petriceicu on the Moldavian throne between January and February of 1684. The war efforts of both the King and the Hetman Stanisław Jabłonowski also did not change the status of Moldavia. More importantly, the efforts to make Prince Constantin Cantemir cooperate failed, despite issuing a protective prerogative in 1688, which normalized the rules of the Polish King’s supremacy over Moldavia. Despite all of the efforts of John III Sobieski, the political and legislative status of Moldavia did not change. His successor, Augustus II the Strong, also failed in this task. The Commonwealth made no further efforts in the eighteenth century.

Looking at this issue from a perspective, it is impossible not to notice that both sides, Turkey and Poland, exercised very balanced politics, often opting out of using force. Both parties recognized the importance of the Moldavian buffer, visible in the fact that the guarantees of Moldavia keeping its status appeared in almost all political agreements between Poland and the Ottoman Empire between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries.


LOGISTIC SUPPORT PROVIDED FROM WALLACHIA-MOLDAVIA DURING THE OTTOMAN-AUSTRIAN WAR (1716)

Bekir Gökpınar*

I-Ottoman-Austrian War (1716)

In 1715, following the appointment of Damat Ali Pasha as Grand Vizier, the Ottomans went through a period of recovery and took back the Peloponnese peninsula from the Venetians. In early 1716, the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha began preparations for a siege on the island of Corfu, a significant Venetian naval base. Ali Pasha’s plan was to go to Zadra over Bosnia and after seizing the city penetrate into the Venetian territory. In the meantime, the Austrian general Prince Eugene of Savoy signed an alliance with the Venetians on April 13, 1716. According to the agreement any Ottoman attack on Venetian territory would mean the violation of the Karlowitz Peace Treaty.

The Austrian Prime Minister sent a letter to Ottomans stating that their campaign against Venice possibly would have reverse effects on Ottoman-Austrian diplomatic relations and demanded a peace treaty between two parties based on the Karlowitz Treaty and compensation for the damage caused by the Ottoman forces to Venice.

Ali Pasha was eventually successful in obtaining a legal authorization (fatwa) from the mufti to wage war on the Austrians. The Austrian campaign was officially declared when the Ottoman army arrived at İncirli Village en route to the island of Corfu (April 24, 1716). Accordingly, contrary to what was previously

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5] Ahmed b. Mahmud (Göynüküllü), Tarih, Berlin, Statsbibliothek, Ms.or.quart, nr.1209, fol. 270a; Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, IV/I, pp. 110-111.
planned, the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha would lead the main army to the Austrian front whereas Kara Mustafa Pasha, the governor-general of Diyarbakır, would continue his way to the island of Corfu7.

The Grand Vizier arrived in Belgrade on July 22, 1716. Ali Pasha, held a council whether to take Timișvar or Varad routes, Sari Ahmed Pasha’s suggestion, the governor-general of Rumelia, prevailed in the talks and the Ottoman troops were headed towards Oradea Varadin. Bridges were built on the Sava River and the Ottoman troops passed to Zemun on 25th of July8. On August 5, 1716 both sides were ready for a battle. Austrian forces were approximately 64,000 men; the left side of the army was covered with a swamp, while the right wing was secured by a relatively steep hill. The Ottoman forces, on the other hand, numbered around 120,0009.

Prince Eugene ordered a sudden attack on the morning of August 5th. In the opening phase of the battle, the Ottoman army took the initiative but the Ottoman cavalry was dispersed by their German counterpart; and the withdrawal of the right wing of the Turkish army under the command of Ahmed Pasha encouraged the enemy for an all-out attack. Meanwhile Turk Ahmed Pasha and Can Arslan Paşa-zâde Hüseyin Pasha’s, the governor-general of Adana, news of martyrdom came. Ali Pasha was also shot in the forehead with a bullet (August 5, 1716)10.

Battle of Petrovaradin lasted 5 hours and the Austrians gained a victory. The total loss of the Austrian troops is estimated to be around 5,000 while the Ottoman army lost its 30,000 soldiers11. The Ottomans seemed to fail to bring sufficient amount of troops and ammunition to the battlefield which ultimately sealed the outcome of the battle12. Seeing the defeat of the army, Ottoman high rank officers took the Sancak–i Sharif (holy banner) and returned to Belgrade (August 6, 1716). Seal of the Grand Vizier was handed over by the Sultan to Halil Pasha, the governor in Belgrade. Prince Eugene went on to Timișoara, one of the few remaining Ottoman provinces in Hungary by that time and took the city on October 15, 1716. The garrison surrendered to the Austrian forces at the end of

a 44-day siege which brought the Ottoman rule in Timișoara to an end after 165 years\textsuperscript{13}. The Ottoman army turned backed to Belgrade on the 21th October and arrived in Edirne on November 29, 1716\textsuperscript{14}.

The plausible reasons of the Ottoman failure in the war against the Austrians might be listed as follows: baseless confidence in the absolute victory, under-estimating the enemy forces, getting caught by a sudden attack, lack of reinforcements and good command of the army\textsuperscript{15}, lack of discipline among the fighting units\textsuperscript{16}.

II- Military Aid (Contribution) from Wallachia and Moldavia to the Ottoman War Effort

There were some financial obligations of the Wallachian-Moldavian voivodeship against the Ottoman Empire which were:

a) Sending annual tribute (tax),
b) Meeting the Ottoman demands of grain produced in the voivodeship
c) Sending armed troops, transport vehicles and providing manpower for the Ottoman campaigns,
d) Sending gifts on official occasions.

It is clear from the above mentioned obligations that Wallachia and Moldavian Voivodeships were to perform important financial, military and political tasks against the Ottoman Empire. Especially during times of war, when the Ottoman government demanded logistic support from the region, their obligations were increased considerably\textsuperscript{17}.

To be more specific about the liabilities; Wallachian voivodes were obliged to send annually 160,000 bushels of barley for the imperial stables, 20,000 sheep for the imperial kitchen as well as a certain amount of honey, wax and salt. They also delivered breed horses, hunting birds, etc. for the sultan. They were obliged to pay 10,000,000 akcah to the imperial treasury as tribute/ tax (harac). In the event of an Ottoman military campaign they also provided oxcarts for artillery.

\textsuperscript{13} Târih-i Râşid, II, p. 1035; Uzunçarşılı, Osmani Tarihi, IV/I, pp. 121-122.
\textsuperscript{14} Göynükülü, Târih, fol. 286b; Uzunçarşılı, Osmani Tarihi,IV/I, pp. 125-128.
\textsuperscript{16} Nusretname, s. 883.
transportation ox and horse carts as well as auxiliary units\textsuperscript{18}. In early 17th century
the Moldovian Voivodeship used to pay 7.000.000 akca as tax (harac) annually\textsuperscript{19}.

The liabilities of Wallachia-Moldavia varied over the centuries. The sums
required to submitted to the imperial treasury during the war times were being
delivered through transfer of money\textsuperscript{20}. Significant amounts of grain was taken in
exchange for the tribute the Wallachia-Moldavia owed to the central treasury\textsuperscript{21}.

Wallachia and Moldavia voivodeships provided in this way for both the
Ottoman palace and army when necessary. In fact, the bulk of the obligations sent
from Wallachia and Moldavia was grain cargoes which was purchased during the
campaign time. Barley, wheat, millet, oats, oil, honey and cheese were also added
to the shipments\textsuperscript{22}.

Grain was sent from Wallachia-Moldavia in varying amounts in most of
the Ottoman expeditions. For example, 100,000 bushels of barley was dispatched
to the Ottoman army besieging Szigetvár in 1566. For the Astrakhan expedition
in 1569, the Ottoman administration demanded 800 horses and flour and barley.
Similarly, for the campaign against Iran in 1582 2016 horses, 50,000 bushels of
barley and 10,000 bushels of flour were purchased in Wallachia and Moldavia\textsuperscript{23}.
Within the military preparations for the Kamianets campaign in 1672 150,000
bushels of barley were purchased and transported to the frontier city of Iassy\textsuperscript{24}. In
1711, in the campaign of Prut, grain obtained from the region was significantly
cheaper than those brought from the other regions in the empire. The price of
barley was around 30-35 akcah in Aydos whereas it was purchased from Isaccea,
Braila, and Akkerman ports for only 16.5 Akca\textsuperscript{25}.

Apart from the logistic support provided from Wallachia and Moldavia,
two voivodeships also recruited and send auxiliary fighting units to the Ottoman
army, albeit small in numbers. According to the narrative sources depicting the
Uyvar Campaign in 1663 there were fully armed 1000 Wallachians and Moldavi-

\textsuperscript{18} Uzunçarşılı, Osmania Tarihi, II, p. 430.
\textsuperscript{19} Uzunçarşılı, III/II, p. 100.
\textsuperscript{20} Uzunçarşılı, IV/II, pp. 101-102.
\textsuperscript{21} Arif Bilgin, Osmania Saray Mutfağı (1453-1650), İstanbul 2004, p. 126.
\textsuperscript{22} Mihai Maxim, “Efik-Boğdan’ın Mükellefiyetleri”, pp. 561-562.
\textsuperscript{23} Mihai Maxim, “Efik-Boğdan’ın Mükellefiyetleri”, pp. 564-565.
\textsuperscript{24} Mehmet İnbaşi, Ukraynâda Osmanlılar: Kamaniçe Seferi ve Organizasyonu (1672), İstanbul
\textsuperscript{25} Hakan Yıldız, 1711 Prut Seferi’nin Lojistik Faaliyetleri, (unpublished PhD thesis), Marmara
Üniversitesi, İstanbul 2000, pp. 127, 128.
ans infantries fighting among the Ottoman ranks. In the Kamianets campaign in 1672, on the other hand, 7000 Wallachian and 2000 Moldavian soldiers participated the campaign.

Transportation of rations and ammunition along the Danube river was a favored option for the Ottoman Empire because of its low cost. However, there were some difficulties in traffic on the Danube. The vortexes at Tahtalı, Inlik and Ihram after Vidin, for instance, prevented ships moving forward. Paid workers/soldiers were employed to pull the vessels with ropes to pass the vortexes. Both cerahors (paid soldiers/workers) and ropes were provided from Wallachia for this purpose. For the Peloponnese campaign in 1715, 400 cerahors were demanded from Wallachia for ammunition vessels and piers located along Danube.

Oxcarts were also used to transport grain and ammunition for the campaigning Ottoman armies. If the Ottoman forces were headed towards Europa or North or South directions oxcarts were provided from the towns in the Balkans. In fact, during the Kamianets campaign in 1672 all oxcarts in the Ottoman army were procured from Balkan towns. In order to transport 9000 bushels of wheat from Babadag to Kamanice the Ottoman military lcommand needed 300 oxcarts a hundred of which were then requested from the voivode of Moldavia. In the Prut Campaign in 1711, 3000 oxcarts and 100 carriages were sent to Isaccea from Wallachia to carry the supplies and ammunition of the army. In Peleponnese campaign in 1715, the Ottoman military leaders demanded 5086 carts and received 2000 carts from Wallachia and 500 from Moldavia. In order to cover the three-month advance fee of the carts, 62,500 cents (7,500,000 maple) were allocated from the jizya (poll tax) of Wallachia and Moldavia.

Horse was also widely used in Ottoman logistic service trains. Strong and durable horses for the gun carriages were usually brought from Wallachia and Moldavia. They were in great demand for carrying heavy weight during the campaigns. For the Vienna campaign in 1683, 217 topkesan horses were requested. In order to carry army’s weight in the campaign 350 draft horses from Wallachia

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27] Mehmet İnbaşı, Kamaniçe Seferi, pp. 120-121.
32] Mehmet İnbaşı, Kamaniçe Seferi, p. 79.
and 250 draft horses from Moldavia were requested\textsuperscript{33}. In the beginning of the Peleponnese campaign 250 horses and 150 \textit{topkesan} horse were demanded from Wallachia and Moldavia respectively. Later on 1.250 horses from Wallachia and 500 horses from Moldavia were additionally requested\textsuperscript{34}.

While the large part of the army’s meat demand in campaigns were provided by the sheep flocks dispatched from the Pasha Liva in Rumeli in the 16th century, Wallachia and Moldavia came to the fore in this regard in the 18th century. For the Kaminets campaign in 1672, 15.000 sheep from Wallachia and 13.000 sheep from Moldavia were purchased (\textit{sursat})\textsuperscript{35}. In the Second Siege of Vienna in 1683, 12.000 sheep from Wallachia and 13000 sheep from Moldavia were requested for the army’s sustenance\textsuperscript{36}.

\textbf{III-Logistic Support Provided from Wallachia and Moldavia During the Ottoman- Austrian War (1716)}

In the 1716 Ottoman-Austrian war carriages, horses, ammunition, and food were supplied from Wallachia and Moldavia as a part of campaign logistic. Carriages/carts had great importance in terms of military organization. Imperial orders were sent to several towns in Rumeli demanding carts for military use in order to transport food, ammunition, cannons etc. Wallachia and Moldavia were among these places. In December 1715, the Ottoman government sent an edict to the Wallacian voivode and requested 500 oxcarts to carry campaign ammunition\textsuperscript{37}. Considering that the number of carts/carriages demanded from the Rumeli province were 5458 for the 1716 campaign\textsuperscript{38}, the number of carts provided from Wallachia amounted to 11% of the total. Food was also transported Cocora to Khotyn that held a critical strategic position for the campaign. The Ottoman government asked for 400 oxcarts from Wallachia and 300 carriages from Moldavia in order to be used in this transportation as well as in repair works of defensive structures\textsuperscript{39}.

In addition to oxcarts which were used to carry ammunition and food for

\textsuperscript{34} Yaşar Ertaş, \textit{Sultanın Ordusu}, pp. 94-95.
\textsuperscript{35} Mehmet İnbaşi, \textit{Kamaniçe Seferi}, p. 268.
\textsuperscript{36} Meryem Kaçan Erdoğan, \textit{II.Viyana Seferi}, p. 146.
\textsuperscript{37} BOA, KK.2851, pp. 330, 340.
\textsuperscript{38} BOA, \textit{D.MKF.d 28178}, pp. 2-8.
\textsuperscript{39} BOA, \textit{MAD.8461}, p. 56,15; \textit{İE. DH. 2059}. 
the military units, the Ottoman army also made great use of animals such as horses, mules and camels\textsuperscript{40}. Topkeşan and kaltak horses were mostly used to transport artillery during the campaign. They were mostly provided from Rumeli, Wallachia and Moldavia in particular. Topkeşan Horses were bought from Wallachia for 15 kurus (\(1800\) akca) and from Moldavia 17 kurush (\(2040\) akca) and other Rumeli region 25 kurush (\(3000\) akca). Kaltak Horses were bought for 19 kurush (\(2280\) akca). The sum of money needed for the purchase of these animals were deducted from the poll taxes of the region which they normally paid to the central treasury\textsuperscript{41}. 500 horses requested from Wallachia to carry Sahi (great) cannons for the campaign of 1716. With the 200 horses that remained from the previous campaign the total number increased to 700. 300 topkeşan horses were ordered to be bought in Moldavia\textsuperscript{42}. The Ottoman treasury paid a sum of 7500 gurus (15 kurush for each) for the horses sent from Wallachia. 251 out of 300 horses were delivered from Moldavia and a total of 4467 gurus were paid (17 kurush each)\textsuperscript{43}. And 40 of 370 water carrier horses used to distribute water among the janissaries in the camp were\textsuperscript{44} bought in Wallachia\textsuperscript{45}.

In 1716, in addition to those built in the imperial arsenal, ships were also constructed in the shipyards along the Danube which were then used to carry food and ammunition towards Belgrade. Ibrahim Pasha, the captain of the Danubian fleet, was entrusted with the duty of building 50 şaykas and 50 open deck vessels. The Ottoman central administration decided that timber required in the construction of the vessels were to be procured in and transported from Wallachia and the cost of sawing and transporting timber were to be deducted from the poll tax collected in Wallachia\textsuperscript{46}. The Ottoman government also covered the payment of the steersmen working on these vessels from the same financial source\textsuperscript{47}.

Within the preparations for the Austrian campaign in 1716, the Ottomans repaired a number of fortresses along the northern border such as Azov, Khotyn, Bender, Timişvar, Vidin, Nigbolu which were vulnerable to enemy attacks. The

\begin{thebibliography}{10}
\bibitem{40}
Mehmet İnbaşi, \textit{Kamanıçe Seferi}, p. 81.
\bibitem{41}
\bibitem{42}
BOA, KK.2851, p. 342; KK.2847, p. 186.
\bibitem{43}
BOA, KK.2847, p. 186.
\bibitem{44}
\bibitem{45}
BOA, \textit{MAD.6266}, p. 213.
\bibitem{46}
BOA, \textit{MAD.6549}, p. 388.
\bibitem{47}
BOA, \textit{MAD.7866}, p. 84.
\end{thebibliography}
walls surrounding the Timişoara gate in Khotyn needed particular attention and lime, stone, and sand carts were demanded for the repair work. For this purpose, the Ottoman administration asked for 1000 *cerehors* (workers), 500 *baltaci*, and 200 oxcarts from Wallachia. According to the imperial order all the requested items should be ready in the fortress of Khotyn by May 1716 and the expenses for the shipment would be met by the poll tax of Wallachia. 750 *cerehors*, 250 *baltaci*, 150 oxcarts were also sent from Moldavia along with 399 workers from Istanbul. According to another imperial order around the same time in between November 1715 and May 1716 employed 200 Wallachian *cerehors* (with 50 carts) and 100 Moldavian *cerehors* in the repairment of the ditch walls of the fortress of Khotyn and demanded a further 500 well-sinker with buckets and 20,000 müsendir planks from the voivode of Moldavia.

The island of Sans-i kebir (Adakale) in Vidin Demirkapi (Iron Gates), an area renowned for its vortexes, played a strategic role in the Ottoman campaigns. The Ottomans sought for a rather solid protection for the island especially during the campaigns towards the Austrian state. The soldiers deployed on the island during the war time were transferred to other places at peace time. Defensive works in the island of Sans-i Kebir needed to be reconstructed and the timber used for construction were cut from the environs of the fortress by a group of *baltaci* (axeman) under the command of two *boyars* who were appointed by the Wallachian voivode. Ibrahim Pasha, the captain of the Danubian fleet, undertook the construction of a palanka (wooden fort) in Tekye across Orsova and the *baltaci* and *boyars* assigned by the Wallachian voivode were charged with sawing and transporting timber for the construction. The Ottoman government demanded from Wallachia to provide the bulk of the building material, namely 6,000 *belvan*, 2,000 plank talya, 300,000 nails, as well as 300 *cerehors* for the palanka which was rebuilt in Tekye and for the palanka of Demirkapi.

The scope of Ottoman-Austrian war preparation provision were transport-
ed both towards Belgrade and the important castle located in North. In order to supply the army with provisions, the Ottoman administration demanded 30000 bushels of barley and 20000 bushels of flour from Wallachia. It was then ordered to purchase 20000 bushels of wheat and 20000 bushels of barley in Timişoara and to send them to Belgrade which in turn would be paid by the imperial treasury with a sum of 180000 aspers. 34080 bushels of wheat and 1.890 bushels of barley that were in arrears of the former Wallachian voivode Stefan was to be transported to the piers at Ibrail, Silstra Ruse, Vidin along the Danube. The shipment of these provisions were organized by the captain of the Danubian fleet, Ibrahim Pasha.

The Ottoman government ordered the transportation of newly purchased 20.000 bushels of wheat and 30.000 bushels of barley from Wallachia and 23.000 bushels of wheat from Moldavia to Cocora pier which was then shipped to the fortress of Khotyn. For this transportation the Ottomans made use of 300 oxcarts from Wallachia and 400 oxcarts from Moldavia. For the transported grain from Cocora to Khotyn, the Ottoman treasury disbursed a sum of 9900 aspers in a month which is 33 akca for each cart. The shipment lasted 115 days and led to an expenditure of 1.100.000 aspers (9166.6 gurus). There were more than 90 vessels loaded with provisions and ammunition anchored in Tahtali, Demirkapi vortex area which needed to be pulled and the Ottoman government demanded 1500 cerahors and a reliable boyar for this operation from the Wallachian voivode. The kadis of Passarowitz, Ihram, Smederevo and of others were warned by the central administration that the number of cerahors and prestoyka assigned to pull the loaded vessels through the vortexes was not enough. Along with additional cerahors to complete the lack of manpower, the Ottomans also asked for 100.000 ropes to be used in pulling the vessels.

In order to supply the soldiers with meat ration Ottomans purchased cattle primarily in Rumeli and Wallachia regions. In fact, in an attempt to supply Tatar horsemen and infantries in the Ottoman camp it was ordered to purchase 10.000 cattle in Wallachia in return for a sum of 20.000 gurus to be transferred from the

61] BOA, KK.2847, p. 69.
63] BOA, KK.2847, p. 103.
64] BOA, KK.2851, p. 399.
poll tax collected in the country. The Ottomans also sent an imperial order to
the chief butcher, Osman Aga, asking him to buy 13,224 sheep and goat and 700
cattle that were among the assets of the former Wallachian voivode, Stefan. In
1716, Osman Aga was provided with 7,842,305 gurus to be spent for the soldier’s
meat ration of which 7978 gurus came from income of Stefan’s sheep and goats.

Apart from bread, rusk wheat, flour and meat there were some other victuals
as well which were essential for an army on a campaign. Butter, olive oil, salt
and rice were considered the main items in Ottoman army provisioning. Butter
distributed in the Ottoman campaigning army in 1716 around Belgrade was pur-
chased in Wallachia. The Ottomans in fact ordered 25,000 vukiyye (appr. 30,500
kg) butter from Wallachia and the imperial treasury demanded that the transpor-
tation expenses be covered from the poll tax revenues in the voivodeship.

Salt supply was also very important for the Ottoman army. The Ottomans
bought fair quantities of salt in Wallachia. In 1716, a total of 40,000 vukiyye salt
was purchased in Wallachia of which the half of the total amount was stored to
be sent to the fortress of Belgrade and the remaining half to be used in the army.
The payment was again made in exchange of the Wallachian poll tax (cizya) and
the salt packs were carried to Belgrade via “Yeni Palanka” and “Tekye Palanka”.

A letter sent to the army treasurer then in the fortress of Nis includes details
on how to supply provision for the Tatar warriors in the army. According to the
instructions in the letter, cattle and sheep were to be provided and purchased by
the chief butcher; barley and rusk were to be provided from the stock of storage
and butter were to be directly purchased in open market.

Cattle supplies for Tatar horsemen and infantry units were dispatched from
many places in Rumelii, mainly from Wallachia and Moldavia. For the 1716 cam-
paign, for example, the Ottoman government demanded 1000 cattle from Wal-
lachia and paid for the expenses from the poll tax of Wallachia.

When the Tatar hordes entered the Wallachian-Moldavian territory in
1716, the voivode of Moldavia provided and delivered them both live stocks (cattle
and sheep) and provisions (rice, butter, barley, bread, coffee), again to be paid

65] BOA, MAD.6266, p. 325.
66] BOA, MAD.6549, p. 414.
68] BOA, MAD.17900, p. 81; DBŞM.1903/68.
69] BOA, MAD.6549, p. 380; MAD.2854, p. 64.
70] BOA, MAD.6549, pp. 323-324.
71] BOA, MAD.6266, p. 325; MAD.2854, p. 324.
from the Wallachian poll tax\textsuperscript{72}.

\textit{List of allowance for Tatar soldiers in Moldavia (1716)}

\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Allowance} & \textbf{Qty} & \textbf{Unit Price} & \textbf{Total Price(Akçe)} \\
\hline
Cattle & 1500 head & 600 \textit{akçe} & 900.000 \\
Sheep & 1500 head & 100 \textit{akçe} & 150.000 \\
Rice & 500 \textit{kıyye} & 10 \textit{akçe} & 5.000 \\
Butter & 220 \textit{kıyye} & 28 \textit{akçe} & 6.160 \\
Wax & 150 \textit{kıyye} & 80 \textit{akçe} & 12.000 \\
Barley & 2500 \textit{kile} & 30 \textit{akçe} & 75.000 \\
Bread & 5000 \textit{çift} & 1 \textit{akçe} & 5.000 \\
Coffee & 30 \textit{kıyye} & & \\
\hline
\textbf{Total} & & & \textbf{1.153.160} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

At the time the Tatar soldiers reached the Wallachian border, the Ottoman administration ordered the voivode of Wallachia to supply the Tatar army with the same amount of ration, only for one time\textsuperscript{73}.

As a result, in many of the Ottoman military campaigns, great amount of logistic support were provided both from Wallachia and Moldavia. Northbound and westbound campaigns both increased and diversified in the amount of this support. The expenses of this support were deducted from the annual taxes collected in Wallachia and Moldavia. In the 1716 Austrian campaign, the Ottoman military received great amount of support, both as provision and ammunition, from the Wallachian and Moldavian territories, as had been the case in previous campaigns.

\textsuperscript{72} BOA, \textit{MAD.2854}, pp. 94-95; \textit{MAD.6549}, pp. 505, 458.

\textsuperscript{73} Bekir Gökpınar, \textit{Varadin Seferi}, p. 306.
The aim of this paper is to identify the main patterns of Ottoman politics affecting the fiscal system of Wallachia during a period of intense threats for the Empire, both internal and external. Thus, it will concern with the attempts of the imperial decision-making factors to strengthen the fiscal control on the Danubian province, to meet their economic interests in Wallachia. By focusing on this particular problem, the paper can reveal new aspects regarding the more general issue of the relationship between centre and periphery, and between centralization/decentralization in the Ottoman Empire before the nation-states era in the Balkans. Following Karen Barkey’s definition of empire, this study stresses the importance of the relations between the Porte and the Romanian Principalities as an important factor of this “configuration of relationships” in the Ottoman Empire, with its own unique characteristics: (...) ”a negotiated” enterprise where the basic configuration of relationships between imperial authorities and peripheries is constructed piece meal in a different fashion for each periphery, creating a patchwork pattern of relations with horizontal relations of segmentation”1.

Before proceeding to the analysis, it is useful to discuss the general historiographical background of this research, regarding Ottoman history and the juridical status of Wallachia within the Ottoman Empire.

The grand narrative of the Ottoman Empire, which dominated historiography until recently, stressed the continual decline of the Empire after 1683, implying a somehow teleological view of the irreversible fall of the empire to its dissolution. At the beginning of the 21th century, researchers like Şevket Pamuk, Metin Coşgel, Kivanç Karaman2, or Karen Barkey, who focused more on the causes of

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2 Metin M. Coşgel, 'Efficiency and Continuity in Public Finance: The Ottoman System of taxation', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 37, No. 4, 2005, pp. 567-586; Kivanç
continuity of the Ottoman Empire (especially during 1683-1914), rather than the causes of its decline, challenged the prevalent view by asserting that the Ottomans had a remarkable institutional flexibility and the capacity to adapt itself to threatening situations and thus preserving the main political structures until the First World War, even though with continual territorial losses. Accordingly, the most important single characteristic of the institutional change in Ottoman history is the selective nature of it, i.e. the prevalence of bureaucratic, fiscal and monetary reforms aiming at preserving the political order against other institutional changes that could have shaped the economy to a more capitalist model. Thus, one of the main issues of this study is whether the policies of the Ottoman factors of power towards Wallachia were characterized by pragmatism and flexibility and whether they responded positively to the Imperial needs.

The above observations could be valuable to Romanian historiography, which usually embrace without much critical enquiry the model of irreversible decay of the Ottoman Empire. This view contradicts strongly with another influential construct in Romanian historiography: the continual growth of economic exploitation of the Principalities after during 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century. One problem that arises from this view is how could have the Ottoman Empire, which was disintegrating/decentralizing and losing ground in Europe against Russia and the Austrian Empire, increased the political flows of money and products from the Principalities. A key in understanding this problem is the scarcity of rigorous quantitative studies concerning fiscal and economic data of the Principalities. But even with the limited number of financial documents regarding Wallachia and Moldavia available so far, there are many interesting matters concerning the economic relationship between these provinces and the Ottoman centre to be addressed. However, some recent studies, as we shall see, indicate that the financial pressures of the Porte did not grow gradually in this period, but had many oscillations, influenced greatly by drastic debasements of Ottoman coins, periods of war and of Russian and Austrian military occupation.

Estimating the real value of Wallachia’s total payments to the Porte is a very


difficult enterprise, due to the scarcity of the official records available so far and the dependence on narrative, indirect sources, mainly on the observations of contemporary foreign travellers, diplomatic agents, officers and so on. But there is a further impediment to this operation: the fact that the official tribute (harac) paid to the sultan began to be considerably surpassed by the official gifts (peskeş) and unofficial payments and bribes (ruşvet), to which we can add the values of the requisitions in kind, not always paid or deduced from the tribute by the Ottoman officials. 

As a short illustration, we may say that the total sum of money paid to the Ottomans grew with one half, in nominal value (gurush), from 1740 to 1765, and with almost one fifth, if we transform the values in silver tonnes; and it more than doubled, both in nominal value and in silver, from 1740 to 1768. In fact, 1768, just before the outbreak of the war with Russia, represented the highest figure in all the „Phanariot” era, somewhat close figures occurring only at the beginning of the 19th century.

Another key indicator of the level of the Ottoman’s financial pressures is the fiscal burden, because of the determinant factor of the Ottoman demand in shaping Wallachia’s fiscal system. At the end of the 16th century, the excessive financial demands from the Porte transformed Wallachia and Moldavia into states with high fiscal burden and determined the peasants to commercialize most of their products, turning Wallachia, into an export economy, characteristics which remained constant until the first part of the 19th century. As Bogdan Murgescu showed, in spite of the apparent, the average level of tax burden remained under one golden ducat per capita in Wallachia during 17th and 18th centuries. This was mainly due to severe debasements of Ottoman coin, a surprisingly significant growth of population in Wallachia during the 18th century, and, for the period after 1774, Russia’s political interventions.

To have a clearer image of the importance of Wallachia’s resources for the Empire we may also estimate that total revenues of this province grew from about 7%, in 1750, up to 14%, in 1780, of the total revenues of the Ottoman Empire (excluding those of the tributary provinces) and a fiscal burden 3 or 4 times higher than in the Empire. From these total revenues of Wallachia, a rate that varied

between 40 to 80% represented the sums paid (officially and unofficially) to the Ottoman political factors. This suggests both the great financial importance of Wallachia and the considerable growth of the resources gained by the Porte in this short period.

The central issue of this paper is how to connect these quantitative figures (albeit rather rough and incomplete) with the qualitative aspects provided by the official documents available, especially the sultan’s orders directed to the princes. Do these documents tell us something about how the increase in the gains occurred? Can we relate this increase with Ottoman efforts and policies?

The documents I used were edited in Romanian translation in several volumes. The most important ones are the decrees and laws (hatt-ı şerifs, sened, ferman, kanunname) addressed directly to the princes, which concern fiscal institutions and commercial relations.

For a better understanding of the general juridical framework of the Principalities in the second part of the 18th and in early 19th centuries is important to point out some of the results of Viorel Panaite’s research. The various official terms used by the Ottoman chancellery referring to Wallachia and Moldavia in this period (dar al-zimmet - the Abode of Tributary Protection -, serbestiyet - Freedom, and eyalat-ı miimtaze - Privileged Provinces) were used to reflect both their autonomy status and the responsibility of the sultan to protect them against Ottoman officials and subjects from neighbouring Ottoman territory. At the same time, the rhetoric of the official acts emphasised that the two Principalities were territories from dar al-Islam, parts of the Ottoman Empire (Devlet-i Aliye), patrimony of the Sultan (Memleketeyn) and Well-protected Dominions (Memalik-i Mahruse), “in order to protect its territories and inhabitants both against the interference of Ottoman officials and in order to reject the political claims of neighbouring

8] Based on my preliminary investigations.
Christian rulers\textsuperscript{11}.” Furthermore, the official documents stated that Moldavia and Wallachia had distinct exchequers/treasuries (Boğdân ve Eflâk memleketleri miri-i maktû)\textsuperscript{12} and that their revenues are part of the Ottoman treasury (beyt-ül-mâl-ı mülimîn)\textsuperscript{13}. As a document from 1760 emphasized, “All the taxes, the farming, as well as the revenues and full gains of the principality of Wallachia, from the Imperial conquest until now, were assigned and given to its voievods, provided that <the country>, been now separate at the Chancellery and saved from being stepped by foot, must be ruled with full power, in exchange for the fixed cizia”\textsuperscript{14}. But, as we shall see, there were some limitations of this fiscal autonomy.

As Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, in Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference, put it, „The Ottomans called their empire the „well-protected domains”, underscoring the sultan’s responsibility to defend his subjects. One kind of protection was defence against aggression – from outside the polity and from bandits within”\textsuperscript{15}. This is also true in respect to Wallachian subjects, which were, in theory for sure, protected by the sultan both internally – against rapacious princes and boyars – and externally – against bandits and aggressors from South of Danube.

Nicolae Iorga noted the fact that the Ottoman regime had an inclination to favour the poor people, hence its recommendation to all princes not to upset the „poor reaya”\textsuperscript{16}. I think that these recommendations need to be further explored.

First I will address some aspects regarding the regulations of commerce, since they appears to be of central importance to the Ottoman government, but also symptomatic for the limited possibilities of inference in Wallachia’s economy. One of the basic functions of Wallachia, as was emphasized in official Ottoman rhetoric, was that of kiler – the storage, deposit – of the Porte: a very important provider of grains, cattle, sheep, grease, honey, timber and other products for the population of Istanbul, a role that gave Wallachia a colonial feature. For that reasons, the Ottoman Government dealt very carefully every detail regarding the conditions of trade with Wallachia.

Recent research points out to the constant involvement of political factors

\textsuperscript{11} Viorel Panaite, ‘Wallachia and Moldavia,’ pp. 31.
\textsuperscript{12} Valeriu Veliman, Relațiile româno-otomane..., pp. 185-186.
\textsuperscript{13} Valeriu Veliman, Relațiile româno-otomane..., p. 195.
\textsuperscript{14} Valeriu Veliman, Relațiile româno-otomane..., pp. 397-400.
\textsuperscript{15} Jane Burbank, Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference, Princeton University Press 2010, p.140.
in Ottoman-Romanian commerce, the oscillations and inconsistency of these imperial policies, the actual inexistence of the Ottoman commercial monopoly in the Principalities and the incapacity of Ottoman political factors to efficiently control the economic processes in this area\textsuperscript{17}.

The official Ottoman documents are concerned especially with protecting the official merchants that carry this commerce and eliminating competition, but also with countering the merchants’ own abuses in Wallachia. The rights and obligations of these merchants were very clear specified and the princes were asked to take all the means necessary to impose them. The recurrence of such stipulations suggest that there were often not respected.

One suggestive example of Ottoman failure in regulating the commerce is the fruitless effort to eliminate the production and usage of \textit{holerka} (a low quality spirit) in Wallachia on the ground that it caused the decline of the quantities of grain provisions sent to the Porte. Because the Ottomans lacked the practical means to impose this kind of interdictions, all the responsibility was passed to the voivode\textsuperscript{18}.

The official available Ottoman documents suggest intensified efforts by which the Porte tried to materialize its interests in Wallachia. The provisions coming from the centre of the empire can be divided into measures which affect indirectly the fiscal system and those who affect it directly. The first type includes measures aiming at eliminating the abuses from local Ottoman notables which lead to impoverishment and decrease in Wallachia’s population. The second type includes specific demands in money and kind, tax reliefs, and also direct involvements of the imperial government in the domestic organization of the public finances, especially measures against the abuses of princes.

The care for the happiness, stability and wellbeing of Wallachian subjects is part of a simple and pragmatic logic of the Ottoman government, exemplified in this next phrase taken from a 1765 ferman: “Wallachia and Oltenia are the granary of my Grand Empire (Devlet-i Aliyye) and the provision of large quantities of various supplies from this country helps the good sustenance of Allah’s believers. It is well known that only through a large number of subjects many supplies can be obtained and the money for Wallachia’s tribute, which is used for the payment of the soldiers at the borders, can be provided”\textsuperscript{19}. It was the prince, as he was frequently reminded, the one who was responsible for demographical stability,

\textsuperscript{17} Bogdan Murgescu, \textit{Ţările Române între Imperiul Otoman şi Europa creştină}, pp. 173-184.
\textsuperscript{18} Mustafa A. Mehmed, \textit{Documente Turceşti privind Istoria României}, II, pp. 37, 63, 170.
\textsuperscript{19} Mustafa A. Mehmed, \textit{Documente Turceşti privind Istoria României}, I, pp. 294-296.
the creation of conditions necessary to secure that the peasants won’t flee their villages, a crucial condition for demographical growth. For this, the sultans gave the princes “absolute power” to be obeyed by everybody (1749) and to teach, to frighten and to punish anyone who disobeys (1725). The prince was also instructed to “firmly advise the boyars to refrain from tyrannizing and oppressing the poor” (1755).

The Porte didn’t seem to try seriously to change, improve or “modernize” the fiscal system of Wallachia in 18th century. Many of the Ottoman regulations confirmed the preservation of the old fiscal customs of the province and the need for the prince to guarantee their subjects equity, prosperity and happiness. The vagueness of the Ottoman instructions to the princes is illustrated by this document, dated 1720: “the tranquillity of the poor subjects and the stability of their families and the prosperity of the country and the setting in order of its tasks represent my high Padishah will. (...) you must make the principality of Wallachia prosper and populous and waste your forces and strengths so that the poor subjects could enjoy wellbeing and peace at the shadow of my Padishah benevolence. The full power received by the princes in administrating the Principality seems to be insufficient provision for prosperity and peace.

But some clearer provisions about the tax system were also stressed. The sultans strengthened at different times the old practices regarding Wallachia’s custom duties, both imposed on the prince’s subjects and on Muslims (1719).

The prince Grigore II Ghica was ordered in 1749 not to devise various new taxes, and to ban those invented by his predecessors, who ruined the country with this practice. In 1754 the sultan Mahmud I praised Constantin Racoviță for banning the tax on cattle (the infamous văcărit) A ferman from 1755, addressed by the sultan Osman III to the same prince, in response to a complaint by the boyars, confirmed the previous agreement between the prince and the boyars, and restated, in detail, what taxes should be imposed and in which way.

The sultans, following the customs of the Principality, plainly stated that

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payments for the crowning of a new prince should be collected from his personal revenues (salt-mines, custom taxes, which were interpreted in Ottoman documents as given by sultans, long time before, to the princes, as farming, mukataa\(^{28}\)) and not from the direct taxes paid by the majority of the population, which constitutes public revenue, separate from the prince’s own treasury (1724)\(^ {29}\).

Thus, the direct implications of the central power of the Ottoman Empire on Wallachia’s fiscal system were limited to this kind of provisions, which reflected some of the most important malfunctions, specific to center-periphery, long-distance relationship. Most of those imperial orders which weren’t imposing new payments (in money or in kind), including as well those who praised as those who rebuked the prince’s actions, came as a response (usually to the petitions of officials south from Danube, from the prince, or the boyars). The central power depended on these persons to learn about potential threats to Wallachia’s fiscal system.

The Ottoman government did not try to change this system and to propose new solutions, but firmly opposed changes which were perceived as destabilizing. The Ottoman political factors gave way to local traditions and to the prince’s own methods and possibilities. Nonetheless, when they’ve faced these problems, they’ve firmly responded, urging the local rulers to resolve them and not rarely did they punish them on account of strong complaints from the subjects. Anyway, these types of policies resemble, I think, those taken by the Porte after 1774, which were more systematic and needed to be negotiated with Russia.

This suggests weak control over Wallachia’s fiscal system. Yet, as I’ve shown, the total value of the payments to the Ottomans increased considerably towards the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war (1768-1774). This could be explained, of course, by internal factors (maybe the most important one being the overall demographic growth). But the unexplored Ottoman documents could, indeed, enrich our knowledge of the impact of Ottoman policies upon Wallachia’s public finances.


\(^{29}\) Valeriu Veliman, Relațiile româno-otomane..., pp. 164-165.
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Age of Ottoman suzerainty in the history of Wallachia and Moldavia is a complex phenomenon that resists a simplistic or historicist view. Its analysis requires a multidisciplinary perspective, sometimes historical, political, ideological, sociological, and cultural. This paper examines the concept of mental geography of the Enlightenment epoch and its implications for the two Danubian Principalities.

The notion "geography" here reflects the conception of "geography" not as a positivistic discipline, but as a mode of social and ideological discourse meaning political, economic and cognitive control\(^1\). This concept refers to the cultural construction of the Eastern Europe by the Enlightenment intellectuals, who therefore imagined Eastern Europe as a space lying in between the politically and economically puissant Western Europe perceived as a "civilization area" and its antipode – barbaric, despotic, contradicted by the fact of progress Orient. In this respect, the geography of the Eastern Europe is to be seen as geography of Occidental Europe in expansion into Muslim-influenced Oriental Europe. I consider the development of this thesis in the work "Inventing the Eastern Europe" by the American author Larry Wolff and subsequent scholars.

Larry Wolff assumes the invention of Eastern Europe might be conceived as an intellectual project of demi-Orientalization\(^2\). While the term "orientalization" is a product of the discursive colonialism as it was famously formulated by the American scholar Edward Said. At the core of Said definition of the Orient is the Occident attempt to self identification, while the "Orientalism" – is regarded as a style of thought by which the difference between the Europeans and the Orient is established in a way to proclaim Western superiority\(^3\). In this paper I consider

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Orientalism as a key in interpreting the history of the eighteenth-century Wallachia and Moldavia under Ottoman suzerainty. The case study focusses on the way in which West European observers, influenced by the doctrine of Enlightenment, represented the Ottoman government in the two principalities beyond the Carpathians.

One of the tool of this intellectual apparatus, which came into shape in the XVIIIth-century, called Orientalism, was the *oriental despotism* as a source of social regression⁴. It is one of the main arguments that will be developed in the XVIIIth-century travel narrative on the two provinces. The philosophical and ideological component of this argument engages the oppositions between Oriental despotism and European liberty formulated in the writing "In the spirit of the Laws" (1747) by French Enlightenment thinker Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755). These assumptions rely on the Enlightenment theory of a civilized society based on law and order as opposed to the barbarian world where lawlessness prevails⁵. Thus, L. Wolff affirms this opposition allowed for the maturation of an intermediary cultural space, in which the idea of Eastern Europe develops⁶.

I will argue from the promise that the Enlightenment thought helped furnished a ready tool with which the travelers could articulate colonial theme of the *oriental despotism* in their narratives on Wallachia and Moldavia. My focus is to show these elaborations fit into the frame of representations and practices of the West European expansionist projects.

Part of the complex political problem of the Ottoman heritage of the XVIIth century Europe, Wallachia ans Moldavia "mapping" begins with the Enlightenment⁷. In this period of political unrest, which devided the Europe into eastern and western sections⁸, Moldavia and Wallachia had a new role to play. Since the


⁷ Эдвард Саид, Ориентализм: Западные концепции Востока, p. 352.

Karlowitz Peace Treaty (1699) came into force, the new established geopolitical frame, provided strategic importance for the two provinces due to their key-positioning in relation to areas of expansion of the three competing empires (Russian, Austrian, and Ottoman). The new system of international diplomatic relations between the Ottomans and the Europeans in the XVIIIth century brought many diplomats, merchants, and trevellers in the Principalities.

The increase of the Western Europe natives interest in the two Ottoman Danubian provinces translated in the rise of number of voyages in the XVIIIth century appears evident from the VIIIth, IXth and Xth volmes of the collection *Călători străini despre țările române*, (Foreign travelers about Romanian Countries) as well as from other valid sources. It is precisely the time, that inaugurates the project of ”knowing” Moldavia and Wallachia meaning classifying and contrasting.

The travellers’ descriptions of the Wallachia and Moldavia is not just a characterization of these countries, but a sustained argument for why it looks the way it does, is an examination of quite concrete historical and institutional context that produces it. Specifically, we locate the mental geography of the two provinces within the history of the imperial competition in the region.

The cardinal aspect of the European thought to argue all along the XVII-Ith-century was that the despotic Ottoman government gives no development to the countries and peoples under its rule. If we look at the XVIIIth century travel narratives about Wallachia and Moldavia this argument will be always furnished.

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12) Ларри Вульф, *Изобретая Восточную Европу: карта цивилизации в сознании эпохи Просвещения*, p. 31.
French historian Henry Laurens (1987) has shown that oriental despotism, particularly that of the declining Otoman Empire had become a kind of most” negative model” of despotism for Europeans in the XVIIIth century14. We shall see how this model of oriental despotism influenced the West European views of the Romanian Principalities in the XVIIIth century.

Depictions of the despotic Ottoman government in the XVIIIth-century Wallachia and Moldavia by its main protagonist phanariot prince, show it was remarkably inefficient at all the levels of its functioning15. They, thus created a deterministic dichotomy and accepted as self-evident the concept of a vast difference between the systems of government of Europe and Orient16. In this way, oriental despotism was the main institutional backing, “the axis around which the image of the Other would revolve17”.

There is a great coincidence in Briton, French and Austrian interests in places like Wallachia and Moldavia, which are important because of the XVIIIth century special relation between knowledge and power18. The primary justification for this special relation was the colonial projects19. Herewith we are to consider some of the most invoked effects of this government, which is to say a range of elements, by means of which, XVIIIth century Moldova and Wallachia became comprehensive for the West.

**Extreme Poverty**

Most of the travelers are astonished by the conditions of the chronic pauperization of the indigenous population, particularly in the rural areas20. Inhu-
man exploitation and over taxation are the primary causes of the social insecurity. From their stand point, the worst consequences of the predatory phanariot rule is therefore the one suffered by the peasants, since they lack any legal and institutional protection (such as exists in Europe) against the exactions of taxations and all sort of abuse. At the same time, a related philosophical view emerged to the effect that inhuman treatment of peasants was typically oriental practices that contravent the "civilized imperative to treat other human beings with sympathy and respect for their personal rights." The lines are am going to quote represent quite a standard assumptions of the time, by a foreign observer of the two couthries. They are taken from the Journey from Constantinopole to Poland of the well-known jesuit scholar Roger Joseph Boscovich (1711-1787). Boscovich analysis represents the manifestation of an increasingly important enlightenment phenomenon of the educated traveler as philosophical observer of foreign peoples and their customs, religious and politics. In his Journal the ideas of the "...almost exhausted poor peasants ... with miserable living conditions..." and that of a the "despotic rule bringing to the country nothing but war, assassinations, pillage and desolation..." appear quite recurrent. Furthermore his testimony, helps to refine the Montesquieu model of inefficiency and illegitimacy of despotic government.

**Unlaboured Lands, Rural Decline**

Land issue re-emerged as the most pounding evil brought by the despotic rule. In the accounts, the wellness of Wallachia and Moldavia is in no doubt: the countries are fertile, however, the despot claims the property of all rents from

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the land and this generates all kinds of awful consequences\textsuperscript{26}. In effect, a prosperous country is ruined by overtaxation\textsuperscript{27}. The peasants end up in debt and often enslaved or run away and much of the coutry remains uncultivated\textsuperscript{28}. The message is clear: political despotism operates at all social and economic levels, and leads to economic and social decline. Then, Albert J. Sulzer Austrian historian and military in the well known work ”The History of Dacia” (1781)” (Istoria Daciei Transalpine) expresses readiness to bring the cease of civilisation on these lands\textsuperscript{29}. He puts forward the enterprise of colonization of two principalities to bring here law and order\textsuperscript{30}. His attitude was heavily tinged by a discourse of superiority, which provided justification for the prospective of “well-intentioned” German interventions in the two provinces, since the introduction of European knowledge was thought to be necessary in order to fight despotism and remedy the desolate conditions. A plan, which, apparently comes together with the political agenda at home. Despotism is therefore portayed as a desastrous system from a mercantilist perspective.

\textbf{Ignorant, Barbarous Natives}

Another judgmental term with which Moldavians and Wallachians were usually associated with was ignorance, barabarity. The despotic rule generates slave mentality, which actually “cast humans into the chains of ignorance”\textsuperscript{31}. Cliques like ”servile nature of Wallachs\textsuperscript{32} or ”the dominion of complete ignorance,”\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{26} Daniela Căzan Bușă, Orașul românesc și lumea rurală. Realități locale și percepții europene la sfârșitul secolului al XVIII-lea și începutul celui de-al XIX-lea, Brăila: Muzeul Brăilei Editura Istros 2004, p. 88.


\textsuperscript{28} Ruggiero Giuseppe Bosovich, ”Journal d’un voyage de Constantinople en Pologne”, p. 466.


\textsuperscript{30} Franz-Joseph Sulzer, ”Istoria Daciei Transalpine”, p. 567.


\textsuperscript{32} Jan Louis Carra, ”Histoire de la Moldavie et de la Valachie”, in George Pascu, Călători străini in Moldova și in Muntenia în secolul al XVIII-lea. Carra, Bauer și Struve, Iași: Institutul de arte grafice 1940, p. 87.

\textsuperscript{33} Charles-Claude de Peyssonel, Observations historiques et geographiques sur les peuples barbares qui ont habité le bord du Danube et du Pont-Euxin, Paris: Chez N.V. Tillard 1765, p. 196.
"savage", "unpolished" people\textsuperscript{34} were quite common. West european travelers considered the persistance of despotism as an effect of the of some structural limitation such religious and political first of all\textsuperscript{35}, as well as educational\textsuperscript{36}, which conditions the aims and the effects of each regime. Thus, the link between despotism and religious, educational, civilization competences is established in connection with the general idea that the despotic government often sought to maximize the power of the state without carrying to benefit/development of their subjects.

François Baron de Tott (1733-1793) aristocrat and French military in \textit{Memoires du Baron de Tott sur les Turques et les Tatares} published in Amsterdam in 1785, pretty frankly declares that "humanism can not be applied in regard to such brutes as Moldavians". He said so because he himself was deeply "disappointed" by the fact that Moldavian village elder did not procure him food against payment, but did so when the Turk company of Baron de Tott beat him. Once you lamped the "other" into such degraded category it was possible to accept their exploitation more easily\textsuperscript{37}. From his perspective Valachs are to be treated brutally because the rational faculty is underdeveloped among them. Such punishments were seen as "required" when they misbehaved because they mainly understood force and violence\textsuperscript{38}. The message is they are not like us and for that reason deserved an appropriate (to their nature) treatment. An "orientalist" construction predicated upon an idea of race backwardness, ignorance.

\textbf{Corrupted Morality}

Many travel writers bring evidence for Montesquieu’s thesis of despotism not only as a form of political rule but also as a form of society, since despotric rule could pervade the entire community. Administrative elite the latter, as well as the subjects, have a slave mentality\textsuperscript{39}; in the relationship between the ruler and the subjects, as well as among the subjects, fear reigns\textsuperscript{40}. That these stereotypes were


\textsuperscript{36} Baronul Francois de Tott, "Memoires du Baron de Tott (1767-1769)", p. 597.

\textsuperscript{37} Эдвард Саид, Ориентализм: Западные концепции Востока, p. 32.

\textsuperscript{38} Эдвард Саид, Ориентализм: Западные концепции Востока, p. 35.

\textsuperscript{39} James Poter, "Observations sur la religion, les lois, le gouvernemnt et les moeurs des Turcs", p. 491.

\textsuperscript{40} Ларри Вульф, Изобретая Восточную Европу: карта цивилизации в сознании эпохи Просвещения, p. 285.
not exceptional becomes obvious, if we take a variety of XVIIIth century primary sources – French, German or English into account\textsuperscript{41}.

We will consider in some details the way Baron D’Hauterive came to the issue of despotism in his \textit{Journey from Constantinople to Iassy in 1785}. Actually, the French aristocrat encountered despotism everywhere in Moldavia\textsuperscript{42}. He is symptomatic of the issue not only thematically, but also methodologically while he approached the model of despotism in Moldavia he notes:

 Oppression of the people, oppression of the overlords, unlimited authority of the prince <....> The boyars seem very humble while staying in front of the prince, hence always ready to intrigue <....> the prince try to deal with them. He buys the silence of boyars, of friends with important offices and rents, offers them the possibilities to commit extortions <....>. Excellent administration of a court, where a honest official is to be taken by the prince himself for a dull\textsuperscript{43}.

The author introduces his reader in a kind of protocol of the governance. Here despotism is employed as a morally and ethically charged concept. The most important consequence of the d’Hauterive analysis is that the orientalization of the two provinces came to be primary determined but by the relation between civility and politics.

In summary it can be said travel-writing on the XVIIIth century Wallachia and Moldavia provided valuable information to their audience: they described sweeping lanscape, indigineous people, introduced new markets and investment opportunities. However, these texts are not telling us actual facts about Wallachia and Moldavia at that time, instead they are revealing us the intelectual millieu of the people who wrote these texts\textsuperscript{44}. These writings actually reflect the Europeans’ epistemological assumptions about Moldavia and Wallachia. A state shaped by the despot is mainly in regress, a significant advance of the ideological self-definition.


\textsuperscript{44} Ларри Вульф, \textit{Изобретая Восточную Европу: карта цивилизации в сознании эпохи Просвещения}, p. 448.
I think that the most decisive part of the enterprise of ”mapping” Wallachia and Moldavia is the conquest of knowledge. The travelers did not simply come with diplomatic or other affairs in the principalities, they produce an organized writing meaning recording the two provinces in every conceivable way. In my perspective, the most challenging part of this european enterprise of ”mapping” the two principalities ”is the colonization of the their mind”. And that is more engaging because it’s consequences are to be perceived down to the present day. Mind mapping, a largely Enlightenment phenomena continue in our times.
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A HISTORY OF PARTNERSHIP AND COLLABORATION IN THE BALKANS

ESTABLISHMENT OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN WALLACHIA AND MOLDAVIA ACCORDING TO A WALLACHIAN

Feyzullah Uyanık*

Introduction

In the process of Ottoman withdrawal from the Balkans Russian influence on the Danubian Principalities had an important role. In this paper it is tried to evaluate – in general terms- the Russian policies undertaken in order to establish its political and military influence on the Danubian Principalities. The views put forward here have been shaped around a booklet named *Memleketeyn Yani Eflak-Boğdan Tarihi* (History of the Danubian Principalities or Wallachia and Moldavia) which is recorded with the accession number of TY 2479 in Istanbul University Library of Rare Books. The booklet has only one copy of 58 leaves (116 pages). Though the exact time when the booklet was written is not known, it is thought to have been written in the second half of the 19th century as it describes events that took place in the Danubian Principalities up to 1850. Though no exact information about the identity of the author exists in the booklet, the expression “işbu risaleninmüellifi Eflak’lı olub/ the author of the booklet is Wallachian” makes it possible to deduce that he is from Wallachia.¹

1. Wallachia and Moldavia in Turco-Russian Relationship

The Balkans with its Orthodox Christian majority attracted the attention of Russia who followed the policy of Orthodox union.² Dimitrie Cantemir’s siding with Russia in 1711 Prut War was the first fruit of that interest.³ According

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¹ Memleketeyn Yani Eflak-Boğdan Tarihi, İstanbul Üniversitesi Nadir Eserler Kütüphanesi Tarih Yazmaları (TY) 2479, folio, 1b. (The full text of this booklet is being prepared for publication by us.)


to the author, the war was a great economic destruction for the Romanians who provided logistic support for Russia.⁴ The most significant outcome of the war in terms shaping the future of the Danubian Principalities was that the Hospodars would be appointed among Phanariots. According to the booklet, the situation apparently came to the interest of the Ottoman Empire had negative outcomes in the long run. The Phanariot administrators not giving priority to public interest and observing their own interests like tax farmers left the door open to the establishment of Russian influence in the region. The inability of the Ottoman Empire to establish political stability and the Ottoman defeat in the war of 1768-1774 gave rise to decisive effects on the political future of the Danubian Principalities. One of the most important of them was granting Russian ambassadors the right to negotiate with the Ottoman Empire about the affairs of the Danubian Principalities. By means of those negotiations Russia was able to express its demands about the Danubian Principalities and the Ottoman Empire was expected to consider reasonable demands. Another effect was that Russia had the right to establish consulates in Ottoman lands by means of which it could closely follow local developments and take first hand information.⁵ The confirmation of annexation of Crimea by Russia by Iași Treaty signed in 1792 and determination of the Turla River as the border between two countries strengthened Russia’s position not only in the Danubian Principalities but also in Bulgaria, Serbia and Black Sea ports.⁶

In the beginning of the 19th century Russia had attained geographical enlargement necessary for realizing its political aims. Later, it aimed to attain the right to express opinion directly on the appointment of Hospodars of the Danubian Principalities. Russia attained its aim with the decree of 1802 which determined the tax rates and privileges of the Danubian Principalities and aimed at minimizing the negative outcomes of Pazvandoglu Rebellion which blazed the Balkans.⁷ The office of Hospodars were determined as 7 years according to the

⁴ Memleketeyn Yani Eflak-Boğdan Tarihi, folio, 13b-16a.
⁷ For the detail of rebellions that put Wallachia and Moldavia in a difficult situation see Yücel Özkaya, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Dağlı Isyanları (1791-1808), Ankara, 1983, pp. 14-116;
Treaty of Kainarja Ghica. Sublime Porte declared clearly that they would not be expelled from their offices as long as they did not abuse their position and that Russia’s consent would be taken for their appointment and expulsion. While the decree prevented suppression of the people of the Danubian Principalities under financial obligations, determination of its political future came under the control of two rivaling Powers. It is a reality to be expected easily that the autonomous structure of the Principalities was shaken seriously.

Russia which succeeded in having a voice in the administration of the Danubian Principalities intensified its propaganda activities for Orthodox union. In 1814 with the aim of realizing the projects of the Russian Tsar who was aggrandized as the successor of Jesus, *Philiki Etaireia* (Friendly Society) – which would later trigger Greek Revolt in 1821 – was established in Odessa under the leadership of Capodistria and Ypsilanti. Acquisition of power by the Society in real sense became possible with appointment of Alexandru Sutu to the Position of Hospodar of Wallachia and Mihail Sutu to Hospodar of Moldavia in 1819 by the Sublime Porte. Rebel of 1821 which put the Ottoman Empire in a very difficult position took place with the contribution of last Phanariot Hospodars in the region. The Phanariot which lost their prestige in the eyes of the Sublime Porte lost their privileges in the Dabubian Principalities with new regulations. From then on Hospodars would be elected by councils of the Danubian Principalities among native boyars. The candidates then would be presented to the Sublime Porte and appointed to the post after necessary investigation.

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10] BOA, Hatt-i Hümayûn (HAT), nr.45624.


13] BOA, HAT, nr. 45441; In the background of this application were the important role of
appointed to the region according to this method was Grigore Ghica for Wallachia and Ioan Sturdza for Moldavia. From then on the intervention of Russia who closely followed the efforts of the new Hospodars to develop the region and establish a central administrative system marked a new start in the establishment of Russian influence in the region. Russian efforts to manipulate the struggle of the Danubian Principalities to restore their former autonomous structure laid the background for incessant process of Russian invasion which lasted from Turco-Russian war of 1828-1829 to the Treaty of Saint Petersburg in 1834. The process which was detailed elaborately by the author corresponds to the strongest period of Russian influence in the Danubian Principalities.


Wallachian Hospodar Gika which came to the post with the consent of Russia and the Ottoman Empire started the business of modernizing and raising life standards in Wallachia. He assigned a committee made up of 5 people with preparation of a bill about ancient administrative order of the Danubian Principalities. In order to realize the projected development movement he laid the foundations for modern educational institutions. He enabled the handover of monasteries which were usurped by Greek clergy to local ecclesiastics. However, in the eve of Turco-Russian War of 1828-1829 Russia demanded re-establishment of old order under the pretext of inability of Romanian priests to manage and problems in distribution of revenues from foundations among other monasteries. Considering the demand of Russian ambassador, the Ottoman Empire approved the demand provided that Greek priests who were involved in Greek revolt of 1821 would not step up monasteries and churches. Thus Russia prevented strengthening of Hospodars and acquisition of privileges by local elements in the

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16] For the demands of assignment of the monasteries’ administration to the Romanian see Memleketeyn Yani Eflak-Boğdan Tarihi, folio, 21a; BOA, C.HR., nr. 133/6647; for the acceptance and application of new conditions see BOA, HAT, nr. 45724; BOA, HAT, nr.45724-A.
Danubian Principalities.

Organization of the National Army was among the issues which Hospodars followed closely. Hospodar Sturdza expressed his wish to found an army by recruiting five armed soldiers from every district and village to Selim Pasha, mayor of Silistra. The Sublime Porte having been informed about the case estimated that an army of 4,000 would be raised if Sturdza were allowed to do so. The Porte was worried that it would risk the security of the Muslim in the region.\(^{17}\) On the other hand the Romanian abolished Albanian troops founded by the Phanariot and re-established old order.\(^ {18}\) Moreover they wanted the number of Beşlinefer\(^ {19}\) to be cut by half.\(^ {20}\) Russia keeping abreast of developments in the Danubian Principalities immediately mediated conveying Romanian demands to the Porte.\(^ {21}\) Though the Ottoman Empire objected to restoration of the number of Beşlinefer to pre 1821, it accepted the demand with the Treaty of Akkerman whose terms were clarified in October 1826. Moreover the appointment of Başbeşli Ağaları\(^ {22}\) was taken from the Porte and given to Hospodars.\(^ {23}\) Thus, Russia succeeded in diminishing the influence of high-ranking Ottoman soldiers.\(^ {24}\) In fact, Russia succeeded in getting involved in military reforms of both principalities.

The interim government established under Pavel Kiselev’s administration after Turco-Russian War of 1828-1829 consolidated Russian influence in the

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17] BOA, HAT, nr. 45459-A.  
18] BOA, HAT, nr. 37877-D.  
19] Beşli Nefers are the troops of Janissaries that received five akçes daily. See Abdülkadir Özcan, “Serhad Kulu”, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, XXXVI, İstanbul 2009, p. 560-561; When the Greek Revolt broke out in 1821 to prevent the massacre of Muslims and to establish order the Porte sent 1,000 Beşli Nefers to Wallachia and 2,000 Beşli Nefers to Moldavia. See (Selim Aslantaş, “Osmanlı-Rus İlişkilerinden Bir Kesit: 1826 Akkerman Andlaşması’nın Müzakereleri”, Uluslararası İlişkiler, IX/36 (Kış 2013), p. 152, footnote 11) There were Beşli Nefers in the Danubian Principalities in earlier periods. See Mustafa Kesbi, İbretnümâ-yı Devlet, (haz. Ahmet Öğreten), Ankara 2002, p. 129-130.  
20] BOA, HAT, nr. 45588-F.  
22] Chief Commander of Beşli Nefers.  
24] There were complaints that high-ranking Ottoman Soldiers intervened in Hospodars. BOA, HAT, nr. 45553-G.
Danubian Principalities.\textsuperscript{25} One of the first actions of occupation administration was spreading the propaganda that unlike other territories in Balkans the Wallachia and Moldavia were not conquered by the Ottoman Empire but came under Ottoman rule with their own consent. The presence of a great power like Russia which took over the role of savior and protector of Christianity rendered this subjugation meaningless. The people of Wallachia and Moldavia were expected to express their will towards Russia. The author states that the Russian did more than propagating and collected signatures from boyars.\textsuperscript{26}

Ever since Wallachia and Moldavia were organized as voivodeship a metropolitan was always present in the administration of councils. Occupation administration appointed Russian consul Minciaki to the post in violation of traditions. Minciaki assured that legal regulation codified in the Danubian Principalities was carried out under Russian and Ottoman control.\textsuperscript{27} Thus the Romanian lost their centuries owned privilege of taking decisions about their internal affairs.\textsuperscript{28} A council with high participation and representation was formed and discussions for Organic Statutes were launched. The aim was diminishing boyars who opposed the intervention of Russia to minority and reducing their influence. Boyars who were aware of the plots protested on the grounds that a council without a metropolitan to lead could not be a real council of people. Kiselev sent opponents from Bucharest. Among them Brâncoveanu, Văcărescu, Bălăceanu and Câmpineanu miraculously died before the abolition of the Council according to the account of the author. During their funerals which were carried out in a chaos the new regulations were accepted. But the article about surveillance about Russian Emperor was left blank. Articles which determined appointment of hospodars among local boyars and bended the rules for complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Ottoman lands

\textsuperscript{25} After the war Ottoman and Russia signed Adrianople Treaty. Porte accepted that Wallachia and Moldavia would remain as a hostage in Russia until the end of war indemnity’s all installment were paid. ŞerafettinTuran, “1829 Edirne Antlaşması”, \textit{Ankara Üniversitesi Dilve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi}, IX/1-2 (1951), p. 140; When Russia was given the right to occupy, Kont (Fyodor) Pahlen, PyotrZheltukhin and General Pavel Kiselev were instructed to administer the provisional government. \textit{Memleketeyn Yani Eflak-Boğdan Tarihi}, folio, 22b.

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Memleketeyn Yani Eflak-Boğdan Tarihi}, folio, 23b.

\textsuperscript{27} Viktor Taki, “Russia on the Danube: Imperial Expansion and Political Reform in Moldavia and Wallachia, 1812-1834”, Central European University, Phd Thesis, 2007, p. 264; Russia raised difficulties for the presence of charge d'affaires and consul of the Ottoman Empire in Bucharest. Thus Russia seized administration of Danubian Principalities. See \textit{Memleketeyn Yani Eflak-Boğdan Tarihi}, folio, 24a.

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Memleketeyn Yani Eflak-Boğdan Tarihi}, folio, 24a.
were added to Organic Statutes which became effective faultily.\textsuperscript{29} Organic Statutes was approved by Sublime Porte after Petersburg Treaty of 1834.\textsuperscript{30}

Although the Treaty of St. Petersburg ensured withdrawal of Russian troops it did not mean end of Russian influence in the Danubian Principalities. Although Hospodars had to be elected by Councils of Wallachia and Moldavia, Kiselev secretly contacted Sublime Porte and presented the list of candidates whom Russian Tsar proposed.\textsuperscript{31} Alexandru Ghica was appointed as Hospodar of Wallachia and Mihail Sturdza as Hospodar of Moldavia whose former services were appreciated by Mahmud II.\textsuperscript{32} According to the booklet Russia’s seeking consent of the Ottoman Empire may be evaluated as a diplomatic move to consolidate the power of Hospodars who would later follow pro-Russian policies.\textsuperscript{33}

Kiselev carefully shaped the bureaucratic staff that would take the Hospodars under pressure and control. Diplomatic representative of Wallachia and Moldavia’s (Kapı Kahyaları) were selected among pro-Russian Greeks. Odobescu, who was a Russian sympathizer, was appointed as adjutant of Prince Alexandru Ghica.\textsuperscript{34} Russia was determined to maintain its presence in the Danubian Principalities in accordance with St. Petersburg Treaty. Ghica was forced to convince the Council and demand troops from Russia in order to prevent probable mass unrest during adaptation process of people to the novelty that Organic Statutes brought. The Hospodar knew well that he would lose the control upon arrival of Russian troops so he declared that his own troops could solve the problem and took initiative. Ghica had no choice but give up his post as he lost his prestige in the eyes of the Council. He was thought to consider his own interest rather Wallachia’s. When an authority gap occurred in Wallachia due to his resignation developments in Bulgaria gained priority for Russia. The committees which were

\textsuperscript{29} Memleketeyn Yani Eflak-Boğdan Tarihi, folio, 24b-26a.
\textsuperscript{30} According to the Petersburg Treaty the Russian troops would be withdrawn from the Danubian Principalities. For details of the treaty see BOA, A.DVN.DVE.d., nr. 83/1, p. 232-235; Kaynarca, Aynalı Kavak, Bükreş, Edirne, Petersburg Muaahedeleri, Türk Tarih Kurumu Kütüphanesi (TTK), Y/135, p. 49-51; For acceptance of Organic Statutes by the Ottoman Empire see BOA, HAT, nr. 46120; Nikolae Jorga, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi, p. 315.
\textsuperscript{31} BOA, HAT, nr.45375-A; BOA, HAT, nr.45375-C; BOA, HAT, nr.45375-D; BOA, HAT, nr.45375-E.
\textsuperscript{32} BOA, HAT, nr. 45381; BOA, C.HR., nr. 71/3543; Memleketeyn Yani Eflak-Boğdan Tarihi, folio, 26a; According to Nikola Iorga HospodaGika is merciful and dreamer on other hand Mihail Sturdza seems as if influenced by Russian Tsar’s ideas but he really is rational, practical and despotic. Nikolae Jorga, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi, p. 315.
\textsuperscript{33} Memleketeyn Yani Eflak-Boğdan Tarihi, folio, 26a.
\textsuperscript{34} Memleketeyn Yani Eflak-Boğdan Tarihi, folio, 26b.
organized by Russian consuls in Brăila and Galați were in action. Events which started in Brăila and spread to Bucharest formed a negative outlook. Those developments were enough for Russia which was warrantor of peace and prosperity in the area to send troops.\textsuperscript{35}

The new Hospodar Bibescu who was brought to the post in a chaotic atmosphere agreed with Russia on military matters. Russia being unable to drive its army into the area because of hardening discourse of European Powers planned to realize its aim by its investments in metalurgy. Trandafilov, who was originally an engineer, acquired the concession of mines in the Danubian Principalities with the consent of the Council.\textsuperscript{36} Four or five thousand workers were needed for operating mines. The intended workers were actually Russian soldiers infiltrated into the Danubian Principalities in worker uniforms. When the Council realized the \textit{fait accompli} and put it onto agenda, extreme discussions broke out. After it became clear that Russian soldiers would not be allowed to infiltrate into Wallachia and Moldavia, Bibescu abolished the council and won Russia’s favour.\textsuperscript{37}

Keeping the council closed for three years enabled Bibescu to rule as he wished without a control mechanism. Authors writing books in Romanian were tried to be kept under control. Youth who were trying to revive national consciousness were sent to exile with Russia’s support in alliance with the Phanariot. They tried to prevent national awakening in the area in that way. Russian influence had its golden age during that period. According to the author Bibescu acted like \textit{aide de camp} of Russian Tsar and made important contributions to consolidation of Russian influence.\textsuperscript{38}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Russia reached the peak of its power in the Danubian Principalities with the interim government which was established after the revolution of 1848. The process which ended with Paris Treaty of 1856 turned the Danubian Principalities issue which was formerly an area on which Russia and the Ottoman Empire struggled for influence, into an issue which concerned the whole Europe.

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\textsuperscript{35} Memleketeyn Yani Eflak-Boğdan Tarihi, folio, 27a-30a.
\textsuperscript{36} Barbara Jelavich, \textit{Russia and the Formation of the National State 1821-1878}, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{37} Memleketeyn Yani Eflak-Boğdan Tarihi, folio, 30a-31a.
\textsuperscript{38} Memleketeyn Yani Eflak-Boğdan Tarihi, folio, 31b-32a.
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In this paper, we try to examine the role of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia on Ottoman foreign policy through the Russian ambassadorial account of Prince Nicolai Vasil’evich Repnin. According to article XXVII of the Küçük Kaynarca treaty, the Ottoman Empire and Russia agreed upon exchange of ambassadors and principles of protocol rules.

The treaty and the protocols were put on test when Prince Repnin was appointed to ambassador extraordinary to Istanbul on 18 November 1774. He spent his time in Moscow in winter for his embassy’s preparations. His embassy consisted of between six and seven hundred persons. Repnin departed from Moscow in the spring and reached at Kiev on 15 May 1775. The envoys of Repnin and Ottoman ambassador Abdülkerim Paşa exchanged on the Dniester River at the frontier on 13 July 1775. Repnin’s account describes his journey via Moldavia, Walachia and Bulgaria to Istanbul, his audiences with the sultan and the ceremonials activities and finally his return to Hotin in July 1776.

We try to demonstrate the importance of the Principalities on Ottoman foreign policy with border countries such as Russia. One of the duties of the Principalities was to make arrangements for the Ottoman missions and European missions from their capital seats to the border lines including the quarantine and reception. Principalities were also in charge of almost all missions to European countries, such as Austria, Prussia, England, Russia, France and Poland. This paper aims to demonstrate functions and roles of the Principalities in hosting the foreign envoys according to Repnin’s account. Some of the questions to be asked in this paper are: Who were Wallachian and Moldavian principalities and how did they become one of the channels for Ottoman foreign policies with European countries? We shall try to demonstrate the importance of the Principalities for the

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Ottomans on European political and diplomatic affairs and their communications with border countries such as Russia and Austria at that time.

I) The Relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Danubian Principalities

The Ottomans ruled their subject territories according to Islamic law. The interpretation of Islamic rule adopted by the Ottomans prompted the division of subject territories according to their relationship with the central authority. Vassal principalities were part of dar-ül-ahd (the House of Peace), an intermediary regime between that of dar-ül-Islam (the House of Islam) and dar-ül-harb (the House of War). The lands around the Black Sea did not all share the same status under Ottoman rule. Therefore, the territories mostly inhabited by the Muslims on this region such as Anatolia, Bulgaria and southern Georgia became part of dar-ül-Islam, and were administrated as provinces of the Empire. Within the Empire, the dar-ül-ahd regime was applied to northern Georgia (Gürcistan), Wallachia (Eflak), Moldavia (Bogdan) and Transylvania (Erdel). In such situations a native ruler from a princely family occupied the throne, and the political, administrative, military, judicial, and ecclesiastic institutions were preserved. The boyars elected the prince (Dieta in Transylvania) and the Sultan confirmed this decision. After the consolidation of Ottoman power, the Sultan ceased consulting local landowners in the appointment of titular rules.

From a political point of view, the Danubian principalities enjoyed a considerable measure of autonomy under the Ottoman rule; they were not colonised by immigrants from other parts of the Empire, lands were not confiscated from existing owners, and Muslims were prohibited from owning and building mosques in these lands. The rulers of the principalities were obliged to have the same friends and enemies as the Ottoman Sultan, and to take part in all military campaigns organized by him. Transylvania, which was to become an independent principality, enjoyed a superior status to compare to Wallachia and Moldavia, mainly because it was a neighbour of the Austrian Habsburg Empire. Compared to Moldavia

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3] The Ottoman legal sovereignty and the legal background of the Principalities are studied by Viorel Panaite’s article in detail see, “Power Relationships in the Ottoman Empire: The
and Wallachia during the period of Ottoman rule, Transylvania possessed more independence in the election of their princes. The principal pressures imposed by the Ottoman Empire on the region were military and fiscal. Important defence posts, such as the fortress of Akkerman, were occupied by units of Janissaries. In some cases, such forts also became the headquarters of a territorial unit, such as the sancaks created around Tighina fortress in 1538, put under the authority of a bey (local Turkish ruler), and the transformation of the fortress Hotin into a rayah in 1716, which included not just the territory of the fortress, but also some villages from the vicinity of Soroca, Jassy, and Cernauti. The Turkish authorities encouraged the movement of Muslim Tatars into Moldavia and Wallachia. The number of Tatars gradually increased from 30,000 in the second half of 16th century to 45,000 in the middle of the 18th century in Moldavia. They were called the Tatars from Bucak or Nogay.4

The principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia were obliged to pay harac (official tribute) and peşkeş (official gifts to the sultan and his magistrates). From the 17th century onwards, the principalities paid the Ottomans a new money tribute called “mükerre”, which to start with was paid once every three years (the big mucker), then annually (the small mucker). The principalities were obliged to offer the Ottomans grain, cattle, wood for ship construction, and other commodities. The ownership of property was restricted. The property of princes, boyars, and monasteries were requisitioned by the Ottoman Empire, and divided among the military victors. New territorial divisions were created for fiscal purposes (rayahs). The local leaders of Christian Orthodox church answered directly to the Metropolitan Church in Istanbul.5

The principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia gained an important situation due to the change imbalance of powers at the end of the 17th century. After the Siege of Vienna in 1683 and the Peace of Carlowitz, the 17th century ended in the turmoil represented by a significant change in the patterns of power around the Southeast Europe and the Black Sea. The golden age of Poland as a great power, linked Baltic Sea and Black Sea, came to an end. Instead, the Ottoman Empire continued its wars with the Habsburgs on the Danube and the fringes of south Eastern Europe, and with Spain in the Mediterranean, although serious defeats at the end of the century checked further advances in that region. Two new pow-

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ers appeared at the extremities of Europe. Hohenzollern Dynasty, the electors of Brandenburg, turned Prussia into secular fiefdom of the Polish kingdom, made the enlarged territory into an independent state in the middle of the century. Russia (Muscovy) expanded significantly, acquiring Kiev and Western Ukraine, as well as exploring eastwards into Siberia. Although the Russia of the new Romanov Dynasty had yet to assert itself on the shores of the Baltic Sea, it had an active role in the South Eastern Europe through its religious and cultural links with most of the peoples in the region⁶.

The principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia had to carve out a policy of their own between these growing states. They were subjects, albeit with a degree of international autonomy, of the Ottoman Empire. But these principalities were also Christian states with a long tradition of conflict with their sovereigns. In the leadership of Austria, Russia, Venice, Poland and Papal State set up a Holly Alliance against the Ottoman Empire after the Siege of Vienna in 1683. The Austrian offensive after the Siege of Vienna, and their seizure of Transylvania, represented an important message for the princes of Wallachia and Moldavia. Some of them even had secret contacts with them, although one of them was obliged to accompany the Ottoman army to the siege of Vienna. After the Peace of Carlowitz (1699), the orientation of some political groups in Wallachia and Moldavia towards an alliance with Austria and Russia grew stronger⁷.

This period was also one of the significant cultural developments, the last echoes of the Renaisances, and the first signs of the Baroque, were observed in the architecture of the period. Printing activity increased. Great personalities were in active in this period, and the princes were sponsoring cultural activities such as printing, the opening of new schools, the bestowal of promising young people to study abroad and invitations to illustrious teachers to visit the country. Some of them, like Dimitrie Cantemir, were in contact with other important European intellectuals and had a thorough knowledge of the region. All of them were involved in politics as well. Constantine Cantacuzene, the brother of Serban Cantacuzene and the uncle of the Hospodar Constantine Brancoveanu, was even beheaded for his involvement in politics, while Dimitrie Cantemir, winner of a Berlin Academy prize, ended his years in exile, in Russia, as a close friend of Czar Peter I, and Chancellor of the Russian Empire. This developing intellectual life of principalities ended with Russian aggrandizement against the Ottomans. The ambiguous attitude to the imperial government of Constantine Brancoveanu, who was ex-

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executed for having alleged treachery against the Ottoman Empire, and the outright alliance of Dimitrie Cantemir, the prince of Moldavia in 1710-1711, with Peter I against the Ottomans, persuaded the Ottoman authorities to change their attitude towards the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia.

From 1711 onwards in Moldavia and from 1715 in Wallachia, the princes were no longer to be elected in the traditional way by the boyars. Instead, they were selected and appointed by the Sultan from among the Greek families from the Phanariot area of Istanbul. Some of them, at least those who enjoyed a longer reign, proved to be rulers with a special interest in the cultural development of the Principalities, promoting activities such as the translation and printing of new books, the development of the school system, increasing the number of principalities students abroad, and the encouragement of foreign teachers to the principalities and the construction of monasteries, which acted as cultural centres. Principalities involvement in regional politics had to be restricted and closely watched by the Sultans. These princes were valued by the Ottoman authorities not for their culture, but their fidelity and loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, which could not be taken for granted, particularly in view of the fact that Austria was beginning to expand her own Empire towards South Eastern Europe, such as in 1716, Austrian troops enter Walachia, with the aim of occupying it. Prince of Wallachia, Nicola Mavrocordat decided to retreat towards the Danube, hoping for a swift response from the Ottomans. Not only the prince but also the entire court including metropolitan Antim retreated. But later on Antim left Bucharest, probably wanted to reach an agreement with Austrians, as legal representative of the prince, during a possible vacancy of the throne, which he would have had a major role to play. Prince Mavrocordat decided that Antim had acted as an enemy, and deposed him. Later, Antim was confined to a monastery, thus the ruler decided on a drastic way of getting rid of a troublesome cleric.

In the 18th century antagonism between Russia and the Ottoman Empire continued to develop. The Ottomans generally tried not only to preserve their territories on the northern coast of the Black Sea, but to expand them. In Russia, Peter I made an access to the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea the main goal of his foreign policy. After Peter I this policy became Russians traditional foreign policy to expand against the Ottoman territories. In the 18th century the absence of any compromise in the situation caused four wars starting from 1710-1711, 1736-1739, 1768-1774 and lastly 1787-1792. The result of the Russo-Turkish wars

of the 18th century was the annexation of the northern coast of the Black Sea, from the Dniester to Kuban including Crimea, to Russia. Thus, active economic and cultural development began soon afterwards in this annexed territories. The Black Sea coastal steppes were colonized by Russian settlers and opened to the spread of Russian culture at the expense of Muslim Turkish and Tatar people. The proportion of the Black sea trade was not large, because the Ottoman Empire did not let any foreign ships pass through the straits, but later wheat export in the Black Sea became very important. Since 1774 Russian trade ships got the right of free navigation in the Black Sea, which led to the growth of Russian Black Sea trade.

II) The role of the Principalities on Ottoman Foreign Policy

Especially with the conclusion of Prut Peace Treaty, the principalities of Walachia and Moldavia had taken their duties on internal and external affairs of their territories. Before coming to the Prince of Principalities, these Phanariot families were mostly served as a dragoman or a chief interpreter of the Sublime Porte communicating with foreign countries. The Secretary of Ottoman Foreign Office, Reis Efendi, were rarely ever well-informed regarding European politics, or even frequently, the location of European states, thus, they were forced to rely on the Phanariot dragomans of the Porte dealing with western diplomats. The position of dragoman of the Porte was a very minor functionary who spent much of his time in the ante-chambers of the Ottoman officials whom he served. However, gradually, as Ottoman foreign relations and policy became more complex and the dragomans came to be indispensable in the conduct of diplomacy. So did lot of them improved radically, they acquired honours, titles, authority, influence, fame and wealth. Before the Phanariot families, up to the middle of the 17th century, the dragomans were usually Jews or Europeans converted to Islam. After that pe-

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11] There is a general study on these Principalities’ rulers and their backgrounds, lives and their activities in the Ottoman bureaucracy, see Zeynep Sözen, Fenerli Beyler, 110 Yıllık Öyküsü (1711-1821), Istanbul 2000.
period, however, leading Greek Orthodox Families of Phanar (Fener) of Istanbul began to Europeanise themselves by educating their sons in Italian universities, such as Padua, Rome, Venice, Florence and Milan. They were able to provide the requisite talents. Some of the earliest Phanariot dragomans served as interpreters for both the Ottomans and European embassies. At the same time, the Ottoman ruling elite probably became aware of the full worth of their talents as a result of skilful performance of Alexander Mavrocordat at the negotiations for the Treaty of Carlowitz (Karlofça). They also became prepared linguistically and intellectually to receive the new western ideas which penetrated the Empire. As we already mentioned above starting from 1711 onwards in Moldavia and from 1715 in Wallachia, the Porte began to appoint the Phanariot dragomans regularly as Hospodars/Prince/Voivodes of the Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. The posts of dragoman and Hospodar were monopolized by almost a dozen or so Greek families.

However, the dragomans and the Hospodars were the primary source of information on Ottoman Foreign Office prior to the establishment of permanent Ottoman Embassies in the major European capitals until Selim III’s reign. Actually, before this date, the Ottomans depended primarily upon two sources for information about events in Europe. One was the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, the other was the dragomans of the Porte. The Hospodars maintained agents in the capitals of central and Eastern Europe who provided them with

The dragoman’s function was to translate notes exchanged between foreign representatives and the Sublime Porte, and to interpret for the Reis Effendi during negotiations and whenever the latter, The Grand Vizier, or the Sultan received European emissaries. When the Reis and the Grand Vizier accompanied the army on campaign, he or one of his chief subordinates went with them. Starting from the second half of the 17th century, 18th and a part of the 19th centuries, dragomans used often to conduct negotiations under their own direction, but not on their own initiative; generally, they were accompanied by an Ottoman official who observed their work. Most of the diplomatic exchanges which took place at the Sublime Porte were between the dragoman of the Porte and the interpreters of the various embassies; minutes were taken by a chancery scribe and/or an embassy secretary or second interpreter. The dragoman of the Porte had his own small staff and subordinate interpreters to assist him in his duties, the latter usually being younger members of the leading Phanariot families training for the post. Thus the dragomans were persons of some importance in the hierarchy of the Sublime Porte and were treated accordingly by the diplomatic corps. Moreover, because their duties brought them into frequent contact in both an official and an unofficial capacity with the resident envoys in Istanbul, the interpreters became vital channels of the information for Ottoman officials. However, while the dragomans for the most part served the Ottoman government well and loyally, there were some who amassed large fortunes through divulging state secrets to foreign representatives. Thomas Naff, “Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Reign of Selim III, 1789-1807”, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 83, 1963, p. 295-315.
unsifted and often inaccurate reports which they in turn transmitted to Istanbul. After the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (Kainarca), during the reign of Abdülhamid I and his successors, communications between the Principalities and the capital were unreliable and at times even impossible, owing to the breakdown of central authority and resultant disorders and brigandage. When they were isolated, the Porte had to rely for news on the dragomans and on a secondary source, which was often, useful although biased- the European envoys. The Reis Effendi might tap them directly or, frequently, the envoys themselves volunteered information, which was usually shaded to suit their political objectives. When the Ottomans felt strong enough or so long as the Empire had little fear from European powers, these arteries of diplomatic communication sufficed to furnish Ottoman officials with all they cared to know about west. However, this system had become increasingly inadequate, and after 1789 with crisis mounting upon crisis, its retention was intolerable to the security of the Empire. Thus, the problem of communications bulked large in generally program of reforms and specifically diplomatic reforms of Selim III.  

During the Phanariot Hospodar period, both Danubian principalities had no major influence on Ottoman foreign policy. They still sent some reports dealing with Austrian Habsburg domains, Russians and Poles to the Grand Vizier. These reports were in general dealt with Russian forces and their activities in Poland. Also these reports mostly dealt with Prussian and Austrian forces activities in the central Europe. The Wallachian and Moldavian Hospodars’ role became very important after the occupation of Crimean by the Russians. On the other hand the most important fraction of the information that the dragomans, Hospodars and their families delivered were not really secret, while some other pieces could be acquired, most probably, from other sources. Moreover, sometimes the Porte itself was interested in sending certain information to the European embassies in Istanbul, through non-diplomatic channels. The Sublime Porte also used the Phanariot families as non-diplomatic channels. Anyhow, the Porte did not encourage the great families to approach Russia, but none of them stopped

13] Naff, Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy, p. 302-303; there is similar information can be found in the documentary research by Valeriu Veliman. In this work generally gives the reports of Wallachian and Moldavian Hospodars on European affairs and Russian activities on Poland and of Ukraine. See, Valeriu Veliman, Relațiile Româno-Ottomane (1711-1821), Documente Turcști, București 1984. Shaw’s study on Selim III’s reign is a remarkable book and it enlightened us every point of that period affairs and events. Shaw also gives the origins of the war, the campaigns of the war and the conclusion of the peace, see, Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New, The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1971, p. 21-68.
their tendencies. During those times of weakness, the Porte had chosen a similar double play, balancing between the great powers. It was the kind of play that the Phanariot Greeks did too, on another level, and the Ottomans tried to use them to their own goals. Simultaneously, Hospodars remained the leading political agent in the Principalities, reporting to the Sublime Porte about international events in Europe. As well as interpret the news from the European political scene for his own benefits, sometimes even misinforming the Porte. Some European diplomats in Istanbul claimed that the ties the Hospodar families maintained with rival countries diplomats was beneficiary. So the Ottomans releasing their treachery, some of them the foreign-oriented Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia were deposed, their properties were confiscated and sometimes they were also executed. One of the duties of the Principalities was to make arrangements for the Ottoman missions and European missions from their capital seats to the border lines including the quarantine and reception. Principalities were also in charge of almost all missions to European countries, such as Austria, Prussia, England, Russia, France and Poland.

III) The Meetings of the Embassy of Repnin by the Danubian Principalities in 1775-1776

14] There is a specific study on Constantine Ipsilanti and his activities as a dragoman and Hospodars in the service of the Ottoman Empire, see Vladimir Mischevca-Periklis Zavitsanos, *Principele Constantin Ipsilanti, 1760-1816*, Civitas, Chişinău 1999. In this study we used the summary of this work, see Summary – Prince Constantin Ipsilanti. 1760-1816, s. 140-155, esp. see, p. 141-143. And also a case study for the Morusi Brothers and their political activities in Principalities and the role of Ottoman foreign policy see Armand Goşu, “The Political Elite in the Danubian Principalities and Russia at the Beginning of the 19th Century. A Case Study: The Moruzi Brothers”, *Romano-Turcica* I, İstanbul 2003, p. 169-185. Nigar Anafarta, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile Lehistan (Polonya) Arasındaki Münasebetleri İlğili Tarihi Belgeler - Historical Documents Concerning Relations between the Ottoman Empire and Lehistan (Poland)*, İstanbul 1979.

15] The Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia altogether, 31 princes from 11 different families ruled during the Phanariote period. Many times they were exiled or even executed: of these 31 princes, seven sentenced to death, and a few were executed at their own courts of Bucharest or Iași. The first deposed Wallachian Phanoriote Hospodar was famous Alexander Mavrocordat’s son Nicola in 1709. From the same family Constantin Mavrocordat six times appointed to this post after 5 times deposed and exiled to Limnos. For detailed information see, Cafer Çiftçi, “Bâb-ı Âlî’nin Avrupa’ya Çevrilmüş İki Gözü: Efâk ve Boğdan’da Fenerli Voyvodalar (1711-1821)”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 7/26 (Yaz 2010), p. 27-48 and see also more information Sözen’s work, *Fenerli Beyler*.

At the end of the Ottoman-Russian war (1768-1774) the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca signed between the Ottoman Empire and Russia on 21 July 1774. According to article XXVII of the Küçük Kaynarca treaty, the Ottoman Empire and Russia agreed upon exchange of ambassadors and principles of protocol rules. The treaty and the protocols were put on test when Abdülkerim Efendi was appointed as an ambassador extraordinary to Moscow on 3 October 1774 and General Repnin was appointed as an ambassador extraordinary to Istanbul on 18 November 1774.

After the appointment, Repnin spent his time in Moscow in winter for his embassy’s preparations and in communications with the Catherine II. His embassy consisted of between six and seven hundred persons including his family members. Among his retinue only some names were mentioned. The officers were mainly recruited from noblemen and some of them had served with Repnin during the war. Repnin departed from Moscow in the spring and reached at Kiev on 15 May 1775. The envoy of Repnin and Ottoman ambassador Abdülkerim Paşa exchanged on the Dniester River at the frontier on 13 July 1775. The account of Repnin starts from one day before the exchange and then his account describes his journey via Moldavia, Wallachia and Bulgaria to Istanbul, his audiences with the sultan and the ceremonials activities and finally his return to Hotin in July 1776.

A) The Meeting of Repnin’s envoy by the Moldavian Principality on the way of Istanbul

After the exchange of the ambassadors on 13th of July 1775 over the Dniester River at Hotin, Repnin’s envoy stayed almost 6 days in Hotin. The Russian envoys left Hotin on 19 July and on 21 July 1775 arrived at Kosteshty where Repnin was received by a chorus of Moldavian musicians sent by the Hospodar. Every governor was responsible to these meetings within their boundaries. When Repnin and his retinues

17) Russian and Turkish ambassadors’ accounts are translated to English by Norman Itzkowitz and Max Mote, Mubadele: An Ottoman-Russian Exchange of Ambassadors, University of Chicago Press, New York 1972. Repnin’s account serialized at the first in 1776. The following year this account appeared as a book. The text was written by Iakov Ivanovich Bulgakov, marshal of the embassy, and printed in 600 copies at the expense of the Academy of Science.

18) Itzkowitz and Mote, Mubadele, p. 125-130.

19) Itzkowitz and Mote, Mubadele, p.130-131.

20) See more information on Ghika family and Gregory Ghika II, Sözen, Fenerli Beyler, p. 87-99.
entered Moldavian territories, the Hospodar made arrangements to meet them on the border towns and provide their loadings, meals, animals and other needs. Repnin and his envoy stayed the night at the camp and the next morning three boyars arrived sent by Hospodar Ghika to meet and accompany them to his capital Jassy. On behalf of their prince they brought him various fruits. On 23 July 1775 Repnin and his retinue departed from the town of Kosteshty in accompany of Moldavian boyars. They reached to the town of Stefanesti same day where they were received by the district administrative officer. After dinner Hospodar Ghika’s third treasurer arrived at the camp and he presented four horses for Repnin and the princesses.

The journey of Repnin from the border to the capital city Jassy did not last long and after 4 days they reached to Jassy. Here how did Repnin and his retinue follow the journey and how did they meet by the Moldavians on the way will be examined. On 24 July 1775 Repnin and his envoy left the town of Stefanesti and reached to Tabara where he was met by the district administrative officer of Jassy with few Albanian soldiers. On 26 July they departed from Tabara and reached near Trifești and spent the night there. Next day they rode three hours halted near the town of Sculeni. After the arrival of Repnin at Sculeni the brother and brother-in-law of Ghika arrived in the name of the Hospodar with congratulations on the ambassador nearing Jassy satisfactorily. Also they told Repnin the Hospodar’s pleasure at his forthcoming meeting with him. On this occasion he gave him a letter of the same contents and presented various fruits. Then in accordance with the latter, the secretary of Oriental Languages, Panaiodoros, was sent to the Hospodar with respectful compliments and with a letter of reply. After luncheon a relative of the Hospodar, Prince Mavrocordato and his wife arrived, and towards evening the Moldavian hetman arrived with some 150 troops who were appointed to accompany the ambassador to Jassy. During the same evening Moldavian nobles who welcomed to Russian mission were invited to take supper by the ambassador.

Foreign envoys were mostly welcomed by the governors/hospodars before entering the centre of provinces. It can be seen from the account of Repnin, the Russian embassy also met with the Hospodar of Moldavia. On 28 July 1775 Repnin and his retinue left the camp near Sculeni with Moldavian hetman and his troops. About 5 km to Jassy Moldavians troops prepared to erect two tents for the ambassador and his wife. Repnin and his wife carriage were received by the

courtiers of the Hospodar approached to the tents. When the envoy approached the tent, Repnin met with Hospodar Ghika himself and with his children. After meeting they entered the tent where two tables were set up with liqueurs and cold food. One of the tables in the middle was for the ambassador and at the other edge was his two mihmandars (official escorts). After entering the tent they took their places at their tables and spent some time resting. During their meeting the Hospodar gave Repnin a horse as a present with all the trappings. Repnin also promised to ride into Jassy. After this conversation, Hospodar departed from the place to return to Jassy to make arrangements for Russian mission’s reception leaving with the ambassador his two sons and a number of boyars. This reception took place in the house assigned to the Russian embassy. Another tent was prepared for the ambassadress and she was received and shown hospitality by Moldavian hospodar’s wife and most distinguished ladies of her court. When the ambassadress rode in the carriage for Jassy, the wife of the Hospodar went on ahead with her.

At one o’clock in the afternoon Russian Ambassador Repnin and his retinue rode into the city of Jassy in this order with the bells of all the churches ringing. In this entry Moldavian troops had taken place on each side along the street on which embassy quarters were located with salutations. When Repnin entered courtyard the troops fired from the cannon and rifles. Hospodar, his wife and members of the courts met Repnin and his wife in the quarters assigned to them. In his quarters, Repnin, his wife and their children were served refreshments of cold drinks. Later on, meal table was prepared by the Hospodar. At the meal Ghika, his princess, his two sons, a few leading boyars and their wives were present. This meeting was described by Repnin’s account in detail. According to his description other persons of the court were also present and they stood behind the chairs of the ambassador and ambassadress. There was also Moldavian music played during the dinner and afterwards there were also Moldavian dances. Later on the Hospodar and his whole retinues took leave of the ambassador.

Repnin and his envoys stayed in Jassy until 9th of August. He had some diplomatic, social and cultural activities. He was visited by some guest officials and ordinary people. He paid some visits to the Hospodar and other places during his stay in Jassy. On his return, Repnin sent one of his secretaries with gifts to Ghika and his wife on 29 July 1775. Repnin also paid a visit to Moldavian Hospodar and his wife likewise paid a visit to the hospodar’s wife. Next day, Repnin organized a luncheon for ninety places inviting Ghika, his wife, their sons and the most

24] Itzkowitz and Mote, Mubadele, p. 132.
25] Itzkowitz and Mote, Mubadele, 132-133.
prominent male and female citizens of Jassy. Russian music was played during the dinner followed by Moldavian dancing. During this time Repnin played card with Ghika. Apart from the Hospodar’s invitation, other Moldavian rulers also visited Repnin. On 31 July 1775 toward the evening Repnin was visited by the first mihmandars Kara Ahmed Paşa. Later, on 2 August 1775, in the morning Repnin was visited by second mihmandar, the kapıcıbaşı.

During Repnin’s stay in Jassy, he attended to few hunting in the county sides around Jassy. Repnin’s account gives some detailed information in his social activities organized by Moldavians. Repnin and his mihmandars rode to hunt at the invitation of Ghika, firstly on 1 August and secondly on 5 August 1775. On 3 August Repnin, his wife with their daughters and part of the retinue were served lunch with the Hospodar who attended with his family and a few ladies of his court. Also there was a party at the Galata Mountain in honour of the Russian ambassador near Jassy on 6 August. Repnin, his family and part of his retinue went at the request of Ghika. The hospodar’s tent had been set up to receive them. There were various games of horsemanship in the Turkish and Moldavian style on the mountain. During this time coffee, confections, and various cold drinks and later on dinner were served. After meal, there was also Moldavian national dance entertainment that ended with a small display of fireworks. Apart from the Hospodar’s invitation, other Moldavian rulers were also invited and visited Repnin. On 7 August in the morning the first mihmandars Kara Ahmet Paşa second time visited Repnin. After his visit, Repnin was visited by distinguished clerical as well as secular officials. On 8 August 1775 Repnin was visited by the metropolitan of Jassy.

These were the last activities of Repnin in Jassy. He wanted to go through on his way to Istanbul via Wallachia and Bulgaria. Before his departure, on 7 August 1775 Ghika requested Repnin and his whole retinue to have supper with him the next evening. On 8 August Repnin ordered to prepare the whole retinue for departure from Jassy. Repnin, his family and all the retinue went to the Hospodar to have their last supper. On 9 August in the early morning the Hospodar came to Repnin’s place before his departure to take leave of him and invited him at breakfast a short distance from the city. After the Hospodar departure, Princess Ghika and the Moldavian ladies came to leave of the ambassadress. After all carriages were ready, the cortege departed from Jassy. They stooped after riding about 3 km for breakfast at the place where a tent had been erected at the command of Ghika. The Moldavian troops also stayed at the camp. In this place Ghika received Rep-

26] Itzkowitz and Mote, Mubadele, p. 134.
nin and his family in the manner of their arrival in Jassy. Later Repnin took leave of Ghika, thanking him for all his hospitalities during their stay in Jassy. Repnin’s mission was accompanied on his way to Foşkani by the Moldavian hetman with his retinues and two boyars. After traveling five hours from Jassy, they arrived near a postal station called Scînteia and made their camp there, where Repnin met with the district administrative officer.

Repnin and his mission left the camp near Scânteia in the early morning of 10 August 1775 and they arrived at the postal station Uncești where they built a camp and spent the night. Towards the evening Repnin was visited by two Moldavian boyars. These boyars were living in the vicinity of this place to pay their respects. On 11 August they reached to the town of Vaslui, where they made a camp and stayed for two nights. On 13 August they left Vaslui and came to Dekolin where they took quarters and spent night there. Next day they left Dekolin and reached to the city of Bârlad. In Bârlad they took quarters in homes of the inhabitants for two nights. On 16 August 1775, after departing from Bârlad they called at Guru-Paraskevului and made camp there. Next day they left this place and arrived at the town of Tecuci. They were stayed at the homes of the inhabitants of Tecuci.

On 18 August for the mission was the rest day and after lunch local archbishop came from Brăila to visit ambassador. In late evening three Wallachian boyars came to the ambassador from the town pay their respects. But it was so late for their introduction was postponed until next early morning. On 19 August in the morning before his departure Repnin met with three Wallachian boyars and after their greetings, his mission set out on the road and called Pomistreasvului, where a camp was prepared for him because this place was the last quarters to camp on the border of Moldavia to Wallachia. There was a tent erected for the honour of the ambassador and there were the spatar (the captain of the Wallachian troops) and the archimandrite Varlaam of the Focşani Monastery.

On 20 August 1775 they left the camp in the early morning and after travelling four hours arrived at the Milcov River which separates Moldavia from Wallachia. The Moldavian hetman formed his troops on the Moldavian bank. The ambassador thanked the Hospodar Ghika and entire Moldavian cortege accompanied him and his retinue for courtesies and for all the services which he had rendered during their crossing of Moldavian territory. Also he expressed his gratitude to the hetman

29] Itzkowitz and Mote, Mubadele, p. 137.
for his correctness and diligence in carrying out those matters entrusted to him.  

B) The Meeting of Repnin’s envoy by the Wallachian Principality on the way of Istanbul

Repnin and his mission crossed the Milcov River to Wallachian side and made a camp in the village of Virteșcoiu. He was met by the Wallachian spătar and the hospodar’s secretary, Gospodin Racoviță, both of whom congratulated him in the name of the Hospodar, Alexander Ipsilanthi, on his safe arrival. There was a salutations ceremony by the military music of the Wallachian. Then they entered to their tent, where Wallachian spătars repeated their congratulations on his safe arrival. The former spătar excused himself because he was required to execute certain arrangements for entraining the embassy. Repnin and his mission stayed at this place for 4 nights in order to take care of their journey necessities.

Early morning of 24 August 1775 Repnin’s mission left the village of Vârteșcoiu and after travelling for six hours reached to the village of Slobozia, on the Rimna River, here they stayed in the homes of the inhabitants for the night. The following day they left the Slobozia and after riding for three hours reached to the village of Topliceni near town called Râmnicu Sărat. In this place seniors and few Wallachian boyars met Repnin. They also escorted him to lodging place which had been prepared for the ambassador in the lord’s home and spent two nights there. Also after luncheon the wives of the mentioned boyars came to pay their respects to the ambassadress.

On 27 August 1775 Repnin and his mission left the village of Topliceni and arrived at the town of Buzău and spent a night there. The next day they reached to the village of Mârgineanu where they made a camp and spent two nights. On 30 August 1775 they left the village of Mârgineanu and stopped at Podikuram, where camp was prepared on the bank of the Ialomița River. The actual State Councillor in the service of Her Imperial Majesty, Prince Cantacuzene, rode out to meet the ambassador at this place. The following day, they left Podikuram and stopped at the village of Creața where they made camp. On arriving there the leading official of the embassy, the chief quartermaster, was quickly sent to Bucharest to access the quarters assigned for the ambassador and his retinue. On the same day late af-

31] Itzkowitz and Mote, Mubadele, p. 138.
33] Itzkowitz and Mote, Mubadele, p. 138.
34] Itzkowitz and Mote, Mubadele, p. 138-139.
ternoon the archbishop of Râmnicu and three leading Wallachian boyars arrived at the camp. They congratulated the ambassador in the name of the Hospodar, Alexander Ipsilanti, on the occasion of his safety arrival in Bucharest and presented the letter of the Hospodar that contained similar congratulations on his arrival to their capital. After the departure of Wallachian nobles, in which they had been served coffee, cold drinks and confections, various fruits and other items for the table were brought to the ambassador in the name of the Hospodar. In return, Repnin sent his chief secretary of oriental languages, Panaiodoros, to Bucharest with the compliments for the Hospodar.

On 1 September 1775 Repnin and his retinue departed from the camp and before entering within 5 km of Bucharest, they were met by Alexander Ipsilanti and his wife in the same manner as in Jassy. The special tents were prepared for them and they were served various drinks and fruits. After some rest, the Hospodar requested his permission to leave and he also presented a horse with rich trappings. Repnin promised to ride this horse into the city. The wife of the Hospodar also took to leave of the ambassadress. Later on, after leaving of the Hospodar and his wife, Repnin and his envoy were ready to go into public entry in Bucharest. Repnin mounted the mentioned horse given by the Hospodar as a present and the ambassadress entered her carriage and they rode into the city in the same manner as they entered Jassy. Repnin and his envoy’s public entry into the city, the two sons of the Hospodar, at the sides of marshal and his first mihmandar rode altogether. In this cortege two secretaries of the embassy rode after the ambassador. At two o’clock in the afternoon upon their entrance to Bucharest, there was ringing of bells, cannon and rifle fired and reception and refreshments were held at their quarters. Almost similar honours showed the ambassadour and the ambassadress on their arrival in Jassy.

On 2 September 1775, Ipsilanti and his wife sent his marshal of the court in the morning to inquire about the health of the Repnin and his wife. Adjutant general, Rontsov, of the embassy retinue, delivered presents to the Hospodar and his wife. Later on the Hospodar was paid a visit by the ambassador and his envoy. After luncheon the wife of the Hospodar was visited by the ambassadress. Afterwards the Hospodar went to the ambassador and sat with him the entire evening and stayed for supper. The following day, the Hospodar again came to Repnin and his wife with compliments, the same day afternoon the Hospodar’s wife paid a visit with her daughter to the ambassadress and stay until eight o’clock in the

35] Itzkowitz and Mote, Mubadele, p. 139-140.
36] Itzkowitz and Mote, Mubadele, p. 140.
evening. On the same day, Adjutant general, Rontsov invited the Hospodar, his family and most prominent Wallachian boyars to luncheon on the following day. On 4 September, Repnin organized a dinner for seventy persons at his place. At the dinner there were present the Hospodar with entire family, Cantacuzene, and the most distinguished females and males of Bucharest city. After meal the guests were engaged with national dances, while Repnin and Ipsilanti played cards. The next day Repnin and his entire retinue had luncheon at the Hospodar palace.

On 6 September 1775 Repnin and the entire retinue attended a service in the Monastery of the Forty Martyrs. After leaving this place, Repnin visited the archimandrite of the monastery. On returning to his quarter, the metropolitan of Bucharest and two other Walachian bishops arrived. They were seated at the luncheon table to which the Hospodar, his family and his entire court had been invited. There was music during the dinner. Later on there was a ball after dinner. The next day, early morning Repnin and his first mihmandar attended hunting out of the city organized by Hospodar. In the hunting area there a tent was erected and a table prepared for him and his retinue. There were also present the Hospodar’s wife and the most distinguished ladies of her court. Afterwards, for the entertainment of Russian envoy there was a Turkish comedy and late in the evening there was a small display of fireworks. At the end of these events at ten o’clock Repnin returned to his quarter. Repnin had decided to leave on 8 September 1795 from Bucharest to Istanbul, but it was postponed to the eleventh of the month on the urgent request of the Hospodar for the departure preparations.

In the evening of 9 September, Ipsilanti and his wife, along with a few persons of the court visited Repnin and his wife. The following day, Repnin and his retinue attended the service of the religious dedication in the name of the Cavalier Feast Day of Saint Alexander Nevsky in the Monastery of the Forty Martyrs. After this, they came to have lunch organized by Cantacuzene and also in this lunch, Ipsilanti, his family and entire court were also invited. In that evening, Repnin informed his retinue to leave from Bucharest in the early morning. On 11 September 1775 early morning, Repnin sent his envoy except the carriages, the saddle and draft horses. At nine o’clock Ipsilanti and his wife came to see Repnin and his wife and after staying shortly, they departed altogether out of city to where a breakfast was prepared by the Hospodar. At ten o’clock Repnin took leave of Ipsilanti thanking him for all his courtesies during the stay in Bucharest. The departure from this place described by the account as Repnin himself rode in a

37] Itzkowitz and Mote, Mubadele, p. 140-141
38] Itzkowitz and Mote, Mubadele, p. 141-142.
carriage, with Cantacuzene, two sons of the Hospodar rode on horseback at either side of the carriage. In other respects, the entire order of march was arranged as it had been for the departure from Jassy. After riding few km they stopped in the vicinity of Văcăreşti Monastery, where the tents had been erected with tables set up for them. After resting while at this place, Repnin made a speech expressing his gratitude to the Hospodar for all his courtesies that had been shown by him. Also the ambassadress expressed the same things on her own behalf. After this, they set out on their journey. After riding a few hours, they reached to the bank of the Sabar River, where they spent the night. Next day they departed this place and arrived at Călugăreni and spent the night there. The following day they left Călugăreni and reached to the village of Daia and made a camp there.

On 14 August they left this village and before coming within few km of the city of Giurgiu, Repnin found a reception group sent there to meet him. In this Ottoman group consisted of Turnacı Ağası Çadırcıoğlu Mehmet, Turnacı of Giurgiu Abdullah Aga, Voivode Musa Aga and also two çorbacis, twenty serdengeçti agas and a few janissaries. After this salutary meetings on the way, Repnin rode past the city of Giurgiu to reached near a camp place on the bank of the Romadan stream, which flows from the Danube. On the same day afternoon galleys for transporting the Russian envoy across the Danube had been procured. The following day the transport of the carriages was made whole day. After luncheon, the above mentioned Turkish chiefs of Giurgiu arrived to pay their compliments to Repnin.

On early morning of 16 August the rest of the carriages were taken across the Danube. After eleven o’clock Repnin and his envoy were ready to cross the Danube. The Wallachian convoy was released; except for the spatar himself, who wanted to accompany further. Then the entire Russian envoy boarded galley to cross the river towards Ruse. Therefore the responsibilities of the Wallachian Hospodar in charge of the foreign mission were terminated when those envoys reached to Giurgiu.

C) The Meeting of Repnin’s envoy by the Moldavian Principality

Return to Moscow

After completing his diplomatic mission in Istanbul, Repnin departed

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from Istanbul on 24 April 1776 and they passed through Kırklareli, Prodaviya, Măcin, Brăila and Galați. On 4 June 1776 Repnin and his envoy came in the vicinity of Galați, where a senior Turkish district administrative officer met him. The Hospodar of Moldavia also sent three boyars for this meeting with some one hundred Moldavian troops. Later all of them moved to the camp set up at the out skirt of Galați, where Russian envoy spent the night. The following day, while resting at the camp, the baggage carriages were repaired and procured new horses and carts. On 6 June 1776 they left the camp and passed through near some villages, towns or camp places as follows; Penevul, Dcherul, Puteni Recea, Bîrlad, Dekolin, Vaslui and Unceşti. On 14 June 1776 they arrived at near Scînteia and made camp there. Repnin was met by Moldavian hetman, with a considerable number of mounted troops and the third district administrative officers Debasta with a letter of the Moldavian Hospodar of Ghika. Repnin also responded Ghika despatching an answer to secure quarter in Jassy with Major Markov. The head of the Moldavian chiefs remained in the camp and they were invited to have a dinner. After dine, the lead carriage was sent to Jassy.

On 15 June, in early morning the remaining of the baggage carriages were sent off and afterward Repnin and his retinue set out the way. On the way to Jassy firstly the chamberlain or the first boyar paid the compliments of the Hospodar to Repnin. Later, in half an hour from Jassy Ghika and all his boyars were awaiting the ambassador in a tent. Russian envoy was received and entertained at the table prepared with cold food and liqueurs. Shortly after, Ghika requested permission to leave for the meeting in the ambassador's house in Jassy. Later on, Repnin and his envoy carried out their way into Jassy in the cortege order. When he entered the city, cannons and rifles were fired and churches bells were rung. Repnin and his envoy were met by Ghika and Moldavian nobilities at the stairs of the house allocated for Russian mission. In the evening they dined at the table prepared by Ghika. While Repnin was in Jassy for few days, some religious leader and nobilities visited him as usual. On 16 June Repnin was paid a visit by the Metropolitan of Jassy and the entire boyars of the council. After this, Repnin went to Ghika on a return visit and they had a dinner. The following two days, Russian envoy rested and took supper with the Hospodar.

On 19 June 1776, in the early morning Russian envoy sent off the lead

43] Itzkowitz and Mote, Mubadele, p. 191-195.
44] Itzkowitz and Mote, Mubadele, p. 195-196.
45] Itzkowitz and Mote, Mubadele, p. 196.
46] Itzkowitz and Mote, Mubadele, p. 196-197.
wagons. At nine o’clock, the Hospodar came to Repnin at his house for a short time visit. Then he went to see the preparations of the tents for Russian envoy a half hour from the city. Afterwards Repnin and his retinue moved to that place in the same order like their entrance into Jassy. After official reception and meeting they had breakfast at the tables. As usual Repnin took leave of the Hospodar and carried out on his way. Moldavian hetman, a considerable number of troops and three boyars accompanied him and a few hours later they stopped to his camp on the location Sculeni. The following three days Russian envoy passed through near some villages and towns as follows: Trifești, Tabăra and Ștefănești. On 23 June 1776 Russian envoy crossed the Pruth River and later reached near the village of Costești. This place was the border of Moldavian principality and Hotin province, therefore the Moldavian officers and forces accompanying the Russian envoy returned to Jassy. In this border place, the governor of Hotin, Melek Mehmed Paşa sent his steward (vekilharç ağa) to meet Repnin and he also delivered the letter of welcome to the ambassador. From this time onwards Repnin envoy was in charge of the Hotin Pasha’s responsibility up to the Russian border.

All in all, the Danubian Principalities had very important role on Ottoman foreign policy gathering information from the European countries as well as with border countries such as Russia. They were also in charge of arrangements for the Ottoman missions and European missions from their capital seats to the border lines including the quarantine and reception. This paper demonstrated functions and roles of the Principalities in hosting the foreign envoys in case of the Russian embassy of Repnin to Istanbul in 1775-1776. According to Repnin’s account Russian mission met with Wallachian and Moldavian principalities and they provided their lodging, meals, horses and other needs. Repnin and his retinue were met by the officers and nobles of the Principalities on the border, some important towns and near the capital cities of the Principalities. The journey was conducted under the guidance of the Principalities officers and they also took security of the mission. Especially when the embassy arrived at the capital cities of the Principalities, they were met by the Hospodars, his families and the whole nobles were present. They had some social, cultural and diplomatic activities. Some special guests like clerical and other civil nobles paid visit to the ambassador. The journey of the embassy in every day took around 4 hours and when they reached to camp places they at least spent a night but in some specials places they stayed few days and nights. When they reached the borders of another governorship, the principalities’ functions and duties were terminated.

47] Itzkowitz and Mote, Mubadele, p. 197-198.
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To start the discussion on the degree of linguistic proficiency as to Turkish mainly in the 18\textsuperscript{th} century and mostly on Romanian soil one has to mention that roughly speaking, in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century formal written Ottoman had evolved\textsuperscript{1} from its starting phase in the colloquial Turkish of Anatolia into a prestige language subject to elements from Persian (the inherited language of early administration and literature) and Arabic, the first language of religion and scholarship.

By the 19\textsuperscript{th} century a mounting critical trend, particularly among reformers in Istanbul rejected the Ottoman language as an unnecessarily complex and artificial hybrid, understandable only with constant reference to dictionaries. That language was argued against as symbolic of an inward-looking, complacent conservatism responsible for the late Ottoman decline and a barrier to political and social reform. Official use of Ottoman Turkish came to an abrupt end in November 1928.

Usage wise, although the Ottoman judicial military and administrative officials performed their business officially in Turkish, there was perhaps not much systematic attempt to impose the language on local communities in the way that early modern European states increasingly promoted the use of one particular language over others for the ideological purpose of ultimate political unity\textsuperscript{2}. Ottoman communication clearly relied heavily on bilingual intermediaries, drawn both from the subject populations and from among government officials.

The extent to which the Ottomans positively encouraged the use of Ottoman Turkish and Turkish as instruments of integration, rather than merely of communication is not known, it can be that it was not the same everywhere and possibly as complex an issue as their attitude to conversion to Islam, to which usage of language is doubtlessly associated.

If ever questioned, the issue of how people managed to communicate on

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\textsuperscript{1} Ed. Christine Woodhead, \textit{The Ottoman World}, Routledge, 2012.

\textsuperscript{2} See our \textit{Româna în secolul fanariot}, Cluj: Ed. Casa cărții de știință 2012.
Romanian soil, in fact in what language, with the Ottomans, mainly in the 18th century, has never met proper answers. In line with previous research we have carried3, the present paper will focus on the degree of knowledge of Turkish (or Ottoman language) the evidence of which is available in either memoirs, manuscript dictionaries or handbooks. This we hope, will allow each of us to look besides the disciplinary silos in which we often shelter.

A first x-ray image of the phenomenon we are attempting to highlight would be the viewpoint of the history of the Romanian language in which many Turkish loan-words are involved4. Minutely studied, the Turkish influence varied in intensity. Irrelevant, still present in the 15th century, it grew in the 16th-17th centuries (with approximately 500 loan-words), with a climax in the Romanian 18th century when it took over 2000 words. Three thirds of them had an ephemeral existence, and the most resilient will stay those of the 16th-17th centuries.

The semantic spheres represented are: clothing, shoes, jewelry (bohcea, caftan, ciorap, gaitan, papuc, peruzea), political and administrative organization (Agă, alai, arnăut, beg, buluc, caimacam, ceauș, deliu, hanger, hatişerif, ien-icer, mazil, odaie), transportation (caic, liman, surugiu), home objects (ibric, lighean, sipet, tava, tingire, tipsie), music and entertainment (cinghie, geampa-rale, mascara, nai) etnonimy (agem, person, arap, nogai).

The terminology of Turkish origin was absent in Christian literature.

A manuscript kept in Berlin (Oriental manuscript no. 4.193 in Preussiche Staatsbibliotek) and originating in Wallachia is a testimony for a case in the 17th century (24th of March 1646). It was copied by a certain Ianache Misirliu, a subject of prince Matei Basarab5 and was the Turkish version of Genadios Scholarios’ Εκθεσις της πίστεως των ορθοδόξων χριστιανών (Exposure on the faith of the Orthodox Christians) published in Vienna in 1530 in Greek with a Latin translation. The copyist was said to have a good command of Turkish.

In the 18th century the knowledge of Turkish increased. There was the functional repartition of languages, maybe varying as to the place in which the subjects lived (living in the Turkish space, they spoke and wrote Turkish, living outside it the degree of knowledge should be determined for every individual case).

The linguistic situation in the Romanian Principalities in the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century consisted in a functional multilingualism, in the sense that besides Romanian, which had developed its functional styles and was witnessing a period of modernisation (the 1st period of the modern epoch was placed by Gheție and Munteanu-Țâra between 1780 and 1836 (1840), Greek was also used (as the language of upper education and various other functions at the upper level of society), as well as other languages, as for instance French, whose introduction or proliferation can be connected to the third language often seen as a solution in bilingual communities, and Turkish (to a certain degree, difficult to appreciate, as an official means of communication).

A learned man, a teacher in Bucharest produced a theory which had that:

School should have two basic living languages, Greek and Romanian, to have separate teachers for each science and art... we can accept that the same teacher teaches the same subject in Greek and in Romanian or at least this thing should be prepared for the future...

A child’s education during the development is this: ... his parent should teach him two or three languages... Civilized and autonomous nations speak but their natural language and less than three languages; All these seem mandatory for subjected nations. A Greek seems obliged to know Greek and Turkish, a Romanian, Romanian and Greek...

The conclusion of the above is that the Greeks had to know Turkish while the Romanians, due to its prestige, learnt Greek....

Yet given the fact that the Romanians learnt Greek what we are going to present from now on (manuscripts written on the Romanian soil of which some are Greek) is not relevant so much for the Greeks as it is for the Romanians.

If we are to consider a case-study for the 18th century that is Ienăchiță Văcărescu. He was a high ranking Romanian aristocrat with some kind of Turkish which he learned during his stay in Constantinople. Among many other things (a grammar of Romanian, Romanian poems and daily records in the princely court registers) he authored the *Istorie a Preaputernicilor Împărați Otomani* (History of the All Mighty Ottoman Emperors) comprising less than 200 pages. It is more of

9] Which will be diagnosed when his dictionary/vocabulary is published.
a diary written when he was exiled in Nicopole where people kept asking him when exactly had Bulgaria been subjected to the Ottoman sangeac. His sources are mainly Ottoman. He added a precis of the Coran because he wanted his readers to know things about the ethics of the religion in which their emperors lived.


The familiar terms displayed are: aferim (“well done”), alis veris (“small business”), beendisi (“to care”), buiurdusi (“to officially send a complaint”), calabalic (“luggage”), calcan (“shield”), calem (“a pen”).

There is just one Turkish Romanian vocabulary of quite small dimensions ascribed to Ienăchiță Văcărescu. That is the Romanian manuscript no 1393 (from the collection of a bishop, i.e. Dionisie de Buzău). It contains 285 folios only that they are not filled and also the dimensions of the folios are in fact small in spite of their being long. The dictionary is still to be edited and thus his Turkish part to be completely elucidated. If one is to consider the type of dictionary and the notions it contains taking the sample of one letter is telling. Thus we considered the G letter (in fact the cluster Gre (f. 41) and found out the following Romanian words: Graiu “language”, Grăiesc “to speak”, Grăitor “telling”, Graiu lucrător “an efficient language”, Graiu pătimitor “a suffering language”, Grăiesc de bine “to speak well of someone”, Grăitor de bine “someone who speaks well”, Grăiesc de bine “someone who speaks well”, Grăiesc de bine “to say the truth”, Grăiesc împotrîvă “to speak against”, /f.41v Graiul împotrîviuc “speaking against” Graiu rau “speaking evil”, Graiu cu amâruntul “speaking in detail”, întărire Graiu dă bine “emphatic speaking good”, întărire ci Grăesc de bine “emphatic speaking good”, Grăiesti fără lucr “to speak pointlessly”. Yet another sample is taken from the lexical family “face” (f.151v ) fațisare “aspect”, cu fața in jos “face down”, față “face”/f.152r fața “surface”, față adică fața apii “water surface”, fața pământului “the face of the earth and of other things”, fațescu “to polish”, dau față “make a thing look better”, înfățișare “looks”, înfățișăz sau dau de față “to prove”.

Coming to manuscripts, an invaluable one, as it practically depicts the profile of an employee at a princely court in the Romanian Principalities a diary is the Greek manuscript no. 116. In the first place it describes the standard itinerary
of a passage from Bucharest to Constantinople mentioning the necessary time between localities. The stops over are done in monasteries and villages. All in all a passage took one hundred hours. Follows the itinerary Iași-Constantinople, in all 105 hours. The manuscript is dated 1769. It mentions lots of French words, with recipies written in that language and excerpts from a military handbook. When it comes to Turkish three pages out of the 200 are dedicated to it with such words as: uzugia, kiozlevege, (4 mebuzides) bahce seogia, kara sugia, kerege gine kara sugia, ghiozlevege, uzugia balren, Balti ghirai, kara sudadir, Ak ghioz sultan, Cioban ciraghi, Hagi ghirai.

Only one Grammar is to be found among the manuscripts of the Romanian Academy library, namely the Greek manuscript no 58 which belonged to Cezar Bolliac (1815-1881), a well-known Romanian writer and revolutionary of 1848. It is complete with explanations in Greek and examples written in Arabic letters in a different ink (and a different hand).

The dictionaries and vocabularies besides the one already mentioned and possibly authored by Ienăchiță Văcărescu are as follows:

A Greek-Turkish dictionary of the 18th century, originating in Wallachia, i.e. the Greek manuscript no 466 is either a dictionary/vocabulary or a handbook proper resembling or observing the Byzantine tradition of synonyms (folios 1-28). The handbook comes from the Academy of Sf. Sabbas, what was the highest form of education in Wallachia all through the 18th century. One word at f.27 is φυγάς firari (“a fugitive”).

Starting from f. 29r the Turkish equivalents stop and the equivalents are in Latin:

32 r παρρησία copia φουρσάτ
34 αεροβατών ventosissimus. cic.
37v σαφάλεια salus conductus

A telling omission is that of the Ονομασία χρωμάτων, names of the colours.

The Greek manuscript no 607 is a Turkish-Greek Lexicon. It comes from St. Sabbas, as well and has 221 p.

On f.5 there are Latin-Turkish equivalents: solemne ambasciatore bighiok eltzi, mediatore mutavasit.

The Greek manuscript no 553 is a Greek-Turkish vocabulary, comes from St. Sabbas, has 52 incompletely filled folios.

The Greek manuscript no 401 is medical and comes in its own turn from the Academy of Sf. Sabbas. It is called Ονομαστικόν εις τα του Διοσκορίδου περί της ιατρικής (A vocabulary of what Dioscorides wrote on the medicine). This is
maybe a telling item of the reception of Ottoman medicine which was combining the ancient Greek tradition with the Arabic one\textsuperscript{10}. The Turkish part is written in Greek letters as is the Romanian one:

\begin{verbatim}
Αγαρικόν παρικόν, λάριξ του δένδρου, εξ ου το αγαρικόν, κατράν αγατζί [Tc]/ f.3r αιξωνεία ...Semper vivu
Αθη τζουλαμά [Tc] μαμαλίγα [Rom.] βλ.
10r αντιρρίνον κετάνι περί εν φουλ ίτζλι [Tc] . λίμπα όουλουι
[Rom.]
Ανωνίς ...δουλ γιεπουρουλουί [Rom.]
12 αρτεμισία ...καλογηρόχορτο ...βετρίτζα [Rom.]
13 αστήρ αττικός κουρμολε
25 δαύκος ...ρουσινα φέτι [Rom.]
28 ρίζα σολομώνιον μάνος γιάρπα μάρε βλ. [Rom.]
38 το πλατύφυλλον πασίνα πόρκουλοι [Rom.]
46 μπετονικα τζαν οτί [Tc] γιάρπα νιάγρα [Rom.]
48 λαδανιά τεκέ σακαλī [Tc] τούρα βλάχοι
63 μελισσόχοταματαξίνα [Rom.]
68 λιμυνα πλούτα δε άπα [Rom.]
79 σταυροχόρτι σπόρις
93 καλδηρίμ γιασπραγί [Tc] ζοχός σουσάι
100 μοσχοσίταρο, νιχάκι, δούχνουλχουλπέτι [Tc] λάπτελε κούκκουλουί [Rom.]
\end{verbatim}

**The Greek manuscript no 558** comes from Sf. Sabbas has 263 folios and is described in the library catalogue as a «pêle-mêle» with scarce Arabic notices.

**The Greek manuscript no 526** has its origin in the library of the College of Saint Sabbas, has 127 folios and is an incomplete Turkish-Greek vocabulary with plant and animal names.

The manuscripts originating in Moldavia are distinct in that the Arabic vocabulary is more often made use of.

Thus the **oriental manuscript no 211**, a small one as it only comprises 11 folios, was bought in Iași in 1907. It is called Συλλογή λέξεων τινών και τας τρεις διαλέκτους τουρκ.περσ. αρα). The Turkish part is written in Arabic, thus displaying a better knowledge of the language than those in the Academy of Sf. Sab-

bas: το απανότα (“ebony”), το σχοινί του κακού λοπού δένουν το (“the rope with which they tie the ship”), ο ατζαμί (“the ignorant”), το καθαρόν πράγμα (“a clean thing”), το επιφόρτισμα της καμίλας (“a camel’s burden”), ο μάγκερος (“the cook”), το κότζι που παίζουν (“the ball”), τα απομεινάρια της καμίλας (“the rests of the cropped seeds”), τα χωρίσματα (“the limits”), το ιατρικό (“the medicine”), η αγκινάρα (“the artichoke”), η πήλη (“the entrance”), φαγάς (“the gourmand”), η χρεία (“the debt”), η φαμέλια (“the family”), ο εγλεντζές (“”), η περί την κεφαλή τρίχες των πουλιών ή το κρέας το μικρόν (“the feathers around the birds’head”), το τραγούδι (“the song”), το πουρνό (“the sunrise”), ο σταχός (“the shrimp”), η στρείδια (“the mussel”), η σκάλα (“the stair”), το σκαμνί (“the chair”), η διπροσωπία (“the double face”), 7ν ή κάλυβα (“the hut”), το άστρον τον (“the plough”), ο παπουτζής (“the shoemaker”), ο παπαγάλ (“the parrot”), ο παπουτζής (“the shoemaker”), ο πακάλης (“the grocer”), ο τεντζερές (“the pan”), το τζιζικό για τους μικρούς πουλιά (“the sound of the small birds”), η λέπρα (“the leper”), το τζουρέκι (“the Easter cake”), ο τζορβάς (“the soup”), τα σκουπίδια (“the garbage”), 8τ το τζόενι, τζοιλάκης, 6ν το τιμόνι (“the steer”), η μαστίχα (“the resin”), το τζάκι (“the ricewine”), το τζάκι (“the cognac”), το τζάκι (“the ricemilk”), το τζάκι (“the cognac”), το τιμόνι (“the steers”), η λεπρά (“the leper”), η ταχυδοτήσεις των ριαγίαδων (“the yearly taxes of the rayas”), 4η αρρώστος (“ill”), αρρώστεια (“illness”), 3ν ο σοβάς (“the heater”).

The oriental manuscript no 212, bought in Iași, in 1907, has 3 big folios: ανίκομεν (“we belong”), ανταλλαγή (“exchange”), αντανάκλασις (“reflection”), αξίοσις (“evaluation”), απώλεια (“loss”), απλότης (“simplicity”), βασιλεύς των ρωμαίων (“the emperor of the Romans”), Ρωσσίας (“of Russia”), Ινδίας (“of India”), Φραντζ (“of France”) … Περσίας (“of Persia”), βοσκότοπος (“pasture”), γλυκόλογος (“sweet speaking”), δάκρυα σε καρδία (“a tear of joy”), εφιστήμη (“science”), πρακτική (“practice”).

The oriental manuscript no 213 was bought in Iași, 1907, is mostly written in Arabic characters and some French is implied (Les premieres personnes des deux chancelleries maitre de ceremonies, garde role de la malice).

The oriental manuscript no 214 has only 2 folios, and was written by the same hand on both sides. The words are ακουσίως (“on purpose”), αλληγορία
The eight (?)ten languages dictionary of Iași was probably written after 1769 and before 1780 and is still a manuscript kept in the library of the University of Iași. It was set up by Loukas Iannouleos de la Rocas, its title is Λεξικόν οκτάγλωσσον and comprises nine volumes.

The author had been born in Constantinople and functioned for a long time as an interpreter of the Ottoman Porte in the Peloponnesus and afterwards as a first interpreter and secretary of Charles of Bourbon, the king of the two Sicilies. Towards the end of his career he was a delegate employee of the Porte by the princes of Wallachia and Moldavia. The languages included in the dictionary are: ancient Greek, modern Greek, Latin, Italian, French, Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Hebrew and Romanian.

The Romanian manuscript no 2088 has between folios 219-222 a Turkish-Romanian guide for conversation. It comes from the town of Huși and the Turkish expressions are written in Cyrilic: f. 219r Unde să te găsescu ca să vorovim mâine dez demineță (“Where can I find you so that we could speak tomorrow early in the morning”), la casa me să vii (“you should come at my place”), ies în târgulu de jos, căci eu într-acolo mă zăbă (“I go to the lower town, because there…”)... de la ce loc mă (“from what place …”)... De la cetate Albă (“from Bender”), De la Hotin (“from Hotin”), f.219v ba, n-am tâlnit, (“no, I have not met”), de unde vii? (“Where are you coming from?”). Ce veste ce poveste, bine pace (“to cut a long story short, good peace”), Alah versin să dea Dumnezeu (“May god dispose Alah versin”), pă aicea ce veste ce poveste (“How are things here?”), bine pace și pă aicea (“good peace over here”), încă ce să mai spui dispre voi (“what should I say about you?”), ce să aude ce nu să aude? (“What could you hear and what not?”), De răzmirișă ori de moscalu ori de neamțu? (“about unrest by the Russians or the Germans”), Auzeam că scrie oastea la primăvară are bătâlie cu neamțu, cu împărătu (“I heard that next spring the army will fight the Germans and their emperor”) / f. 30v pâine (“bread”), apă (“water”), mămăligă (“polenta”), focu (“fire”), sare (“salt”), lumânare de seu (“lard candle”), lumânare de ceară (“wax

11) I. Ștefănescu, Opere istorice, București 1943, p. 205.
candle”), sfesnec (“chandelier”), chie (“key”), sticlă (“glass”), pune pernă (“set a pillow”), ado apă (“bring water”), adu masă (“bring a table”), să mâncăm pâine (“let’s eat bread”), ado lemne (“bring wood”), să facem focu (“let’s make the fire”), ado vin (“bring wine”), ado rachi să bem (“bring cognac so we can drink”), adu bucate (“bring food”), ado carne (“bring meat”), adu unt (“bring butter”), adu miere (“bring honey”), să facem plocintă (“let’s make a pie”), adu pușca (“bring the rifle”), iu uchiescu un epure (“I aim at a hare”), cine este (“who is there?”), dâ-mi nuci (“give me nuts”), dâ-mi alune (“give me peanuts”), ce avem deșeară să mâncăm? (“what have we got for dinner?”), pește sărat (“salty fish”), unde te duci? (“where are heading for?”).

2. The Romanian-Turkish manuscript no 3600, 1815, f.126-134, din 1815 (probably from Moldavia).


At the end of these exposures several conclusions are at stake that seem to confirm that there was perhaps not much systematic attempt to impose Turkish on local communities in the way that early modern European states encouraged the use of one particular language over others12. The stuff we have relied on, i.e. the manuscripts kept in the Library of the Romanian Academy and just a few others display a poor knowledge of Turkish, a preference for the basics. In most of the cases it is quite obvious that Turkish was a language among others and not a main task. It is nevertheless very significant that so many manuscripts should have been part of the St. Sabbas collection, in the sense that in that high school there were attempts at learning Turkish.

Were we to give an answer as to the Ottoman communication, it is obvious from “our own” samples that it must have relied a great deal on bilingual intermediaries, recruited both from the local populations and from among government officials. How these were taught is quite another chapter of which the author of the present article is almost completely unaware13.

12] (Ed.) Christine Woodhead, The Ottoman World.

13] An idea of how teaching went on in a Turkish community, i.e. the Ada-Kaleh one, settled in 1736, can be gleaned from A. Decei’s contribution in Revista arhivelor, 1, anul XII, Bucharest, 1969, pp. 3-12. There were four Arabic grammars and handbooks for cosmography written in Turkish.
Ienăchiţă Văcărescu’s effort to bridge the two levels is noteworthy in many respects: 1. It was part of a modernisation endeavour 2. The former was part of Enlightenment. 3. It came in a well represented series of bilingual dictionaries which had started at the beginning of the 17th century.
A HISTORY OF PARTNERSHIP AND COLLABORATION IN THE BALKANS

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WHAT HAPPENED BEYOND THE BORDER: SOME REPORTS OF MOLDAVIAN AND WALLACHIAN VOIVODS RELATED TO THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH (1764-1795)

Hacer Topaktaş*

The Voivodeships of Moldavia and Wallachia, while under the Ottoman sovereignty, had important positions in the political relations between the Ottoman Porte and Poland. Situated on the border between the Ottoman Empire and Europe, they were important sources of information from Europe and especially from Poland. The two voivodeships kept their critical position during the 18th century which saw many significant developments, in the political life of the Ottoman Empire in terms of transitions in the borders, diplomatic incidents, and the conveyance of information from and to the Ottoman capital. As Russia was rising in power in the 18th century, it was always necessary to monitor it closely for both the Ottoman Empire and Poland. Therefore the Voivodeships of Moldavia and Wallachia gained more importance as sources of information. In this study, the place of the Moldavian and Wallachian Voivodeships in the relations between the Ottoman Empire and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the reign of the Stanisław August Poniatowski, the last king of Poland, will be examined. Several reports of voivods related to Poland-Lithuania will be presented below. However, initially it will be useful to dwell briefly on how the Moldavian and Wallachian Voivodeships came under Ottoman sovereignty and the developments afterwards.

Moldavia and Wallachia Under the Sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire took Moldavia under its sovereignty towards the end of the 15th century. After Kilia and Akkerman were conquered in 1484 Moldavia became subject to the Ottoman Empire. The Voivodeship of Wallachia on the other hand became a subject to the Ottoman Empire earlier, during the reign of Mehmed I (r. 1444-1446, 1451-1481). However, Moldavia came under the sover-

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eignty of the Ottomans only during the reign of Bayezid II. The principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania were subject to Ottoman rule in different conditions from the other places in the Balkans. Therefore, these lands were not subject to land registration and their inhabitants were exempt from the poll tax (Cizya) and were not subject to the tax system applied in the southern places of Danube. These principalities had internal autonomy and dependent on the Ottoman Empire externally and they kept their former administrative structures. The Ottoman Empire did not settle any foreigners in these lands or appoint any officials to rule these areas until the 18th century.2

Problems arose within the administration of the two principalities even under such light terms. Many Voivods attempted to extract themselves from Ottoman rule. A well-known example was Dimitrie Cantemir, son of Constantin Cantemir, whose collaboration with Russia resulted in the famous Prut campaign (1711) of the Ottoman army against the former. As a result, with the reign of Ahmed III the Ottoman Empire began assigning greek dragomans as princes to both principalities starting from 1711.3 This was the advent of the so-called Period of the Phanariots which lasted until 1821.4 After the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca Russia was given the right to intervene in the Voivodeships of Moldavia and Wallachia. This meant that Russia had moved closer to control of Moldavia. After the Russo-Turkish War (1787–92) Russia began to share borders with Moldavia. Consequently, following the Treaty of Bucharest (1812) and Russo-Turkish War (1828–29) the ties between Ottoman Empire and Moldavia and Wallachia weakened and they united in 1859. Afterwards, during the Russo-Turkish War (1877–78), the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia declared their independance. Romania, which was acknowledged in the Treaty of San Stefano and the Treaty of Berlin, was freed from Ottoman sovereignty.5


3] Nikolai Jorga, A History of Roumania, London 1925, p. 182. The Voivodes were appointed for a period of 3 years, but for many times this rule was violated. Following the appointment the Voivode wore his official robe and kuka and he was given a number of officers for his service. After that a plume and a flag was sent to where the city where he was seated. In case of the change of the Voivode local boyars fulfilled his duties in return. İsmail Hakkı Uzuuşçu, Osmanlı Tarihi, v. IV/II, V, Ankara 1995, pp. 86-103; Zeynep Sözen, Fenerli Beyler, 110 Yılın Öyküsü (1711-1821), İstanbul 2000, pp. 13-25.


Some Reports of the Moldavian and Wallachian Voivods on Poland (1764-1795)

The Ottoman Empire had different sources of information about foreign countries. The Voivodeships of Moldavia and Wallachia, Transylvania and Dubrovnik, the frontier fortresses of Khotyn and Bender, and Crimean Khanate functioned as sources of information for the Ottoman Empire. Translators called dragomans were sources of information for the Ottoman Empire. Summaries from European newspapers are commonly found in Ottoman archives. Reports from spies present us different points of view regarding how the Ottoman Empire followed the foreign world. In addition, interviews with the foreign embassies in Istanbul and the reports presented by the embassies were sources of information for the Sublime Porte. The Ottoman Empire preferred to compare and confirm the information from different sources in order to avoid information pollution (wrong information). Likewise, it was also a common practice to get information from merchants that travelled to Europe.

Polish historian and Turkologist Jan Reychman pointed out that the Voivodeship of Moldavia was one of the alternatives developed by the Sublime Porte by saying “The Ottoman Empire had formed a wide intelligence service that comprises south-eastern Europe and even Poland. They made use of Moldovian agents in this respect”. A good deal of information was sent to Istanbul by means of messengers and agents sent by the Moldavian and Wallachian Voivodes to Poland and neighboring places and by means of merchants via the city of Iaşi. The Voivodeships gathered information on behalf of the Sublime Porte, but it was necessary to

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confirm this information. Some of the Voivodes were in opposition to the Ottoman Empire, and the source of information was not always reliable. The Ottoman Empire accomplished this through different methods. For the 18th century, a lot of information arrived to the Porte via the Moldavian and Wallachian Voivodeships. For example, it was the Moldavian Voivode who sent the information about the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) in Europe many times before other sources.\footnote{12}

During the election of the last king of Poland, Stanisław August Poniatowski between 1763 and 1764, the Ottoman Empire received some very good information. One source of this was the information carried by the Voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia. Thus, the Sublime Porte had detailed information about the royal elections and local developments following the election of Poniatowski. Information about the election reached the Porte with the report of Grigore Callimachi, the Voivode of Moldavia, to the Moldavian chamberlain of the Porte dating February 2, 1764.\footnote{13} According to this report:

“\textit{Massalski}^{14}$, Grand Lithuanian Hetman fled from the Polish parliament in Warsaw called “Sejm” claiming that he was offended. Massalski was an opponent of peaceful relations and understanding especially with Russia. In spite of the fact that it was a tradition to adjourn the Sejm if one of the members was opposing a matter (liberum veto), this time they decided to deal with the matters with the majority vote system. The new Polish King is a supporter of Russians and the Russian army was still in Polish lands.”

In addition, the Voivode of Moldavia got first hand information by sending an observer to the coronation ceremony of Poniatowski and presented this information to the Ottoman Empire.\footnote{15} However, the information he sent was not taken as viable and was only considered.\footnote{16}

The Sublime Porte acted cautiously at first regarding the events in 1767-1768 in Poland about the activities of the members of the Bar Confederation that

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{12}{Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (hereafter BOA), HAT, 7/259, 8/299.}
\footnote{14}{Michał Józef Massalski (1700-1768) was the Lithuanian Grand Hetman between the years 1762-1768.}
\footnote{15}{BOA, A.DVN.DVE. (8), 168/57.}
\footnote{16}{BOA, A.DVN.DVE. (8), 168/59.}
\end{footnotes}
opposed the rights that would be granted to non-Catholics. The Crimean Khan and the Moldavian Voivode were ordered not to support the Bar Confederates and not to accept them on the Ottoman border. Yet, one of the causes of the Russo-Turkish War (1768-1774) which was important in the political history of the Ottoman Empire, was the killing of the Bar Confederates who were refugees in the Ottoman land in Balta. The Moldavian and Wallachian Voivodeships played a key role between the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Austria and Hungary because of their geographical positions. Also during this war the Moldavian and Wallachian Voivodes communicated with the Ottoman Empire and sent some reports and information about the northern and western border neighbors of the empire. According to the information Moldavian Voivode Ligor Grigore Callimachi got from Warsaw, the meetings of the Polish Sejm was still proceeding until the date of 28 November 1768 and they did not reach a consensus and it was decided that the Palatines would be consulted about some of the matters. In addition, it was also reported that the Russian ambassador Repnin didn’t attend the meetings in the last week, and the Prussian embassy, in answer to why he didn’t attend the meetings, had said that they wanted the Polish to deal with their own business and if they couldn’t reach an agreement then Russia and Prussia would reach a mutual agreement. However, failure in the duties of Voivode Grigore Callimachi and Sucho and his execution effected the flow of information in a negative way. In addition, Catherine the Great of Russia was supporting the efforts of the Voivodeships to become independent states. The succeeding new Voivode of Moldavia gave a report on the 30th of September containing information about all of Europe and especially Poland that were summoned by his staff. According to this report, during the election of the marshall, the Polish boyars and Voivodes demanded that the Saxon armed forces should leave Polish territory and do no harm to the Polish people. During the aforementioned war there was a period when a new Voivode couldn’t be appointed to Moldavia and so this effected the flow of information to the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, Moldavia was attacked by

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18) TSMA, nr. E. 4781, Anafarta, ibidem, p. 52.
21) BOA, A.DVN.DVE. (8), 169/21.
Russians during the war and Moldavia suffered from that. Moldavia made sure that other states didn’t send agents to the Ottoman lands. Jorga defined this situation as follows: 

“Real Rums who wore the title of Roman boyars and who had formed relations with the Roman dynasties lived in Istanbul. Their duties was to represent their patron princes in Bucharest and Iaşi as chamberlains, to get credit and pay debts on behalf of them, to deliver the information they got from the French and Levantine spies named Linchoult, Laroche, Nagny and others about European politics and to fight opposing dynasties on their behalf. Grigore Callimahos who was sitting on the Moldavia throne was monitoring, arresting and executing agents like Yankarov, in spite of the fact that they introduced themselves as landscape painters.”

A different era began for the Moldavian and Wallachian Voivodeships after the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774. Platon, a Roman historian, states this by referring to the fact that four Voivodes were killed in the 18th century following the impacts of military defeats after which the Sublime Porte turned towards a rigid policy. The need for the Moldavian Voivodeship in function was increasing vis-a-vis gradually strengthening Russia. Following this, Catherine the Great of Russia found more opportunity to get involved in Moldavia and Wallachia by using the Küçük Kaynarca Treaty. On August the 2nd 1783 Alexandru Mavrocordat (Delibey), the Moldovian Voivode, sent information to the Porte about activities of Austria, Prussia and Russia and their desires regarding the partition of Poland. At the same time, the Voivodeship delivered reports on the general situation of Poland, Russia and Austria. The news about Russia making

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26] BOA, HAT, 10/327D.
27] BOA, HAT, 12/443E.
military preparations in Poland and Ukraine was among the information. 28 “The Voivode also said that news about Ottoman Empire making peace with Russia had spread, Russia had increased the number of soldiers in Poland, Austria who had assured France about neutrality had also allied with Russia and Russia had honored Shahin Khan Geray of Crimea.” 29 The information given by the Voivode of Moldavia had parallels in reality. In this period, while Russia was preparing to annex Crimea, it was also working on the Great Greek Project with the treaty it signed with Austria. 30 It has been stated above that the messengers sent to Poland were one of the important ways that Moldavian and Wallachian Voivods delivered news to Istanbul. “Persons” were frequently sent to carry news to Moldavia and Wallachia and then return to the capital. The Russo-Turkish and Austrian War of 1787-1792 was important for Poland as well as for the combatant states. Likewise in this period, an important parliament meeting “Sejm” which is called as Four-Year Sejm/Sejm Czteroletni was held in Poland-Lithuania and the first written constitution in the history of Europe, the “3rd of May Constitution”, was ratified in 1791. On the eve of war, Moldavian Voivode Mavrocordat sought refugee in Russia and this was explained as a casus belli to the Russian embassy Bulgakov. 31 During the war, the new Voivode of Moldavia (Emanuel Giani Ruset 1788-1789) delivered the information about the developments in Europe to Istanbul. The Sublime Porte was informed by the Moldavian and Walachian Voivodes that the tsarina honored Potemkin who was beneficial in the war, the Prussian king was preparing for war with Russia, and about the events in the bordering areas of Poland. 32 During the second (1793) and third (1795) partition of Poland Alexandru Moruzi (1792), and then Mihai Sutu (1793-1795) the Moldavian Voivode reported to Istanbul that he had been informed that Poland had signed a treaty with Russia and Prussia and the Polish people who lived on the occupied territory would be given their rights. 33 The Moldavian Voivods sent numerous reports to the Porte in this period.

28] BOA, HAT, 12/443.
29] BOA, HAT, 12/443A.
30] 1779 Treaty of Aynalıkavak was no use for the Sublime Porte in order to get back Crimea. The embassies of Great Britain and France had made contacts with the Porte on the basis that the treaty should be applied. See: Ahmed Vâsif Efendi, Mehâsinü’l-Âsâr ve Hakâikü’l-Ahbâr, (prep. Mücteba Ilgürel), İstanbul 1978, pp. 31-32. Catherine the Great of Russia had declared that Crimea was occupied in total after sending armed forces after using a revolt against Shahin Khan Girai. For details see Alan W. Fisher, The Russian Annexation of Crimea 1772-1783, Cambridge 1970.
31] Zinkeisen, ibidem, v. VI, pp. 421-422.
33] BOA, HAT, 258/14877.
These reports support the above mentioned comments of Reychman. In the report sent by Voivode Moruzi (Walachian voivode 1793-1796) on December the 1st 1794 following the second partition, the news was summarized in detail. In addition, the same Voivode sent a translation of the treaty signed between Russia and Poland regarding the second partition. The Moldavian and Wallachian Voivodeships continued their function as information gatherers during the 1794 Kościuszko Revolt which was lead by Polish-Lithuanian opponents of partitions and occupations. This situation was declared by Constantin Stamati, who was a double agent working both for the Moldavian Voivode, France, and who was also a spy for the French Republic Government in the German city of Altona, in his report sent to the Ministry of State. The Voivodes sent the reports coming from Poland to Istanbul after making a Turkish translation. The agent of the Moldavian Voivode in Poland was an officer who worked in the chancellery of letters of Polish King Poniatowski. This means that the agent of the Moldavian Voivode carried information directly from the Polish palace to Iaşi. With the use of this network news about the Kościuszko Revolt was easily delivered to Istanbul.

Following the second and third partition of Poland, a lot of Polish soldiers and civilians took refugee in Moldavia and Wallachia in order not to be a citizen of Russia and to escape the invasion. Since these Polish refugees were consid-

35] "Getting information has become very hard because of the occupation of the Russians. Russian General Suvarov has attacked Praga, which is one of the cities divided by the Vistula river and connected to Warsaw with two wooden bridges, on 24th of October with a military force of 30,000 soldiers and conquered the city on the 25th of October, and tore down the bridges. 7,000 Polish and 6,000 Russians were killed, and Polish officers died heroically on the battle field. Lots of Polish people threw themselves to the river fearing the cruelty of the Russians. The Polish, fearing that same things would happen in Warsaw sent an envoy to General Suvarov demanding an armistice, but Suvarov didn’t accept it and gave a 24 hour notice that Warsaw would surrender unconditionally. On the 28th of October a parliament has assembled and this situation was argued, later Vaverenski (?) who was designated as chief general instead of Kościuszko abd Minister of State Ignacy Potocki, and higher officials named Zafrinski, Mokronowski, Mustoski, Jankowski has fled from the country. They wanted to take the king with them too but they couldn’t persuade him. A concordat on the surrender of Warsaw was signed, and General Suvarov informed the Polish king that he was waiting orders from Petersburg regarding what he would do about Warsaw. Russian General Soltitok who was currently in Ukraine was sent as reinforcement. Polish soldiers partially began to enter into the service of Austrian Empire and Prussian King sent reinforcement forces to Cracow which was conquered before." TSMA, nr. E. 2845/9, Anafarta, ibidem, p. 9.
ered by the Tsar to be Russian citizens some of them were returned to where they came but some of them were sent to other European countries.  

The Moldavian Voivode had meetings with Russian authorities about this situation but Russia demanded the return of these people. For example, some of the refugees were transported to Khotyn in French clothes in small groups in 1797. Then, they were sent to Austria from Khotyn. Moldavian Voivode Mihail Sutzo (Mihai Sutu-1793-1795) got permission to accept some of these emmigrants to Moldavia after great effort. It was even rumored in Istanbul that 20,000 Dutch ducats were sent to Polish patriots via Sutzo. In addition, in 1795 a person who came to Moldavia with the name Baruc was interviewed in Moldavia about how the partition of Poland was made and the information he told was sent to Istanbul.

The Moldavian and Wallachian Voivodes also sent detailed information regarding the situation in Poland following the third partition of Poland in 1795. According to these reports the Russians were making promises to Poles in order to please them and increased the number of armed forces. In addition, Russia sent officers to Poland to make land registration, and said that it would give seeds and give some exemptions in order to encourage its citizens to settle down in Poland. The situation of the last Polish King Poniatowski who was taken from Warsaw to St. Petersburg was also monitored from the reports of the Voivodes. Since the situation in the Eastern Europe did not result favorably for the Ottoman Empire, the Sublime Porte was forced to closely follow the news coming from Poland. According to another report sent by Wallachian Voivode Alexandru Moruzi in 27 June 1795, Russian and Prussian soldiers made some preparations for a military operation in Poland, and Catherina II wanted to take Cracow and Sandomierz from Prussia and to give the Austrian Emperor. In 1797 the Moldavian Voivode (Alexandru Callimachi-1795-1799) reported that Poland was a part

41] Reczmann, ibidem, p. 89.  
45] BOA, HAT, 249/14083.  
46] BOA, HAT, 223/12997.
of Russia from then on.  

In fact, in addition to Poland, reports on situations from all over Europe came from Moldavia and Wallachia. Although the Ottoman Empire got information about Europe and especially about Poland from the Moldavian and Wallachian Voivodeships, it didn’t find this enough and got reports from administrators in Khotyn, Bender and Iaşi as reports of voivodas of Moldavia and Wallachia. The reports from Moldavia and Wallachia were always subject to fact-checking. It is a known fact that during the time of the Period of the Phanariot Beys (1711-1821) the loyalty of Moldavian and Wallachian rulers to the Ottoman Empire was questionable. These rulers damaged both the Ottoman Empire and the local people together for their own benefits. The Voivodeships of Moldavia and Wallachia were heavily affected by the struggles between Russia, the Ottoman Empire, Austria, and Poland and this had a negative impact on the developments of the Voivodeships as during the The Russo-Turkish and Austrian War of 1787-1792.

**Conclusion**

It is stated above that Moldavia and Wallachia were important sources of information concerning political developments in Europe for the Ottoman Empire as well as other aspects as shortly mentioned at the beggining of the paper. During this time, the Voivodeships of Moldavia and Wallachia carried a great significance for the Polish-Ottoman relations. However, the period of the Phanariot Beys has to be considered as a different era. In spite of the fact that some Voivodes worked against the Ottoman Empire or some of them acted illegally, Moldavia and Wallachia are definately two of the“doors opening to the European front” for the Ottoman Empire not only geographically but also politically. The Moldavian and Wallachian Voivodeships undoubtedly were valued places in the Ottoman-Polish relations because they ensured the regular flow of information, had duties as border territories and played practical roles in European diplomacy. This study has shown examples of this during the time of last Polish king, Stanisław Poniatowski. It is necessary that further studies be made in order to understand the meaning and importance of these principalities for the Ottoman Empire.


48] Registers like BOA, HAT, 258/14909, 234/13047, 254/14424, 1414/57743, 1416/57915, 234/13039-A can be shown as an example for this.


50] This issue is a different topic for this paper. So the author of this paper prefers to not explain it.
### List of rulers of Moldavia and Wallachia (1764-1795)

**Moldavia**
- Grigore Callimachi (171-1764)
- Grigore Ghica (1764-1767)
- Grigore Calimachi (1767-1769)
- Russian occupation (1769-1774)
- Grigore III Ghica (1774-1777)
- Constantin Moruzi (1777-1782)
- Alexandru Mavrocordat (Delibey-1782-1785)
- Alexandru Mavrocordat (Firaris-1785-1786)
- Alexandru Ipsilanti (1786-1788)
- Austrian occupation (1787-1791)
- Emanuel Giai Russet (1788-1789)
- Russian occupation (1788-1791)
- Alexandru Moruzi (1792-1792)
- Mihai Sutu (1793-1795)
- Alexandru Callimachi (1795-1799)
- Constantin Ipsilanti (1799-1801)
- Constantin Hangeli (1797-1799)

**Wallachia**
- Constantin Racovita (1763-1764)
- Stefan Racovita (1764-1765)
- Scarlat Ghica (1765-1766)
- Alexandru Ghica (1766-1768)
- Russian occupation (1768)
- Grigore III Ghica (1768-1769)
- Russian occupation (1769-1770)
- Emanuel Giani Russet (1770-1771)
- Alexandru Ipsilanti (1774-1782)
- Nicolae Caragea (1782-1783)
- Mihai Sutu (1783-1786)
- Nicolae avrogheni (1786-1789)
- Austrian occupation (1789-1790)
- Mihai Sutu (1791-1793)
- Alexandru Moruzi (1793-1796)
- Alexandru Ipsilanti (1796-1797)
- Alexandru Moruzi (1799-1801)
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A report of the Voivode Ligor Grigore Callimachi about the meetings of the Polish Sejm (1768) Topkapi Palace Museum Archive in Istanbul
Annex-II:
A Report of Wallachian Voivode Alexandru Moruzi on the third partition of Poland (27 June 1795), Office of the Prime Minister of the Ottoman Archives in Istanbul
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RUSSIAN CONSULATES IN THE DANUBIAN PRINCIPALITIES IN THE 1780S AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Akitsu Mayuzumi*

I. Introduction

As written in the preamble of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, “consular relations have been established between peoples since ancient times.” Although the character and role of consuls vary from time to time and from country to country, their principal role has consistently been a commercial one, and their activities have exerted a great influence on the history of international relations. The history of the Ottoman Empire and the history of the Balkans are not exceptions. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, according to the privileges granted by the Porte (the so-called Capitulations), some European countries, such as Great Britain, France, the Dutch Republic, and Venice, appointed their agents to several cities in the Ottoman Empire, according them the status of “consul.” In that period, their activities were almost entirely limited to their original role: protecting the interests of the home country and its subjects and promoting commercial and economic relations with the Ottoman Empire. However, after the treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, in which the Ottoman Empire lost its supremacy over Europe, particularly from the second half of the eighteenth century, foreign consuls and consulates in the Ottoman Empire extended their activities to the political sphere and played an important role in advancing the influence of their home countries. Therefore, the modern history of the Balkans cannot be researched without examining these issues.

Needless to say, one of the key actors in the modern history of Romania and the Balkans was Russia. Russia was the first country that seriously sought to send its consuls to the Balkans and, as a result, at the beginning of the 1780s, it succeeded in establishing its general consulate in Bucharest. This was regarded as one of the important steps for the development of the Eastern Questions. Although some researchers have paid attention to this issue, most studies are based on the materials of one country and do not sufficiently place it in the context of the inter-

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national relations at that time. The aim of this paper is to briefly survey the issue pertaining to the establishment of Russia’s first consulate in the Danubian Principalities, and to provide some perspectives and frameworks on this issue.

The questions around the establishment of the foreign consulates in the Danubian Principalities have been examined, of course, in Romanian history. They have been sometimes mentioned in books and articles, and some articles have focused on just this issue[^1], including the Russian case[^2]. Apart from Romanian history, this issue has attracted the attention of researchers in the context of the history of the Balkans. For example, Greek historian Basile G. Spiridonakis conducted detailed research mainly based on French diplomatic documents[^3]. In Russia and the former Soviet Union, this issue was treated as a part of Russia’s Eastern Questions, although there has not yet appeared a study that has specialized in this Russian case[^4].

As historical sources, all of these studies rely on Western and Russian materials, particularly Russian and French diplomatic reports. On the other hand, in Turkish history, many studies have been made on the foreign embassies in the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman embassy in Europe in the eighteenth century, but this consular question has been almost totally ignored. The only exception is Osman Köse’s study[^5]. He examined the issue from different viewpoints by using Ottoman archival sources and several Ottoman chronicles, on which other studies had not relied. In this sense, his works should be highly valued. They remain, however, in the margins of the typical corpus of Ottoman studies in Turkey. That is, they pay little attention to the earlier literature written in various European languages, as mentioned above. In order to examine this issue, we should research


[^4]: For example, see Г. С. Гросул, Дунайские княжества в политике России. 1774-1806, Киев, 1975; Л. Е. Семенова, Княжества Балахия и Молдавия. Конец XIV – начало XIX в. (Очерки внешнеполитической истории), Москва 2006.

it using not one single source, as the above-mentioned earlier studies did, but a combination of two or three sources.

In this paper, as a starting point, we make a survey of the question concerning the opening of the Russian consulate in the Danubian Principalities around 1780 and consider its significance in several contexts.

II. The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774)

The Russo-Ottoman War, which broke out in 1768, ended in Russia’s overwhelming victory. Though Russia could not obtain as many territories and rights as its great military victories, it still gained strategic regions and some rights of great importance. It is widely known that the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 included several significant articles that changed the balance of power between Russia, the Western Powers, and the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, it is generally regarded as the starting point of the “the Eastern Questions.”

One of the most noticeable articles in the treaty, not only for this study but also for the Russo-Ottoman relations that followed, seems to be Article 11, which stipulated what the general commercial relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire were. It gave Russia the right of free navigation for its merchant ships in the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Bosporus-Dardanelles Straits, and the same commercial rights in the Ottoman Empire as Great Britain and France had. Besides that, Article 11 provided that the Sublime Porte allowed Russia to establish its consuls and vice-consuls in “any places” that the Russian Empire recognized as necessary.  

6] The text of this treaty was prepared in three languages; Russian, Italian and Ottoman-Turkish. The Russian representatives signed on Russian and Italian texts, while the Ottoman representatives signed on Italian and Ottoman-Turkish texts. The Russian text is in Полное собрание законов российской империи, серия 1 (1649-1825), том 19, СПб 1830, с. 957-967 (hereafter cited as ПСЗ). The Italian text is in G. F. de Martens, ed., Recueil de traités d’Alliance, de Paix, de Trève, de Neutralité, de commerce, de limites, d’échange etc. et de plusieurs autres actes servant à la connaissance des relations étrangères des Puissances et états de l’Europe, 2eme ed., Tome 2, Gottingue 1817, pp. 286-322. The Ottoman-Turkish text is in Mu’âhedât mecû’âşi, vol. 3, İstanbul 1294h. (1877-78), pp. 254-273; Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Tarih-i Cevdet, tertîb-i cedid (new edition), Der Saâdet 1309h. (1891-92), vol. 1, pp. 357-370.

As for the Danubian Principalities, Article 16 addressed the status of Wallachia and Moldavia. Therein, the Porte assured the freedom of Christianity in the Principalities, tax exemption for two years, free migration for the inhabitants, and so on. Some have conjectured that owing to this treaty, Russia obtained the right to protect Orthodox Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empire. It is not true, but in this article, Russia gained the right for its diplomatic representative in Istanbul to voice his opinions concerning the affairs of the Danubian Principalities. This right was not so strong as the right of “protection,” but it paved the way for Russia to officially involve itself in issues pertaining to Wallachia and Moldavia.

III. Consulate problems after 1774 and the Russian policy on the establishment of a consulate in Bucharest

With the various new rights gained by the treaty, Russia started a full-scale advancement into the Black Sea and its surrounding regions. The Danubian Principalities, along with the Crimean Khanate, were an important target for Russian advancement, and to achieve this aim, immediately after the conclusion of the treaty, Russia succeeded in installing its puppet, Alexandru Grigore Ghica, as prince (hospodar, voyvoda) of Moldavia for life. Through him, Russia tried to expand its influence over the Danubian Principalities.

Within the Russian government, opinions about the establishment of its consulate in the Danubian Principalities were expressed in 1775 by the Collegium of Commerce, and Alexander Stakhiev, who would be appointed as the Russian Minister to Constantinople the next year, supported them. On this matter, however, the Russian government did not enter into serious discussion because in this period, it was disputing with the Porte the question of the Crimean Khanate and, therefore, restrained itself from provoking the Porte on other issues. In 1777, Grigore Ghica, the Russian puppet prince, was assassinated by an agent of the Porte. This event resulted in Russia’s loss of its foothold in the Danubian Principalities, dealing a hard blow to its ambitions.

Immediately after this event, the Russian government started discussions concerning the establishment of its consulates in the Principalities, and when the Crimean crisis between the two empires was temporally settled by the Treaty of Aynalıkavak (Aynalıkavak tenkîhnâmesi) in 1779, the Russian government finally decided to appoint S. L. Lashkarev as consul-general of Russia in Bucharest and accredited him in December 1779. Russia demanded the credentials for him

8] Г. С. Ёросул, указ. соч., с. 76.
9] Г. Л. Кесельбреннер, Хроника одной дипломатической карьеры (Дипломат-востоковед
from the Porte under the provisions of Article 11 of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, but the Porte refused. Russia argued that the Danubian Principalities were included in the Ottoman territory and that, therefore, Russia had the right to establish consulates there. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire claimed that all stipulations concerning the Danubian Principalities were contained in Article 16; hence, Russian consuls had to be placed in territories of Ottoman direct rule and, moreover, in places where the British and the French consuls had already stayed\textsuperscript{10}. Thus, the Porte offered resistance to Russia's claim. After negotiations lasting about six months in Constantinople, in November 1780, through the mediation of the French ambassador, both sides agreed that the Russian consulate would be opened in Silistra, situated on the Danube, approximately 100 km from Bucharest\textsuperscript{11}.

However, as the Russian government was quite dissatisfied with this compromise made by Stakhiev, the Russian Minister to Constantinople, it disapproved of this agreement and replaced him with Iakov Bulgakov. Under instructions from the government, as soon as he came to Constantinople, he demanded the Porte to reopen negotiations on this issue. This time, with the support of the Habsburg Empire, Russia forced the Porte to accept its claim and finally, in November 1781, the Porte recognized Lashkalev as consul-general of Russia in Bucharest. Following Bucharest, Russia succeeded in establishing a vice-consulate in the Romanian city of Iași (1784). Besides the original role of consulate, which included the protection of Russian merchants, the promotion of commercial activities, and so on, these consulates in the Danubian Principalities engaged in active political and diplomatic activities and played an important role for further Russian advancement into the Balkans.

Thus, one of the largest factors of Russia's diplomatic success lay in the active support of the Habsburg Empire. After the death of Maria Theresa, mother of and also the co-ruler with Joseph II, in November 1780, Joseph, aiming to enter the Danube-Black Sea trade, formed an alliance with Russia in June 1781. As mentioned above, this Austro-Russian cooperation resulted in the Porte's concession to Russia.

This alliance worked as a strong diplomatic pressure for the Ottoman Em-
pire until the outbreak of the Russo-Austro-Ottoman War of 1787. The decisive pressure for the Porte was the joint representations made by these two empires. They demanded that the Porte enter into negotiations with them on the following three issues: firstly, their new commercial privileges and the free navigation of Habsburg ships in the Black Sea; secondly, Ottoman nonintervention in the problems of the Crimean Khanate; and thirdly, Ottoman observance of the stipulations on the Danubian Principalities. This strong demand soon produced fruit in the form of a new commercial agreement with the Ottoman Empire (Russia in 1783, Habsburg in 1784), the Habsburg establishment of a “commercial agent” in Bucharest in 1783, the Russian annexation of Crimea, and the convention concerning the Danubian Principalities in 1784. It is obvious that the first half of the 1780’s was the period in which, under the condition of the Russo-Habsburg alliance, their advancement toward the Black Sea and the surrounding region was accelerated. The issues pertaining to the establishment of the Russian consulate in the Danubian Principalities should be considered in this context.

IV. Conclusion

Some earlier studies have placed this issue in the context of the rivalry among the Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Empires over the Danubian Principalities or the Balkans. This framework is important without question. We, however, would like to emphasize that besides this framework, the issue should be examined in the context of the rivalry over the Black Sea region too. In other words, the issues of the Balkans after the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 relate to those of the Crimea, the Caucasus, navigation and trade in the Black Sea, passage through the Straits, etc. Thus, we should take them into consideration as a background from multifaceted perspectives, and this point provides good

14 Ibid., pp. 379-382.
grounds for the importance of using multilingual sources. In addition, attention
should be paid to the relations between each empire and the principal actors in
the local society. In this case, hospodar (*voyvoda*), phanariot families, boyars, and
ecclesiastics were the key actors related to the issue. Such an attempt to connect
the history of international relations with the local socio-economic and political
history is the task for the future.
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A WALLACHIAN LORD IN 1787-1792
OTTOMAN-RUSSIAN-AUSTRIAN WAR IN OTTOMAN SOURCES: NIKOLA MAVROYANI

Filiz Bayram*

A group of Ottoman primary narrative sources, i.e. the chronicles reflecting the official viewpoint of the Ottoman state, ruznamcs and ruzmerrcs, private historical works, as well as archival documents contain historical data on the 1787–1791 Ottoman-Russian-Austrian War.

Among the Ottoman historical works related to the Ottoman-Russian-Austrian war in 1787-1792, Sadullah Enverî’s narrative comes to the fore with regard to his detailed depiction of the events. Ottoman chronicler Vasîf Efendi who added Enverî’s narrative into his work also offers historical data on the war. Edib Efendi, appointed rikâb chronicler on 9 Cemâziyel-Awwal 1202, (17 March 1788) provides information on the subject as well. Furthermore, we can encounter with some information on the subject in the history of Âsım Efendi. The information about Ottoman-Russian and Austrian Wars has been written generally by using History of Enverî. Ottoman chroniclers pointed to the original source by revealing the name of the Enverî’s work and the name of the author they built their own narrative upon. Ahmet Cavit Bey describes the Ottoman-Russian relations in his two-volume work, “Müntehabât-ı Câvid Bey”, on the notes he compiled from the the history of Enverî’s first, second and third volumes. He mostly abbreviates Enverî’s line of narrative and refers to the primary source with the recurring statement “Tafsîli Enverî’de mündemicdir. (Detailed depicted

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is narrated in Enverî’s history.” Although the prominent Ottoman chronicler Ahmed Cevdet Paşa⁶ also gives information on the 1787-1792 Ottoman-Russian and Austrian Wars, he seems to have directly quoted from other history works. Cevdet Paşa also refers to the sources he used when writing on the Ottoman-Russian and Austrian wars in 1787-1792. On the other hand, Sadullah Enverî was the only Ottoman chronicler who witnessed the war in person and wrote down accordingly the military and political events in detail. Enverî dedicated third volume of his work completely to the 1787-1792 Ottoman-Russian-Austrian wars which remains to be the primary source for the subject at hand.

1787-1792 Ottoman-Russian and Austrian Wars occurred in the reigns of Abdülhamid I and Selim III., so the ruznames⁷ and ruzmerres covering the rules of these two Sultans contain information on the War.

Special history books written in the same period have information about Ottoman-Russian and Austrian Wars. These books are; “Sefer-nâme-i Serdâr-ı Ekrem Yusuf Paşa”⁸, Teşrifatı Hasan Efendi Tarihi⁹, Vak’a-i Hamidiyye¹⁰, Abdi Paşa Risâlesi¹¹, Ceride¹², Câbi Târîhi¹³, Taylesanizâde Hâfiz Abdullah Efendi Târîhi¹⁴. It should be added that the Prime Ministry’s Ottoman Archives also houses a good number of official documents related to Ottoman-Russian-Austrian political and military relations at the period.

This paper aims to explain the tasks undertaken by Mavroyani, Voivode of Wallachia during the 1787-1792 Ottoman-Russian and Austrian Wars on the basis of the sources mentioned above. Likewise also research works have been referred in case of necessity as seen on the footnotes.

The Ottoman Empire continued to dominate over the Balkans until the

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10] F. Sarıcaoğlu, a.g.e.
11] F. Sarıcaoğlu, a.g.e.
end of seventeenth century by taking advantage of the conflicts between Western
governments. In the beginning of the 18th century, however, the political and
military alliance between Russia and the Habsburgs emerged as a significant force
against the Ottoman Empire, which weakened Ottoman control of the region. By
the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had to put up a struggle
against the Austrian and Russian Empires for domination over the Balkans. Wal-
lachia and Moldavia principalities, in the north of the Danube, were the primary
places where those struggles took place.

The Ottoman Empire regarded Wallachia as the main defensive line against
the Austrian threat that emerged in the eighteenth century and started to apply
a new strategy there. Ottoman reaction evolved as a result of the acts of Greek
voivodes and boyars who sought to take advantage of the changing balance of
power in the Balkans. During this political process to manage Wallachia and
Moldavia in a better way against Russian and Austrian threats, Phanariot Greeks
rose as prominent figures in the Ottoman administrative system.

Around this time, Rumanian voivodes considered the Russians as savior
who claimed to undertake the patronage of the Orthodox peoples. Russians had
conducted negotiations with the Wallachian voivode Constantin Brankoveanu
and the Moldavian Prince Dimitri Cantemir before 1711 Ottoman-Russian war.
At this conjucture, Prince Cantemir signed the secret agreement, named as “Luck
Agreement”, with Russians. With this agreement Cantemir obtained important
privileges for himself and for the principality under his rule. Though, Russian
defeat at Prut in 1711 against Ottoman and Cantemir’s escape to Russia revealed
significant political consequences for Wallachian and Moldavian Princedoms. Af
er this event, the Sublime Porte, taking into account that native voivodes could
not protect the region, began to appoint Phanariot Greeks who had proved their
competence in business management, as voivodes to Wallachia and Moldavia.

Wallachia was governed by Phanariot Greeks from 1716 until 1821 who
were called hospodar by the local populace. Hospodar were appointed for a tenure
of three years. They were absolute rulers and representatives of the Ottoman pow-
er in the region. That caused problems for the people in these princedoms; due
to those frequent replacements, amount of taxes, cronyism, and corruption in-

creased in the region. Greek voivodes gave important roles to their relatives and business partners, which caused hatred against the ruling class among the locals.

Greeks living in Phanar, Istanbul in the eighteenth century achieved a privileged status not only against Christians but also against Muslims. Phanar was the region where Orthodox patriarchy was located, a fact that motivated Greeks to form a great community there. Along with the Greeks, Phanar also housed a number of Hellenized Italian, Romanian, and Albanian families. Those who lived there maintained their language, faith and national identity. As they were mostly urbanized; they were mostly shopkeepers, traders, and active in all economical areas. A large part of the inhabitants were wealthy people dwelling in ornate stone buildings and waterside residences which indicated to a considerable amount of prosperity. Thus the architectural style in the area was mainly marked with stoned buildings in contrary to the wooden architecture of Istanbul. In addition, they paid attention to the education and sent their children to Italy where the most famous intellectual centers of the time prevailed. In addition to Turkish and Arabic, they spoke several European languages, kept a keen eye on international politics and were successful in business. Because of such competencies the Ottoman government commissioned Phanariots in state services with the aim of conducting foreign relations. They served at the Imperial Council and the Navy Council as official interpreters which led the way for the Phanariot families to be appointed to Wallachian and Moldavian voivodeships.

In 1780, Austrian and Russian governments signed a secret alliance in the city of Mohilef in Poland with the aim of dividing up the Ottoman lands among themselves. This agreement later became known as the “Greek Project”. Thus, Russia relying on this project did not keep the agreement of Küçük Kaynarca, signed with the Ottomans, and took over Crimea. To get Crimea back, the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia in H. 1201-M. 1787. Later on, Austrian Emperor Jozef who allied himself with Katerina II joined in the war on the Russian side. Russians invaded Moldavia while the Austrians forces attacked Wallachia.

18] Aurel Decei, Eflak, İA, C. 4, s.186.
20] Barbara Jelavicch, Balkan Tarihi, C. 1, Küre Yayınları, İstanbul 2006, s. 60.
25] İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, C. IV, II. Kısım, TTK, Ankara 1983, s.84: A.B. Şirokorad,
Thus, the Ottoman Empire faced a war on two fronts. Wallachian and Moldavian voivodes joined the war as allies of the Ottoman Empire. Ottomans sent military help to region. Wallachia gave significant support to the Ottoman war effort that started in 1787. Nikola Mavroyani who was assigned voivode around this time acted in accordance with the Ottoman policies. Mavroyani’s cooperation with the Ottoman forces who followed the imperial orders sent by the central administration, was appreciated by Abdülhamid I.

Nikola Mavroyani was from the Greek Island of Paros. After coming to Istanbul, he began to serve at Grand Admiral Gazi Hasan Pasha’s exchange office. By virtue of his perfect command of Italian language, he became an interpreter in the imperial navy. He rose among Hasan Pasha’s intimate retinue with his perseverance and hard work. His ultimate goal was to become the voivode of Wallachia one day, and he finally attained his desire. Due to the ongoing Ottoman and Russian-Austrian war, it was of great importance to appoint a trusted and useful voivode to the Wallachian throne. By support of the Grand Admiral, Mavroyani was assigned to this position. Mavroyani did not share pro-Russian attitude of Wallachians under the patronage of the Russian Consul Voynović; favored the existence of a mighty Ottoman Empire, and believed in the political and military capabilities of Hasan Pasha. Mavroyani could put forward a convincing claim that he would be a much more loyal to the Ottoman sultan than the Phanariot Greeks, since he had served as an interpreter in the navy. In fact there were two problems about his appointment. Firstly Mavroyani was not from Phanar, and secondly he had not worked as interpreter in the Imperial Council. Phanariot Greeks justly objected to these two issues. However, Hasan Pasha sent a letter of assurance to Imperial Council office and pleaded Sultan to ignore the objections against Mavroyani. Other than Phanariot Greeks, Russians were against his coming to Wallachia as well. Ottomans reviewed the articles of the treaty signed with Russians, and proved there was no mainstay for Russian objections. In the end, thanks to Hasan

Osmanlı Rus Savaşıları, Selenge Yayınları, İstanbul 2009, s.212.

27] Zeynep Sözen, Fenleri Beyler, Aybay Yayınları, İstanbul 2000, s. 135; Ü. Filiz Bayram, Enveri Tarihi: Üçüncü Cilt (Metin ve Değerlendirme), İstanbul üniversitesi Sosyal bilimler enstitüsü Tarih anabilim dalı Yeniçağ Tarihi Bilim Dali, Basılmamış Doktora Tezi, İstanbul 2014, s. 734.
28] Zeynep Sözen, Fenleri Beyler, s. 135; Vâsıf Ahmed, Mehâsinü’l-ásâr ve Hakâikü’l-ahbâr (Hicri 1203-1209), AE, nr. 608, vr. 53b.
29] Nicolae Jorga, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi, Yeditpe Yayınları, C. 5, s.53.
31] BOA, AE.SABH.I., 617.
Pasha’s great support, Mavroyani was appointed as Wallachian voivode. Greeks could not object more to Mavroyani’s assignment after they saw Hasan Pasha’s respect to Mavroyani during the parade of sailors under Mavroyani’s order\(^{32}\).

Admiral interpreters were not appointed as voivode directly according to the established customs in Ottoman administration. Before rising to the Wallachian and Moldavian thrones, they were normally promoted to the Imperial Council to serve as interpreters. According to Ottoman sources, Mavroyani’s assignment violated this tradition and was therefore caused discontent among his contemporaries. Sultan Abdülhamid I, in an attempt to hold to ancient customs appointed Mavroyani as the Imperial Council interpreter for a short time, and then as voivode of Wallachia\(^{33}\). Sultan acted in line with the traditions and thus overrode the objections and converted it to a normal appointment.

In the course of the Ottoman-Austro-Russian War, important military engagements took place around the major Ottoman fortresses in the area such as Ibrail and Yergöğü. Therefore, the Wallachian Voivodo had to dispatch reinforcements to the Ottoman forces defending Ibrail and Yergöğü and sought to meet the varying military needs of the Ottoman army. Mavroyani established close contacts with the Ottoman viziers and officers in the region and became influential at regional politics\(^{34}\). He recruited an elite and private army at his own expense. He reinforced his army with volunteer troops achieved considerable success in the field\(^{35}\).

Mavroyani made significant achievements on the Austrian front. He distributed pamphlets along the border arguing that Romanians and the Ottomans on the other side of the mountain shared a common origin in response to the Austrian Emperor’s declaration promising freedom to Christian Romanians\(^{36}\).

Mavroyani seized Toprak Castle in Mehadiye and captured the Austrian garrison together with its artillery and ammunition. He sent the cannons, captives and a number of Austrian flags to the Ottoman military camp\(^{37}\). Upon this success Grand Vizier Yusuf Pasha appreciated Mavroyani’s effort and loyalty and ordered

\(^{32}\) Nicolae Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, C. 5, s.55.
\(^{33}\) BOA, İE.HR., 1548.
\(^{34}\) Ü. Filiz Bayram, *Enverî Târîhi: Üçüncü Cilt (Metin ve Değerlendirme)*, s. 411.
\(^{36}\) Nicolae Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, C. 5, s.57.
him to keep fighting against Mehadiye together with his soldiers.38

Mavroyani captured the Island Monastery at the Moldavian border with the soldiers hidden in it as well as the ammunition and sent them to the Ottoman army. During the attack, a prominent Russian military officer, Polkavi,39 was taken captive who was believed to have essential information about the Russian army. Enverî writes on the third volume of his work under a separate subtitle that 25-thousand-penny was sent to Mavroyani to cover the expenses of the soldiers fighting successfully against the Austrian forces in Wallachia and that the Austrian prisoners were transported to the Ottoman camp. This amount was not enough for Mavroyani’s soldiers; therefore, Mavroyani was informed that more money would be sent as soon as possible.40 After Mavroyani conquered the fortress of Hakana around Şebeş, he again sent some cannons and prisoners to the camp. In return, sable, fur and various gifts were granted to him.41

Letters sent by the Wallachian voivode to the Ottoman camp during the war were important, too; these included vital intelligence such as the positioning of the enemy units,42 military urgencies and achievements on the front. In one of his letters, Mavroyani stated his and the Wallachian villagers’ status, and asked for more help from Ottoman against Russians. Upon this news from the Voivode, the Ottoman leaders who appreciated the benefits of a military cooperation with the Wallachians against the Russian forces decided that the army would winter near Rusçuk. According to what he wrote in his letter, it was obvious that Mavroyani did not have enough soldiers and Hasan Pasha, the Janissary Agha, decided to reinforce him with janissary troops.43 Mavroyani, in another letter, wrote that he would proceed to Fokşan at the head of his soldiers to fight against the Russians/Austrians and deliver intelligence obtained by his spies to the Ottoman army as soon as possible. After a while, prisoners captured by the Voivode were indeed sent to the camp who were then interrogated by the Ottoman officers to extract information about the enemy.44

38] BOA, C. MTZ., 291.
40] Ü. Filiz Bayram, Enverî Târîhi: Üçüncü Cilt (Metin ve Değerlendirme), s. 732.
41] BOA, HAT-00133_05494.
42] BOA C. MTZ., 543.
43] Mustafa Öge, Vak’a-i Hamidiyye, s.60.
44] Mustafa Öge, Vak’a-i Hamidiyye, s.57.
45] Ü. Filiz Bayram, Enverî Târîhi: Üçüncü Cilt (Metin ve Değerlendirme), s. 553.
46] Ü. Filiz Bayram, Enverî Târîhi: Üçüncü Cilt (Metin ve Değerlendirme), s. 583.
With the support of Wallachian voivode Mavroyani, Ottoman forces won a series of battles against the Austrians and Austrian troops could not enter Wallachia\(^47\). During the clashes, Mavroyani invaded Austria with his forces and raided the countryside. Then he turned back with a great amount of prisoners and booty. Moldavian Voivode Alexander was captured by the Austrians; Mavroyani was temporarily appointed as the Moldavian voivode in his place\(^48\). His task was to gather a military force among the Moldavian people and defend Iaşi. Mavroyani, in turn, asked for twenty cannons from the Ottoman capital to increase his firepower\(^49\).

Mavroyani fulfilled the orders given him, showed his commitment and loyalty to the Empire, sent prisoners and booty to the center taken after the war. Good news from the front was rewarded with various gifts\(^50\). Mavroyani not only fought in the Austrian front but also supported the forces of Serasker Kemâneş Mustafa Pasha in the Russian front\(^51\).

In addition to his direct military contribution, Mavroyani also gave significant logistical support to the Ottoman army. He was in close communication with the Ottoman government and acted in accordance with the orders given him for about three years from his appointment until the day he was executed. Archival sources have substantial information on Mavroyani’s relations with the Ottoman Empire; there are documents about his services and support. These services can be outlined as follows: supply of timber for bridge construction, iron ore for army, food and fodder for soldiers and animals, financial support in the payment for soldiers, intelligence gathering, transfer of prisoners, dealing with foreign ambassadors, military assistance, and ship construction.

Wallachia held a critical geographical point facing the western neighbors of the Ottoman Empire, and information obtained by the voivode’s spies was very crucial to the Ottoman central administration\(^52\). When Mavroyani became voivode, he received orders to investigate the status of French, Spanish and English

\(^{47}\) Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi, C. V, s.2639.

\(^{48}\) Ü. Filiz Bayram, Enverî Târîhi: Üçüncü Cilt (Metin ve Değerlendirme), s. 411; İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi C. IV-B. II, s. 528.

\(^{49}\) Ü. Filiz Bayram, Enverî Târîhi: Üçüncü Cilt (Metin ve Değerlendirme), s. 411; İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi C. IV-B. II, s. 528.

\(^{50}\) Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi, C. V, s.2644.

\(^{51}\) Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi, C. V, s.2686.

\(^{52}\) Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı Tarihine Ait Belgeler Telhislari, İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, İstanbul 1970, s. 64.
armies and Russian mobility in Poland\textsuperscript{53}. Mavroyani fulfilled his duties and sent news gathered by his spies to Istanbul. The news included important information such as the alliance agreement between Austria and the Netherlands\textsuperscript{54}, sending intelligence\textsuperscript{55} about France, Austria and Russia obtained by his men settled in Vienna and Warsaw, activities of the Austrians and Russians at the front and taking precautions on this subject\textsuperscript{56}.

In the Ottoman-Russian-Austrian War, transportation of the soldiers emerged as an important issue. In river passing, boats called açık-a kind of raft-, small ships and bridges were occasionally used. It was under the responsibility of the Wallachian voivode Mavroyani to supply the necessary labor, craftsmen and building material. Mavroyani sometimes directly procured the materials himself and sometimes purchased them. There is plenty information in the sources on the matters such as supplying the lumbers for bridge construction in Vidin\textsuperscript{57} and wages of the laborers from Wallachia, providing necessary lumbers and masters to build bridges over the small rivers by Wallachia\textsuperscript{58}, sending lumbers\textsuperscript{59} cut by Wallachians and Moldavians for large bridges, supplying necessary lumbers and materials for Yergöğü people to build 20 open-roofed ships\textsuperscript{60}.

Bulwark construction and supply of ammunition for the artillery in the fortresses were among Mavroyani’s duties. He served in supplying piles to build gates at suitable places and to surround the trenches excavated longitudinally throughout Danube with the şaranpo\textsuperscript{61}; sending material for the defensive works\textsuperscript{62} out of the fortress of Özü\textsuperscript{63}; bringing lumber, pine and hornbeam poles, iron, nail and masters from Wallachia and its vicinity for the cannons at the fortress of İbrail\textsuperscript{64}; supplying wood, labor and material for the artillery in the fortress of

\begin{thebibliography}{1}
\bibitem{53} BOA, AE. SABH.I. 1694.
\bibitem{54} BOA, AE. SABH.I. 25755.
\bibitem{55} BOA, AE. 6650.
\bibitem{56} BOA, HAT-00018_00829
\bibitem{57} BOA, C.AS. 11763; BOA, C.NF., 439
\bibitem{58} BOA, C.NF 2316.
\bibitem{59} BOA, C.AS. 14461.
\bibitem{60} BOA, SABH.I. 6602.
\bibitem{62} BOA, C.AS. 46143.
\bibitem{63} BOA, C.AS. 45073.
\bibitem{64} BOA, C.AS. 50115.
\end{thebibliography}
Bender; manufacturing leather and barrels to store gunpowder at the fortress of Vidin.

Some of the food necessary for Ottoman army was also supplied by Mavroyani which was again a major duty for him. There were different issues among his tasks like purchase of clarified butter and cracked wheat from Wallachia for the army around İsmail Castle, cereal transport and supply, food and necessary material supply on time and delivery, meat provision by Wallachian voivodos for six thousand soldiers of Başbuğ Mustafa Paşa, sending money to Wallachia voivodo to purchase cereal.

In order to convey material and cereal supplies, Mavroyani also procured carts and pack horses. He purchased the horses used for artillery transportation mostly in Wallachia. Mavroyani was thus significant in the Austrian Front by providing military and logistical support to earn success.

In 1789 the Ottoman military suffered from shortages in supplies and fighting force and Ottoman war efforts against the Russian eventually failed. Ottoman Empire had also several attempts to protect the borders, though Ottoman army got weakened due to war at two fronts. Ottoman army, nevertheless, held a formidable defensive line along Rimniç River which is the border between Romania Principality. Here Mavroyani supported Ottoman forces with Romanian and Albanian mounted troops. On the first Monday of September, 1789 Ottoman military leaders held a war council and decided to launch an attack on the next day. Ottoman forces fighting on two fronts simultaneously began to fall back towards the evening. Ottoman army and the forces under the command of Mavroyani was completely routed which then came to be known as the Boza Defeat. Following their victory against the Ottomans, Russians seized Akkirman and Bender, and Austrians entered in Bucharest, the capital of Wallachia.

Mavrayoni failed at his effort to get Wallachia back and at convincing

65] BOA, C.AS. 14036.
66] BOA, C.AS. 15790.
67] BOA, C.AS. 10956.
68] BOA, AE. SABH.I, 20265; AE.SSLM.III, 21525.
69] BOA, AE. SABH.I, 9271.
70] BOA, C.AS. 36663.
71] BOA, C.AS. 38362; C.MTZ. 804.
72] BOA, C.AS. 51208; C.AS. 51782; C.AS. 16321; C.AS. 25421; CMTZ. 1203.
73] Ü. Filiz Bayram, Enveri Tarihi: Üçüncü Cilt (Metin ve Değerlendirme), s. 635.
74] Nicolae Jorga, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi, C. 5, s.84.
his soldiers to carry on with the war. Mavroyani attempted to draw the Sultan’s attention by sending successive letters to the palace, but to no avail. He tried to keep his troops intact by making several promises; but he could not implement discipline among the units. Besides the Wallachian people were already exhausted due to supplying cereal, horse carts and various materials to the army. Mavroyani could not resist to his soldiers’ demand to turn back to home, and informed the Ottoman army that he and his soldiers were out of power to carry on with the fight. Due to the fact that the requested support asked by Mavroyani was not given, he passed to the other side of the Danube. Therefore, in the region just Ottoman castellans remained. Russians found an opportunity to besiege the fortress of Akkerman. That Mavroyani left the battlefield was considered as disobedience. Meanwhile, the Ottoman government was receiving complaints of the people from the region about Mavroyani, and high taxes he levied on the subjects, turned the situation at his expense.

According to the eyewitness Chronicler Enverî, Mavroyani in the beginning fought successfully against the Austrians but since he paid high salaries and gave lots of gifts to his soldiers, the taxes levied upon the subjects was increased. In the days of success, he collected money from the public on the pretext that fighting units needed financial support which made the rich of the country poorer. He, in fact, ravaged the countryside in his effort to satisfy the needs of troops under his command. When Gazi Hasan Pasha became grand vizier, he appointed Mavroyani to protect Belgrade and Vidin. He did not always pay attention to Seraskier Yusuf Pasha, either, and passed to Ziştovi Town with his soldiers. He unnecessarily collected money in the local villages and towns and requested high amounts of money from the central treasury. He put Wallachian people in a difficult condition and acted like a bandit. His unruly ways paved the way to his disastrous end and the Ottoman government ordered him to be arrested. However, it was not easy to capture him. When he received the news that he would get arrested, he objected and tried to escape from the combined Ottoman and Tatar forces under the command of Cengiz Giray Khan. He was surrounded in a house in Bela village eight to ten hours away from Ruse (Ruşçuk) town and was captured following a desperate attempt to repel the forces surrounding him. He was executed there and his head was sent to İstanbul. Enverî records his death as September 30, 1790. Ottoman chronicler Vasıf describes him as unsympathetic, bold and arrogant.

75] Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi, C. V, s.2693.
76] Vâsıf Ahmed, Mehâsinü’l-āsār ve HakÀikü’l-ahbâr (Hicrî 1203-1209), AE, nr. 608, vr. 54a.
Mavrayoni rendered important services to the Ottoman Empire and contributed to the Ottoman war effort against the Austro-Russian forces in 1787-1792. From the day he was appointed to his post until his execution in the hands of the Ottomans he was a well-known figure in the Wallachian politics which made his way into the pages of history.
Bucharest during the Peace of 1812

Ana-Maria Lepăr*

The Balkans represented between the 18th and 19th century an area of interest for three expanding empires in Central and South-Eastern Europe: Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Empire. The Romanian Principalities, due to their position at the crossroads of these three powers, were a theatre of war and they acted as exchange coins between neighbours. The fate of the Principalities has been following this pattern during the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812. In the first stage of the conflict, due to the Russian occupation, they were transformed into a venue point on Russian troops. After the Peace concluded in Bucharest, the territory of Moldavia was dismembered in favour of victorious Russia, which enclosed the region between the Prut and Dniester, now known as Bessarabia.

As a radiography of the events between 1806-1812 at the edge of Europe, it can be said that: “This war was the longest military conflict between the these two great empires, worn on two theatres of military operations - the Danube and the Caucasus (secondary), but it was mainly represented by the diplomatic disputes, including secret diplomacy, than by the military confrontations. It was a war between the three Ottoman sultans (Selim III, 1789-1807; Mustafa IV, 1807-1808, Mahmud II, 1808-1839) and the ambitious Alexander I (1801-1825), behind which stood the ubiquitous Napoleon I Bonaparte”

This paper is not focused on the presentation of the military and political events of 1812, but on the Romanian capital city, which has became the place for the peace negotiations. The cause of the conflict was apparently simple, as recorded in his memoirs by Admiral Paul Ciceagov: the dismissals from the Romanian Principalities of the rulers- Ypsilanti in Walachia and Moruzi in Moldavia by the Ottoman Empire- thus breaking the treaty signed with Russia, where was stated that households were appointed for 7 years. Also an unofficial reason was the at-

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2] He was appointed in April 1812 Danube army commander by Tsar Alexander I in order to speed up the peace and organize the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of the Principalities.
traction of the Turkey in the Napoleon’s projects against Russia.\(^3\)

Along with military events, peace talks began in November 1811 in Giurgiu, at which attended among others the following: Andrei Italinski\(^4\), Ivan Vasilić Sabaneev, Joseph Fonton\(^5\), Anthony Fonton, Peter Fonton, Bobrov, from the Russian side and Selim, Hamid and Galib-Efendi\(^6\), from the Ottoman Empire’s part. At the thirteenth meeting on 21\(^{st}\) of November / 2\(^{nd}\) of December, 1811, the representatives of the Sublime Porte proposed Prut River as border between the two empires and that the Ottoman Empire to continue to possess the cities Chilia and Ismail. Unfortunately, there was not an agreement between the two parties, due to the fact that the “the return to the initial discussion on the European side of the border (Siret and Prut) was considered contrary to Russian friendship and M. Kutuzov himself, being quite surprised, remained very pained.”\(^7\)

Negotiations were moved to Bucharest after one month. They were advancing slowly, due to different views as regarded the border between the two empires. The prerequisites of peace were signed on 5\(^{th}/17\(^{th}\) of May 1812, after many sessions and confidential meetings.\(^8\) The following points were specified in the six articles accepted by both Kutuzov from Russia and Ahmed Pasha from the Ottoman Empire: the border between the two countries was established on the Prut River, Chilia arm was common, Ismail and Chilia fortresses were to be demolished and Russia was obliged not to build in their place other fortifications, the Caucasian border remains as they were before the war, the Serbians received general amnesty and the right to autonomy, the conventions of privileges before the War for Walachia and Moldavia were again available.\(^9\) The last article mentioned

\(^4\) He was the Russian ambassador in Constantinople, during Tsar Alexander I (1801-1825).
\(^5\) He was advisor and translator (*dragoman*) for the Russian embassy from Constantinople.
\(^6\) He was the head of Turkish plenipotentiaries.
\(^7\) He was appointed commander of Ismail fortress. He served as Russia’s ambassador to Constantinople in 1791 and he was among the favorites Tsar Paul I. He ordered the Russian troops during the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812 and he was replaced in April 1812 by Admiral Ciceagov as the Tsar held responsible for the delay in signing the peace.
\(^10\) At these negotiations took part only the Russian supreme commander Kutuzov, the Russian State Councilor Joseph Fonton and Galib Efendi (from the Ottoman side).
the start of the final peace negotiations that took place immediately after the signing of the preliminaries. It has been scarcely applied on 16th/28th of May 1812, when the peace treaty was officially signed at Manuc’s Inn. The treaty had 16 base articles and 2 remained confidential. Regarding the fate of the Romanian Principalities, it decided that the territory between the Prut and Dniester (Bessarabia) is annexed by the Russian Empire. Note that the peace was not underwritten by Kutuzov, or vizier Ahmed Pasha, although they were in town. Among the signers were from the Turkish side Galib Edendi, Zade-Ibrahim, Selim Efendi and Abdul-Hamid Efendi, and from the Russian Italinski, Sabaneev and Joseph Fonton. The minutes of the final meeting were drafted by Alexandru Sturdza, whose father, Scarlat Sturdza, received the Governor of the province of Bessarabia. The participants at this political event recorded impressions of capital and especially about the Manuc’s Inn, where they conducted the negotiations and finally signed peace.

The owner of the inn is a controversial figure in history, playing an important role in the economical and political life from Walachia. He was born in 1769, at Rusciuc, in a family of Armenian merchants. Many aspects of commerce he learned from an Armenian trader in Iasi, where he was sent by his father. In 1785 he returned to Rusciuc, where he was among the richest people, and is going to lend money even the governor of the city, Tersenicli-Oglu. Because of the wealthy he collects, he creates relationships in elitist circles, borrowing with large sums of money important personalities, like Bairactar vizier and the ruler of Walachia, Constantin Ypsilanti. In this context is easy to understand how he receives some noble titles from Ypsilanti: in 1802 he becomes sirdar (serdar) and in 1803 cup-bearer (paharnic). During this time, he acquires land in Bucharest, including the former prisons and some properties from the Old Court that were on sale. In their place he started the building of an inn “which becomes one of the most

14] He studied history, theology and philosophy in Germany. He entered into diplomacy with the help of Capodistria, capturing the attention and appreciation of Tsar Alexander I, who sent as a delegate to negotiate peace both in Bucharest in 1812 and at the Congress of Vienna 1815.
17] These places have been sold out since 1798 by Prince Constantine Hangerli, who needed revenue to cover the investment made to become a leader in Wallachia.
famous inns from Bucharest from the first half of 19th century”\textsuperscript{18}.

Manuc is used by both sides during the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812: Sultan Selim III and Grand Vizier Bairactar receive loans from him and the Russian commander Kutuzov receives information. According to Gheorghe Bezviconi, “Manuc Bei was the man who decreases the French influence; he was a friend of Galib-Efendi, the head of Turkish plenipotentiaries and he was the organizer of intimate festivals for emissaries”\textsuperscript{19}. He was rewarded by both empires because of his activity: in 1809 he became translator holder to the Ottoman Empire, and a year later he received the decoration Cross of Saint Vladimir gr. III. As appears from a report on August 30, 1811, Manuc Bei played a dual role, because he was also mandated by the Turks to treat for peace with the Russians, the latter enjoying a huge consideration\textsuperscript{20}. In fact, the peace was standing in the way Manuc directed negotiations between the two empires.

In 1815 he moved to Kishinev, in Russian Bessarabia, where he raised a mansion at Hâncești. He passed away there, two years later\textsuperscript{21}.

During the war, the Manuc’s houses from Podul Târgului din Afară were exempted from requisition, which has facilitated their transformation since 1808 in a “diplomatic premise” where different Russian and Ottoman officials were hosted\textsuperscript{22}. The inn had a similar status, because some officials were hosted here and the peace negotiations were kept here. This accomplishment lasted only a year, since a document from 1804 states the purchase of shops inside the inn. Initially it was called Old Court Inn (\textit{Hanul Curții Vechi})\textsuperscript{23}. It was a magnet for Western travellers: having carved arches, wide staircases and ornaments above doors and windows. Illustrating traditional Romanian style, it was totally different from the other inns in town, that were imitations of Italian style, \textit{i fondacchi}:

“The two verandas supported by wooden pillars, balconies on the second floor, the stairs gave a great turn north façade of the inn, rhythm from sin II arches and tall, wavy shingle roof, all these architectural elements, stucco twin masters of fine sculptures modelled and columns embroidery, printed building an atmosphere

\textsuperscript{18] Ibiden, p. 20.  
20] Ibiden.  
23] Ibiden, pp. 32-34.
of peace and rest that comes from the harmony of shapes and volumes”\textsuperscript{24}. The inn was a “mixture of dirt and luxury and opulence indolence”\textsuperscript{25}. Various officials were hosted in the inn’s suites during the peace negotiations. Among them we can mention: the Turkish envoy, Numan Efendi and Count Italinski, Russian ambassador in Constantinople\textsuperscript{26}. The Russian general Kutuzov spent his free time at the inn’s restaurant in an oriental atmosphere.

The discussions from the 15\textsuperscript{th} of December 1811 were held in the right wing of the inn and the signing of the treaty took place in the inn’s reception hall on 16\textsuperscript{th}/28\textsuperscript{th} of May 1812\textsuperscript{27}. On this occasion, the buildings in the city centre were decorated with garlands, and at night, the bridges were illuminated following the orders given by the Russian commandment. The author of this decoration was none other than Alexander Sturzu: “A fig tree branch shone forth: <<Semper co-latur et vigeat>>... In her right hand, the lodestar: <<luceat orbi>>, and to the left, crescent: <<crescat unita>>”\textsuperscript{28}.

Contrary to the expectations, the population reaction to the peace decisions was peaceful, residents not knowing its content. They were happy that they escaped the war and the foreign occupation. Russian evacuation was done a few months after the signing of peace, in October.

The Bucharest image of this period can be reconstructed from memories of the foreign travellers. In this case are being relevant the journal of the French General from Russian army, Alexandre Langeron, Kutuzov’s letters and the Private Diary of Travels written by the British General, Sir Robert Thomas Wilson.

The French general, Alexandre Andrault Langeron, focuses on the military and diplomatic aspects of the conflict along with issues on the behaviour of Russian soldiers that arrived in the Principalities. His attention was kept by the corrupt officials that came to make fortune and taste the luxury. Most of them were Greeks from Fanar, established in Bucharest, which influenced the residents in a negative way with their habits. The governors appointed by various means less honest were interested in the town’s luxury, squandering theirs fortune quickly. After this, they tried to obtain a new job and the cycle repeated. This landscape is complemented by local boyars - a mixture of Greeks and Romanians. The War of 1806-1812 showed even more duplicitous character of the elite who seek the

\textsuperscript{24} Ibidem, pp. 33-34.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibidem, p. 151.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibidem, p. 147.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibidem, pp. 154-158.
\textsuperscript{28} Gheorghe Bezviconi, Manuc-Bei, pp. 25-26.
protection of the occupants or of the French or Constantinople agents. Also from Langeron, we find that Wallachia is divided into districts, each of them being headed by an ispavnic\textsuperscript{29}, a job that brings an income of about 7000–8000 ducats a year. The head of Bucharest police was called aga and it was considered a help of thieves, because after Langeron, he would conceal the thefts\textsuperscript{30}.

An eternal objector of the system imposed by the Russian with the occupation of the Principalities, it highlights the mistakes made by the tsarist administration:

“By occupying the two provinces, our Court has committed an unforgivable mistake, with fatal consequences; the mistake was represented by the fact that we haven’t kept their privileges, we have let them their disastrous administration and we have not set a provisional government as the Austrians did in 1788. [...] Under the direction of rulers, abuses are still smaller and sometimes repressed louder than in the time the two countries were under the Russians domination. But because the Russian government is always too lenient, boyars have never known any bridle and unfortunately, they were able to buy protection from the ones who surrounded the generals or even among the generals themselves. Resulting from inexcusable blindness, boyars have let go to their immorality and to their villainy shamelessly and without fear of punishment”\textsuperscript{31}.

He presents also the political preferences of the boyars in Bucharest, grouped in multiple packs where everyone was, ultimately, the enemy of the other and vice versa. Receiving a job by a boyar quickly becomes a reason of conflict with the others, even if they are relatives. For the French general the social elite of the Bucharest is only a set of corrupt individuals without any moral qualities that arrived on various functions using obscure means. This impression is extended to both Principalities\textsuperscript{32}.

Langeron considers the move of the peace talks from Giurgiu to Bucharest a mistake, because the Turks attitude changed. A staunch critic of the Russian commander Kutuzov known for his libertine lifestyle, the French considered

\textsuperscript{29} He had both administrative functions and legal and tax, being basically a guverantor the County who had been appointed.


\textsuperscript{31} Ibidem., p. 336.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibidem, pp. 337 – 339.
Giurgiu too boring for the Russian, where he would have been deprived of the pleasures offered by the Walachia’s capital[33]. The Russian transformed his residence from Bucharest into a real brothel, whose mistress was madam Giuliano, a wife of a Romanian boyar[34]. On this occasion, we learn and how the local elite interacted with the Russian administration, during the Kutuzov administration. Starting with 1811, using lady Giuliano, many Romanian boyars were able to obtain administrative jobs in Walachia: Count Dudescu – General Governor of Oltenia and boyar Filipescu - Bucharest agra. These appointments were not long since Wallachia’s government was changed again in hopes of a better organization and supply. Langeron was among the contributors to these changes and he hoped to improve the situation, but this was difficult, because “the new administration found the country ruined with a 500,000 piasters duty and without possibility to pay or to prevent military needs in case of war”[35].

Fortunately, the much desired peace was signed after nearly half a year of negotiations. Originally an enigma for the French, it was clear that the end of the conflict between the two empires was determined by the Tsarist’s army reorganization in the context of Napoleon’s campaigns – the Russians “were afraid if the war continues, we will be forced to use against the Turks a lot of our troops needed in vain, giving thus Napoleon more opportunities to destroy our power and afterwards that of the Crescent”[36].

Information about the economic life and about the measures taken by the Russian government in Bucharest can be found in letters addressed by the Russian Field Marshal Mihail Ilarionovici Kutuzov, the tsarist army commander of Principalities in 1811 to various Russian officers.

In his letter to N.P. Rumyantsev from 1st of June 1811, Kutuzov records that, in the capital, shops, numbering 2981, were divided into four classes by the Divan (central administration of the city): 2215 belonged Romanians, 126 to French, 172 to Austrians and 268 to Russians. Initially, the tax rate was fixed depending on the quality and quantity of goods sold, requiring annual gathering of 98,410 lei. Finally, it was considered a fixed amount for each shop. Those who opposed the new pay tribute were chastised: the shop was closed. They were forbidden to do trade anymore and they were placed under the supervision of Agia in order not to trade in secret. If a merchant was caught illegally selling merchandise, his business

[34] Ibidem, p. 355.
was seized, the goods were sold at the public fair, and the proceeds deposited in the treasury. The imposition of this new tax caused tension between the Russian government, on one hand, and Austria and France, on the other, since the subjects of these powers enjoyed certain privileges in the Principalities, including some tax exemption. From a subsequent letter, dated on 10th of June 1811, we find that the tax on the shops was not paid equally by all merchants, despite the initial decisions. The most advantaged were the French, who received “the weighted price [...] that are happy both the consul and the townsman”.

On the 7th of August 1811, Kutuzov shows to general Steter one of the Bucharest’s most sensitive issues, the quartering, which generated discontent among the population, with the poor being the most disadvantaged. Although initially were affected by this measure only native habitants, Kutuzov extended it to the foreigners, removing a considerable number of privileges exemption. The process has not been received favourably, mainly due to Agia abuse. Therefore, to improve the situation and avoid a riot, it proposes “to completely exempt owners [...] like in the first case: if the owner has two houses and one is taken entirely from the hospital barracks or other military needs; in the second case: if the owner has a large family and you will be convinced personally that he is unable to provide entirely a room or two”.

In the same document Kutuzov brings into attention the petitions written by residents of Bucharest who do not agree to pay the fee for street pavement, if their homes were not having street access. He advises Steter not to consider their complaints, since the measure is in “the benefit of all citizens”. Observer of society where he had been introduced, Kutuzov recorded some aspects of daily life. From his correspondence with Lisanka, we find the impression left by the capital of Walachia- “a city so large that surpasses all Russian cities except the capital. Across the busting crowds [...]”.

38] Ibidem, p. 426.
39] He was appointed military governor in Bucharest, while Kutuzov has gone to Giurgiu.
40] Ibidem.
41] There was a local law which provides for payment only ones who had the house bordering the street.
other beautiful, more but also some Russian women “full of pretensions”\(^44\). We find that there is a growing interest for balls, as a place of socialization and recreation, but also for drama. He reminded the Polish theatre, found by Ms. Bennigsen terrible and splendid by Countess Manteuffel\(^45\).

These changes are from the Bucharest society are due the tsarist army officers who led women emancipation and modernization. Relevant in this regard is the description of one of the balls from 1810 hosted by the boyar Constantin Filipescu where Western influence can be seen: besides the Moldavian Cotnari makes its way the famous Bordeaux, the oriental dances are left past and replaced the European, most of them from Paris, the oriental clothes gave way to dresses and tuxedo\(^46\).

Some aspects of the townspeople can be found in the *Private Diary of Travels* written by the British General Sir Robert Thomas Wilson, who is sent on 27\(^{th}\) of July 1812 by Ottoman Empire to implement the provisions of the peace concluded on 16\(^{th}\)/28\(^{th}\) of May 1812. From his point of view, the capital is “a delightful city, if streets were not paved with logs”\(^47\). In the same manner with Kutuzov, he presents the women from Bucharest, who wear funny clothes with many ornaments and are used to being admired: “I have never read about the beauty of the women of Walachia, but they are of known and feared rival of the institutions of Venus”\(^48\). He notes the hospitality, being invited to an epicurean lunch with a variety of well-cooked dishes\(^49\). For Wilson the most attractive places from the city are the boyars’ houses and the public places for walking.

From the above sources, it appears that there isn’t more information about the organization of the city, but more impressions, which differ from one author to another, depending on the experience that had a space and provenance. During the Russian occupation, Hartingh officer creates a detailed plan of the city, marking the major buildings and 113 churches (which is a very large number)\(^50\). Anything of this issue is not recorded by any of the travellers mentioned above. Also some information does not reflect objective reality, for example the number of shops that Kutuzov mentioned in one of his letters that does not correspond to

\(^{44}\) *Ibidem*, p. 178.

\(^{45}\) *Ibidem*, p. 179.

\(^{46}\) Ștefan Ionescu, *Manuc Bei*, pp. 138 – 139.

\(^{47}\) Georgeta Filitti (coord.), *Călători străini*, vol. I, p. 556.

\(^{48}\) *Ibidem*, p. 557.

\(^{49}\) *Ibidem*.

what emerged from the 1810/1811 census - only 914 merchants are mentioned in the 5 out of the existing 7 divisions\textsuperscript{51}.

There are some common elements captured by the three travellers: large influence of the Greeks from Fanar, come to make wealth, burdensome taxes that the population was not intending to pay, the women's charm and their desire for emancipation and modernization fuelled by soldiers with Western origin from the Russian army. These are irreversible trend towards modernization and contribute to creating a different mentality, which leads to decrease of the Ottoman influence in the lifestyle and in the fashion in the coming decades.

The information provided is especially useful in order to understand how people in Bucharest were perceived by foreigners. It is also useful because it permits us to restore some of the aspects of life during the course of peace talks held in Bucharest.

A HISTORY OF PARTNERSHIP AND COLLABORATION IN THE BALKANS

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CHAPTER III

MILITARY ENCOUNTERS AND BALKAN WARS
AN AGENDA OF THE OTTOMAN EXPEDITION BY SULEIMAN THE MAGNIFICENT AGAINST THE CASTLE OF SUCEAVA IN 1538

M. Akif Erdoğru*

In this paper, a copy of the journal of the military campaign against the Vaivode of Moldavia, Petru Raresh, by Suleiman the Magnificent in 1538 will be presented, which is registered in a Turkish manuscript maintained in the National Library in Vienna. The text was copied most probably by J. V Hammer or one of his students. We explain the agenda of Moldavian expedition dated 1538 in which Suleiman the Magnificent dispossessed Petru Raresh, Vaivode of Moldavia, and captured the castle of Suceava that was the centre of province of Moldavia (Moldova) near Danube River.

The castle of Suceava, written as Seçav, Siçav, Sincav, Suçova, Suceava, Suçeava, Suçiava, Sucheava etc. in some modern Turkish publications, is now situated in Romania, the city of Suceava. We point out that a copy of the journal with minor differences was registered in Münsheatü’s-Selâtin of Feridun Bei, one of the important books for the official and literary letters written by Ottoman Sultans in the late sixteenth century. However, the same text is also registered into an Ottoman manuscript maintained in the catalog 327 of Turkish manuscripts of the National Library in Vienna and is not quite different from the text in Münsheatü’s-Selâtin.

According to the military journal of the Ottoman army, Suleiman the Magnificent marched to castle of Suceava with a large army with the intention of conquering the town. He passed 45 stopping places en route to Suceava. Prof. Franz Babinger, German historian and orientalist, points out the existence of the agenda

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2] Moldavia province became conterminous with Ottoman Empire when the castles of Kiliya and Akkerman were acquired by Bayezid II. Relations continued on condition that rulers of Moldavia pay kharaj to Istanbul and do not exceed the border.
3] Suceava is an historical city situated in the north eastern part of Romania which was founded before the 14th century. It is located in the upper right of Suceava River.
4] Feridun bey, Müşateüs-Selâtîn, I, İstanbul 1265, p. 602
for the first time and stated that a critical edition of the work with other expedi-
tions of Suleiman the Magnificent would be useful. Daily narrative of this mili-
tary expedition which was known as the expedition of Moldavia (Kara-Bogdan) in contemporary Ottoman histories was probably included in other Ottoman works of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

In fact, in the History of Pechevi, a contemporary Ottoman narrative source, written in 1641 by Ibrahim effendi of Pécs in Hungary, there is valuable information on this expedition, though not day by day. The journal contains an important text which completes the fetih-name (an official Ottoman document proclaiming the conquest of the castle of Suceava to other rulers) of Suceava, published by the Romanian historian Aurel Decei in the year of 1953.

This Ottoman text that proclaims the conquest of the castle of Suceava in 1538 was written in Ottoman Turkish, while Suleiman the Magnificent was returning to Istanbul on October 1538 in Isaccea. It was addressed to the sub-gov-
ernor (sancak-bei) and the judge (qadi) of the city of Amasya. This valuable doc-
ument has been preserved at the Prime Ministry’s Ottoman Archives in Istanbul and was published by Aurel Decei (d.1976) in 1953. In this document, reasons of the 1538 Moldavian military expedition were explained in general. The arguments held in the fetih-name are well known by the Ottoman historians of Turkey. De-
cei describes this campaign as “a disciplinary expedition made upon the treachery of the Boyars”.

According to the official text which reflects the reasons of the military expedi-
tion from the Ottoman perspective, Petru, the Vaivode of Moldavia, plotted against the Ottoman Empire and attempted an alliance with “the Infidel” who was Ferdinand I., the emperor of Austria. The name of Infidel was not written explicit-
ly in official text, as far as we know from other sources, this person was Ferdinand I., the Emperor of Austria. It was expressed in the fetih-name that Vaivode Petru Raresh has abandoned his loyalty to the Sultan with the purpose of declaring independence for Moldavia and sent Ferdinand secret letters.

6] Pechevi Tarihi, I, ed. B.S. Baykal, Ankara 1981, pp.149-152. Baykal misreads Suçav, the capital of Moldavia, as Sincav (p. 154)
Turkish professor Uzunçarşılı wrote in his book, *Ottoman History*, that the Sultan kept this military expedition a secret and announced it in the last day. Moreover, he states that the Sultan held the Vaivode responsible for the killing of Andre Gritti, Venetian bailo of Istanbul and informer to the Sultan about Hungary, who was living in Budapest in that period.¹⁰

Furthermore, an official reason for this expedition was the death of a number of Muslims and plundering of their properties by the Vaivode. He decreased the amount of kharaj (tribute) that was paid to Istanbul every year. He seemed obedient to Sultan, yet he was indeed staging a revolt against Ottoman rule.¹¹ As a concrete reason, it is indicated by Ottoman sources that Vaivode did not send 1000 cavalries to the Sultan.¹² Therefore, Suleiman the Magnificent left Istanbul with his army on July 9, 1538 and marched to the sanjak of Silistre. In the journal of the Ottoman army, the name of Silistre was not written clearly. This place is quite likely the stopping place of Danube River or Sultan Çayırı that he arrived in August 6th. While here, he was visited by the Petru’s ambassador and his interpreter. There is no evidence showing the ambassador was honoured, however, as it seems, their request for forgiveness was accepted by the Sultan.¹³ The day the ambassador of Vaivode arrived in the Ottoman camp, Suleiman the Magnificent sent his ambassador Sinan Çavush, superintendent of Caffa in Crimea, with messenger (ulak) to Moldovia calling Petru to surrender and come to Istanbul. But, nine days later, he reported Suleiman the Magnificent that Petru did not accept the offer.

Petru Raresh gathered 70,000-80,000 soldiers around himself and employed hit-and-run tactics upon Ottoman forces in the highlands of Moldavia (in some sources: in the region of *Fokşani or Potşani*¹⁴). Afterwards, he fled to Transylvania avoiding a pitched battle with the Ottoman army. According to the journal, Suleiman the Magnificent assigned Mehmed Pasha as commander in chief and he had a bridge built over the Danube River and went across the bridge.

He crossed the border of Moldavia with Rumelian and Anatolian troops as well as with the raiders (*Akıncı*). He came nearby the Prut River and went across by having a bridge built over.¹⁵ Sahib Girai, Khan of Crimea, greeted Suleiman

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¹⁰ Uzunçarşılı, op.cit, p. 342
¹¹ Baykal, op.cit, p. 150
¹³ Baykal, op.cit, p. 152
¹⁴ Baykal, op.cit, p. 155
¹⁵ Pechevi writes that bridge was made by Vizier Lütfi Pasha (p. 152).
the Magnificent with 150,000 Tatar soldiers. The intelligence about the Vaivode that he was at a place called Yaş Bazari was received. Ottoman soldiers headed towards this place. Sahib Girai burned this city down. However, Petru Raresh managed to escape. Many were taken captive but Vaivode's whereabouts could not be found out. From here, Suleiman the Magnificent marched to the Suceava castle, the capital of Moldavia, with his army (numbering a total of 230,000 with the Tatar soldiers) in September 16th. He arrived at Suceava seventy days after he left Istanbul.

We know from the Ottoman journal that the castle was besieged immediately on September 16, 1538. It was embargoed. Great iron cannonballs were manufactured in front of the castle. The commander of the castle - his name was not mentioned in our journal -, who realized that to defend the castle was impossible against the Ottoman soldiers delivered the keys of the castle to Suleiman the Magnificent and asked him for mercy. It appears that the Sultan stayed in here for seven days. Treasure and goods preserved in the castle came into the hands of Ottoman soldiers. Hasan Agha, the chief master of the horses of the Sublime Port, discovered these Moldavian treasures, golden pots, adorned crosses and crucifixes, inlaid swords and skewers, pearls in golden inlaid, jewels, fabrics etc. After the conquest of the castle, the rulers and lesser Vaivodes of Moldavia presented their obedience by coming to the royal tent of Suleiman the Magnificent. They requested from Sultan to assign one of them as Vaivode. According to information, the new Vaivode was Stefan, the brother of Raresh, known as Stefan the Locust or the Great. An expression in the journal which reads as “the son of former Vaivode was appointed to the land of Moldavia”, shows that the new Vaivode was the son of Raresh. According to the late Turkish professor Uzunçarşılı, the new Vaivode was somebody named Cetine?, name of the son of the former Vaivode, Stefan, and also a village name.

16] The number of Tatar soldiers was given as 200,000 in some sources (Uzunçarşılı, op.cit, p. 343). In History of Pechevi, there is no given information about the number of Tatar soldiers but it is understood from telling that Suleiman the Magnificent credited the Tatar soldiers. This number must exaggerated.
17] Uzunçarşılı writes that Yaş Pazarı was capital in second degree of Moldavian prince (Uzunçarşılı, op.cit, p. 343).
20] Baykal, op.cit, p. 154
21] Özcan, op.cit, p. 270.
22] Uzunçarşılı, op.cit, p. 343. Baykal has read this person’s name as Çetne (p. 154).
rulers were forced to pay protection money regularly (kharaj) and the son of one of the rulers whose name was not clearly written in the journal was appointed as Vaivode above all others. In addition, borders between Ottoman and Christian lands were newly designated. 23 Professor Uzunçarşılı wrote that an amnesty was proclaimed by the Sultan in Moldavia. 24

According to the journal, Sultan left the castle of Suceava on 16 September, 1538, and headed for Istanbul after he appointed the new Vaivode. When Sultan arrived at a place named creek of Lapushna, the newly appointed Vaivode informed that Bogdan, the son of the former Vaivode, was beheaded and his head was sent to Istanbul. Sultan ordered the capture of the former Vaivode (Petru or Petri Raresh) who was believed to flee to somewhere in Buda.

Unfortunately, the return route, from Suceava to Istanbul, is not given in the journal we published in Turkish. However, according to Uzunçarşılı, Sultan returned to Istanbul through Yambol. It is seen that Sultan reached to Edirne on October 24, 1538. 25 When the journal was examined, it appeared that Sultan arrived at Suceava with tracking the route of Istanbul-Edirne-Danube River-Babadag-dock of Isaccea-Kalçın-Yaş Bazari-Suceava. He stayed in Edirne for 8 days. His two sons, Sultan Selim and Sultan Mehmed were with him present. 26 He accepted the son of Emir Rashid bin Megame, named Manı, while he was on his way towards Edirne. 27 On August 17th, Sultan visited the tomb of Sari Saltuk Baba in Babadag. The next day, inhabitants of Babadag were immigrated to other places of the empire.

With the conquest of Suceava, which was attended by Rüstem Pasha, Hüsrev Pasha, Lütfi Pasha and Mehmed Pasha alongside the governors of Anatolia and Rumelia (especially the bey of Smederova, son of Yahya Pasha) and Khan of the Tatars, Sahib Girai, Moldavia was transformed into an Islamic province in terms of Ottoman law. In order to announce the conquest to Muslims, Mahmund, son of a cavalry, was sent to the city of Amasya in Anatolia. As a part of the celebration of the Suceava conquest, the city of Amasya was decorated; festivals were organized; and prayers for perpetuity of the empire were held. Chief Judge

23] Uzunçarşılı, op.cit, p. 344.
26] Baykal, op.cit, p. 151.
27] Baykal, op.cit, p. 151. Son of Basra ruler, Manı, presented blood horses, colored cloths, nacres, pearls, corals, a kind of colored cotton cloth (Kandehari), royal turbans, and Indian towels, bottles of fragrance, various desserts and the key of Basra city to Suleiman the Magnificent. He was well respected.
of Amasya was assigned to collect a herald tax, müjdegani akçası in the journal, a money or tax given to the chief Judge of Amasya in exchange of good news of Suceava, from all householders in the Amasya region.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{28} Decei, op.cit, p. 123.
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In 1657, György Rákóczi II, the Prince of Transylvania, attacked Poland with his troops as an ally of the Kingdom of Sweden. His objective was to gain the Polish throne. He had not sought the permission of the Ottoman capital for his military campaign, and therefore was forced to quit from his office as the Prince of Transylvania. Seemingly, he resigned in late 1657; however, he returned to power early in the next year. Despite multiple warnings the Transylvanians did not make him leave, so as retaliation, the Ottoman Grand Vizier Mehmed Köprülü led a campaign against Transylvania within the same year.

The Ottoman Empire was already at war with Venice at the time, and although the advancing Venetians, who in 1656 reached the Dardanelles, were finally stopped, even till early 1658 they could not have been successfully driven back to a safe position. Therefore in the same year a land campaign were planned at first against the city state of Venice herself, then after this plan were dismissed in favor of a new plan against the Venetian strongholds in Dalmatia.

In the paper I aim to describe the initial military undertakings directed straight against Venice and Transylvania month by month to reach out the original objective of this campaign.

December 1657- January 1658

The Ottomans prepared an attack for early 1658 definitely against the Venetians. Primarily a land offensive was planned, but a possible naval onslaught was also not excluded. For the land offensive the Habsburg territory was to be used. The Ottoman troops would have gone from the direction of Friuli, but they could have also marched through the territories of the Zrínyi family. This is confirmed by the fact that the imperial order in connection with the campaign was given out on January 11 to collect the sursat of the vilayets of Bosnia, Buda, Temesvár, Eger and Kanizsa.  

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The Venetians were inclined towards a peace treaty with the Ottomans, who, however, demanded Candia, as well as some islands located near Asia Minor, the castle of Klis and the refunding of their expenditures spent on the war. The Habsburg Ambassador in Istanbul, Simon Reniger thought, if the Venetians did not agree the terms, then the Ottomans would turn against them, while otherwise they would deal with the case of Transylvania. Besides according to the public opinion the Sultan also came with the armed forces as far as Bosnia. According to Reniger’s point of view, the Sultan would have marched against the Venetians, while the Grand Vizier considered the breaking of Transylvania was more important.²

Rákóczi sent the tax in vain, because it was viewed by the Ottomans so that he had done this as a sign of redeeming; moreover from the Turkish point of view by doing this he declared that he was still the prince, so his envoy was thrown to prison, and as the Ottoman grand admiral uttered, his chance for being prince again was only that much, as if it would start raining upwards. According to Reniger even that became questionable, whether Transylvania could keep its right of the free principal election or a pasha would be appointed over the land.³

Moreover the Turks, pointing back to the promise of Gábor Bethlen, started to demand the surrender of Jenő and other surrounding minor fortresses from the orders. The duplication of the yearly tribute also came into question, naturally beside all this they were to exile the former prince along with his son. This was good for only one thing: they provided Rákóczi a claim to regain the control of the country and at the end of January the Transylvanians orders pledged loyalty to Rákóczi on the diet at Szászmedgyes (Mediasch).⁴

As for the Rumanians, Köprülü began to made examples on them and reinforce the Turkish positions against Rákóczi. On January 26 already a new voivode, Mihail Radu also known as Miheea III, pledged loyalty to the Sultan. He was installed in his office as he was a beylerbeyi, and his deeds were supervised by one of the kapijilar bashi of the Sultan. By this, Şerban, an ally of Rákóczi, who escaped

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² Reniger from Edirne, 6 January 1658.
³ Reniger from Edirne, 6 January 1658; ÖStA, HHStA, Türkei I. (Turcica), Karton 129, Konv. 1. fol. 40a-b. Reniger from Edirne, 12 January 1658.
to Transylvania, was ruled out, and the voivode of Moldavia was going to share the same fate.\textsuperscript{5}

**February-March 1658**

In the meantime Ballarino’s man, sent home in December, arrived back on February 21, and the message of the Venetian Republic was written in a conciliatory tone. The Venetians did not intend to give up Candia, for which as a compensation they were ready to accept to pay 50 000 golds every year. The Turks might be willing to renounce their claim on Candia in exchange for Klis and other places, but only in return for a tribute. Reniger was of the opinion that there would be some kind of peace treaty with Venice, so the Turkish were going to march against Transylvania, and it seemed that the Grand Vizier surely, and the Sultan maybe, would be traveling to Belgrade.\textsuperscript{6}

However Ballarino had a different point of view. He admitted that because of the situation in Transylvania the Ottomans were pretending to march against Rákóczi, but their real goal was to attack the republic, especially from the direction of Friuli. So he encouraged the Turks to attack the Transylvanians.\textsuperscript{7}

Moreover following this concept in February and March the Turks began building bridges on the rivers of Sava and Drava, as well as near Belgrade. In the city itself the preparations were started for securing the food supply, because at that time it seemed so that the Sultan would also accompany the army.\textsuperscript{8}

Besides the Turks did not give up their plan of attacking from Friuli, and in this matter they were constantly bothering Reniger in order to get not just permission, but more information about the place, too. However the Austrians did not want any “disorder”, they wanted peace primarily because of the lingering imperial elections in the Holy Roman Empire, but they were also concerned about the Hereditary Lands. So the Habsburg resident tried to dissuade them from this by enumerating arguments and disinformation, but the Grand Vizier insisted to the

\textsuperscript{5} Reniger from Edirne, 12 January 1658; ÖStA, HHStA, Türkei I. (Turcica), Karton 129, Konv. 1. fol. 66-79b. Reniger from Edirne, 13 January 1658; János B. Szabó, Balázs Sudár, “Independens fejedelem a Portán kívül” II. Rákóczi György oszmán kapcsolatai. 2. Századok, 4 (2013), pp.931-999, 987.

\textsuperscript{6} ÖStA, HHStA, Türkei I. (Turcica), Karton 129, Konv. 1. fol. 143a-b. 147a-149b. Reniger from Edirne, 28 February 1658.

\textsuperscript{7} Lipót Óváry, A Magyar Tud. Akadémia Történelmi Bizottságának oklevél-másolatai. III. Budapest, 1901, pp.143-144: Ballarino from Edirne. 1 and 14 March 1658.

\textsuperscript{8} Reniger from Edirne, 13 February 1658; ÖStA, HHStA, Türkei I. (Turcica), Karton 129, Konv. 1. fol. 229a-238a. Geheimrat to the Emperor, Vienna, 17 March 1658.
official request, so Köprülü sent an envoy to the Emperor. According to Austrian opinion a minor goal of this journey was at least scouting the terrain.\textsuperscript{9}

Ottoman envoy arrived at Vienna in late March. He was reassured that Vienna would not support Rákóczi and will strive for maintaining the peace, but in exchange they expected the Turkish side to keep the treaties. Meanwhile the Ottoman fleet was planned to be stationed near Candia, and Reniger thought so, that the objective would be Dalmatia or Kotor by land, only if the Transylvanians would not cause greater problem.

The counter steps of the Grand Vizier could have been expected: he displaced Rákóczi’s other ally, Gheorge Ştefan, the voivode of Moldavia, and instead of him on March 18 he appointed Gheorghe Ghica. Furthermore the Tatars were ordered to stand prepared in Wallachia and Moldavia for an incursion into Transylvania, and the Transylvanians got the message, that if they removed Rákóczi, then they would not share the fate with the Rumanian voivodships.\textsuperscript{10}

In the middle of March Reniger predicted, that at the end of the month the war would be announced, and in this he did not err, because Köprülü made his banner stood on March 25. On March 29 the kapudanpasha sailed out with 30 galleys, and other 10 were planned to be sent either after him or against the island of Tenedos. Reniger estimated that the army would be ready for setting out around May, and from the current situation he drew the conclusion that the objective was going to be Kotor or Dalmatia.\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{April 1658}

At the beginning of April it was rumored that the Sultan was going to stay in Edirne, only the Grand Vizier would go to Belgrade, and furthermore if Rákóczi would not leave Transylvania, then the army would have been split at Belgrade: one part would go against Venice, while the other part, mainly with the Turkish forces from Buda, Eger, Temesvár, Silistre and the Tatar Khan, would pursue military operations in Transylvania. In this latter “enterprise” the Turkish hoped in the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{9} Reniger from Edirne, 6 January 1658; Reniger from Edirne, 13 February 1658; Geheimrat to the Emperor, Vienna, 17 March 1658.
\item \textsuperscript{10} Reniger from Edirne, 12 January 1658; Reniger from Edirne, 13 February 1658; Reniger from Edirne, 19 March 1658; EOE, XI. 380-382: Reniger from Edirne, 3 April 1658.
\item \textsuperscript{11} ÖStA, HHStA, Türkei I. (Turcica), Karton 129, Konv. 1. fol. 219-220a. Reniger from Edirne, 10 March 1658; ÖStA, HHStA, Türkei I. (Turcica), Karton 129, Konv. 1. fol. 97b-98b. Reniger from Edirne, 12 March 1658; Reniger from Edirne, 3 April 1658; EOE, XI. 383-384: Reniger from Edirne, 8 April 1658; ÖStA, HHStA, Türkei I. (Turcica), Karton 129, Konv. 1. fol. 98b-100a. Reniger from Edirne, 11 April 1658.
\end{itemize}
participation of the Cossacks and the Polish. So the Grand Vizier expected only a few days of resistance from Rákóczi.\textsuperscript{12}

On April 13 the campaign against Transylvania was decided, and presumably the one against the Venetians too, because two days before a certain müteferrika Jusuf was ordered to map the route between Belgrade and Zadar, and to make preparations for a journey on this route. In these days it was also decided that the Turkish give up the plan of marching through the passage at Friuli, so the direct assault on Venice, but Ballarino was kept under pressure in order to gain information about the true goal of the Venetians.\textsuperscript{13}

The departure of the army was expected at the end of May, but the more cautious estimations did not rule out even the end of June. The reason for this was Abaza Hassan, the pasha of Aleppo, who had become the head of a resistance against the Grand Vizier, and along with a part of the Anatolian troops joined him he was not willing to appear in Edirne.

\textbf{May 1658}

The agha sent to Vienna as an envoy arrived back at Edirne on May 17. The agha reported that the outcome of the negotiations was not favorable, adding that while the messengers of Rákóczi had been able to travel to Frankfurt, he had not been allowed to. This strengthened the Turkish insecurity about the neutrality of the Austrians, since news of the Hungarian barons campaigning at the Habsburg court on behalf of Rákóczi were coming on and on.

On May 24 the Turkish troops along the border led by the pasha of Buda and the Moldavian voivode were ordered to stand ready to break in Transylvania. For this time it became sure that the Ottoman army would not depart before the kurban bayrami, and it was rumored that the Grand Vizier was going to spend the winter in Belgrade, while the Sultan would stay in Edirne.\textsuperscript{14}

In the meantime on May 20 the Belgrade-Zadar route became fixed, and the supply for it was about to be covered by not only by the sursat tax of Bosnia and Kanizsa, but from those of the vilayets of Buda and Temesvár too, so if from

\begin{footnotes}
\item 12 Reniger from Edirne, 3 April 1658; Reniger from Edirne, 8 April 1658; Óváry, III. 145. Ballarino from Edirne, 11 April 1658; Óváry, III. 145. Ballarino from Edirne, 22 April 1658.
\end{footnotes}
then on Transylvania ever came up again, then only as a minor theater of war.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{June 1658}

Since the Transylvanians had not fulfilled the Turkish terms, on June 10 the \textit{pasha} of Buda received the imperial order: if he has no other means at disposal, he must break into Transylvania. The plan was provided: Kenan Pasha would attack from the direction of Temesvár with the other Turkish border troops, the voivode of Wallachia with the \textit{pasha} of Silistre from the direction of Wallachia; while the voivode of Moldavia with the Khan of the Tatars from the direction of Moldavia.\textsuperscript{16}

The Ottoman army set out on June 24 and the rumors about the Sultan staying in Edirne and the Grand Vizier spending the winter in Belgrade were still in circulation. The exact objective, however, was still unknown. Reniger thought that the Ottomans would attack Dalmatia, and the chase and expelling of Rákóczi would be executed by the border troops and the Tatars. But in that case if Rákóczi and his followers would seal themselves up into the garrisons, the whole Ottoman army was about to invade Transylvania. On the other hand Ballarino was fully convinced that the objective was going to be Transylvania.\textsuperscript{17}

The theory of the Turkish war intention against Dalmatia was supported by the experiences of Johann Friedrich Metzger, the Habsburg envoy sent from Vienna to the \textit{pasha} of Buda. Metzger traveled between June 18 and 27 from Buda to Lippa. On his way he heard that the Turks were building bridges both on the Sava and the Danube, digging wells at Vukovar and Tovarnik, and preparing campsites at Osijek and other places. Hearing these he had the impression that the Grand Vizier’s primary objective was Dalmatia, especially because on his way he had not seen any depots.\textsuperscript{18}

\textbf{July 1658}

The Ottoman army advanced with “the usual speed”. The news about the defeat of the \textit{pasha} of Buda by Rákóczi on July 5 reached the Grand Vizier proba-

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\textsuperscript{15} BOA, MAD 2998, pp.140, 147, 159/1-2.
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\textsuperscript{17} Óváry, III. 148. Ballarino from Edirne, 21 June 1658; ÖStA, HHStA, \textit{Türkei I.} (Turcica), Karton 130, Konv. I. fol. 168-170a. Reniger from Edirne, 24 June 1658; Reniger from Edirne, 24 June 1658.
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bly while he was in Sofia on July 11. Following that the Turkish army marched till Belgrade without stopping and arrived on July 26.\textsuperscript{19}

In mid-July Ballarino was informed that on one hand the Grand Vizier would be going to Buda, where he would coordinate the food supply for the troops attacking Dalmatia, and on the other hand that Köprülü advanced only till Belgrade where he would negotiate with Rákóczi.

Meanwhile the direction of the attack was questionable even in mid-July, at least for the soldiers. The messenger of Transylvania, Marin Görög, faced with the discontent of the soldiers against the Grand Vizier in Sofia, for not knowing the objective of the campaign, namely they knew only that they were marching towards Transylvania or Zadar.\textsuperscript{20}

During the planning of the campaign the Grand Vizier must have counted with the \emph{jelali}es, because of the news about Abaza Hasan marching towards Istanbul with his rebels. According to Görög’s statement, Köprülü had sent back 2400 Janissaries from Sofia.

Probably because of the news about the defeat of the \emph{pasha} of Buda, on July 14 by a reinforced command it was ordered to make a plan for invading Transylvania according to the current situation; parallel with this it was also ordered to finalize the appointed \emph{menzils} on the Belgrade-Lippa route, and to alarm them and provide them with food supply.\textsuperscript{21}

By this time for Ballarino it seemed that in the Sultan’s court there were many, who supported the war against Dalmatia and considered the Transylvania problem less important, but everyone thought that the Grand Vizier must have succeed, or he was risking his head. This probably had come from the abovementioned fact that the Sultan himself supported the attack on Dalmatia.\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{August 1658}

The Habsburgs sent another envoy to the Ottoman state. The envoy’s name was Julius Heinrich Wogni and arrived at Belgrade on August 12. Along his way he saw and heard about the wells driven, he saw the roads properly cleared, and he also came to Metzger’s conclusion: Dalmatia was the objective.\textsuperscript{23}

\begin{footnotesize}
19] ÖStA, HHStA, Türkei I. (Turcica), Karton 130, Konv. II. fol. 1-2a. Reniger from Edirne, 1 July 1658.; ÖStA, HHStA, Türkei I. (Turcica), Karton 130, Konv. II. fol. 7a-9b. Reniger from Edirne, 21 July 1658.; BOA, Kamil Kepeci, 1949, p.32.


\end{footnotesize}
But by this date the tables have turned in connection with the objective. According to Wogni’s report on August 6 the Grand Vizier in Belgrade received a message from Edirne in which he was ordered to finish his task in 40 days and return home. The Grand Vizier was called back because of Abaza Hassan’s rebellion, for by that time the pasha of Aleppo and his rebels were threatening to burn down Uskudar and Istanbul.  

Presumably this gave Köprülü the final push in deciding that Transylvania would be the objective, hence the situation was more urgent there, and nonetheless the problem seemed resolvable to the given deadline. Following this it was decided that the sursat-tax would be claimed in cash from the other sanjaks of Bosnia. On August 11 the shipment of the Janissaries’ equipment towards Temesvár had begun. Wogni already saw the camp of the Grand Vizier at Pancevo. He arrived at Temesvár on August 20 and with his army he departed on August 24 for Jenő in order to siege the castle on August 27.

Conclusion

In sum it can be stated that the campaign of 1658 would have been launched certainly against Venice. These plans were ruined by the return of Rákóczi, who, with his resistance, attained that the Turks planned a war not just against Venice, but against Transylvania too. In determining the actual objective there were different points of view in the Sultan’s court, therefore thanks to this both countries remained an objective. In the beginning Köprülü could think that the problem, what Transylvania meant, could be solved by the Turkish troops in the border garrisons (the pashas of Buda, Temesvár, Eger and Silistre) with possible Cossack and/or Polish contribution, while the main army would attack Zadar, which was under Venetian rule, through Dalmatia.

However at the beginning of July because of the escalating situation in Transylvania it came up that the case of Rákóczi might not be solved by the local


forces (which became true), then the plans for the main army’s intrusion into Transylvania was realized. After his arrival at Belgrade the Grand Vizier wanted to decide depending on the current situation, but this decision was “made” by the recalling order sent because of the jelalies. Since the situation was urgent the problem of Transylvania was the one to be solved.
The early modern history of Eastern Europe witnessed a slow but steady decay of the political powers of Transylvania, Wallachia, Moldavia in the face of political, diplomatic, and military interventions coming from neighboring imperial powers with ever-centralized bureaucracies. As one of these powers, in the beginning of the latter half of the 17th century, the Ottoman capital secured political stability within the empire and returned to the tricky game of imperial dominance over its northeastern border. Köprülü Mehmed Pasha who was appointed grand vizier in 1656 and his successors in the post from the ‘Köprülü House’ adopted an aggressive policy towards the Transylvanian lands that combined elements of diplomatic coercion with direct military measures. Although the Transylvanian policy pursued by the Köprülü vizier family was interrupted by fortuitous setbacks and intriguing difficulties caused by mutual diplomatic moves, it had a clear-cut invasive tone. In 1657, György Rákóczi II (1648–60) finally brought down the military and political status quo in Northeastern Europe by laying claim on the Polish throne. The Ottoman state, in response to Rákóczi’s ambitious attempt to carve out a formidable kingdom for himself, refused to reset the political circumstances in Transylvania and sought to bring Transylvania under direct Ottoman influence: Köprülü Mehmed Pasha and his son and successor Fazıl Ahmed Pasha invested a considerable part of the empire’s time and energy until 1664 to attain this goal.

From a historical point of view, the Köprülüüs were able to establish a long-lived government that was always proud of dispatching a great number of Ottoman troops to engage in military actions along the western frontiers of the em-
pire. This, in fact, marked a striking contrast with the Ottoman policy in the first half of the 17th century which nurtured the peace with the Habsburg palace even when the Habsburgs were overwhelmed by the military troubles of the Thirty Years’ War. The Köprülü government, in the event of György Rákóczi II, however, never considered restoring peace in Transylvania but incorporated a fair amount of Transylvanian soil into the Ottoman Empire and reasserted Ottoman sovereignty over the region. In the eyes of the Ottoman decision-makers, the ambitious Transylvanian ruler represented a vicious idea of independence. Furthermore, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha's response to the aftermath of Rákóczi's defeat in Poland in 1657 was the first example of what was to be expected from the ‘Köprülü foreign policy’ in the succeeding decades.

The Köprülü Foreign Policy and the Rise of the ‘Hawks’

John F. Guilmartin seems to be right in his assessment that the fluctuation in the average length of tenure of grand viziers can be taken as a political stability index in Ottoman history. In 1518–79, for instance, when the Ottoman military and political power attained crushing victories over its rivals on the battlefield as well as in the diplomatic arena, the Ottoman grand viziers held their post on an average of six years and one month. However, this length of time dropped to a mere one year and four months in the succeeding fifteen years when the Ottoman state was entangled in ever-increasing political, military, and social disturbances. In the first half of the 17th century, it was continuously harder to cling on to the grand vizierate, a fact which is well displayed by the dismissal of ten grand viziers in only four years (1621–25). The political circumstances had not changed much in the first years of the reign of Mehmed IV (1648–87) during which the Ottoman ruling elites failed one after the other in the face of the unbearable military and

3] Ottoman political leaders, putting aside the temporary confusion in 1644–45, appreciated the benefits of peace on the western frontier and sought to overcome any difficulty related to the Habsburg palace by diplomatic means rather than military actions from the treaty of Zsítvatorok in 1606 until the day Ineu (Borosjenő) was captured in 1658 by Köprülü Mehmed Pasha (Petr Štěpánek, “War and Peace in the West (1644/5): A Dilemma at the Threshold of Feckility?”, Archiv orientální, 69/2 (2001), pp. 327-340). Georg Wagner assessed the Ottoman policy towards the Habsburg Empire during the Thirty Years’ War on the basis of the notes held by the Austrian envoy Hermann Czernin von Chudenitz’s second visit to Constantinople (“Österreich und die Osmanen im Dreißigjährigen Krieg. Hermann Czernins Großbotschaft nach Konstantinopel 1644/45”, Mitteilungen des Oberösterreichischen Landesarchivs, 14 (1984), pp. 325-392).

financial burden created by the Venetian war from 1645 onwards. In only eight years following the enthronement of Mehmed IV in 1648, thirteen grand viziers were replaced by their rivals: one died a natural death; two were executed, three resigned, and seven were removed from the office by the sultan.

So, in the middle of the 17th century, Ottoman political society was craving an independent grand vizierate office with a reasonable amount of liberty in decision-making. The anonymous writer of Kitâb-ı Müstetâb, who most probably presented his work to Osman II (1618–22), appealed to the Ottoman sultan to grant unlimited authority to a selected grand vizier in the government. He admitted that, according to the established political customs in the empire, the vizier second in rank should replace the grand vizier. He claimed, however, that the administrative system had been so severely impaired to that day that in order to retrieve the governmental posts from the incompetent hands in charge, the Ottoman sultan had to search and find the most talented and eligible person regardless of his rank and standing in the empire. Koçi Bey, in his report to Murad IV (1623–40), warned the Sultan of the hazardous effects of dismissing the grand viziers for trivial reasons and maintained that the state would benefit much more from the viziers who would occupy this glorious office for longer periods. Kâtip Çelebi elaborated this view in his renowned advice work of 1653, Düstûrü’l-Amel li-Islâhi’l-Halel (Norms of Activity for the Reform of Defectivity) in which he claimed that in order to revert the seemingly unavoidable decay in the empire a sâhibü’s-seyf (man of the sword) should take complete control of state affairs. Kâtip Çelebi did not believe in a turn of events so he extended the political responsibility over a wide range of ruling strata: the ‘man of the sword’ would not be necessarily a sultan; it might well be a grand vizier. More interestingly, Kâtip Çelebi could only submit his work to Mehmed IV and probably his mother Turhan Hatice Sultan in 1656, a few months before Köprülü Mehmed Pasha rose to the head of the Ottoman administrative system. In 1654, two years before Mehmed Pasha was appointed grand vizier, the vizierial residence was moved out of the imperial palace which heralded the coming independency of Ottoman bureaucratic authority from the Ottoman dynastic house. It is not very likely that Mehmed IV and the queen mother had studied lit-

8] For an overall assessment of the political circumstances in the early 1650s which paved the way to Köprülü Mehmed’s rise to the grand vizierate see İ. Metin Kunt, “Naima, Köprüli, and the
erature on political advice, produced and submitted to them by Ottoman intellectuals and statesmen in the 17th century, in search of ideas to help them form a new governmental structure for the empire. Yet, the mere existence of such treaties indicates the changing expectation of the Ottoman public which was becoming more and more receptive to a long-term authoritarian government which would lay emphasis on social order rather than social justice.

Köprülü Mehmed Pasha fulfilled the expectations of those who wanted to see the janissary corps in far-off frontiers fighting the infidels rather than wreaking havoc in the heart of the empire. Mehmed Pasha spent his last few years as the grand vizier and, in 1661, contrary to all established political practice in the Ottoman Empire, managed to hand down the office to his son, Fazıl Ahmed. In Fazıl Ahmed's tenure, the pillars of a 'government of hawks' began to rise: the sons and son-in-laws (Kıbleli Mustafa, Kaplan Mustafa, Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa, Siyavuş) of the Köprülü House held high-ranking state offices at different times for the next half century or so. The pride of the family, Fazıl Ahmed Pasha, remained the head of the Ottoman central administration from 1661 till his death in 1676, an admittedly long period for such an office in Ottoman history. Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha, who was raised in the Köprülü House, undertook the deceased Grand Vizier's responsibilities for the following seven years - again a fairly generous span of time in comparison to the political circumstances in the first half of the 17th century. In fact, Ottoman notables such as Minkârîzâde Yahya Efendi⁹, Vani Mehmed Efendi¹⁰, Ahmed Pasha¹¹, and

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⁹ Minkârîzâde Yahya Efendi became sheikh al-islam on 21 November 1662 and held the office until he resigned due to health problems on 21 February 1674 (Mehmet İpşirli, "Minkârîzâde Yahyâ Efendi", Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, XXX (2005), pp. 114-115).

¹⁰ Vani Mehmed Efendi came to Constantinople in 1661 upon Fazıl Ahmed's invitation and was granted an audience by Mehmed IV the same year. As the sultan's preacher, he continued to be a highly influential figure in Ottoman politics until 1683. He lost his privileged status in the aftermath of the Ottoman siege army's defeat in Vienna that also wiped out the Köprülü hegemony in the Ottoman central administration (Erdoğan Pazarbaşı, "Mehmed Efendi, Vani", Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, XXVIII (2003), pp. 458-459). He was an unrelenting supporter of the Kadızadeli movement. For an assessment of Vani Mehmed's role in Ottoman domestic and foreign politics see Marc David Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Empire, New York: Oxford University Press 2008, pp. 109-119.

¹¹ Ahmed Pasha was appointed imperial treasurer in 1661 (Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmâni, I, Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire 1308, p. 223; II, 1311, p. 195 [The work is reproduced in Westmead: Gregg International Publishers, 1971]). He was granted the rank of vizier on August 4, 1665 (Abdurrahman Abdı Paşa, Vękâyi'-nâme, Osmanlı Tarihi (1648–1682), prep. Fahri Ç. Derin, İstanbul: Çamlıca, 2008 p. 200) and remained in his office, uninterrupted, for thirteen years. In 1680, he was the governor-general in Kamianets-Podilskyi and continued to assume leading roles in the Köprülü's political plans (Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, The Ottoman Survey Register of
Acemzâde Hüseyin Efendi\textsuperscript{12} who became a part of the Fazıl Ahmed’s government in the early 1660’s also had outstandingly long careers which altogether underlined the strength and consistency of the administrative structure established by the Köprülü viziers.

For many contemporary observers, the policy the Köprülü government would pursue was already unfolded in Mehmed Pasha’s lifetime. Claes Rålamb, the Swedish envoy to Constantinople from the summer of 1657 to February 1658, extolled the bloody tranquility the tyrannical Ottoman Grand Vizier secured in the empire\textsuperscript{13}. Paul Rycaut, the private secretary of the English ambassador to the Ottoman capital in 1660–67, albeit with rather ambiguous statements, knew well that Köprülü Mehmed Pasha urged the young sultan to wage multiple wars in order to keep the trouble-making kapikulu troops busy along the border lines\textsuperscript{14}. Simon Reniger, the Habsburg resident to Constantinople (1645–69), in his Finalrelation submitted to the Habsburg Emperor Leopold I in April 1666, propelled the view that the Ottoman Empire was built on war. Mehmed IV, from his very early childhood, grew under the menacing shadow of the central army stationed around the imperial palace, so when Köprülü Mehmed Pasha advised him to set everlasting goals for his military, the then juvenile sultan ardently complied with the offer and sent successive Ottoman field forces to the empire’s western frontiers\textsuperscript{15}.

Kürd Hatib, in defense of the strict Köprülü authority in his time, seems to have deliberately constructed his historical narrative around the circumstances Köprülü Mehmed Pasha obtained the office of the grand vizierate. In his narrative,

\textsuperscript{12} Acemzâde Hüseyin Efendi became re’is ül-küttâb in 1663 in lieu of Şamizâde Mehmed Efendi who was executed during the siege of Érsekújvár. He composed the treaty text of Vasvár the following year (Mustafa Zühdi, Ravzatü’l-Gazâ, I.Ü. TY. 2488, fols. 37b-39b). He participated in the campaigns of Crete (1666–70) and Kamianets-Podilsky (1672) in the company of Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Pasha (Ahmed Resmi Efendi, Halîfetü’r-Rü’esâ, publ. M. İlgürel–R. Ahiskalı, İstanbul: Enderun Kitabevi 1992, pp. 41-42).
\textsuperscript{15} “Sein Reich ist auf Krieg fundiert, hat er keinen Krieg, so hat er innerliche Unruhen und Sublevationen ...” Österreichisches Staatsarchiv [OeStA], Kriegsarchiv [KA], \textit{Alte Feldakten 156}, Finalrelation of Simon Reniger von Renningen, 27 April 1666, in “Manna Scripta 1651–1666”, fol. 69a.
Kürd Hatib turns a blind eye to the fact that Mehmed Pasha’s candidacy for the head of the government was not approved by a wide range of Ottoman notables of the period and, by referring to the discourse of the ‘man of the sword’, implies that Köprülü Mehmed’s rise to power was completely natural as there were no other statesmen at the time capable of running the Ottoman administrative apparatus in times of crises. According to Kürd Hatib, in the troublesome days the Venetian fleet blockaded the Dardanelles, Grand Vizier Boynueğri Mehmed Pasha was instructed to break the Venetian line and make a safe passage for Ottoman ships transporting reinforcements, munitions, and provision to the Ottoman soldiers stuck on the island of Crete. Boynueğri Mehmed, however, timidly declared that such a task exceeded his capabilities and renounced his post: “The office of the grand vizierate became unclaimed” wrote Kürd Hatib. In 1656, Ottoman dignitaries assembled a council to announce the most suitable candidate for the vacant post. Köprülü Mehmed Pasha assumed the command of the Ottoman fleet that would set sail against the Venetian forces that same year and thus began his glowing career in Ottoman politics.

Köprülü Mehmed Pasha and the Transylvanian Question

In March 1657, not long after becoming the grand vizier, Köprülü Mehmed executed the Greek Patriarch Parthenios III in Constantinople who was accused of taking part in a plot against the Ottoman rule. He was believed to have secretly supported the ‘rebellious’ Christians in Wallachia and after his letter to Constantin Şerban, the voivode of Wallachia, was intercepted by the Ottomans the Greek patriarch found himself on a scaffold in Parmakkapı, a small district in the Ottoman capital. Marc D. Baer assumes that the execution of the spiritual head of the Greek Orthodox Church in Constantinople was linked with the fading freedom in religious matters in the 17th-century Ottoman Empire. However, this incident seems to be better explained by Rákóczi II’s increasing influence over Wallachia and Moldavia in the 1650s. In 1653–57, György Rákóczi II, in an attempt to secure control over the two neighboring principalities, used a method of combined diplomatic pressure and sheer force and succeeded in eventually bringing Georghe Ştefan, the voivode of Moldavia, and Constantin Şerban, the voivode of Wallachia, under his rule. In 1655, a riot broke out

16] Dördüncü Mehmed Saltanatında İstanbul: Risâle-i Kürd Hatîb, by H. Ahmet Arslantdır, Murat Kocaaslan, İstanbul: Okur Akademi 2014, p. 34.


in the Wallachian army which was soon backed by certain social groups in the country and the newly-elected voivode Constantin Şerban had to take refuge in Ottoman territory. When the overthrown ruler pleaded György Rákóczi II to help him regain his throne, the Transylvanian prince entered Wallachian soil at the head of his army, an action which was initially supported by Ottoman authorities. Rákóczi II, nevertheless, left several Transylvanian troops back in Wallachia and took with him 32 cannons captured during the clashes against the rebel army; a move that altogether raised suspicion in Ottoman political circles. The Ottomans, however, were going through a time of crisis and could do nothing but leave the ‘northern affairs’ in the hands of Fazlı Pasha, the Governor-General of Silistra at the time\textsuperscript{19}. Seemingly, Rákóczi II was disfavored by the Ottoman decision-makers well before he ventured in his disastrous campaign into Poland in 1657. The relations between the vigorous Transylvanian prince and the Ottomans were obviously embittered: in the year Köprülü Mehmed Pasha ordered Parthenios’ dead body to be dropped in the placid waters of the Golden Horn, he also ordered Adil Giray (1665–70), the khan of Crimea, to unleash the Tatar horsemen and pillage the Transylvanian countryside.

The Ottoman government was not happy with the political and military alliance between Rákóczi II and Karl X Gustav, the King of Sweden (1654–60). The Swedish King promised Rákóczi II the Polish crown who in return invaded Poland with a mighty army in 1657. Rákóczi II most probably knew well that the Ottomans would not approve his action against the Polish kingdom and he did not seek the permission of the Sublime Porte. Ottoman historiography, deceived by the recurring stereotypes in local sources, has tended to view Rákóczi II’s Polish 1657 campaign as nothing more than the presumptuous act of disobedience of a vassal who owed absolute allegiance to the Porte. In the second half of the 1650s, however, the prime concern of the political entities partaking in the Northern War (1655–60) was to decide the fortune of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Swedes, now backed by Rákóczi II, who had become a political and military power in Transylvania, believed that it was time to deliver a fatal blow to the Polish forces\textsuperscript{20}. The political leaders in the Habsburg and Ottoman courts, however, favored the continuation of the status quo and helped the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to repel foreign invasions, espe-

\textsuperscript{19} Gábor Kármán, “György Rákóczi’s Attempt to Establish a Local Power Base among the Tributaries of the Ottoman Empire 1653–1657”, Power and Influence in South-Eastern Europe, 16th–19th Century, Berlin: LIT Verlag pp. 229-244.

cially by prompting the Tatar hordes to fight in cooperation with the Polish armies\textsuperscript{21}.

Karl X Gustav sent two envoys, one after the other, to the Ottoman capital and sought to convince the Ottoman dignitaries that the Swedish-Transylvanian alliance was not detrimental to Ottoman interests, an argument eventually rejected by the Ottoman government. Claes Rålamb, the first Swedish envoy, arrived at Constantinople in May 1657. A month later, Gotthard Wellingk joined the Swedish embassy bringing the latest instructions from the Swedish King\textsuperscript{22}. Köprülü Mehmed Pasha stated that Rákóczi II launched an attack on a foreign kingdom without obtaining the consent of the Sultan and thus invoked the wrath of the Ottoman state. According to Claes Rålamb's account, he was doing his best to reconcile the relations between Rákóczi II and the Ottoman government when the news of Rákóczi's defeat in Poland quashed all remaining hope. The Transylvanian representatives in Constantinople were imprisoned and the Swedish envoys were deprived of the privilege of an audience with the Sultan before embarking on the journey back to their country\textsuperscript{23}.

Following the events that occurred in the spring of 1657, the Ottoman government, and above all Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, was not inclined towards a peaceful solution that involved Rákóczi György II. In fact, the 1657 campaign of the Transylvanian ruler was surely ill-timed. The reaction of the Ottoman capital


\textsuperscript{23} Claes Rålamb, pp. 94-98. The Swedish envoy was hosted in April 1657 by Rákóczi György II's mother who was worried about the Porte's future plans for her son (pp. 26-27).
to the changes in Transylvanian politics could presumably be easily controlled at
when the Ottoman central administration was held by a low profile government,
as opposed to the absolute authority gained by the Köprülü family. Simon Reniger,
the Habsburg resident in Constantinople, was most probably alarmed by Köprülü
Mehmed's unyielding stance in Transylvanian matters. In early December 1657,
he departed from the Ottoman capital for Adrianople where he would be able to
keep abreast of the latest developments in the palace and government circles24.

Köprülü Mehmed was stepping forward and taking initiative in Ottoman
foreign policy planning. In the autumn of 1657, he invited Mehmed IV to Adri-
anople to discuss the details of an Ottoman move against Transylvania25. Frankly,
for the Köprülü elites who favored the end of the reconciliatory policies pursued
for the past decades by former governments, Rákóczi II's attempts to create a pow-
er base in Eastern Europe were in no way acceptable. In June 1658, Mehmed Pasha
moved with an Ottoman army to crash the forces of Rákóczi who deposed Ferenc
Rhédey from the Transylvanian throne early in that year and regained control of
the country. The Ottoman forces captured the fortress of Ineu (Borosjenő) in Sep-
tember 1658, during which time Köprülü Mehmed's disdain for Rákóczi György
II became widely known to his contemporaries. According to Evliya Çelebi, the
renowned 17th-century Ottoman traveler, the reason Mehmed Pasha urged the
Tatars to sack Transylvanian lands the previous year - at least according to many -
was that he held an unrelieved grudge against Rákóczi György I (1630–48), the fa-
ther of Rákóczi György II26. There, indeed, seems to have been a strife between the
Köprülü and Rákóczi Houses as far back as 1645 when Köprülü Mehmed Pasha
was the governor-general in Eger27. Rákóczi György II knew well that there was

24) Prime Ministry's Ottoman Archives, İstanbul [BOA], Mühimme Deferterleri [MD] 92, p. 56/262
(7–16 December 1657).
26) “Hânüm, ibtidâ Köprülü Egre paşası iken bizim Rakofçi kral ile hasm idi. Şimdi vezîr olup
intikâm almak ister” (Evliya Çelebi b. Derviş Mehmed Zilli, Evliyâ Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi,
5. Kitap: Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi Bağdat 307 Numaralı Yzmanının Transkripsiyonu-Dizini,
27) Although Köprülü Mehmed's tenure as governor-general in Eger has convincingly been
established by József Blaskovics more than half a century ago, modern Ottoman historiography
seems widely to have omitted the fact. József Blaskovics, "Beiträge zur Lebensgeschichte des
Yusuf Blaşkoviç, "Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’nın Macarca Bir Ahidnamesi", Türküyat Mecmuası, 15
államférri életrajzának kérdőjelei", Keletkutatás, Spring 2010, pp. 107-113), provides much
more precise data on the term of Köprülü Mehmed's office in Eger on the basis of his studies of
the Ottoman registers of appointment.
not much he could do about this old-time animosity. In November 1658, he wrote to Mehmed IV, in conformity with what Evliya Çelebi wrote in his travelogue, complaining to the Ottoman Sultan that Köprülü Mehmed came to blows with his father when he was in Eger and was now seeking unjust revenge from him.\(^{28}\)

Julius Heinrich Wogni, the Habsburg ambassador, in his report of September 5, 1658 from the Ottoman camp, provided more details on this personal enmity: according to what he had learned from the Turks, Rákóczi I in one of his letters ridiculed Köprülü Mehmed who was the Governor-General of Eger at the time, a fact that greatly offended the latter.\(^{29}\)

This is not, of course, an attempt to claim that the Köprülü family planned and executed the Ottoman foreign policy in the 1650s and 60s according to their personal ambitions or individual resentments. Nevertheless, according to political scientists studying the birth of the early modern state, the boundaries of state and government power, were not duly distinguished in the middle of the 17\(^{th}\) century and the Köprülüs were able to exercise a great amount of authority in their own right. In the end, Köprülüs' despite of Rákóczi rule in Transylvania accorded well with the Porte's military goals of extending the empire's territories deeper into its northern neighbors. The Ottoman troops took Ineu in 1658 and Oradea (Nagyvárad) in 1660, in two successive campaigns that unveiled the Ottomans' eagerness to put Transylvania under tighter control, if not a direct rule. Rákóczi György II, in this regard, had already been prejudged by the Köprülüs to be unsuitable as an ally to the Ottoman armies operating for the Porte's interests along the Transylvanian border.

The Ottoman chronicler Hasan Vecîhî claimed that in the autumn of 1658, Köprülü Mehmed wanted to seize Rákóczi in person. Rákóczi II, nonetheless, crossed the Tisza River and retreated to his hereditary possessions under the Habsburg rule,\(^{30}\) causing a major diplomatic problem between the Ottoman and Habsburg palaces. He also related that, around this time, Tatar raiding parties,

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29 “… er ein alte passion auf ihme hat, in deme er ungefahr 8 Jahren Bassa zue Agria wahre hat ihm der Ragozi etlicher unterthanen wegen einen spöttlichen brief, auch ihme darinen minrirret geschriben, weliches er bis aniezo ad notam genomben, und auf alle weis sich wider ihme zurechen suheht.” OeStA, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv [HHSTA], Türkei I/130, Konv. II, fol. 131. Szabolcs Hadnagy, “Köprülü Mehmed”, p. 110.

supported by a group of Cossack warriors, extended their incursions to Alba Julia (Gyulafehérvár/Weißenburg), the princely seat of Rákóczi II in Transylvania. According to Ottoman sources, if Köprülü Mehmed Pasha had not been forced to return to the Ottoman capital to face the rebellious coalition led by Abaza Hasan Pasha demanding his immediate dismissal from the grand vizierate, he would have surely wished to continue the Transylvanian campaign in 1658 and put an end to the ‘Rákóczi nuisance’ once and for all. Instead, the Ottoman government installed Barcsay Ákos to the throne in October 1658, disregarding the election right of the Transylvanian estates. Köprülü Mehmed increased the amount of the tribute to be paid annually by the Transylvanian ruler to the Ottoman treasury from 15,000 ducats to 40,000 – ramming the new power balance down the new regime’s throat from the very first day. This sum was to be added to the money owed by the Transylvanians to the Ottomans for the expenditures of the latest military engagements. Köprülü Mehmed seemed to have been trying to cut the financial strings of those who might attempt to raise the Transylvanian principality back on its feet. Along with this, the Ottoman Grand Vizier harshly warned the newly-enthroned Transylvanian ruler that he should never forget the evil-minded nature of troublemaker Rákóczi II. Barcsay Ákos, in turn, promised in a letter of oath he signed on September 14, 1658 - under Köprülü Mehmed’s penetrating eyes - that he would make no contact, officially or secretly, with György Rákóczi II; and would do anything in his power to seize him, and if he were to succeed, would deliver him to the Ottoman government. In fact, Köprülü Mehmed seemed truly frustrated that he could not complete the task he had undertaken and had allowed Rákóczi II to escape. The fourth article of the protocol between Barcsay Ákos and Kenan Pasha, the Governor-General of Buda, revealed, as I see

31) Hasan Vecihi, pp. 176-177.
33) Barcsay Ákos agreed to pay a yearly amount of 40,000 ducats (sikke-i hasene in the Ottoman document, equaling 6,400,000 akçe) to the Ottoman treasury in exchange for the fixed poll tax of the inhabitants living in Transylvania (BOA, İbnülemin-Hariciye, 109/1). He rendered 400,000 akçe as part of the payment on June 28, 1658 (BOA, İbnülemin-Hariciye, 109/3-4). For the Ottoman version of the treaty concluded between Barcsay Ákos and the Ottoman government see İ. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, “Barcsay Akos’un Erdel Kırallığına Ait Bazı Orijinal Vesikalara”, Tarih Dergisi, IV/7 (1952), pp. 55-59.
34) “… ve dahî şart iderüz ki Görgi Rakoci ile ne gizli ve ne âşikâre dostluk itmeyp annila asla bir muâmelemez olmaya belki anı düşmen bilüp zikr olunan Görgi Rakoci’yi iki vovodalar ile bile ele getürmege sa’y ideyüz ve elimize girüler ise Âsitâne-i saâdete ısrâl ideyüz …” (İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, “Barcsay Akos’un Erdel Kırallığına”, p. 61).
A Transylvanian Ruler Out of Place: György Rákóczi II and the Habsburg-Ottoman Rivalry

From the Ottoman perspective, or more precisely from the standpoint they wanted to impose on the Habsburgs, the solution to the Transylvanian problem was hindered by the ‘mere existence’ of György Rákóczi II. In fact, the Habsburg Emperor Leopold I also did not have a great opinion of the runaway ruler of Transylvania who had taken refuge in his domains. However, the Rákóczi’s estates in Hungary were intermingled with those of the empire and it was beyond any doubt that a ruler directly enthroned by the Ottomans in Transylvania would turn the region’s political equilibrium upside down. A coalition of Hungarian noblemen led by the Nádasdy, Zrínyi, and Batthyány families impelled Leopold to take action against the impending Ottoman interference in Upper Hungary. The Köprülü government planned to benefit from Leopold I’s difficult circumstances and looked for ways to exploit the problems created by Rákóczi’s unwelcome stay in Habsburg lands.

August von Mayern, the Habsburg internuntius who visited the Ottoman palace in August 1659, was promptly rebuffed by the Ottomans when he started his audience on how to tranquilize the political disturbances in Transylvania. He received no other answer than what had hitherto been told to Simon Reniger who discussed Rákóczi’s future several times with the Ottoman Grand Vizier and the re’is ül-küttâb (chief of clerks). S. Reniger, on behalf of the Habsburg palace, had offered a common way to keep Barcsay and Rákóczi together in Transylvania which was vigorously rejected by Ottoman officers who demanded the handing over of György Rákóczi II, dead or alive. This time, the Ottoman government asked for the ‘practically impossible’ from August von Mayern and sent word to

37] August von Mayern was granted an audience with the sultan on August 12, 1659. Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa, s. 139; Mehmed Halife, Tarih-i Gılmanî, prep. Ertuğrul Oral, unpublished PhD, Marmara University, Istanbul, 2000, p. 69; Silahdâr Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, Silahdâr Târîhi, I, Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası 1928, p. 166.
38] OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I/131, Konv. I, fols. 68a-74b, from Simon Reniger to Leopold I, 16 March 1659, Constantinople and Türkei I/131, Konv. I, fols. 95a-96b, from Simon Reniger to Leopold I, 7 April 1659, Constantinople.
Leopold I to deliver the refugee prince to Ottoman hands. Mehmed IV, as was expected, paid little attention to the Habsburg internuntius and simply told him that the ‘Erdel affairs’ rested completely on Köprülü Mehmed Pasha. The Ottoman Grand Vizier did not hold back in his letter to Leopold I: György Rákóczi II was to be killed - as long as he was alive the peace between the Habsburg and Ottoman palaces would be at stake.

The Ottoman government was using Rákóczi as a pretext to further interfere with Transylvanian affairs. It was unimaginable for Leopold I to comply with the Ottoman demands and surrender Rákóczi to the Porte. This would only undermine the Habsburg influence on the Hungarian nobility in Transylvania, as well as in Royal Hungary, if not bring down the imperial reputation altogether. Köprülü Mehmed was well aware that Leopold I could do nothing but hold on to György Rákóczi II; by asking Rákóczi’s confinement by the Habsburg authorities, he obviously intended to gain a political edge over the Ottomans’ age-old rival and to stoke up the tension that already existed in Transylvania.

The Ottoman envoy Süleyman Agha arrived in December 1659 at Vienna in order to congratulate Leopold on his imperial accession. Apart from this, in a private talk in the quarters allocated to the Turkish embassy, he assured Budai Zsigmond, the negotiator of Barcsay Ákos who was then on the Transylvanian throne, that the Porte would back his master against Rákóczi’s attempts to retake the seat at all costs. The Ottomans, in any event, disliked the idea of a united and larger kingdom of Hungary which several noble families in Transylvania appeared to fancy under the banner of a mighty leader like György Rákóczi II. Rákóczi II had already demonstrated that he was capable of gathering and leading troops into battle whereas the Ottomans preferred someone who would be in no position to take up arms on his own initiative. György Rákóczi II eventually lost the struggle against Barcsay Ákos who gained the support of the Ottoman forces and in May 1660, died of the wounds he received in the battle of Gyula where he fought

39) “Çasarın maksûdu elbette beynimizde mün’akid olan sulhu ri’ayet ise ol bî-dîni ele getirip Der-i devlete ırsâl etsin” (Naîmâ Mustafa Efendi, IV, p. 1836).


41) Note Köprülü Mehmed’s statements in his letter to the Emperor: “… ol hâ’in Rakofci … beher hâl vâcûdî izâlde olunmak lázm idüği ve hayâtda oldukca fitne vû fesâd ile dostluğa ihtilâl virmekden hâlî olmayaçağı …”; “… ol mel’ûnun dünyâdan gitmesi her ne cânibden mümkün olursa …”; “… vûcûd-ı habîs-âlûdının def’ ü izâlesine takayyüd olunmak ümid olunur …” (Münselâtî’s-Selâtîn, II, p. 418).

against Seydi Ahmed Pasha, the Governor-General of Buda.

**The Ottoman Foreign Policy and the Köprülüls**

The chain of events which took place in the aftermath of György Rákóczi II’s death blatantly displays the Köprülü government’s intended plans. Köprülü Mehmed Pasha now asked for the deceased prince's son Ferenc and his widowed mother Zsófia Báthori. In fact, one can readily claim that the Ottoman government’s insistence on the total destruction of the Rákóczi was in perfect line with the ‘methods of conquest’ applied by the Ottomans in the early modern period.

The Ottomans, after taking Ineu and Oradea in 1658 and 1660 respectively, reorganized them as beylerbeylik centers thus declaring their will to establish an enduring rule over the region by penetrating deeper into Transylvanian territory. The capture of Oradea, in particular, suggested a continuity in the empire's northern affairs: the Ottoman capital was always ready to annex a good slice of Transylvania whenever the opportunity arose as had been the case in the middle of the 16th century. For the Ottomans, in terms of strategic planning, cutting off the communications between the Hungarian estates in Transylvania and the Habsburg palace in Vienna was of prime importance; this was also why the Ottoman army marched towards Nové Zámky (Érsekújvár) in 1663. According to political leaders in the Ottoman capital, any political power seeking to take hold of the reins in Transylvania should find a way to take possession of the fortress of Oradea. In this conjuncture, Köprülüls were merely keeping up with the well-tested methods of expansion developed by former Ottoman sultans and dignitaries: they sought to destroy the Rákóczi in order to eliminate a well-established noble family that

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could potentially lead an anti-Ottoman resistance in Transylvania.

The Köprülü government stood firm in its aggressive policy throughout the negotiations held with the Habsburg diplomats until August 1664, when the Ottoman invading army was crushed by the allied forces on the banks of the Rába River. In the summer of 1660, however, when the news of György Rákóczi II’s death reached the Ottomans, they declared to Simon Reniger that all the family possessions left behind by the dead prince would be inherited by the Ottoman Sultan which they knew very well would do nothing but exacerbate the flames already burning down the Transylvanian country. According to the papal nuncio to Vienna, however, the Habsburg Emperor saw an open war with the Ottomans as a last resort. The palace was swarming with disturbing news coming from Royal Hungary, but Leopold did not give heed to advice for his return to Vienna and headed to Trento instead for some fresh air. Johann Ferdinand von Portia, Obersthofmeister (Lord High Chamberlain) and Geheimrat (Privy Councillor), likewise took the matters lightly and travelled with the Emperor to the south.

Leopold I, in the absence of an imperial decision by common accord, accused the Hungarian magnates of subverting the peace conditions with the Ottomans for their own sakes. Köprülü, on the other hand, were clearly announcing that they regarded the Austrian troops in Transylvanian fortresses as a casus belli whereas they never considered the withdrawal of Ottoman forces from the recently-captured Ineu and Oradea a part of the diplomatic talks.

Rákócziis were no longer on the scene but Köprülü Mehmed Pasha kept fighting in Transylvania, this time against Kemény János, the former general of György Rákóczi II, who attempted to overthrow Ottoman-backed Barcsay Ákos with the military aid he obtained from the Habsburg palace. The Ottomans justifiably considered Kemény as the heir to Rákóczi II’s ideals of self-ordained rule in Transylvania; he was the one, after all, who commanded the Transylvanian forces invading Moldavia in 1653 and Poland in 1657. In 1664, his family name was thus written side by side with that of the Rákóczi in the related article of the Treaty of Vásár which banned the Hungarian nobility in Royal Hungary from interfering with the newly-established regime (fairly favorable to the Ottoman Porte) in

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50) “Nuntiaturberichte”, p. 698 (2 August 1660, Graz).

Transylvania after the Ottoman-Habsburg war of 1663–64. In an anonymous report, most probably sent by Köse Ali Pasha, the Governor-General of Timişoara, the Ottoman central administration was warned of the activities of Kemény János in 1661: he had once again carried out a successful attack against Barcsay Ákos and secured the Transylvanian throne for himself for the second time. According to the report, Barcsay Ákos was asking for Ottoman military aid to reclaim his possessions and authority over the land. It is not easy to derive a conclusion on how the Ottoman political leaders reacted to Barcsay Ákos’s call for help, since he already proved to be a weak defender of Ottoman interests in the region, and yet the demise of Ákos in the hands of Kemény János a few months later obviously forced the Ottomans to come up with a new solution.

In this regard, those who believed in age-old feudal privileges in the principality and despised any attempt to build a united Transylvania under a mighty noble family, such as the Rákóczis, were welcomed by the Sublime Porte. Gábor Haller fitted the description well: he was said to be the power behind the curtains in the accession of Ferenc Rhédey and Barcsay Ákos to the throne, both duly approved by the Porte in spite of the discontent of Rákóczi-followers. According to Evliya Çelebi, Köse Ali Pasha who remained a prominent figure in Transylvanian affairs for a long time, had already marked Haller’s name as a potential prince who would be supportive of Ottoman interests when he rushed to Transylvania to break the forces of Kemény János in the summer of 1661. Although the Ottomans had approved Apafi Mihály’s rule in September 1661, Gábor Haller was still looked upon as an alternative choice for the Transylvanian throne for some time. He was with Ali Pasha in Timişoara the following year where he was held by Fazıl Ahmed Pasha’s order until mid-May 1663. Diplomatically speaking, Gábor Haller was to be no more than an envoy sent by Apafi Mihály, the governing prince, to the Ottoman camp. However, he was not recorded by Ottoman scribes

52] Note the statement in the Ottoman copy of the treaty: “Rakoçi oğlu ve Kemeni Yanoş oğlu ve yahûd Orta Macar bir garî kimesne zabt olunup Erdel içine asker ile gelip yeniden kil u kâle ve fitneye sebeb olmamak için ruhsat virilmeye” (BOA, İbnülemin-Hariciye, 408).

53] BOA, Bâb-ı Âsâfî, Divân-ı Hümâyûn Kalemî [A. DVN], 33/3 (1071/1661).


as an ‘envoy’ (elçi) but as a ‘dhimmi’ (a protected person, in the Ottoman sense of the word, by Islamic law and the sultan), referring to his privileged status in contrast to the Transylvanian envoys hovering around the Grand Vizier during the military struggles in 1663–64\(^{57}\). Rumor had it that Fazıl Ahmed Pasha was planning to recognize Gábor Haller rather than Apafi Mihály as legitimate successor to the Transylvanian throne. Apafi Mihály, in any event, had been suspicious of Gábor Haller’s intentions for some time, and his plot with Ali Pasha against his ‘envoy’ seemed to have drifted Gábor Haller to his tragic end in the hands of the Ottomans who killed him in the military camp in the autumn of 1663\(^{58}\).

Köprülü Mehmed aspired to obtain the Rákóczi family estates in Transylvania. In the summer of 1660, with the arrival in Constantinople of news of György Rákóczi II’s death, he promptly summoned S. Reniger, the Habsburg resident, to his presence and enounced that all the properties and land possessions left by the deceased prince would be inherited by the Sultan. In fact, the larger part of the Rákóczi estates were in the northernmost regions such as Munkács, Sárospatak and Fogaras and laid well beyond Ottoman reach\(^{59}\). According to rumors circulating in the summer of 1660, Köse Ali Pasha who was at the head of the Ottoman forces that captured Oradea in August of the same year, was reminded by an imperial order that the ultimate goal of the campaign would not be attained by the conquest of Oradea. The Sultan was also demanding the annexation of Cluj-Napoca (Kolozsvár) and ordered the Commander-in-chief of the Ottoman troops to lay claim to the Rákóczi estates in Sárospatak and Ecsed, both places in Royal Hungary under the protection of Habsburg rule\(^{60}\). According to the Habsburg resident, the Köprülü government, in effect, sent a letter to Köse Ali Pasha the same day ordering him to confiscate the properties belonging to the Rákóczi family in

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\(^{57}\) Gábor Haller received a daily allowance from the Ottoman army treasury for his expenses in the Ottoman camp between June and October 1663. BOA, Kamil Kepeci 1957, p. 36, 11–24 June 1663 (2. line), 25 June–3 July 1663 (3. line), 2–13 July 1663 (4. line), 14–21 July 1663 (4. line); p. 38, 22 July–2 August 1663 (3. line), 3–14 August 1663 (3. line); p. 40, 15–23 August 1663 (5. line), 24 August–5 September 1663 (5. line), 6–20 September 1663 (9. line); p. 42, 21 September–5 October 1663 (1. line); p. 45, 6 October–1 November 1663 (7. line).

\(^{58}\) OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I/136, Konv. I, fol. 67a, Simon Reniger’s report to Leopold I, December 30, 1663, Belgrade. Haller’s retinue at the Ottoman camp was granted permission for the return journey to Transylvania in the last days of November 1663 (SLUB Eb. 387, fol. 113a, 21–30 November 1663).


\(^{60}\) A. Huber, “Österreichs diplomatische Beziehungen zur Pforte”, pp. 532-533.
the region extending as far as Oradea and Alba Julia\textsuperscript{61}. As had been demonstrated, the Köprülü were inexorable: they wanted to extirpate the 'Rákóczi disease' completely and it was beyond imagination that they would respect the agreement reached between György Rákóczi II and Constantin Şerban, the voivode of Wallachia, transferring the estates of Şerban to György’s son after his death\textsuperscript{62}. Truly, the Köprülü’s distrust towards the Rákóczis was not unwarranted; in 1665, when the military and political borders between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires were once again in peace, Rákóczi I Ferenc, the son of György II, made a weak yet for those in Ottoman high offices disturbing attempt to reclaim the family possessions seized by the Ottomans in the most recent military struggles\textsuperscript{63}.

\textbf{Conclusion}

In the end, the power struggle between the Köprülü and Rákóczi Houses had some practical consequences. At this point, one should remember that, according to contemporary Ottoman narratives, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, until the day he was appointed grand vizier, was not a man of particular wealth. In fact, his election to the post was harshly criticized by his rivals who repeatedly voiced his need of money to insult him\textsuperscript{64}. It appears, therefore, that the Köprülü began to accumulate their family wealth sometime after 1656 when the ‘founding father’ of the House rose to the peak of the Ottoman political system. And yet, the most remarkable aspect of the family’s concentration of capital was its astonishing speed. In no longer than five years, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha was able to hand down to his son Fazıl Ahmed prosperous \textit{wakfs} controlling nearly 7,000,000 \textit{akçe}s\textsuperscript{65}.

The course of events that followed in the aftermath of the Ottoman intervention on Transylvanian matters offers an explanation of the above development. Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, the leading ‘hawk’ of Ottoman politics in the late

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item S. Reniger, \textit{Finalrelation}, fols. 35b-36a.
\item Nicolae Iorga, \textit{Studii și Documente cu Privire la Istoria Romînilor}, IV, București, 1902, pp. 54-55, doc. no. LI.
\item SLUB Eb. 387, fol. 156b (11–20 November 1665).
\item The total sum of income in the account register of the Köprülü Mehmed \textit{wakf} for the Hijri year of 1072 (1661–1662) was 6,048.397 \textit{akçe}s (BOA, \textit{Maliyeden Müdevver Defterler} [MAD], 4869, p. 4). Nonetheless, the real estates of the \textit{wakf} were rapidly increasing and most probably the \textit{wakf} treasury was endowed with a generous amount of 837,250 \textit{akçe}s the following year (see note 69 below).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
A HISTORY OF PARTNERSHIP AND COLLABORATION IN THE BALKANS

1650s, was rewarded by the Sultan for his victories with the tax income of several towns and villages in Ineu, Arad and Oradea\(^{66}\). Most remarkably, according to the Köprülü \textit{wakf} deeds of 1660 and 1661, as well as the survey register of the newly-captured area by the Ottoman imperial treasury, the Ottoman Grand Vizier took over some of the property deserted by György Rákóczi II in Transylvania. In 1661, for instance, Köse Ali Pasha was ordered to register six mills formerly belonging to \textit{Rakoçi oğlu} (the son of Rákóczi) in the town of Oradea among the assets granted by the Sultan to the \textit{wakf} established in the province by Köprülü Mehmed Pasha\(^{67}\). In Oradea, in the course of a few years, the Köprülü House seemed to get hold of a good amount of landed estates and other kinds of tenements that were expected to produce a sum of 837,250 \textit{akçe}s each year\(^{68}\). As far as can be derived from the financial records held by the central administration, at least 75,000 \textit{akçe}s of this amount would be yielded by the four mills gladly collected by the Köprülü agents in the area after they had been deserted by the Rákóczi\(^{69}\).

It must also be noted that the \textit{wakf} deeds do not record the ultimate growth of pious foundations, but provide a momentary glimpse of a continuously expanding economic corporation. Actually, the mere existence of two Köprülü \textit{wakf} deeds in just two consecutive years might well be an indication of how fast the Köprülü family was bringing immovable commodities together. In Transylvania, Köprülü Mehmed seems to have set the example for the coming generations of the Köprülü House. The first three grand viziers of the Köprülü household, Köprülü Mehmed, Fazıl Ahmed and Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa, established pious foundations in Belgrade, Tenedos, Limnos, Arad, Oradea, Ineu, Nové Zámky, Kamianets-Podilskyi, and Crete, all of which were taken or retaken for the Ottoman Empire by armies commanded by Köprülü viziers. The correlation between war, political rise, and material prosperity was quite obvious in the political career of the Köprülü\(ś\): for the most part they were among the first entrepreneurs in the aforementioned areas where the market conditions were to be reset and greatly benefited from the economic opportunities raised by the invasion of Ottoman troops in distant foreign lands.

\(^{66}\) For the deeds enlisting the revenue-generating assets of the Köprülü endowments in 1660 and 1661 see Yusuf Sağır, \textit{Vakfiyesine Göre Köprülü Mehmet Paşa Vakıfları}, unpublished master thesis, Dokuz Eylül University, İzmir 2005, pp. 47-91; for Oradea see: BOA, \textit{Tapu Tahrir Defteri} [TT] 792, pp. 43-73 and p. 84 (for Arad in Romania).

\(^{67}\) SLUB Eb. 387, fol. 33a (2–11 March 1661).

\(^{68}\) BOA, TT 792, p. 73.

\(^{69}\) Ibid. p. 42 and 73.
Despite the numerous existing problems, the Ottoman Empire represented for the Romanian decision-makers the best option to rule the Balkans. When a strong force seemed to boil against the old ruler of the Balkans, a strange fear became present in Bucharest. To express the magnitude of the anxiety, one of the leaders, the President of the Council and Foreign minister, Titu Maiorescu, considered a possible destruction of the Ottoman sovereignty in the Balkans as a true cataclysm.\footnote{Andrew Rossos, \textit{Russia and the Balkans: Inter-Balkan Rivalries and Russian Foreign Policy, 1908 – 1914}, Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1981, p. 137; I.E. Gueshoff, \textit{The Balkan League}, London: Watson & Viney Ld 1915, p. 48.} This scenario would have opened the Pandora box, a problem apparently impossible to digest by the Balkan young kingdoms. In the end, just as the leaders in Bucharest expected, the fundamental transformation triggered by the First Balkan War created a major fracture for the entire space.

The Balkan wars benefit of a consistent historiography but limited interest has been attributed to the view of the Romanian diplomatic attitude outside the border issue with Bulgaria. To analyze any aspect of the Romanian policy during the Balkan should start from the Ottoman question, the one that opened even the possibility of a frontier rectification. The way the interest of Bucharest evolved in connection with Constantinople was the subject only to limited research. This study aims to display how the Ottomans were regarded during the First Balkan War by the leaders in Romania. The argument is mainly based on the diplomatic correspondence, both Romanian and Ottoman as well as memoirs and secondary literature.

Before the autumn of 1912, Romania had been courted by the belligerent parties as the war had become more and more possible. As it has been shown before, the Balkan allies tried to bring Romania to their side as in Sofia there was a great concern for a possible Romanian-Ottoman military convention. Just one year before, in the summer of 1911, when the Ottoman heir, Iussuf Izzeddi, visited Romania, news appeared in Europe that this action confirmed the exist-
ence of a treaty between Bucharest and Constantinople. There was no military arrangement signed between the two countries as King Carol I later explained to the French minister in Bucharest in a private meeting. The sovereign gave assurances that the presumed treaty was nothing more but the invention of the press.

Romania had little desire to take part in such a dangerous affair to support an attack against the Ottoman Empire, the commander of a system that worked for Romania at that time. Still, trying to display moderation, Bucharest had no real intention of joining Muslims against Christians. The leaders in Sofia and Belgrade maintained a high degree of concern, knowing that Romanians and Ottomans had very cordial relations and Bucharest did not want a change in the area. When the Balkan League was in her making, one major issue that emerged among the Bulgarians and Serbians was the danger of having Romania involved into the fray. Journals in Sofia showed a great interest in displaying how treacherous such an attitude would be as the Romanians themselves had liberated from the Ottomans in the past. Much of the Bulgarian decision for war against the Sublime Porte had been accepted under the provision that Romania would not get involved into the clash. The intervention would have been a catastrophe. In the face of this danger, the Serbians made the Bulgarians slowly believe that Romania would stand aside.

The Ottoman Empire was regarded with a strong interest in Romania also for its role as an economic path and financial hub. Despite this, the commercial relations between the two countries recorded a low figure. The main reason why the Ottoman Empire managed to benefit of an important interest came from the dependence of the Romanian commerce on the Straits. The real “breath of oxygen” of the country, the Straits, played the decisive role in positively balancing the exports of Romania. In this regard, Romania was the second most interested country, following Russia, in the fate of the Straits. When the passage of ships had been halted during the Italo-Turkish war, the decision suffocated the Romanian commerce. Later, when the First Balkan War started, Bucharest plunged into a cash crisis. Despite the very good agricultural production, Romania had become paralyzed by the exchange rate fluctuations and numerous Western customers re-

2] Papiniu to Măiorescu, 31 August 1911, Arhivele Diplomatice ale Ministerului Afacerilor Externe (hereinafter ADMAE), fond Dosare speciale (1900-1919), vol. 100, f. 216.
oriented to the United States.\textsuperscript{6} Withing the diplomatic world, Constantinople was still regarded as a center for “high-politics” in Europe.\textsuperscript{7}

Despite the importance of Constantinople, the opinion in the Romanian capital showed that the energy in the South of Danube was understandable. The general view of the Romanians over the peoples in the Balkans allowed this attitude. Even though the status quo and the Straits were vital to Romania, the leaders in Bucharest knew that the Balkan peoples had unsolved matters with their previous patron. In the past, different regime applied to Romanians and to other peoples, as Bulgarians, Serbians or Greeks did not enjoy the level of autonomy Romanians did.\textsuperscript{8} In Bucharest, it was obvious that the reformation of the Ottoman Empire had been a mere illusion. Numerous plans had been drawn in 1903 or 1908, with considerable diplomatic backing. These simple examples made the Balkan peoples accept the idea that only their armies could lead to meaningful transformation and Italy proved to be the best example.\textsuperscript{9} The war against Italy left many open wounds on the body of the Ottoman Empire and the hungry Balkan vultures were preparing for a feast.

Aware of the sympathy existing in Bucharest, the Ottomans were extremely interested to bring Romanians to their side, which could have brought the deterrence effect on the allies. Numerous attempts have been made to secure the armed friendship of Bucharest and transfer the fear factor to the Balkan league. For the Romanian leaders, this attitude meant that the Ottomans were going through hard times and despite their official appearance, they were really afraid of the coming clouds. Just before the attack of the Montenegrin army against the Ottomans, few attempts had been made in Bucharest in hope for a positive answer. The Ottoman minister in Bucharest, Séfa Bey, had insisted to meet Maiorescu in order to secure a Romanian support against the menacing Balkan League. The encounter on September 26\textsuperscript{th} made Maiorescu note how deceived had become Séfa Bey in front of the Romanian unfavorable idleness. The Romanian Foreign minister did not reject the proposals but did not show the will to provide any consistent diplomatic or military aid to the Sublime Porte. Moreover, Maiorescu had been disappointed

\textsuperscript{8} Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale (hereinafter ADMAE), fond Diamandi Constantin, dosar 119, ff. 54-5.
\textsuperscript{9} Norman Dwight Harris, “The Effect of the Balkan Wars on European Alliances and the Future of the Ottoman Empire”, \textit{The American Political Science Review}, 8/1 (1914), p. 106.
that Séfa Bey offered nothing in exchange and expected the Romanian Foreign minister to commit himself and to declare internationally that “Romania would not remain indifferent if an action could jeopardize peace and the status-quo in the Balkans”. Maiorescu was indeed interested in this aspect but would have acted only under his sovereign indications. The Foreign minister, in a report to King Carol I, anticipated that the Ottomans would come back with more solid offers. As the threat grew, the tenacious personality of Séfa Bey made him engage talks once again with Maiorescu on October 2nd. In his report to the King, the Romanian Foreign minister recalled the words of Séfa Bey, who was eager to know what Romania would do “as a friend of Turkey”. The outcome was the same as one week before, Maiorescu showing a splendid capacity to keep the hope alive but not assume any commitment. In the end, the Romanian leader added that if the war did break out, then Romania would probably try to stay aside.

During his visit, the Ottoman minister was accompanied by the senator Nicolae Batzaria, a Romanian-Macedonian, who came to Bucharest with the goal to convince the Romanian leaders to assume a clear stance against the Balkan League. The Ottomans tried to determine Maiorescu to initiate a small mobilization along Romania’s Southern frontier. The position in Bucharest remained elusive, as Maiorescu asked the Ottomans to stop the conflict with Italy and then Romania would take other measures. For the decision-making in Bucharest, this was a very common position, determined by the personality of Maiorescu, who usually did not desire to estrange foreign representatives by directly refusing their proposals. Even though the Romanians did not provide the requested assurances, the Ottomans were completely dedicated to the cause and again pushed for a favorable solution. On October 4th, Séfa Bey received new indications from Constantinople to seduce Bucharest. The Sublime Porte expected a positive answer from Maiorescu that could simply eliminate the danger of a war with Bulgaria and probably the Balkan League. If Bucharest was ready to accept any proposal, the Ottoman Empire was ready to send a superior officer to Bucharest to settle the terms of a clear understanding between Bucharest and Constantinople.

The King had more concrete plans for the Ottoman Empire to avoid a war than his Foreign minister. Sharing the view that Romania should remain neutral, thus not offering the much desired support to the Ottomans, Carol I advised Séfa

10] Maiorescu to Carol I, 3 October 1912, ANIC, fond Casa Regală, dosar 16/1912, f. 1.
Bey to conclude peace with Italy and then outmanoeuvre the Balkan League. He considered that the weakest point of the alliance was Greece and, if the Ottoman Empire was indeed ready to make a small sacrifice, offering Crete could convince the Greek government of good intentions. At the same time, Carol I showed that Romania waited no particular gain on behalf of the Ottomans and, in the face of the storm, Bucharest decided to stay aside.

The waiting attitude of Romania at the beginning of the war deceived the Ottomans, but there were four main reasons that convinced the leaders in Bucharest that an intervention would have decisively complicated the situation in Europe. By the autumn of 1912, Bucharest had little choice as the King and his Prime-minister regarded themselves as the safety belt of the Great Powers in the area. Secondly, any individual initiative would have created a shock effect, especially at St. Petersburg and Vienna that might have easily triggered uncontrollable consequences as a result. Moreover, the war itself was considered very unlikely by the leaders in Bucharest, both for the overestimation of the Ottoman forces and for the Great Powers’ lack of desire to allow such an act. The overestimation was present especially in the capitals of the Central Powers. In Vienna, nobody got really worried that the Ottoman Empire might be defeated decisively. The Foreign minister, Leopold von Berchtold, doubted the strength of the Balkan armies, which were made of illiterate peasant infantrymen, lured by the national ideology. Some of the leaders in Europe even dreamed, especially where the national problem still made part of their agenda, that the Sublime Porte could even give an example. Vienna hoped that the victory of the Ottoman armies would simply strangle any national movement in the Balkans that menaced to undermine the empires. Finally, the internal framework of Romania proved little elasticity for such an action, the political scene being too fragile for a national consensus. The poor cooperation in the government during a tensed international situation had been invoked by Maiorescu in his resignation in October 1912. His partner in decision-making, Carol I, did not want to risk changing the political orientation

of the country and kept Maiorescu close to him.

By the end of 1912, two major opinions became visible in Romania, as a result of the pressure of the Russian diplomacy. Everything had to be reassessed based on this. Almost impossible to accept just two years ago, the possibility of joining a stance close to Russia shook the security system of Romania even though the decision-making was still under major influence of the King’s views and his partner and confident, Titu Maiorescu. They both shared the interest for the Ottoman Empire, not only for the importance of the Straits. The sovereign regarded with interest the link between Berlin and Constantinople and the presence of the German military mission in Constantinople that had started in the 19th Century.\(^{18}\)

The Foreign minister looked at the Sublime Porte with interest because he was aware that Romania could remain the strongest country in the Balkans if the Ottoman Empire survived. None of them wanted Romania to go to war, being both too old for such an outcome. Just as the Great Powers, Maiorescu tried to avoid an uncontrolled explosion of the old empire and new conflicts in the area. With such views he did not support the risky strive of the allies that could easily set into fire the Balkans. The King maintained his hope to see reforms in the Ottoman Empire. After the first initial round of fighting, the sovereign even suggested to grant both Albania and Macedonia independence, under foreign princes. What he aimed with this measure was to cut any future expansion, avoiding “the creation of a new Rumelia or Bosnia, prey for the already established neighboring kingdoms”.\(^{19}\)

Maiorescu tried to maintain the Romanian policy in good terms especially with the Great Powers, showing a vivid support for Berlin and Vienna. But his consideration went to Rome and Constantinople as well. The much debated Romanian-Ottoman convention had little meaning for him and wanted to maintain peace as much as possible and keep the Balkans under a controlled evolution.\(^{20}\) Furthermore, Maiorescu generally wanted as many options opened for the foreign policy.\(^{21}\)

When the war broke out, whatever the good will of Maiorescu to keep the relations warm with Constantinople, there was a strong will among some Romanian leaders to maintain a better relation with the Bulgarians, rather than the Ottomans. Therefore, securing the support of the decision-makers in Bucharest


\(^{19}\) Blondel to Poincaré, 3 November 1912, *DDF*, s. 3, t. IV, p. 345.


became harder. The liberals and conservative-democrats, who backed the idea of a shift in the Romanian policy, bringing her closer to the Entente, more intimate relations with Russia meant a more anti-Ottoman policy. Ever since the creation of the Balkan League, most of political figures and representatives of the public opinion considered that Russia hoped to weaken the Ottoman Empire for the day when St. Petersburg would be ready to launch the final blow.\footnote{Constantin Stere, \textit{Marele Război și politica României}, București: Editura Ziarului “Lumina” 1918, p. 185.}

Concerning the possible anti-Ottoman policy in Bucharest, shortly after his arrival in Romania as a new Russian minister in Bucharest, Nikolai Shebeko proudly reported how Romania kept on refusing the continuous Ottoman offers.\footnote{Shebeko to Sazonov, 16 October 1912, \textit{Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniiia v epohu imperializma (hereinafter MOEI), 2$^{e}$ série, part 2}, Moskva, Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo politicheskoj literatury 1940, p. 481.} His superior in St. Petersburg become aware of the Romanian policy as the Russian charge d’affaires reported that the rumours of an alliance between Bucharest and Constantinople had been invalidated by the King and the Foreign minister. The Russians closely followed the Romanian policy and the Ottoman attempts to seduce Bucharest to take military actions against the Balkan League. Despite the desire to maintain neutrality, it became visible for the Russian legation in Bucharest that “the Romanian sympathies were completely on the side of Turkey”. This was the reason why the Romanians kept the privilege “to analyze immediately any offer from the Porte”.\footnote{Lysakovskii to Sazonov, 26 August 1912, \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 91-92.}

Having interests in other countries, the leaders of the liberals and conservative-democrats, I.I.C. Brătianu and Take Ionescu, showed a little desire to get entangled in an Ottoman affair. Both politicians held important force in Romania, Brătianu being the president of the biggest opposition political party and Ionescu for having his party equally represented in the Maiorescu government. Being aware of these opinions, in a discussion with Séfa Bey at the beginning of the difficult month of November, Maiorescu admitted to the Ottoman minister that Romania avoided any military measure because it could have simply unleashed the Russian reaction. Neither Romania nor Europe was ready for such an outcome that “could trigger incalculable consequences”.\footnote{Séfa Bey to Gabriel Effendi, 6 November 1912, \textit{ODD}, VII-1, p. 207.}

Take Ionescu, who had the governmental position of the minister of Interior, was the stronghold of defending the interests of Sofia in Bucharest, always pointing out how important was the friendship with the Danube neighbor. Be-
cause of his special attention on the South, he had been accused numerous times for being a Bulgarophile and even owning a special network of spies that informed him on the course of the policy adopted in Sofia, as well as about the social transformations. Some of the leaders of the public opinion favored his actions, considering that “the main base for our foreign policy has to be a democratic understanding with the Balkan peoples and especially with Bulgaria”.26

As the despair engulfed the Ottomans after the first defeats, the Romanians were rather convinced that a support for the Sublime Porte would simply complicate Bucharest’s affairs at a time when they were becoming already more obscure, as the Russians showed a great interest for Bucharest. There was a consensus regarding the unfortunate situation in Constantinople as every Romanian leader was being informed from other sources as well. The Romanians understood that if Bucharest was not the one who could keep under control the Balkan League, the Sublime Porte would try to find other friendly faces. The hopes directed towards Austria-Hungary as the Viennese representative in Bucharest pointed out that the Ottoman Empire desired an energetic action of Austria-Hungary against Serbia, to undermine the cohesion of the Balkan Alliance.27

It is not wrong to point out that Romania was not ready for the evolution of things in the autumn of 1912. Being used to leave the foreign policy into the hands of the King and dealing with the internal affairs, the political figures in Romania had to hide the gap. The foreign representatives observed that the Romanian society became more aware of the foreign policy once the news of Ottoman defeats in the Balkans appeared. The public opinion showed more interest to follow the events and to be consulted when decisions were taken. As Russia became very present in Bucharest, the moment seemed close when Romania was obliged to choose one side.28

The Romanian elite followed the events looking at St. Petersburg and Vienna. For both these capitals, the decisions were very hard and their interests collided almost everywhere. It seemed that both wanted to get involved but their allies did not support such actions. When it became obvious at Bucharest that the pressure of the Balkan League was too strong and the Ottoman Empire would not maintain the possessions in the Balkans, the interest rose in Bucharest for the whole Oriental issue. The poor reaction had been deplored by the liberals, who

27] Maiorescu to Carol I, 5 October 1912, ANIC, fond Casa Regală, dosar 16/1912, f. 3.
28] Blondel to Poincaré, 30 November 1912, DDF, s. 3, t. IV, p. 618.
considered that that Romania “was awakened by the noise of the armies that went to war in the South and by the mobilizations that were carried out in the North”, referring to the military preparations of Austria-Hungary and Russia.\footnote{Vintilă I. Brătianu, Învățăminte: politica externă și reformele liberale, București: Editura Institutului de Arte Grafice “Flacăra” 1914, p. 8.}

The smashing of the Ottoman army at Lule Burgas woke up the Romanian leaders from a controlled lethargy. For them, it became clear that the old empire was in ruin and decisions had to be made fast in order to ensure a fair share of the gain. Without antagonizing the Sublime Porte with a direct participation in the fight, the Romanians wanted to gain something out of the war, at the expense of the allies who had been regarded with reluctance.\footnote{N. Shebeko, Souvenirs essai historique sur les origines de la guerre de 1914, Paris: Bibliothèque Diplomatique 1936, p. 141.} In Bucharest, the force of a border rectification idea was growing as the Ottoman army force was decreasing.\footnote{N. Ștefănescu-Iacint, Conflicttele româno-bulgar și austro-rus, București: Minerva 1913, p. 6.}

It was striking for the Romanian leaders to see the Ottoman Empire in his knees. Most of the military leaders in Bucharest believed that the fast initial confrontations had a stunning demoralizing effect on the Ottomans. As a central planning unit, the army General Staff, under the command of general A. Averescu, disconsidered the military force of the Balkan League. In this regard, the general tried to convince the politicians that the victories were not the outcome of good preparations of the allies, but a frightening demoralizing effect of the Ottoman army.\footnote{Lyon to Barclay, 30 December 1912, ANIC, fond Consiliul de Miniștri, dosar 1/1912, f. 7.}

As a subject of the previous Ottoman system, the Romanians considered justified the idea of gaining benefits as the old suzerain crumbled. Moreover, this was doubled by the assumption that no other country in the Balkans should be allowed to threaten Romania’s supremacy as a third gendarme of the area, after Russia and Austria-Hungary. After the first round of military defeats, the interest over the fate of the Ottoman Empire started to decrease in Bucharest and the foreign policy became entangled in the border dispute with Bulgaria.

Even the possibility of a Constantinople conquest by the allies, that the Ottoman Foreign minister Gabriel Effendi considered a calamity with “fatal proportions of which thinking makes us tremble”, did not stir anymore the Romanians.\footnote{Gabriel Effendi to the Ottoman ambassadors in London, Paris, Vienna, Berlin and St. Petersburg, 7 November 1912, ODD, VII-1, p. 210.} The imminent disaster of the Ottoman army against Bulgarians and the coming decisive battle of Çatalca made the leaders in Bucharest exchange some views, but...
no measure was to be taken outside the international framework. Paralelly with the Ottoman efforts in the capitals of the Great Powers, in Bucharest, Séfa Bey strived to convince the Romanians “to make use of all the means to prevent the entrance of Bulgarians into Constantinople”.

There was indeed little that the Romanians could do at that moment outside the international consensus. Under the apocalyptic calls of Gabriel Effendi to keep Constantinople safe, the attitude of other capitals in Europe showed how little desire existed to save the dying Ottoman Empire. Unfortunately, there were just the Russians who seemed interested to keep Constantinople untouched by the menacing Bulgarian armies. The ones that received the highest degree of respect in Bucharest, the Germans, who had seemed so dedicated to the Oriental affairs for the previous years, regarded the whole tension presented by the Ottomans and Russians as exaggerated. The government in Berlin was convinced that “the situation was not under any circumstance desperate”. For the Germans, the solution was to keep a rational attitude and to prepare the defence lines. If Germany was convinced, then Romanians, with their interests directed somewhere else, seemed ready to see the decisive blow passively.

In Bucharest it was obvious that the Ottomans were passing through black days. No one had any interest in joining their side actively. Furthermore, apart from the Balkan states that showed a desire to hit as hard as possible, the Russians were making it clear that St. Petersbourg would act if any measure was prepared by the Sublime Porte against the Russian interests. St. Petersbourg had assumed long before the self-proclaimed role of the Christian protector in the Ottoman Empire. This “right” made Russia recruit troops on behalf of the Balkan peoples even before 1912. Consequently, these actions made Russia act not jointly with the other Powers, but against their will, hoping to gain a full supervision of the Balkans.

As the Ottoman fleet prepared to back the actions of the army, Russia made it clear that any incursion of the Ottoman warships in the Black Sea determined St. Petersbourg to assume an active stance to “protect the commercial interests”.

39] Sazonov to M. Giers, 11 October 1912, MOEI, s. 2, t. XX-2, p. 420.
the leaders in Bucharest, apart from the visible fist of the Balkan League, there was another one that came from the North, from St. Petersbourg, that pushed the Ottoman Empire into a corner, with little room for maneuver.

The clashes around Çatalca cleared the atmosphere in Bucharest as it became obvious that the peace negotiations would soon follow. The allied forces did not have the strength and fierceness to pierce the defense lines before Constantinople. Gaining a first small strategic advantage, the Ottomans wanted more, Séfa Bey asking for initiation of peace preliminaries and a short mobilization of Romanians against Bulgarians to speed up the process. Maiorescu agreed to create the framework just for peace preliminaries and not a peace treaty, as the Ottomans desired. The proposal of mobilization was again seen with reluctance in Bucharest.40

Moreover, one more reason made the leaders in Bucharest lose their interest for the Ottomans. As the Great Powers and Romania sent ships to protect Constantinople, the disembarked troops found a different situation of what they had been told. In Bucharest and elsewhere in the capitals of the Great Powers it became clear that the situation with the civilians was not as dark as it had been pointed out by the Ottoman diplomacy. The sailors from the ships sent to save Constantinople in the face of a Bulgarian invasion reported that the people still followed their daily life and easily got in contact with the foreigners. The mission was very short by all means, in the Romanian case. Nicolae Mişu, the Romanian minister at Constantinople, reported that the fifty sailors had nothing to do in the calm situation they found in the city. The Romanians sailors stayed for just a day in Constantinople, pleasantly enjoying Galata area.41 From the reports, it became obvious that the Ottomans had enough war and the tragedy was over.

The armistice concluded on December 3rd maintained the disputed opinion over the Ottomans in Romania. Before that, the leaders that generally favored the allies’ campaign, even feared that the Sublime Porte would force a counteroffensive and erase the gains of the Balkan League. But the Ottoman Empire had many issues to settle before thinking of a countermeasure.42 In Bucharest, not everyone was glad that Constantinople had not been conquered, just like in some other European capitals. In Rome, the German ambassador, G. von Jagow, admitted in a private talk: “it would have been better for Bulgaria to take Constantinople as

40] Iordache, Criza politică, p. 193.
well, so that Europe can finally end up with this dangerous question. With Constantinople left to Turkey, the problem will be resurrected, probably, under the pressure of Russia.”

Just as the diplomats in Europe were ready to settle the European Ottoman territory, Gabriel Effendi tried again to secure the Romanian sympathy during negotiations. As Mișu had been nominated as the Romanian representative to the Conference of the ambassadors, the Ottoman government supported Osman Nizami Pasha, ambassador in Berlin, in his endeavour to show his true appreciation for Romania. He hoped to secure King Carol’s I good will, striving to stop in Bucharest on his way to London. The Ottoman Foreign minister strived to have his ambassador received by the Romanians and insisted on Mișu to convince his superior to meet Osman Nizami Pasha. Gabriel Effendi pointed out how important such a step would have been in order to cultivate extraordinary relations with Romania in Constantinople. Even though he was considered as “one of the most serious representatives of Turkey and deserving all trust”, Osman Nizami Pasha did not manage to see the King on his way to London.

From Bucharest, during the peace negotiations the Ottoman tragedy seemed over and there was little to be done. Still, by the Romanians’ standard, the Sublime Porte did not face a true catastrophe. The fact that the three strongest fortresses remained in the Ottoman hands showed that hope still existed in Constantinople. To some extent, this approach was right as all three strongholds have been conquered in the spring of the next year. Romania considered the situation very complicated but looked at her issue with Bulgaria before deploring the others.

Maiorescu and King Carol I assumed that the Ottomans would not make their situation even harder and accept the harsh negotiation terms. They were aware that the authorities of the Ottoman Empire, under the Gran Vizier Kamil Pasha, brought in a liberal phase in Constantinople. As the pressure increased in London to have a treaty concluded, the Ottomans accepted on the first day of 1913 the loss of all territory west of Adrianople and refused to concede the Aegean Is-

lands. In Constantinople, many opposed the conciliatory policy of Kamil Pasha.\textsuperscript{48} Even under the terms agreed by the Ottomans, both Bulgaria and Greece decided to reject the proposal and the negotiations halted. No party wanted to cede after January 6\textsuperscript{th}.\textsuperscript{49}

In Bucharest and in other European capitals, it became clear that the situation could not be suspended indefinitely. The possibility to engage again in the battle lured the Ottoman leaders even though they had been warned that such a decision would simply worsen their situation. If the warnings were moderate in Bucharest, they were loud in St. Petersburg, where the Russian Foreign minister, Sergei Sazonov, made it clear to Turkhan Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador, that the moment came when Russia could not stand aside anymore. The outburst ended in the same menacing note as Sazonov said to Turkhan Pasha: “you have nothing to gain recommencing the hostilities but you have much to lose”.\textsuperscript{50}

In the tensed steps undertaken by the Powers, a new concern was produced with the arrival of the Romanian minister of Agriculture, Nicolae Filipescu, in Constantinople at the beginning of January 1913. Vienna had been the first to ask about the purpose of such a visit. The theme of the Romanian-Ottoman secret military convention was again resurrected.\textsuperscript{51} The rumour had again no real fundament, but both countries wanted to make sure the mutual interest was not lost. Bucharest was facing an even stronger opposition from Bulgaria and the public opinion became louder. By that time, in Romania, the defeat of the Ottoman Empire had even become the instrument of the anti-government leaders of the public opinion. Among them, I. Grădişteanu considered that the Romanian policy followed a very unfortunate path of mistakes and therefore the Romanians were “the second fallen, after the Turks”.\textsuperscript{52} As the opposition was launching attacks on the government, Maiorescu was interested to find out which were the plans in Constantinople. On the other side, the Ottoman Empire deliberately expressed the regret for Take Ionescu’s mission in London and pointed out that Bulgaria was blindly forgetting about the danger from the North.\textsuperscript{53} Bucharest was getting each

\textsuperscript{49} Hall, The Balkan Wars, p. 71.
\textsuperscript{50} Turkhan Pasha to Gabriel Effendi, 24 December 1912, ODD, VII-1, p. 331.
\textsuperscript{51} Mavrocordat to Maiorescu, 12 January 1913, ADMAE, fond Dosare speciale (1900-1919), vol. 103, f. 1.
\textsuperscript{52} Gheorghe Zbuchea, România și războaiele balcanice 1912-1913, București: Albatros 1999, p. 378.
\textsuperscript{53} Essaf Bey to Gabriel Effendi, 17 January 1913, ODD, VII-1, p. 400.
day more demanding on Sofia to finish the negotiations for the border rectification. The elusive answers of the Bulgarians who asked for more time irritated even more the leaders in Bucharest. In Sofia, the strategy assumed was to engage the problems separately, trying to sign an agreement with the Ottoman Empire and then to deal with the Romanian claims.\(^{54}\)

Faced with these conditions, Maiorescu and Carol I did not criticize the coup in Constantinople on January 23\(^{rd}\). On that day, the Young Turks, under the command of Enver Pasha, took the power and showed little interest to negotiate further on with the Balkan League.\(^{55}\) As a hero of the revolution in 1908, he obliged Kamil Pasha to resign, holding a revolver in his hand.\(^{56}\) What he proposed was a more rigid system, avoiding the liberalization started by his predecessor. Kamil Pasha constantly looked at the German model, which he proposed as the main instrument to reach his goals.\(^{57}\)

Even though the Romanian leaders considered unfavorable the situation of the Ottoman Empire, the change of government in Constantinople was regarded as favorable for the Romanian interests. One of the Conservative leaders even pointed out that the change was a great opportunity to resurrect and “prepare our solution”, referring to the border issue.\(^{58}\) Even Maiorescu defined clearly the position of the Romanian government, showing that the European accuses for the violent change of power in Constantinople had no echo in Bucharest. He even went so far as declaring that a collective menacing note against the new Ottoman leaders was a wrong measure.\(^{59}\) Following the pressure he had to face at home, Maiorescu was very interested to see if the outcome of the events in Constantinople would lead again to war.

Even if the new authorities in Constantinople did not share much of the policy of the previous leaders, the attention for Bucharest was maintained, under the limits of the Balkan question. Most of the diplomatic correspondence with the Powers was forwarded to Bucharest as well.\(^{60}\) At that initial stage, it represented a cordial action, not a true sympathy. After the ultimatum of the allies had expired,

\(^{54}\) Shebeko to Sazonov, 20 January 1913, ANIC, fond Xerografii Rusia, pack XVIII, act 21/1913, f. 3.

\(^{55}\) Hall, *The Balkan Wars*, p. 78.

\(^{56}\) Dumon and Georgeon, “Moartea unui imperiu”, p. 514.

\(^{57}\) Becker, “La guerre”, p. 10.

\(^{58}\) Marghiloman, *Note politice*, vol. 1, p. 141.


the new Romanian minister in Constantinople, Gh. Manu, reported that the society seemed ready for war, no matter what the Great Powers, Romania or anyone else had to say. Just as they did four months before, the Ottomans were readier to fight than to accept the conditions of the kingdoms in the Balkans. On February 3rd, the fights resumed on all the fortresses and defense lines that Constantinople still controlled: Ioannina, Scutari, Adrianople and Catalca.

The Romanian leaders considered that the Ottomans were preparing to face their biggest test, because they were not supposed just to defend themselves as in the first part of the war, but to fight back and regain some territories. The task was very difficult as the condition of the army still promised no success. In Bucharest, this reckless decision opened the possibility to gain the so much desired area of South Dobrogea. After the war resumed, Bucharest looked less and less to Constantinople and kept a bigger attention for St. Petersburg. The Ottoman Empire also watched Russia with great interest as Essad Bey showed to Maiorescu. But the confidence of the Ottoman representative in the army and the opinion that Russia could not act outside the framework established by the Powers made Maiorescu believe that Constantinople regained some confidence for the next clashes.

What happened in the second part of the First Balkan War looked stunningly similar with the previous campaign. The allies tried to conquer the last points controlled by the Ottomans and the later strived to resist. From Romania, Constantinople seemed to be in a very delicate position and the Ottoman capital could become again threatened. Despite this true premonition, as the renewal of the fighting in the Balkans was seen as a chance, Romania rapidly lost her interest for the events outside her border dispute. Even the decisive fall of Adrianople fortress at the end of March, considered to be the best fortified Ottoman position, created a little stir. At that time, Bucharest faced an internal political debate over the Conference in St. Petersburg, to finally deal with the border rectification issue.

With the fall of Adrianople, the allies were again, just as in November 1912, a few kilometers far from the Ottoman capital. In Bucharest, the impact had been considerably smaller as the Romanians had become readier to see such an outcome. For the Russians, following the same pattern as in November 1912, the plan to curtail a possible entrance of the foreign armies in Constantinople was reactivated. At best, St. Petersburg hoped to have and international fleet dispatched.

62 Igor Despot, The Balkan Wars in the Eyes of the Warring Parties: Perceptions and Interpretations, Bloomington: iUniverse 2012, p. 120.
63 Turkhan Pasha to Said Halim Pasha, 29 January 1913, ODD, VII-1, p. 428.
to the Dardanelles. Since consensus was impossible, Sazonov prepared a Russian expeditionary force to defend the city. At his latest attempt, Sazonov declared to the French ambassador in St. Petersburg: “the moment comes when we have to arrest what we claim.” Finally, the Russian troops did not take over Constantinople; Çatalca resisted again. When it became obvious for the Bulgarian generals that the effort to pierce the defensive lines asked for a formidable endurance, they agreed to come to terms with the Ottomans. Constantinople was safe.

On April 16th, 1913 a truce has been drawn at Çatalca, as the Bulgarians and Ottomans had no strength to fight on. Both parties understood that there was little to gain from the further conflict. Everyone was too exhausted to force a final battle after so many prolonged sieges. The truce had also been forced by the more present disputes of Sofia with his allies and even more pressing, with Romania.

In Bucharest, after the truce, the Ottoman Empire reached a nadir in terms of interest. The outcomes of the Protocol in St. Petersburg and the disputes among allies occupied the agenda of the Romanian leaders. The negotiations and even the peace treaty with the defeated Ottoman Empire did not receive a considerable attention. The Ottoman Empire, just as the Romanians anticipated, lost almost all the European territory with just a small buffer zone to protect Constantinople. As there was not much to lose anymore, Bucharest regarded the Ottomans in a safe point of the Balkan, as their fight seemed over. Instead, the Romanians were getting even more prepared to fight as the allies were too. The tension was in the air between Serbians, Greeks and Bulgarians but a breeze of tranquility blew from Constantinople.

The outcome of the war was immense for the Ottoman Empire. Centuries-old expansion in Europe had been erased in several months. Only few walls defended the capital in front of a future attack. The social tension generated by the population loss and displacement, but also from the disruption of communities in other areas of the empire, prepared the erosion of authority. At least 60% of

64] Louis to Poincaré, 20 November 1912, DDF, s. 3, t. IV, p. 513.
69] Bulgaria, an account of the Political Events during the Balkans Wars, Chicago: Macedon-Bulgarian Central Committee 1919, p. 13.
the Muslim population in the Balkans had to flee and find a new home within the reduced borders of the empire. For some countries, like the allies or Russia, this represented a demographical cleaning. For the Ottoman Empire, it meant a real catastrophe.\textsuperscript{71}

The Romanians’ viewpoint in the First Balkan War was based on the past of the young kingdom. The leaders in Bucharest learned well their lesson in the previous decades, keeping their possibilities opened. This attitude became possible because Romania understood her favorable position, as the Northern outpost of the Balkans and the biggest among these kingdoms. The Great Powers and the belligerents in the First Balkan War treated with great interest the Romanian position. Among all, the Ottoman Empire hoped the most to see Romania into the conflict.

For the leaders in Bucharest, the importance of the Ottoman affairs grew when Romanian interests were put to the test. Despite a vivid interest of the Austro-Hungarian diplomacy to direct Romania towards East, the Oriental problem played a relatively limited importance for the ruling circles in Bucharest. Furthermore, foreign policy had been just a tangential point of the government and political forces.\textsuperscript{72} The conflicts between the political parties on internal matters had always narrowed the view for events outside the borders of the kingdom. The Balkan wars managed to change the approach. Moreover, the public opinion “discovered” the foreign policy during the Balkan wars.

The attacks against the Ottomans had been regarded with anxiety. As Bucharest had no strategy to face the possible disappearance of the Ottoman authority in the Balkans, the leaders did not support the war and hoped to see a short campaign and the Ottomans victorious. When the cataclysm became a reality, it seemed that there was nothing more to be done by the Ottomans. The defeats produced a massive shock in Bucharest and the idleness stopped. Each step back of the Ottomans meant a step forward for the Romanians. Only the change of power in Constantinople at the beginning of 1913 brought again the Ottoman affairs into attention. This time, the stubborness of the Sublime Porte played the game Romania needed.

The secret alliance between Bucharest and Constantinople, even though it has been repeatedly denied by the Romanian leaders, continued to represent a topic among diplomats in Europe. Only the end of the First Balkan War demon-


\textsuperscript{72} Ştefănescu-Iacint, \textit{Conflictele}, p. 3.
strated that the rumours had no real source. Later, the Second Balkan War showed that Romania and the Ottoman Empire joined the same camp, not because they had a treaty, but because their enemy was common and Bucharest was finally ready to fight. In July 1913, it was the Romanian army’s campaign that convinced the Ottomans that the time was ripe to take back some land lost during the First Balkan War. By that time, in Bucharest, there was little interest for the Sublime Porte. Romanians had already entered into a period of intoxication of their own power.
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ON THE VERGE OF WAR: “ACTIVISTS” VERSUS “NEUTRALISTS”. THEPOSITION OF NICOLAE IONESCU

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I. Introduction
When Nicolae Ionescu was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs at the end of July 1876, the political situation at home was strained. Not that the external setting stood very differently. At the time, and later in historiography an answer to the question of why was Nicolae Ionescu appointed, was sought. Several hypotheses have been circulated.

Therefore, this paper aims to highlight the contribution of Nicolae Ionescu in the debate that grinded the Romanian society in the months leading to the Russo-Turkish conflict. Although sympathetic to the attempts of the peoples from the Ottoman Empire to emancipate, Ionescu was not willing to relinquish at any time his neutralist conceptions. While he did not reject the need to defend the country in case of war, he believed that the Romanian politicians must take whatever possible caution in order to avoid it. His image, as it was recorded in the memoirs of the time, and later in historiography remains that of a convinced neutralist.

The study will focus on three main coordinates. Firstly, we will try to analyze the source of Nicolae Ionescu’s neutralist thinking, thus reporting to the interests of the Great Powers in the area, bringing up the deep roots of his Russophobia and also the affinity for maintaining good diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire. Later, we will consider the impact of his ideological outlook in the foreign policy actions that Romania embarked on during this period. In the end, the paper will examine the manner in which Ionescu’s mandate as Minister of Foreign Affairs had influenced the domestic political game as well as the view of the external events other politicians of the era shared.

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II. Ionescu’s Appointment

Firstly, we will first try to respond briefly to the question: why Nicolae Ionescu? Why was he considered the most appropriate person to hold the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs. Further, we proposed four possible hypotheses. The first of these also concerns Mihail Kogalniceanu, former Foreign Minister of Romania. Taking advantage of the fact that the Serbian-Turkish war broke out in June 1876, he made seven requests to the Ottoman Empire, demands which have deeply discontented the European public opinion.

Another hypothesis of Nicolae Ionescu’s appointment is related with the domestic political situation of the time. Looking at the position in which Ion Brătianu, Prime Minister of Romania, in July 1876, was, we may assumethat he needed political support of one of the groups that „controlled” Moldova, namely Nicolae Ionescu’s group. The only groups that represented a power pole in Moldova were the „fractionists” and „Junimea”. The latter group supported Brătianu’s opponent Lascar Catargiu, so the only option was to seek Ionescu’s help.

A third hypothesis converges to the idea that Ionescu’s appointment was made because of his character, which would have allowed Brătianu and Charles I to control him. Mihail Polihroniade, a Romanian historian had its own view on this topic. He explained Nicolae Ionescu’s appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs by Brătianu’s need to have a member of his government from Moldova, but „given the human qualities of Ionescu it seemed a little dangerous considering the external complications of the time”. It is Polihroniade who captures the essence when he states that „over the head of poor Nicolae Ionescu are Ion Brătianu and Charles I”.

The fourth hypothesis was launched by the historian A.D. Xenopol and according to him the appointment of Nicolae Ionescu as Minister for Foreign Affairs was due to his strong neutralist position: „Under such a facade, Ion Brătianu could negotiate with Russia, without raising any suspicion in Europe”.

III. Neutralist Conceptions

Nicolae Ionescu was throughout his tenure as Foreign Minister, with few exceptions, a convinced neutralist. We will try to review the main causes that led to this.

A. The Ottoman Danger

Nicolae Ionescu continued to view the Ottoman Empire as an extremely high risk, despite the apparent weakness of this state, therefore he believed that any action against the Turks would lead to the destruction of Romania as a state. A possible change in foreign policy was view by Nicolae Ionescu as a visionary action for the Romanians, an action for which they were not ready, and if anything were to change, the very existence of the Romanian people would be endangered.

For Ionescu, keeping a good relationship with Turkey was also the only thing that could have guaranteed the existence of Romania. While sympathizing with the Balkan peoples’ attempts to liberate themselves from the Ottoman ruling, Ionescu believed that relinquishing neutrality would lead to a change of heart from the Turkish side and attract a devastating war on Romanian territory.

B. An Alliance With The Turks And The British

In Ionescu’s opinion, Romania’s foreign policy should have been based on two pillars: the Ottoman Empire and England. While talking about the Ottomans, Ionescu proposed neutrality and maintaining good diplomatic relations, as to England his expectations were higher. He saw in this country a fair judge for the situation in the region and an ally against Russian claims, claims that frightened Ionescu.

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(Cucerirea independenței României 1877-1878, Bucharest: Științifică 1967, p. 32).


7] L’etat Roumain et la paix d’Orient. Neutralisation de la Roumanie, Bucharest: Szolloszy-Libraire Editeur 1877, p. 44. The brochure is not sign by Nicolae Ionescu but it is attributed to him by prince Carol itself who in a letter to his father makes the following confession: “I am sending you some brochures; one of them L’etat Roumain et la paix d’Orient, is written by the current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ionescu, whose name however is not stated on the front page of the brochure” (As stated in Memoriile regelui Carol I al României de un martor ocular, vol. III (1876-1877), ed. S. Neagoe, București: Machiavelli 1994, p. 104).
C. The country is unprepared for war

It was also Ionescu who believed that Romania is not ready to face a major war in the Balkans. By adopting a neutralist position in case of a hypothetical conflict, the country would have the chance to continue the process of modernization which was underway. Romania needed peace and quiet to develop in order to preserve and enhance the constitutional regime and to preserve its material resources.8

D. A State Far Too Small

Ionescu perceived Romania as a small country that could not afford „to challenge any of our powerful neighbors”, and that ultimately could not change anything by itself in that part of the continent, change that should have come from Europe which is „strong enough and united enough”. He was willing to defend neutrality by any means („this neutrality must be kept with our blood, and if we were to die it will be wrapped in the folds of the national flag, we will do so if it is needed”). Nicolae Ionescu also wanted an equal status for all people who were still more or less under the formal suzerainty of Turkey („what must be done for us must be done for other people too”)9.

E. Lack Of Better Deals

For Ionescu supporting neutrality meant at that time the only way through which Romania could progress internally, the only way to maintain good diplomatic relations with the Great Powers and finally, as he himself admits „we do not have before us any deals that could persuade us to get out of this neutrality”10.

F. Ionescu’s Solutions

1. Confederation

England was, according to Ionescu, the only state capable of solving the existing situation in the Balkans. He regretted that the British could not identify the only viable solution in this case, namely the formation of a number of independent or autonomous states or an Eastern confederation, as he called it. Mansfield, the English consul saw Nicolae Ionescu’s ideas as dangerous as possible, for if they had been put into practice: „Every province of the Ottoman Empire would find an

8] Ibid., p. 44; Dan Berindei, „Representants etrangers a Bucarest et l’independance de Roumanie (1875-1877)”, Revue Roumaine d’histoire, Bucharest, tom 16, no. 4 April-June 1977, p. 286.
10] Ibid. p. 6522.
excuse concerning race, language or religion to become independent and so the dismantling of Turkey would become a fait accompli”

But by putting this project into effect, Ionescu did not want to achieve the complete disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, for only the survival of the state would have provided protection to the Christian peoples in its borders. Another idea of Nicolae Ionescu regarding this topic was a Christian states of the Danube confederation.

2. The Buffer State

According to Nicolae Ionescu while talking about the geopolitical situation in Europe, Romania should play the role of a „buffer state” between Russia and Turkey, and therefore it deserved a special attention from European diplomacy: „Romania is the only way through which Russia can penetrate the heart of the European territories of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, if this space would become neutral it could block any Slavic invasion into the Balkans”. His conclusion was that supporting a neutral Romanian state was the only way that peace could have been preserved in the Orient.

3. Making An Example Of Romania

Moreover, he considered that Romania was at the time an example to be followed by the Balkan people: „It is to give an example to the Slavic people beyond the Danube, it is to show them by which means they can also reach at a free life”. But this example should be offered peacefully, because „Romania is peaceful, and as a pacifist state, it holds nothing in common with the current unrest other people from the Ottoman Empire share”.

IV. External Actions

During Nicolae Ionescu’s mandate we can distinguish some very important events that happened abroad. The way Romania reacted to them was also influenced by the neutralist concepts of the Foreign Minister in office.

A. The Conflict Between The Serbs And The Turks

Russia wanted to carry guns towards Serbia. Ionescu was forced to adopt a

11) Ibid.
14) L’etat Roumain et la paix d’Orient..., pp. 46-47.
15) Ibid., p. 48.
16) Ibid.
duplicitous position that dreaded him. He accepted some clandestine transports, although internationally he denied everything. Idealistic enough, he wanted to keep good relations with both Russia and the Ottoman Empire, but as it was seen during the first months in office, this was hardly possible.

Even in the early days in office, on July 30 / August 11, to be exact, Nicolae Ionescu was asked by the Russians to grant ambulances the right to transit the Romanian territory. He agreed. Three days later he was writing to George Vernescu, Minister of Internal Affairs that Romania as a signatory of the Geneva Convention, could not prevent the granting of medical aid to belligerents, therefore Russian ambulances should be guaranteed safe passage.

In a telegram from 12/24 August 1876, to the prefect of Mehedinti, a town near the Serbian border, Nicolae Ionescu was saying that “tomorrow or the day after a Russian ambulance with ten sisters of charity will pass through the county. You are kindly asked to facilitate the free passage of the Danube and relieve the vehicles of any review.” Turkish officials became aware of this and faced Ionescu with information which claimed that on the Romanian territory about 60,000 rifles were transported to Serbia. The Romanian Minister vehemently denied the allegations, claiming Romania was still neutral in relation to the Russo-Turkish conflict which was in full swing.

In Vienna, for example, there were flat concerns about the Romanian status regarding the conflict in the immediate vicinity. But Austrian politicians now more than ever relied on the fact that the Foreign Minister will know how to impose his own terms in order to preserve neutrality.

B. The Meeting In Livadia

Another highlight of the first part of Nicolae Ionescu’s mandate as Minister for Foreign Affairs, was the meeting held in Livadia and therefore the subsequent Russo-Romanian negotiations with which he was more or less up to date.

About the meeting in Livadia, Nicolae Ionescu found a series of accurate information, as we shall see, much later. The presence and purpose of the Romanian delegation at Livadia were almost unknown to Nicolae Ionescu: “Our delegation in Livadia and concentration of troops, are particularly intriguing to all diplomatic circle. I am bombarded with embarrassing questions and I respond

with high reserve as I am most ignorant.”

A solid proof of the fact that Nicolae Ionescu knew nothing about the real purpose of the meeting in Livadia is also the conversation that he had with the representative of Italy in Bucharest, to whom he said that “the mission in Livadia does not hide alliance projects; it is a simple act of courtesy from which Romanian govern could not abstain itself after a similar gesture was made with regards to the Emperor Franz Joseph.”

Although, he thought Brătianu was going to Livadia to advocate Romania’s neutrality had the opportunity arose, contrary to popular belief some of his contemporaries shared, Nicolae Ionescu did not deny possible talks with the Russian side as to the passage of troops through Romania.

Nicolae Ionescu receives precise information about the meeting in Livadia only on 7/19 October. Thus, he was informed that the Romanian delegation was received with honors, Chancellor Gorchakov arriving the same day at the encounter. As long as Brătianu and the Romanian delegation were at Livadia, neither the Tsar nor the Chancellor wanted to discuss politics. The discussions were focused, as was Ionescu was told on the issue of non-participation from the Romanian side in the conflict in Serbia and on the number of armed forces that the Romanian army had.

Nicolae Ionescu was not the only one who did not know the details of the meeting in Livadia. The English consul was convinced that during the meeting the officials did not discuss the possibility of moving Russian troops on Romanian territory and that the Foreign Minister will keep him posted with every movement of Brătianu. Although Bucharest was full of rumors that Romanian politics would turn to Russia, the English disregarded these allegations based on reports coming from Nicolae Ionescu.

Despite these assurances, the English consul weighed the existence of a double play coming from the Romanian government. But he conveyed his total surprise in London related to the assumption that the Foreign Minister had not been informed about this.

22] Ibid.
23] Baron Fava to Luigi Amadeo Melegari, 28 September/10 October 1876, Bucharest; D.I.R., I/II, pp. 188-193.
25] Ibid.
26] Ibid, file 200.
27] Ibid, file 201.
Charles Mansfield did not take into account that Nicolae Ionescu did not know the political aspect of the meeting in Livadia because of its position. Ionescu was in favor of maintaining strict neutrality, good relations with the Ottoman Empire, and supported the idea of obtaining the independence exclusively by diplomatic means. On the other hand, Henry Elliot, British ambassador to Constantinople, was convinced that in Livadia, Romania and Russia have reached an agreement.

C. The Constantinople Conference

December meant for Nicolae Ionescu a new opportunity to make his voice heard internally, but especially abroad. He hoped that the Constantinople Conference would give him the opportunity to convince once and for all the Great Powers of the need to maintain strict neutrality from Romania’s side.

Nicolae Ionescu constantly tried to persuade Charles Mansfield, to intervene in the ruling circles from London in order for England to support his point of view at the Constantinople Conference in December. That was the need for Romania to remain a neutral state and for the Great Powers to officially recognize it. The English Consul replied to him that although the British government was willing to discuss any matter of foreign policy with representatives from Romania, practically no guarantee could have been offered. Despite the evasive answer given by the English side, Ion Ghica told Ionescu that “I think we won England for our cause”.

Throughout the conference, he claimed the same thing: Romania wants her neutrality to be guaranteed by the Great Powers, and the country will do anything to avoid war. This raises the question: why did Nicolae Ionescu adopt this attitude? Was it Brătianu who „advised” him to act like this in order to use him as a shield or was Nicolae Ionescu so convinced of the justice of his cause and of the success of his actions that a backup plan did not interest him? It is hard to say, in the absence of direct evidence from him.

The Great Powers had different interests. Although they appreciated Nicolae Ionescu’s dedication, they did not see kindly his audacity to criticize so openly the Ottoman Constitution. They, however, were comforted by the idea that, most likely, Ionescu would fail. Mansfield explains Nicolae Ionescu’s position via the image that Russia had in the Romanian space „hatred of Russia is infinite in all


classes in Romania, and the fear of suffering a breakdown and sharing the fate of Poland, prevails any other considerations.\(^{30}\)

The news regarding the emergence of the new Turkish Constitution, according to which Romania became a privileged province of the Ottoman Empire, took by surprise the Romanian political class. The fact that the Turks officially recognized the name of Romania, would be used by Nicolae Ionescu to gain political capital, given the fact that he had always considered that a good relationship with the Ottoman Empire would translate into benefits for the Romanian state.\(^{31}\) Ionescu’s political opponents ridiculed him because of his overflowing enthusiasm, enthusiasm which actually died when he realized that Romania was regarded by the Turks as a „privileged province”.

A.D. Xenopol hypothesized that Nicolae Ionescu had not protested so vigorously against the Ottoman Constitution out of his own conviction, but rather because of the way he was manipulated by Ion C. Brătianu because the latter „needed to upset the Turks as much as possible so he convinced Mr. Ionescu to intensify his protests”\(^{32}\). Carefully analyzing the events of these months we can truly say that Ionescu was strongly influenced by Brătianu, but also that his protests were arising mainly because of his neutralist conception.

**V. Internal Actions**

If the external actions of Nicolae Ionescu had no chance of success, his position was also rapidly decaying internally. The ministerial crisis in late January was the perfect time for the opposition press to start an unprecedented campaign against Nicolae Ionescu: he was the main culprit for the failures of Romanian foreign policy. As mentioned above, Ionescu’s appointment was linked to the internal political rivalries. As the leader of one of the influential political groups, his external actions have been analyzed in the light of the internal political games.

He was not the only neutralist. Neither Carp, D.A. Sturdza, Epureanu or Dimitrie Brătianu wanted a war. But they were not the foreign ministers, Nicolae Ionescu was. His image, as it was recorded in the memoirs of the time, and later in historiography remained that of a convinced neutralist. The shifting on the international stage preceding the year 1877, led the Romanian society to seriously

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reconsider the possibility of an alliance with the powerful neighbor from the East. But Nicolae Ionescu could not conceive the fact that Romania's foreign policy could pursue such a course.

Following the military conflict and during it, those who supported Romania's participation in the war with Russia enjoyed a privileged position. They were portrayed as true patriots, active people who did not hesitate to choose the path of action in order to achieve their goals\(^{33}\). Ion C. Brătianu and C.A. Rosetti, considered to be the main supporters of this path, were seen at the time as free spirits able to speculate „Prince Charles’ wish for military glory”\(^{34}\).

The last two months of Nicolae Ionescu’s mandate were marked by the general insecurity that reigned among Romanian society. His activity was quite limited and was narrowed to addressing diplomatic notes to Romanian agents and to the latest attempts to defend a neutralist conception which was becoming day by day even more utopian.

On 25 March / 6 April 1877, Nicolae Ionescu resigned and was replaced by Ion Câmpineanu\(^{35}\). About the reasons which led Nicolae Ionescu to this decision, we had many views, including the idea according to which it were his neutralist views that led to this decision. Charles himself supported this assumption when he said that Ionescu resigned voluntarily because he was against any agreement with Russia\(^{36}\).

**VI. Conclusions**

Twenty years after 1876, Nicolae Ionescu was still claiming that neutrality was the best solution despite the obvious outcome: „Our position was very delicate. We said it was for the best to be neutral, not to interfere in the war, on the one hand because the Russians had not made us a clear proposal\(^{37}\), and on the other because we could not have any sympathy for the cruelties of the Turks”\(^{38}\).


\(^{37}\) As it was seen above, there have been discussions with Russia all through his mandate, only that he was not aware of them.

\(^{38}\) Nicolae Ionescu „Un episod din istoria contemporană: luarea Griviţei”, in *Analele Academiei Române. Partea administrativă și dezbaterile*, seria II, tom XIX, Bucharest: Institutul de Arte
In conclusion, we may say that Nicolae Ionescu’s ideas were not necessarily antagonistic with the desire to see an independent Romania. Perhaps he wanted this as much as Brătianu or Kogalniceanu, but unlike them, he lacked the courage to act.
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ATTEMPTS OF DIPLOMATIC MEDIATIONS OF THE ROMANIAN STATE REGARDING THE ITALO-TURKISH CONFLICT (1911-1912)

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Radu Ștefan Racovițan*

Within the Balkan space, the evolution of the relationships between countries was determined by the territorial configuration established in Berlin in 1878. The Albanian territories, Thracia, Epirus and Macedonia, still administered by Constantinople, were totally or to some extent looked-for by the Balkan countries, but also by Italy, Austro-Hungary and Russia, interested in extending their rule and influence over the area.

Italy felt at the same time the need to become one of the important colonial nations. The ways of bringing forward the Tripolitan question were carefully prepared. As soon as 1910, the Italian government protested several times against the Turkish authorities subjective policy towards their Italian subjects. Italy believed in the possibility that Turkey would consider passing over this territory, without marching into the war, since it had misunderstandings with all the major European powers, in spite of the fact that the Turkophile policy of Germany and Austro-Hungary could create some inconveniences.

The ongoing of the Italian-Turkish war raised new problems for the Great Powers, grouped in the two political-military alliances, and had major implications for the states in the South-East Europe.

As for Romania, the situation became complicated because of some important modifications that occurred by the beginning of 1908 in South-East Europe, mainly as a result of a certain reorientation of the Austro-Hungarian external politics. Taking advantage of the situation created within the Ottoman Empire that was had to face the Young Turk Revolution, together with the uncertainties regarding a previous agreement with Russia, the Austro-Hungarian Empire resorted to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovine. Aproximately at the same

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time, Bulgaria, united with Rumelia, proclaimed itself Kingdom\(^1\).

Italy was in need of having its place among the colonial nations. It had came to terms with France and the United Kingdom comparable to that established with Russia, by which the special interests regarding Tripolitania and Lybia were legitimated. As for the Central Powers, they committed themselves in having no opposition regarding a future occupation of these two territories by the Italian colonists.

The ways of bringing to the front the tripolitanian question were carefully prepared. Early in 1910, the Italian government protested on various occasions against the unfair attitude of Turkish authorities to the Italian subjects. The Italian press related the issue at length, utterly complaining that the Italian citizens were mistreated by the local Turkish authorities. The problem became an important issue even within the debates of the Italian Parliament\(^2\). In addition, from the diplomatic correspondence exchanged with the Sublime Porte resulted that the Italian government wanted to make known its position according to which no other state was allowed to benefit from the economic development of Tripolitania.

Such attitude was caused by the denial of the Tripolitania’s governor to grant some Italian companies the commissioning of the deposits under concession, having in view that an American company was allowed to do it without auction. It was also stated that the Italian firms were systematically removed from all the operations performed in this region because of the Turkey’s suspicion about the increase of the Italian influence in Tripolis\(^3\). The conquest of this region can be considered as the final act of dividing Africa until the First World War. Only the small Republic of Liberia and the Abisinian Kingdom still enjoyed the right of questionable freedom throughout the African continent.

Taking advantage from the tensed situation between France, England and Germany, together with the agony of the Ottoman Empire, despite the Young Turk Revolution or the fact that the occupation of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica would not bother too much the Austro-Hungarian Empire, too focused on the Balkan area, in 16/30\(^{th}\) of September 1911, the Italian representative in Constantinople delivered an ultimatum to the grand vizier by which he demanded the retreat of the Turkish garrison from Tripolis\(^4\).

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3) “Anglia contra Italiei în chestiunea Tripolisului”/“England against Italy in the question of Tripolis”, *Românul*, nr. 45, București : 25\(^{th}\) of February /10\(^{th}\) of March 1911, p. 5.
4) “Turcia a respins ultimatum-ul Italiei”/“Turkey rejected Italy’s ultimatum”, *Românul*, nr.203, București : 17/30\(^{th}\) of September 1911, p.4.
There are many reasons for the outburst of the war: first of all, Tripolitania was aimed at for a long time by the Italian experts since it had a strategic importance - together with Sicily - in dominating that particular Mediterranean coast. Another reason was the fact that, on the distance between Alexandria and Tunis, there was a single harbour, namely Tripolis, settled on the way of the ships going to either Egypt or the Suez Channel, being the closest point to the vast surface of Sudan throughout the African seacoast. The demographic increase recorded in the peninsula was also of a great importance because people did no longer have enough supplies for living. Among the 14 countries of Europe that provided records of the biggest emigration, Italia placed itself on the second rank, after Iceland, with percent of its population. That is why Tripolitania was viewed by the Italian government as the proper place for colonization.

The Italian government believed in the possibility that Turkey would concede this territory without any war because, as we have already mentioned, Italy had already had agreements with all the European great powers, although the politics of Germany and Austro-Hungary that were to Turkey’s advantage could raise some inconvenients.

Fearing of the fact that was to be confirmed shortly afterwards, namely the Balkan states that took advantage of the difficult situation of Turkey in order to declare war to the Sublime Porte with the result of unbalancing the force relations from the South Danube, the Romanian government upheld an intense diplomatic activity for the cessation of hostilities between Italy and the Ottoman Empire. Thus, by the requirement of the diplomats in Rome, with the consent of the Ministrieship from Bucharest, the secretary of the Romanian delegation in Sofia, C. Langa-Rășcanu, personally delivered the peace offers on behalf of the Italian government by the end of October 1911. Despite the fact that the mission of the Romanian diplomat did not have immediate results since the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mustafa Assim-bey, rejected the Italian offer, it seems that this way of contact between the two belligerent nations kept being open and the Romanian government even played the role of mediator. In order to support this idea, the note of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Di San Giuliano, dating from 19th of December 1911, sent to the Italian ambassadors from London,
Paris, Berlin, Wien, Petersburg and the ministers from Bucharest, is very interesting because it provides the information about the discussion between the Italian minister and Constantin Diamandi, the Romanian minister in Rome, the latter having a close relation to the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Assim-bey. The Romanian diplomat informed his Italian counterpart that Assim-bey did not resent Italy because of this war; moreover, he expressed the belief that, as soon as the peace would have been restored, the relations between the two states would have become cordial because Italy was interested in the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and Asia. The Minister of the Foreign Affairs agreed upon such a point of view and showed his willingness to grant Turkey the peace on easy terms regarding moral and material advantages. The only condition he imposed instead was that Turkey must allow Italy in the shortest possible time full sovereignty regarding Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Likewise, the Italian minister warned his counterpart about the risk of worsening the peace conditions in case the war would have lasted longer. Diamandi was the one that informed him on the fact that Turkey was ready to cede Tripolitania, maintaining instead the sovereignty over Cyrenaica. This condition was considered unacceptable by the Italian government. Within the same discussions regarding the preservation of the territorial integrity of Turkey, Italy argued that it could not assume the obligation of declaring war to any state that would attack the Ottoman Empire, but it would find the best way by which the territorial integrity of the European and Asian Turkey could become one of the main points of the Italian foreign policy.

According to the same source, King Carol I would have inspired the peace proposal of the Ottoman government from December 1911 by which the Sublime Porte was willing to concede Tripolitania entirely, maintaining instead the nominal suzerainty of the sultan on Cyrenaica, territory that was to be ceded de facto to Italy.

These proposals were brought to the attention of the Italian Ambassador in Bucharest by King Carol I, who warned on the difficulties derived from the fact that, by proclaiming the annexation of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, an agreement based on these grounds would have been impossible. The Romanian ruler was of the opinion that the right time for such military action would have been that par-

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ticular one in which Austro-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovine because, on the one hand, there would have been one crisis instead of two, and, on the other hand, the Young Turks would not compromise themselves and could blame the old regime for territorial losses. Romania’s trade relations have hugely suffered because, until December 1911, war losses caused by war amounted to 50 millions lei. The grain traders were the ones that suffered mostly since they had contracts with Italy and were forced to denounce them having in view that they could not deliver them. Meanwhile, the flour prices decreased significantly in the country, which is why many grain traders went bankrupt.

Closing the straits caused serious problems in Italy, too, as it yearly exported to Turkey goods over 80 million pounds of value and the Italian navigation companies were engaged in intense commercial activity in Russian and Romanian harbours.

By adopting this attitude, the Romanian government, very interested in ending the conflict as soon as possible, actually insisted to solve the Tripolitanian issue problem for the benefit of Italy.

That was not the case of the Italian newspapers. Therefore, “L’Italie” published under the title “The neutrality of Romania” a telegram sent from Bucharest by which it was revealed that “the Council of Ministers was responsible for the last step of the Italian Government, which pointed out the passage through Romania of arms conveyance sent to Turkey”. Likewise, “Corriere della Serra” - in the number of 29th October 1911 - informed that the Romanian Minister in Constantinople would have informed the Sublime Porte that Romania was required to prevent the passage of arms from Germany to Turkey. The newspaper added that the delay of Romania to proclaim its neutrality proved the existence of that military agreements between the two countries that had been so much argued upon.

13] Ibidem
and had been repeatedly denied. On the same occasion, the Romanian official, Diamandi, reported that he had not been shown before any dissatisfaction regarding Romania’s attitude to the mentioned events. Nevertheless, in some environments, especially among publishers, a certain bitterness could be felt following the language of the newspapers in the country, openly hostile to the Italian actions in Tripolitania. It was also criticized the fact that the public opinion did not sustain the Italian cause and most of the Romanian newspapers would have shown very hostile to Italy and extremely friendly to Turkey.

The same Romanian official also stressed the fact that the Italian Minister in Bucharest, Baron Fasciotti, in his reports to the Consulta, would have brought to attention of the Italian governments the attitude of the Romanian press, arguing that it would represent the most significant part of the public opinion in our country.

Despite these small misunderstandings, it is clear that the Romanian government, by its Prime Minister P.P. Carp, acted in Berlin for the benefit of the Italian government, drawing attention to the Wilhelmstrasse leaders, through the German Minister in Bucharest, on the danger of collapse of the Triple Alliance in case the Central Powers would not have been supported unconditionally the third partner of Triplice.

The Romanian diplomacy placed itself in the mentioned position only to hasten the end of Turkish-Italian War that was on the verge to extend to the Aegean Sea, to open the whole issue of the straits and complicate the situation in the Balkans. By the time Italy’s intentions to send its fleet to the Dardanelles were acknowledged by Bucharest, King Carol I changed his attitude, insisting on the fact that the diplomats in Ballplatz had to draw the attention of the Italian politicians very seriously on the ominous consequences of such an action. “A closure of the straits by one of the warring countries would hit so much vital interests of Romania” - said the monarch to Prince Fürstenberg - that “to prevent this, it would be ad-hoc, and even the ally of Russia.”

16] *Ibidem*.
19] AMAE, Fund 71 (1900-1911), Telegram, Bucharest, 10th of November1911 (Fürstenberg to Aehrenthal), f. 228.
Bosphorus and Dardanelles were indeed of huge importance for Romania’s foreign trade, since, until 1914, 95 percent of global exports of the country was made by water and only 5 percent on land\(^{21}\). By the closing of the straits for trading vessels to Turkey, the situation became unpleasant for all the states. In Austro-Hungary, an entire anti-Italian party emerged, headed by the Chief of Staff, Conrad von Hötendorf, who believed that the right moment had come in order to destroy Italy, and together with it, a dangerous competition that it had been preparing to Austro-Hungary in the Balkans.

This attitude of Chief of the Austro-Hungarian army was not in accordance with that of the Foreign Affairs Minister, Count Aehrenthal, who had made a fundamental principle of his position from the good relations with Italy, hoping thereby to counterbalance Germany’s hegemony within the Triple Alliance\(^{22}\).

It seems that Wilhelm II himself was not fully satisfied with the situation, since the results of his policy of reapproaching Turkey were in danger. The diplomatic circles have commented at length the content of the congratulatory letter sent on New Year’s Day by the Emperor Wilhelm to the King of Italy, expressing his desire that the Italo-Turkish war would be over as soon as possible\(^{23}\).

Germany’s dissatisfaction was expressed by its ambassador in Rome within a discussion with the Romanian minister, Diamandi, in October 1912. The German diplomat thought that the Italo-Turkish War was the main cause of the outburst of the Balkan crisis\(^{24}\). He was of the opinion that things would have developed differently if the king of Italy would have not signed the decree regarding the annexation of Lybia, so much the more as Germany mediated and obtained the provinces preserving the sultan’s religious sovereignty\(^{25}\).

The extension of the Italo-Turkish war encouraged the Balkan nations to attack Turkey in September 1912. The stated aim was to release the conational living within the Ottoman Empire and unify the liberated territories. Given this situation, Turkey was obliged to make peace with Italy on the 15\(^{th}\) of October 1912.

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24] Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale/[The Central National Historical Archives] (hereinafter ANIC), fund Casa Regală: Oficiale I [The Royal House Fund], File 26/1912, Note 648/F. confidential, Rome 26\(^{th}\) of October/8\(^{th}\) of November (the Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Rome, Constantin Diamandi, to the Foreign Affairs Minister Titu Maiorescu), f. 4.

in Lausanne, thus conceding Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. The Balkan states did Italy a huge favour. Likewise, Italy helped them in drawing Turkey into a war that weakened its power from all points of view.
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THE AROMANIANS AT THE TIME OF THE TWO BALKAN WARS

Paul-Claudiu Cotirlet*

Brief history
The Aromanians, a branch of the East Latin people have a history that have raised a series of more or less true theories and hypotheses.

Max Demeter Peyfuss in his work ‘The Aromanian Issue’ devides the question of the Aromanian ethnogenesis in three categories:

a) A separated evolution between the Daco-Romans and Aromans
b) The Aromanian location exclusively in the southern side of the Danube
c) The Roman element becomes Slavic in the south of Moesia

Each single theory has had its supporters. For instance the Greek historian Telemachos Katsougiannes says that the Aromanians should be considered as Romanian Greeks.

A completely different idea belongs to Matilda Caragiu Marioteanu, a Romanian lingvist of Aromanian descent, who claims that: ‘The Aromanians have always lived in the South of the Danube’. She based her view on the fact that the ancient Romans in the geographical area between the northern Carpathians and the southern Balkans.

The fact that a number of historians, linguists, anthropologists and scientists cannot agree on the common evolution of the Aromanians (one of the reasons would be the various sources/information as well as the different affinities of each individual on which their work has been based) stirs my curiosity and the need to study this issue in a future research.

The Aromanians are known under various names such as: Arvanitovlahians, Kuţovlahians, Elinovlahians, Greek-vlahians, Macedoromanians, Megleniţians,

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Tinţarians, Vlahians, Vlahorinhinians, Vlahofonians, to which further regional sub-categories have been added: Epirotians, Gramostenians, Farserotians, Cipanians, Plisotians, etc.

In this paper I will substitute (when needed) the term ‘Aromanian’ with the term ‘Vlah’ because they both are often encountered in the specialized literature.

The term ‘Vlah’ has been firstly mentioned in the years 979\textsuperscript{4} or 980 when the emperor of Byzantium, Vasile the Second “The Boulgaroktonos”-(figure I), places the Vlahs of the continental Greece under the command of Nikulitas The Elder. Once the Vlah Episcopate in Bulgaria was established (in 1018), the term ‘Vlah’ becomes the name used to define the people in the north of Greece as well as the South of Albania, the Slavic Macedonia and Bulgaria.

The origin of the name is connected to the German linguistic, the same origin giving the names of ‘Welsh’ and ‘Wallon’ for the local people considered as Romans in other parts of Europe.

The language spoken by these Vlahs is Aromanian or Macedonian belonging to the Roman languages, the sub-group of the eastern Roman languages, together with Romanian (Daco-romanian), Meglenoromanian, and Istroromanian. Depending on the regional dialects, the Aromanians speak Armanian, Ramanian (the Farsherots) or Vlahian (the people in Olympus), therefore Aromanian is not unitary for all its speakers.

A very precise location of the Vlahs in the Balkan peninsula is difficult to establish because of the constant move specific to the lifestyle of some of these people and their fear to declare themselves as Aromanians due to the persecutions they endured (under the Turks or the Greeks).

However, it is certain that regions such as Myzeqeja in Albania, Thessaly and Phlorina in Greece, the Ohrid and Bitola villages in Macedonia or in the Rodope Mountains- (figure II) in Bulgaria were oasis of the Aromanian people. More there is information regarding their presence in Trieste\textsuperscript{5} and Corfu island as well.

The main occupation of the Aromanians was cattle herding, and the transhumance was specific to shepherds. ‘In short the Aromanians are nomads; their lifestyle cannot be compared to the nomad lifestyle practised by the Asian peoples’.\textsuperscript{6} The shepherding time lasted from April to September, in ‘the highlands and

\textsuperscript{4} Ibidem, p.64.


\textsuperscript{6} Peyfuss , Chestiunea aromaneasca ,p.15
the coldest places.\footnote{7}{Kekaumenos, Cecaumeni : Consilia Et Narrationes. Novam Editionem Praeparavit, in Rossicam invertit, Moscova, 1972, p. 256.}

Trading was another occupation for which the Vlahs were well-known and Moscople was one of the most important industrial and commercial centres in the Balkan peninsula (it was the second after Constantinople) during the middle of the 18th century.

The portrait of the Balkan Vlah was similar to his North-Danubian ‘brother’: wearing leather peasant sandals, a warm fur coat, and a knitted hat, also holding a long club typical for shepherds.- (figure III)

The Aromanian religion was Christian Orthodox. They kept and celebrated the ‘Christmas, Easter, the two holidays that mark the period of transition for the transhumance Saint George and Saint Dumitru, Saint Mary holiday on 15th of August, the traditional day for marriages, and the other celebrations of important Saints.\footnote{8}{Djuvara , Aromanii, p. 197.}

The Aromanians at the beginning of the 20th century

At the beginning of the 20th century the destiny of the Romanians in the Balkan peninsula was considered to be similar to their brethren in Basarabia, Bucovina, or Transilvania. Although they all had the same root, they could not become unified only because of the hundred mile distance that separated them from each other.

“Since the beginning of the 20th century, the Aromanians were the last and greatest in number population of migrating Latin shepherds in the South-East of Europe, one of the last pre-mechanical societies living in an area where important civil disorders, relatively recent historically, have had irreversible cultural and ethnic effects”.

In the twentieth century the majority of Aromanians, mainly their elites, especially intellectuals considered themselves as part of the Romanian nation, respectively the southern part of Romanism. They also claimed they spoke a dialect of the Romanian language that they would use frequently together with the literary language. Thus tradition, which had started far back in the time of the second national renaissance, continued with the activity and the work of C. Belimace, G. Murnu, N. Batzaria, T. Capidan, the Papahagi’s and many others. They all sustained and constantly militated for the idea of the one unified language and nation, which is supported, even nowadays by most Aromanians who live in the
current Romanian state.

The major change in the social life of the Vlahs is the wide variety of their occupations, thus quitting all forms of sedentariness. Occupations such as jewelers, shoemakers, tailors and innkeepers have started to appear. Trade has flourished significantly and the goods exchange made the Aromanians be recognised as excellent traders.

In regard with the education in Romanian and Aromanian, real progress was done especially due to Apostol Margarit, also known as ‘the Aromanians apostle’. In the beginning, he was a teacher at the Greek primary school in Kleisoura, then a General Inspector over all the Romanian education in Turkey. In fact he was the one who set the base for the Aromanian education system. Around 1860 he started to use his disciples native language in his school, and 18 years later there were already 13 Romanian schools all over Turkey ( most of them in Macedonia as we know it today). At the beginning of the 20th century there were 100-130 students in 75 Romanian schools.

As concerns the religion, the Aromanian language was chosen to be used in their dioceses, which was a great success in numerous areas (especially in Ohrida region). Margarit has also brought an important contribution to fulfill these wishes, also thinking of creating a national Aromanian episcopate.

All these accomplishments led to the deterioration of the Aromanian-Greek relations which became friendlier later when the Austrian authorities mediated the summit where King George I of Greece and King Carol I of Romania negotiated in Opatija (today’s Croatia) - 1st-3rd May, 1901.

Three episodes with major international shook effects the not exactly calm and peaceful life of these people until the two Balkan wars:

A: The Upraisal on Saint Elijah Day -- “Ilindenskoto vastanie” — 20.07/3.08 1903

B: The Irrads for the recognition of the Aromanian nationality - 22.05.1905

C: The Upraisal of the young Turks- July-August 1908.

Macedonia, a region with an area of 25,000 square miles and 2 million inhabitants, did not have clear political borders consisting of three sub-regions: Selanik, Kosovo and Bitola. At the beginning of the 20th century, four states claimed Macedonia: Bulgaria, Romania, Grecia, Serbia, and also Albania, which was not a national state yet. The majority of the Aromanian population was located on the above territory, therefore regardless of their will, they were at the heart

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of the events.

The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO), constituted in 1893, wanted to set up a southern Slavic federation, but it was also open to annexing of Macedonia to Bulgaria. The leaders of this organization planned the Upraisal in Iliden- (figure IV), their purpose being to take the area out of the Turkish domination. After four months of conflicts (August-December 1903), the Turkish army managed to stop the rebel’s resistance.

Once the hostilities ended, the Austro-Hungarian emperor Franz Joseph together with the Russian tsar Nikolai II decided to intervene. They met in Murtzeq and decided to divide Macedonia considering ethnic criteria and founded an army which had to be under the control of the great powers. The Aromanian population suffered heavy casualties as well as significant material damages. In 1904 the Romanians in Macedonia had a lot of success in:

- Opening a new Romanian Consulate in Yanya
- Organizing civil communities: Manastir
- Founding an Aromanian public library in Manastir.

Thought, the most important achievement was to be obtained success only in 1905 when the Turkish authorities officially recognized a distinct nationality with equal rights as those of the other non-Islamic nationalities. Now, all the rights of the Aromanians had been recognized, apart from having a religious leader.

Here is the summary of the content of that Irad:

1. The Romanian nationality is legally and officially recognized, distinct from the other nationalities of the Ottoman Empire;
2. The Aromanians will also have distinct communities, enjoying the same privileges as the other Christian nationalities;
3. These communities will have the right to elect Muhtar (mayors), counselors to represent them in the general councils of vilas, sub-province sanjaks and cazals;
4. They will also have the right to appoint teachers and manage their schools, churches and all the Aromanian institutions, through their elected representatives.

In a word, the Irad placed the Aromanian nationality equally to the one of the Greeks, which despite the privileges granted the Christian communities by Mehmed II the Conqueror, become a state inside the Turkish state.

Gaining this Imperial Irad was the brilliant diplomatic success of the government of that time. Therefore, a medal having all ministers, y compris, along with Al. Lahovari, Minister of Romania to the Sublime Porte, imprinted on it was
produced in rememberance of it.

The content of the irads in 22 May 1905 made that the relations between Romania and Greece worsen, ending in stopping all diplomatic relations from 1906 on. This decision was based on the Greek terrorism on the European side of Turkey, where the Greek gangs committed many murders within the Aromanians (priests, teachers).

‘Only in 1905, 23 people were killed, 7 injured, and during 13 incursions schools were burnt, flocks of sheep were killed, households were destroyed, school and religious books were burnt and money and furniture were stolen’

In order to get revenged, the Aromanians joined the Bulgarian and Albanian troup and attacked back (an example is the killing of the Greek High Priest in Korice). Compared to the suffering of the Aromanian people under the terror unleashed by the Greeks, the military action of the Aromanians, being mostly defensive, was in fact of a minor importance.\footnote{A.J.B. Wace, M.S. Thompson, \textit{The Nomads of the Balkans. An account of life and customs among the Vlachs of Northern Pindus}, London- Methuen & co., 1914, p. 8.}

The victory of the Young Turks Movement resulting in re-inforcing the Constitution in 1876, after the irad on the 24\textsuperscript{th} july 1908 and the Hatti-i- Huma-yun on the 1\textsuperscript{st} August 1908, marked the moment when inhabitans of the empire were accomplished some of their great not only social-political but also national aspirations.

The parlamentary ballot at the end of October led to two Aromanians being elected in the Senate. They were members of the Unity and Progress Party : Dr. F. Misea and the writer N. Batzaria. ‘These two people could ensure the rights of the Aromanians the enhanced political freedom created the necessary environment for three Aromanian National Congresses to be held from 1908 to 1910.

The period after the victory of the revolution of the Young Turks until the Balkan wars is somehow, politically, a true “golden age” for Romanism in the heart of the Balkan Peninsula. The new political climate enabled the first, in fact the only, national congress of Macedo-romanians to be held and the leading role was represented by the teachers, the most active and conscious voice of Aromanians. They took place in 1909-1910 debating school issues, cultural and political problems, though not having a legislative completion.

The abolition of education and religious autonomy, of the national associations, the excessiv fiscal regime, together with abuses and corruption, the colonization of the Islamic muhadjias affected the non-Turk populations. They all led to re-start several national movements, as a fore-ground of the two wars which were
to start in the autumn of 1912.

The Macedoromanians and the two Balkan wars

The Aromanians completely involved in the wars. Their wish of staying neutral was impossible due to their central location at the heart of the events. The Vlachs fought alongside the Turks (see the case of the defence of Yanya- (figure V), where the Turks joined the Albanians), as well as the Balkan allies (see the case of the attack on Krusevo, where the Aromanians joined the Serbs). All the 106 schools in 18 communities remained closed during the conflict. Once Romania was drawn to the Second Balkan conflict, the Aromanians knew which side to fight for.

Between the end of the first war and the beginning of the Second Balkan War (December 1912 - June 1913), the Aromanian issue was largely debated - on two occasions, in London, in January, and in St. Petersburg in May 1913. Bulgaria committed to recognize their cultural and ecclesiastical autonomy and Serbia took a similar position in the matter. During the negotiations regarding the border with Albania, Greece granted for the Aromanians in Pindus. Later in March the representative of Romania at the conference in London - which was then accepted in extremis to attend it - unconvincingly proposed an Aromanian canton to be founded within an enlarged Albania. The pressing lobby made on the political class and the press by the Macedo-Romanian Society was not able to influence the final decision in spite of its effectiveness in the last three decades.

In the report elaborated by the Society on April 20, 1914, George Murnu can only conclude:

“Greece, Serbia and Montenegro diminished their territory, Bulgaria acquired large areas in the south, Albania became a state of law ... It was only one nation, arəmənimə our armənəmea, that was unable to get back at least one small part of the whole territory which had been conquered by the Turks. Thus they could not participate as an equal entitled member in making any decision regarding the destiny of the people in the East Europe. So the Peace Treaty agreed in Bucharest disregarded the idea of an autonomous Macedonia.”

In a conference held on in Galati on August 25, 1915, Tache Papahagi more precisely reproached Romania that it could not intervene in the Balkans but invoking the Aromanian issue: it was only that one which allowed it to actively participate in the conferences in London an St. Petersbourg before the Aromanian problem escalating in the “Quadrilateral matter” to our great unhappiness.

Can we conclude that cultural and political assistance given to the Aro-
Romanians, for half a century, had other motivations and aimed at other purposes? Some said it, even Iorga (the Macedo Romanian translator of Homer and author of the monumental Dictionary of the Aromanian dialect, published in 1963) suggested it later in 1933. Anyway, none of the intellectuals of his generation, directly ventured to criticize the policy and the decisions made by the Romanian state, which allowed them to continue to serve “the cause” with great illusions - both culturally, conducted an invaluable work to this day, as well as politically but not successfully, on the rare occasions they had.

More plausible explanation seems to be suggested by Count Aehrenthal, the future Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, in the missive sent to Chancellor Galukowski on January 18, 1898: “By founding Romanian churches and schools, the Kingdom aims at two sure a platonic one and a political-practice one. The indigenous megalomania justifies the Romanian political class to intervene wherever Romanian ethnic interests exists, considering it as a sacred duty. As for, the pragmatic politician, he is interested in cuțovlahi just to manipulate them, if necessary, as a compensatory measure in relation with Bulgaria.11 “To avoid any misunderstanding, it must be reminded but, however, that the Romanian state intervened at the request of and with the activ participation of the leaders of the Macedo-Romanians hostile to the hegemonic attempts of the nationalists and the Greek State. Without the intervention of the Romanian State, we might not talk about the Aromanians today only in the past tense.

A categorical response regarding the Romanian in the Balkans during the period 1864-1913 is not possible, and the conjectures on the subject can lead but only to an impasse. If we weighed the situation of the Aromanians before and particularly after the Peace Treaty agreed in Bucharest, we might think of this event as of the end of a national cycle. A painful end, yet predictable one, which some people hardly intuited and some predicted but did not assume. Eventually, for various reasons, it made the Aromanian issue still be largely debated until nowadays. More, after the historical events in December 1989 it became a dilemma very difficult to be dealt with.

The hopes of the Vlahs for a lasting peace and a guaratee of their freedom and national development vanished when the The Peace Treaty of Bucharest was signed on the 10th August 1913. –(figure VI)

None of the 10 articles had the problem of the Aromanians mentioned, but there is an exchange of notes in the treaty’s annex between Romania and the other

three partner countries, where it is stated that the latter had the obligation to give autonomy to the Aromanians schools and churches within their new possessions, to allow episcopates for the Aromanians and the government in Bucharest financially support them to be found.

‘This was an unexpected real blow’, using the words of Braileanu, the consul, the treaty from Bucharest made the Aromanian nation to reconsider their orientation bearing in mind the new arrangements: the Aromanian minority was then living not within a single state, as it was before the treaty, but in four different states.

More Vlah representatives expressed their dissatisfaction publicly: “the treaty from Bucharest did not been guarantee the fate of the Aromanians, but what could be achieved for them was nothing but just simple promises for a more human treatment than the oppressive one under the Turkish administration to these people of our nation spread across the Balkan kingdoms in their new formation.’

Professor D. Abedeleanu said in 1916 that “today with the help of the guns, tomorrow sitting around the negotiation table, Romania needs to stay vigilant and repair the mistake done in 1913 when they sentenced the Aromanians to death, giving them away like merchandise to the Balkan people, accepting only promises for a better life. On behalf of the Aromanians … Romania needs to speak out before the Western Europe which has assumed the right to provide support to other nations. In plight, Romanians being included”. 12

The congress in Bucharest, and the letter exchange between the participating chiefs of the delegations seemed to warrant for a future regime which to assure the cultural background at least through schools and churches. In fact, the new political and statal realities in the south of the Danube would result in a negative evolution for the Romanians due to the de-nationalizing act different paces and following varied methods of all the states in the area. “From this point of view, the beginning of the new era represents for the history of the Southern- Danubian Romanians not only a finalization of its national actions but also the beginning of a continuous attack process by external factors, which resulted in a process of constant diminish, which can end in a complete disappearance in a near future.” 13

What happened after the war:
The Serbs, considering the treaty of Bucharest obsolete, closed all the Romanian schools and churches from Serbian Macedonia and they have remained closed until today!

Along with this extented arbitrary measure, they forced a denationalization action against the Macedo-Romanians; the use of their native language out of their house was banned and introduced a compulsory baptism name of slave etymology.

The Greeks were less brutal than the Serbs. They allowed the Romanian schools and churches to operate but in turn they took a series of administrative and economic measures that led to a fewer number of schools. Thereby, from 45 schools (with where around the time of the Balkan war) only 27 remained. In Greece five secondary schools are still operating: a high school in Grebena, a middle school in Ioannina and one in Thessaloniki, a trade college in Thessaloniki and a trade school for girls in the same town.

In Bulgaria, the same models as in Greece had been used. No schools had been closed, but a constant fervent administrative action and terror had been enforced and the fines the population had to pay brought them into poverty.

In Albania, Aromanians had been deprived of any ethic right recognized by any legal act. This explains why, from 20 primary schools and two secondary schools they used to have, only 3 had been left and those had been closed or nationalized, in accordance with the wishes of the Albanian government.

Thereby, after the Balkan Wars, most of Macedo-romanians were left devoid of ethnic rights, and even those who had enjoyed certain rights, had no guarantees that these would continue to be respected in the future.
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ADDENDA:

FIG. I:


Basil the Second- *The Boulgaroktonos*

Greek: Βασίλειος Β’, Basileios II; 958 – 15 December 1025, was a Byzantine Emperor from the Macedonian dynasty who reigned from 10 January 976 to 15 December 1025.
The Rhodopes are a mountain range in Southeastern Europe, with over 83% of its area in southern Bulgaria and the remainder in Greece. Its highest peak, Golyam Perelik (2,191 meters), is the seventh highest Bulgarian mountain.
FIG. III:

Source: http://wwwromanianmuseumcom/Romania/97/folkCostumes.html
The rebellion in the region of Macedonia affected most of the central and southwestern parts of the Monastir Vilayet receiving the support mainly of the local Bulgarian peasants and to some extent of the Aromanian population of the region.
The Battle of Bizani took place in Epirus on 4–6 March 1913. The battle was fought between Greek and Ottoman forces during the last stages of the First Balkan War, and revolved around the forts of Bizani, which covered the approaches to Ioannina, the largest city in the region.
The Treaty of Bucharest was concluded on 10 August 1913, by the delegates of Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. The Treaty was concluded in the aftermath of the Second Balkan War and amended the previous Treaty of London, which ended the First Balkan War.
CHAPTER IV

TURKEY, ROMANIA AND THE BALKANS
NATIONAL REPRESENTATION UNDERMINED
ROMANIA AS AN ORIENTAL COUNTRY AT 19TH
CENTURY UNIVERSAL EXHIBITIONS IN PARIS

Cosmin Tudor Minea*

Introduction

In 1865 the young Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexandru Odobescu, faced the biggest challenge of his life: He was just named the organiser of the Romanian section at the Paris Universal Exhibition of 1867. For a newly formed country, not even independent as was still under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, it was a terrific occasion to be among the greatest countries in the city that everyone admired and to show its unique features in front of the whole world. Odobescu was far from being overwhelmed by the task. Not long ago, in Paris, as a student, he boldly asserted his nation’s right to independence. He dedicated his subsequent career to pursuing this goal, in line with what his former French teachers, Jules Michelet and Edgar Quinet, also advocated. And now he had to return to his beloved Paris, the city that meant so much for Romania, in order to showcase what has already been his lifetime interest: the Romanian national features.

With his characteristic enthusiasm and energy, Odobescu set to work. He quickly sent people throughout the country to gather the most representative productions of the peasants; he set eyes on the most beautiful works of art in Romania, like paintings made by Theodor Aman and Nicolae Grigorescu; and he hired his old friend from Paris, the architect Ambroise Baudry, to build the Romanian pavilion. It was a complex and costly work, but one that Odobescu was convinced would pay off as the Romanian treasures in art, folk and architecture will surely show to the world a glorious unique past and a bright future of a country that had

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1] The paper is a part of a larger comparative analysis titled An Image for the Nation: Architecture of the Balkan Countries at 19th Century Universal Exhibitions in Paris which represented my Masters Thesis defended in 2014 at Central European University in Budapest. For it I was awarded the Hanak Prize for the best dissertation of the year in the History Department.

survived Ottoman rule. The church of Curtea de Argeș, for example, one of the models for the pavilion, was seen by Odobescu as a “Byzantine monument (…) worthy of being admired by the whole world and [I am] confident that a good reproduction of it will be the sensation of the artistic world” 3. This is why he must have been greatly surprised when the pavilion was seen by the French audience as rather an expression of an Oriental culture, thus connecting it directly with the Ottomans, and in one publication it was even compared to a mosque. What is more, the pavilion itself was located among the Oriental countries section and close to the “exotic” part of the exhibition. His entire work was partially ruined. The carefully designed “traditional Romanian” architecture didn’t have the effect it should but on contrary, it was compared with Romanian’s long time enemies, the Ottomans.

How were these radically opposite perceptions possible? Why did the French, whose interest was to promote each nation as a unique one, made the parallels between Romanian and Oriental architecture? In my paper I will give some answers to these questions by looking at the architects and the architectural motifs used. I will reveal the entangled architectural heritage in the Balkan Peninsula and the way some motifs were taken to be “national”. The intricate process of designing such architecture is further revealed by the architects, the majority of them being paradoxically French. Thus I will reveal the constructed nature of the national architectural motifs and I will add some hitherto unknown elements to the nation-building studies through architecture in Romania.

Here a terminological issue needs to be clarified. When I use terms like the “national” style or “national” architectural motifs, I am not referring to certain physical set of elements or shapes of buildings but to an ideological constructed style. Any set of shapes could have been seen “national” given that there was some expressed reasoning behind the assertion.4

Romania took part with a national pavilion at three Universal Exhibitions in Paris in the 19th century, in 1867, 1889 and 1900.5 I have chosen this timeframe


5] As an autonomous or independent state Romania missed only the Universal Exhibition of 1878, due to the on going Russo-Turkish war. Besides the Parisian ones, it took part also at
because, with a few exceptions, in the 20th century and especially after World War 1, the exhibition architecture wasn’t anymore inspired by past architectural heritage in order to represent the nation. Further, by choosing the period when the nation-building process just began in Romania I can illustrate the development of some concepts and ideologies that were not yet clearly articulated.

Romania’s architecture at World Fairs in the 19th century and the parallels with the Orient made by the French have been only indirectly touched upon in a few studies. Useful are also the studies dealing with the Romanian national style in art and architecture, field I aim to enrich with the present study. In literature dealing with the Universal Exhibitions, the national pavilions, although one of the most visible attractions, have been largely neglected. Helpful are only a few works that analyse the architecture and representation of the Oriental and Latin countries at the world fairs, among which several parallels can be drawn.

In my paper I will not follow a chronological pattern but a thematic one. Therefore I will first embark on the overview of the French orientalising view of the Romanian architecture. In this way I will better define the backbone of my study, namely that Romania, by way of its displayed architecture, was associated in more than one way with the Western idea of “Orient”. Thus, the official discourse at the Universal Exhibition in Vienna, in 1878, but without a national pavilion or other relevant constructions.


of specificity and originality that the national state wanted to promote was at least partly undermined. Then I will explore the causes of it by considering firstly the Oriental architectural motifs used and finally the architects that designed them.

**French reception**

The first Universal Exhibition where Romania took part, the one in 1867, was also the first where national pavilions were used as the main place of displaying a participating country’s products. The Romanian Commissioner, Alexandru Odobescu, chose a French architect, Ambroise Baudry, to design as a pavilion a small orthodox church. It was inspired by the 18th century Stavropoleos Monastery in Bucharest and the 16th century one from Curtea de Argeș (fig. I). The same sources of inspiration were used for the Romanian section in the main gallery. The participation was an important endeavour for overcoming with its displayed image the political status, that of an autonomous country but still under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. A relevant fact is that at the exhibition in Paris in 1867 it was the first time when the name Romania was officially used, instead of Romanian Principalities.9

But even before the construction began, Romania was assigned a place not convenient at all for a country that aspired to be part of Europe, and not under the Ottoman rule. The pavilion was situated in the area where were also the Turkish constructions, the Mosque, the bath and the pavilion as well as the Tunisian and Egyptian buildings. More, in the main gallery, the Romanian section was right next to the ones of Morocco and Siam.

However, the opinions expressed by the French organisers and various commentators must have been an even bigger drawback. They saw a representation of an oriental culture, languorous, in vivid colours, and with a strange choice of a Greek church for a Latin nation.10 The pavilion was further seen as an unfortunate mixture of architectural styles, proof that “Romania doesn’t exist by itself. It doesn’t shine. (...) It is Greek, Russian, French, German, what else?”11

Even the most unwanted comparison, with the Orient, was sharply emphasised in one place:

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9) In 1859 the Romanian Principalities were formed by the partial political union between Wallachia and Moldova.
A HISTORY OF PARTNERSHIP AND COLLABORATION IN THE BALKANS

(...) an architecture that is no more Byzantium than Moscow. Let us take the Romanian church as it is, a transition between Byzantine and Oriental art. What these three cupolas are missing is a magnetic needle like the one in Mecca. One more time, there is something of a mosque and of Kremlin in this architecture, half imported half imposed; it is an art of the middle, if I can say so, that looks for its medium but does not find it, in the same way as the country that it represents.  

As if it wasn’t enough in the official guide of the 1867 Universal Exhibition the pavilion was compared with famous Oriental structures like Alhambra and the Bosporus pavilion and it was criticized for its lack of proportions.  

Romania would overcome a rather ambiguous representation that was criticised in several places, at the next Parisian Universal Exhibition. In 1889 it was highly praised by the French for the atmosphere inside its pavilion that functioned as a restaurant in the shape of a traditional country house (fig. II). But at the same time the connection with the Orient was done in three ways: by way of the location assigned; by presenting Romania in the official publication in chapters following those dedicated to the Oriental colonies as in the case of Figaro-Exposition 1889; and by parallels with the Orient in various publications.  

The location enforced very much the Romanian – Orient connection. On the far right of Champ de Mars, along Avenue Suffren, continuing the Cairo Street, the main Oriental attraction and the Moroccan constructions, were the pavilions of Japan, Serbian and Greece, one next to the other. Exactly across was the Romanian Restaurant, having on its right the Siam pavilion and on the left the Chinese one. The mixture of cultural displays must have been important if even in pictures presenting the Greek pavilion or the Romanian restaurant, there can be noticed visitors on donkeys, driven by Egyptians from Cairo Street. (figure III)  

The connection with the Orient is also made in the French publications, but mostly regarding the atmosphere of the Romanian Restaurant. The Romanians Lăutari, Gypsy singers of folk songs, the traditional food and the waitresses created an atmosphere unanimously appreciated. The popularity was such that

the restaurant became a usual place of meeting for the Parisian high class. The music was a way to have romantic reveries, it was “slow” or “languishing” and had “a sonority more feminized and less appropriate for the interpretation of the heroic sentiments”. These all are epithets usually attributed to an Oriental culture. In the Revue des Deux Mondes the music was even an opportunity for romantic metaphors: “these strings and these reeds [the pan flute tubes] contain all the passion frenzies, all the tears that the earth has ever drunk”. The same the music was considered “charming and full of poetry” or having the authenticity of a “rural people with bucolic insertions”. The association Orient/Romania has been remarked, even if not in a direct way, also in publications dealing with music at world expositions, were “Picturesque” music comprised the Oriental and the Gypsy one.

The exhibition that closed the 19th century was the biggest so far and Romania too had at the Paris exhibition of 1900 the most expensive participation yet. The Royal pavilion, made by the French Jean Camille Formigé, (fig. IV) was inspired by monuments from all the regions of the country that were built in three different centuries: Hurezi, Stavropoleos, and Curtea de Argeș monasteries and Trei Ierarhi Church. But the imposing construction didn’t stop the French authors to connect it with Oriental architecture, confirming a trend started in 1867. The lavish decoration of the pavilion is seen as “Oriental” in one publication: “The Romanian Palace (...) concentrates and evokes all the types of Romanian architecture from the 16th to the 17th century, of this Byzantine architecture so elegant, so vivid, of a very oriental decorative luxury”. Other publications mention “the Romanian Oriental architecture [that] can be found in the motives of the polychrome ornaments decorating the different facades” and even an “Oriental style” in describing the pavilion: “It is the Oriental style with cupolas, campaniles, rows of diverse

17] “Those slow and languishing waltzes are seemingly essential Romanian”. Figaro exposition, 1889, p. 100: “Ces valses lentes, langoureuses, sont, paraît-il, essentiellement roumains”.
18] Le Menestrel, 1889, p. 275: “Il en résulte une sonorité plus efféminée et beaucoup moins apte à la interprétation des sentiments héroïques”.
20] L’Exposition chez soi, 1889, p. 735: “leur musique est charmant et pleine de poesie”.
22] The same umbrella term “Picturesque” has been used in Fauser, Musical Encounters...
coloured stones, small and large windows, twisted forms in its ornamentation, blind windows.” 25 These types of comments were rather positive in the French eyes. In one place the author even finds curious that the Romanians don’t want to be seen Oriental anymore: “We would say that it is the gracious Orient [in the aspect of the pavilion], if we would not be afraid to displease King Charles, whom we heard declaring in Sinaia that from now on the Orient stops at the Danube.” 26

**Architectural motifs**

We can trace two parallel levels for the association Romania-Orient: an orientalising view held by French officials and audience, seen in the positioning of the Romanian section in the exhibition space and in the comments made in the press and in exhibition publications that can partially be attributed to the long time connection Balkans – Orient; 27 and a so called phenomenon of “self-orientalisation”, meaning the use of Oriental elements by the architects. 28 This was done under the influence of Western ideas and encouraged by the success the Oriental architecture and decorations had throughout Europe at that time. The architects were even more inclined to use these decorations for an exhibition pavilion that was designed to be spectacular and to instantly catch the attention.

Especially obvious as examples of Oriental motifs used for Romanian architecture are the trefoil arch and the multi-coloured glazed ceramic decorations. The rather oriental looking arch has been seen as “national Romanian” and thus employed at all three Universal Exhibitions. More, it was the most used element back home, in in the so called “neoromanian” style. 29 But the first time when the arch was used in architecture considered specific Romanian was at the Parisian exhibition of 1867. Then in Romania it appeared for the first time at Lahovary villa, designed in 1886 by the architect Ion Mincu. Subsequently, Mincu has been considered the founding father of the “neoromanian” or national Romanian archi-

26* Le Petit Journal du dimanche*, Octobre 14, 1900 : « Nous dirions que c’est l’Orient délicieux si nous ne craignions de déplaire au Roi Charles que nous avons entendu déclarer à Sinaïa, que désormais l’Orient s’arrêterait au Danube ».
29An complete analysis of the development of this style in Popescu, Le Style...
tectural style. He employed the trefoil arch in all the buildings he later designed and also for various Romanian sections at the Universal Exhibition in 1900 (fig. V). Also in 1889 for the Romanian section the same trefoil arches were used for the glass windows that displayed national products (fig. VI). There are only a few ancient monuments on the territory of Romania that display the Oriental-looking trefoil arch. The motif is rather connected to the rule of Constantin Brâncoveanu, a 17th century medieval prince of Wallachia that became central to the Romanian national discourse. The famous monuments that use the trefoil arch like Stavropoleos and Hurezi monastery and Mogoșoaia Palace have been built under his rule or afterwards, under his cultural influence. Thus, using them was like a memento for the so-believed glorious moments from the nation's past.

The use of multi-coloured glazed ceramics gave an even more orientalising aspect to the Romanian architecture. The element was used by Mincu at the mentioned Lahovary house and for what should have initially been the Romanian restaurant at the exhibition in 1889. In fact it was one of the most used elements for conceiving a specific Romanian architecture, together with the trefoil arch. One of the most conspicuous examples is the Romanian restaurant at the Parisian exhibition of 1900, designed by the French Jean Camille Formigé (fig. VII) But in fact glazed ceramics was one of the most commonly used motif throughout Europe at the turn of the 19th century. It was employed at the same time in Serbia for their pavilion in 1889, or in France, also in 1889, for the famous palaces Beaux Arts and Liberal Arts. Further relevant is the fact that an article about ceramics appeared in that time in a French journal for modern constructions. It was another case of different perspectives. While the countries from the Balkans used ceramics as their traditional element, Western Europe employed it as a modern material. In fact in 19th century a variety of oriental-inspired motifs where used throughout Europe. Be it “Hindoo” architecture in Britain, Moorish revival or Ottoman inspired, all these blended into a variety of revival styles in a diverse landscape. In this sense the Romanian style was not much different from the others. But ideologically it was invested with a far greater significance. As it happened in most of


31] The design was dropped of and was instead transformed in a permanent construction in Bucharest where it still stands today.


33] “Exposition universelle de 1889. La ceramique” in La Construction moderne, 8 June 1889.
the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the neoromanian style was seen as representing a modern proof of the ancient genius of the nation, a revival of the most worthy material creation of the ancestors.

**The Architects**

While the process of creating a national architecture is a complex one, involving officials, scholars and architects in a multitude of situations, those directly responsible for the design were usually French architects. It sounds paradoxically that the French created a national Romanian architecture but actually they were the only ones who knew how to conceive an architecture inspired by the past monuments. Later, foreign-trained Romanians, among them famous names like Ion Mincu would also design buildings in a national Romanian style but according to principles learned in Western Schools.

The Universal Exhibitions not only created an opportunity for self-representation but also the need for this. Countries that since their autonomy or independence from the Ottoman Empire had been satisfied with employing Western architectural styles in new state buildings suddenly had to display a unique, “national” architecture for the World Exhibitions. This was one of the dilemmas facing the young Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexandru Odobescu, when he started working in his newest position, as organiser of the Romanian section at the 1867 Universal Exhibition in Paris. In his country there were few trained architects, most of the new buildings being built by foreigners, and no schools of architecture. For Odobescu it also seemed easier to find a foreigner for the Romanian pavilion and it was even more convenient for the foreigner to be French at a Parisian exhibition. Thus, in 1865 he decided on a young architect, Ambroise Baudry, whom he met in Paris and who came a year before in Romania to do some archaeological surveys.34

Baudry would realise the very Orientalising pavilion we saw at the very beginning of my presentation, one of his first important works, and subsequently, coincidence or not, would become a specialist in Oriental Architecture. Four years after the exhibition he moved to Egypt where he worked for 15 years, creating an “Arab style” for European officials. There he used the same method applied for de-

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signing the Romanian pavilion: he employed ancient motifs or even incorporated older authentic fragments for creating new buildings. More, in the meantime, he would be involved in designing the Serbian Pavilion in 1900.

A comparable career had one of the big specialists in Muslim architecture in 19th century France, Henri Saladin. Besides working in Tunisia and designing the pavilion of Tunisia and Morocco in 1900 he also designed in the same year the Bulgarian pavilion.35 So a specialist in Oriental art designs “national” architecture for a Balkan country. He has been included in the category of “orientalist” architects, those who usually accompanied an archaeological mission to Oriental countries, discovered the local architecture and for the rest of their career worked there, promoted a style inspired by that architecture and wrote books about it.36 Thus, two specialists in Oriental architecture, Saladin and Ambroise Baudry, worked for the pavilions of three Balkan nations. Another one, Albert Ballu, who was in Algeria the equivalent of Saladin in Tunisia and of Baudry in Egypt, also worked in the Romanian Capital. For three decades he was the chief architect of Algeria, he designed the Algerian pavilions in 1889, 1900 and 1906 (at the exhibition in Marseilles), but he also designed one of the most important buildings in Bucharest, The Palace of Justice, in 1890. All three architects have been considered “specialists in and enthusiastic of the Orient”37, in a time when the teaching of Oriental art at the Fine Arts Academy in Paris was behind the knowledge acquired in archaeological expeditions.38 The fact that these architects have been assigned to work for the Balkan countries is telling for the connection Romania – Orient, central to my argument.

The interest in Oriental art was a pan-European phenomenon and French trained Romanian architects like Ion Mincu were no strange of it. But they were at the same time conquered by the drive to make “national” works, in order to represent their newly formed nation.39 Out of these conflicting ideas he and others

36] The term “orientalist architects” was coined and it is further explained by Lorraine Decléty in “L’architecte orientaliste”, Livraisons d’histoire de l’architecture. n.5, (2003), pp. 55-65.
39] It was a type of architecture that became more and more lucrative, being commissioned by the state and especially after 1900 by the rich for their private villas. For the private villas in the neoromanian style see Ruxandra Nemțeanu, Vilan stil neoromânesc, (București: Simetria, 2014).
managed to with a style Romanians for some, Oriental for others but at the same
time not very different from the European architecture of the time.

**Conclusions**

My analysis can be seen as part of the larger phenomenon of associating
the Balkan Peninsula with the Orient. The region was known in France as *Europe
Orientale* and at the Universal Exhibition all the Balkan architecture was often
associated with the Orient. But while the French perceived Oriental or Muslim
architecture as a positive or at least neutral feature, the countries from the Bal-
kans perceived it as an insult. Bulgarian pavilion from the exhibition of 1900 for
example was taken to be Oriental in several instances, although was generally
well received by the French audience. However, back home the Bulgarians heavily
criticise the pavilion by using exactly the Oriental attributes as arguments. The
architect Anton Tornyov thought that “the architectural ornaments and the deco-
roration, together with the four Turkish cupolas and especially the red colour of the
outside walls seem bizarre”40 and the painter Stefan Bobchev also saw the pavilion
as a strange mixture with an Oriental aspect.41 But these critiques come as no
surprise for countries that were in the process of discarding the Ottoman cultural
influence.

At the most important moments for national promotion, Romania and
other countries didn’t manage to overcome the stereotypes that relate them to
the Orient. They can clearly be seen in the position assigned to them and from
the comments in the French press. On the other the architects themselves used
Oriental architectural inspired by the shared architectural heritage of the Balkan
Peninsula that each country saw it to be “national”.

The Balkan countries tried to put their Ottoman and Oriental heritage into
brackets while the West often made parallels between the Balkans and the Orient.
These two different views have correspondence in the two main clichés regarding
the peninsula in the 19th century: The Balkans as a “bridge” between Occident and
Orient and as the “Orient of Europe”. The contradiction is further emphasized by
the World Exhibitions where the dual and often contradictory perception of the
whole Balkan Peninsula is revealed. It was here where Western Europe and in our

234 in Doroteja Dobreva, "Bulgarien au der Pariser Weltausstellung 1900. Bilder von Eigenem
und Fremden in den zeitgenössischen publizistischen Debatten über die Ausstellung", in Petar
Popov, Katerina Gehl, Klaus Roth, eds, *Fremdes Europa? Selbsbilder und Europa-Vorstellungen
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41] Bobchev (1900), in Dobreva, “Bulgarien...”, p. 132.
case France was in search of the exotic, the spectacular, while the countries from the Balkans wanted to assert themselves as “modern” or “European”.

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Orsay Museum, Documentation section: Exposition universelle 1867 Paris, Album

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Moniteur des Architectes, 1890, page 3

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French journal, Paris, 1889

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**FIGURE 1: ROMANIA NATIONAL PAVILION, PARIS, 1867**
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THE TURKISH LOANWORDS IN ROMANIAN:
A SYNTHETIC VIEW

Emil Suciu*

The Turkish language (in its so-called “Ottoman”, “Osmanli” or “Turkish of Turkey” version) exercised, during almost five centuries, a considerable influence on Romanian, from the end of the 14th to the middle of the 19th century, with some local, dialectal extensions in Dobrudja until nowadays: the number of the lexical loans amounts to over 2,770 words. Their inventory – of which almost two thirds disappeared from the today’s Romanian language – does not include those Turkic loanwords that are not Osmanli, but pre-Ottoman (Pečeneg, Qumanian/Koman, or Tatar), and those Turkish words which entered into Romanian by way of other (mostly Balkan) languages, such as Greek, Bulgarian, Serb, Gipsy or Hungarian. The Turkish linguistic influence on Romanian was the result of a historical context in which the Ottoman Empire extended its domination and suzerainty on the Romanian Countries, and exercised a longstanding influence on their social, administrative and economic life until the second half of the 19th century.

1. Studies on the Turkish influence have a long tradition in Romania, starting with the first years of the 18th century (Dimitrie Cantemir), but the work of Lazăr Şăineanu, Influența orientală asupra limbei și culturei române [The Oriental Influence on the Romanian Language and Culture]¹, has remained for more than a century the only monographic synthesis on the subject. Despite its undeniable merits, this work fatally became incomplete and obsolete, as a result of the lexicological and lexicographic progresses, of the publishing of new documentary sources (scientific editions of old texts, dialectal glossaries and atlases, Romanian and Turkish historical and dialectal dictionaries, etc.), as well as of the gradual change of the status of many words in modern Romanian. The history and the actual situation of the Turkish loanwords in the mediaeval and contemporary Romanian language are largely described in my recent work, Influența turcă asupra limbii române².

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¹ Lazăr Şăineanu, Influența orientală asupra limbei și culturei române [The Oriental Influence on the Romanian Language and Culture], Bucharest, 1900.

² Emil Suciu, Influența turcă asupra limbii române. I. Studiu monografic. II. Dicționarul cuvintelor
2. The Turkish influence can be distinguished by some peculiarities, as follows:

a. The source of the loanwords can be not solely Turkish, but another or other neighbouring languages as well (multiple etymology), since many Turkish loanwords can be found in different South-East or East-European languages. On the other hand, in many cases the source is not the modern Turkish literary language, but one of the archaic, popular or dialectal variants of Turkish; e.g. Rom.\(^3\) *dovleac* ~ *duvleac* “pumpkin” < Turk. dial. *dövlek* ~ *düvlek* (lit. *devlek* ~ *divlek*); Rom. *musafir* “guest” < Turk. arch. *müsafir* (mod. *misafir*).

b. The Turkish words penetrated into the Romanian language either as official, possibly cultural loanwords – thanks first of all to the individual bilingualism of the Romanian aristocratic and erudite class (their majority having remained at the level of personal borrowing or jargon) – or on the popular, oral way of direct contacts between common people. The proportion of these two categories is approximately equal, but the geographic dispersion and the viability of the popular borrowings have been much higher.

c. The discontinuity and disparity of the attestations or the different forms and meanings of some words are proves of the fact that they were borrowed repeatedly (e.g. *amanat* “pawn” 1594 ~ *amanet* 18th century ~ *emanet* 19th century; *zor* “violence, force, coercion” 1637, “necessity, compulsion” 19th century).

d. The temporal stratification of the Turkish loanwords of the Romanian language can be studied from three viewpoints: chronology, viability and synchrony of the words in different phases of the influence:

- the end of the 14th century and the 15th century, with 23 loanwords, all of them having survived until the 20th century;
- the 16th century: 152 loanwords, with their majority, 66%, maintained until today;
- the 17th century: 502 loanwords; 52% of them are present in today’s Romanian, but only 168 are still in current usage, the rest being on the way of disappearance;
- the 18th century, marking the top point of the Turkish influence, with more than 1,000 loanwords, but only 274 of them are elements of the usual vocabulary of the today’s Romanian speakers;

\(^3\) Here are the meanings of the abbreviations used in this paper: arch. = archaic; dial. = dialectal; Fr. = French; Hung. = Hungarian; Lat. = Latin; lit. = literary; mod. = modern; Rom. = Romanian; Rus. = Russian; Turk. = Turkish.
- the 19th century, with more than 1,000 words, most of them borrowed until the middle of the century, when the Turkish influence on the whole Romanian language came to an end, and a strictly dialectal influence, mainly in Dobrudja, became dominant; 417 of the 19th century loanwords can be found today in the usual vocabulary, and 161 are in course to disappear.

e. As far as the territorial repartition of the Turkish loanwords is concerned, their great majority are concentrated in the southern and eastern historical provinces of Romania: in Dobrudja (where the dialectal borrowing was dominant, due to the fact that this province effectively belonged to the Ottoman Empire and has had a consistent Turkish population), in the Banat region (which was for two centuries under Ottoman administration, but has never had a significant Turkish population), and in Moldavia, Wallachia and Oltenia (provinces which had for centuries a status of vassalage and used to consciously copy the administrative structures, the economic features and the mores of the Ottoman Porte). As a result, there are numerous loanwords – sometimes with divergent phonetic features – common either to Moldavia, Wallachia and Oltenia, or to Wallachia and Dobrudja, either to Oltenia and the Banat, or to Dobrudja and Moldavia; many other terms are specific to but one of these provinces, even to the Banat (where most of the words of Turkish origin were borrowed through, that is from, the Serb language). Transylvania, where the administration was Hungarian or Austrian-Hungarian, is the only province whose Romanian vernacular generally escaped from the Turkish influence, even if there are a few local borrowings (aga, hăzap), and if, later on, a lot of literary and popular terms of Turkish origin expanded therein from the southern and eastern parts of Romania.

f. We can also remark a stylistic repartition of the words in the moment when they were borrowed, placing them in one of the functional (colloquial, official, narrative, scientific, professional, familiar, vulgar, etc.) variants of the Romanian language, as well as several later transfers from one registry to another, sometimes due to a semantic evolution.

3. All the compartments of the Romanian language have traces of the Turkish influence; nevertheless, there are no longstanding and consistent effects but in the vocabulary: the innovations in phonetics and grammar are usually linked only to some changes in the distribution of the elements, but not in their inventory.

a. In the mass of the more than 2,770 (according to my accounts, 2,775) Romanian terms borrowed from the Turkish language, predominant are the nouns (91%) and the adjectives (6.3%); there are also 32 adverbs, 37 interjections, six
verbs, two conjunctions, one pronoun and one preposition. These loanwords have sometimes conserved the form of the etymons, but there are not rare the cases of phonetic and/or morphologic adaptation, too:

– the reflexes of the Turkish vowels ö, ü and of the very specific spirant ğ, which don’t exist in Romanian, are (i)o, (i)u or i, respectively g, h or zero (e.g. Rom. bobric “kidnay” < Turk. böbrek; Rom. ghioi “lake” < Turk. göl; Rom. dulgher “carpenter” < Turk. dülger; Rom. ghiveci “flower pot” < Turk. güveç; Rom. iama ~ iagma “havoc” < Turk. yağa);

– the groups /či/, /ği/, /ši/ and /ji/, unpronounceable in the literary Romanian, changed their vocalic element to i or e, and at the end of the words, by morphologic adaptation, to iu or ie (Rom. arşic “knucklebone” < Turk. aşık; Rom. bair “slope, hill” < Turk. bayır; Rom. cazangi “boiler maker” < Turk. kazancı; Rom. sași “cross-eyed” < Turk. şaşı);

– the Turkish long or double vowels and the geminated consonants have been generally reduced in Romanian (Rom. adet “custom” < Turk. âdet; Rom. ursuz “morose” < Turk. ārsuz < uğursuz; Rom. ghiulea “cannon ball” < Turk. gülle);

– the /t/, /d/, /č/, /ğ/ and /š/ in front of an affricated consonant changed by total or partial dissimilation (Rom. haracci < Turk. haraççı).

Many loanwords have undergone different alterations of their absolute end, with the only scope to be adjusted to the Romanian flexional types; the vocalic endings under accent, unusual in Romanian, have been adapted as follows:

– Turk. -i/-i/-u/-ü > Rom. -iu or -ie (Rom. burghi “auger” < Turk. buryu; Rom. muşeri “customer” < Turk. müşeri; Rom. sarailie “almond cake” < Turk. saraylı);

– Turk. -a > Rom. -a or -ă (Rom. balama “hinge” < Turk. bağlama; Rom. ciorbă “sour soup” < Turk. çorba);


Many other words have been modified phonetically as a result of reinterpretations induced by the general or dialectal rules of the Romanian phonetic and morphologic system, by analogy or by phonetic accidents; these new forms sometimes alternate with the etymologic, “correct” ones. It can be stated that in the domains of phonetics and morphology there are no real Turkish borrowings, but only changes in the distribution of several phonemes and phoneme groups (e.g. the strengthening of the position of the consonant h), as well as of some nominal flexional types.
b. The syntax, even if more permeable, was also superficially influenced. There are nevertheless several relational elements (ama “but”, başca “besides”, ioc “not at all”) and syntactic structures borrowed from the Turkish language; some of these structures were transposed to Romanian as compounds (get-beget < Turk. cet becet) or, on the contrary, were simplified by lexical-semantic condensation (Rom. bidinea “whitewasing brush” < Turk. badana [firçasi]; Rom. ghiveci “flower pot” < Turk. [çiçek] güvec[i]), in this way quitting the syntactic field. Other structures are not borrowings, but loan translations, imitations of Turkish models, reproduced by lexical or phrasal calque (e.g. Rom. ficat-alb “lung”, cf. Turk. akciğer “idem”; both, word for word, “white liver”). Some word forms are the result of false syntactic interpretations (contraction, agglutination, deglutination).

c. The Turkish loanwords belong to a large palette of semantic spheres, covering almost every field of human life and activity, and reflecting the extended influence of the Ottoman material and spiritual civilization on the Romanian one. The proportions of this influence were nevertheless not equal in all fields. The richest terminological groups of Turkish loanwords are those related to the society (social and administrative organization, armed forces, finances, justice, etc. – 33% of the loanwords), to the human being (his domestic universe, physical and psychical status, manner of clothing, lodging and nourishing – 24%) and to the human action onto the nature (the domains of production, of work – 15%). Medium percentages have the fields of the nature (fauna, flora, other realities of the environment), the peculiarities of the surrounding realities and their perception by man (colors, dimensions, quantities, modalities, etc., expressed by adjectives, nouns, adverbs, interjections, etc.), as well as the abstract notions. The poorest terminological groups are those linked to culture (amusements, music, folklore, education, literature, sciences) and to human relations.

If one wants nevertheless to compare these terminological groups from the point of view of the loanwords having survived until today, it will be clear that, even if every group had lost a lot of words, the terms related to the society fell to the last position, with the heaviest losses. From the viewpoint of the viability of the terms, i.e. of their effective value, it is suggestive that the today’s Romanian current language retained the following proportions from the total amount of the loanwords: nature – 66%; human action onto the nature – 62.3%; particularities of the surrounding realities – 57.6%; human being – 55%; abstract notions – 48.5%; culture – 47%; human relations – 38.7%; and society – 16.7%. The group of terms referring to social realities, which had gained the greatest number of Turkish words, was finally the least viable; in the same time, more than three fifths of the
terms related to natural realities and to professions have survived until today. It goes without saying that many words, after being borrowed, were subject not only of phonetic changes, but of different semantic evolutions as well (extensions, generalizations, depreciations, restrictions, analogies, etc.).

4. The cultural influences, the longstanding direct contacts between Romanian and Turkish people, their cohabitation in one or another area, as well as their ethnic mixture in certain historical periods and at certain social levels, have made possible that – beside the common terms – several place-names (Adacale, Bender, Bugeac, Crâm, Siutghiol, Tuzla a.s.o.), as well as names of persons (e.g. Aslan, Caraman, Deșliu, Ghelmanz, Lehliu, Magearu, Mungiu), animals (Barac, Hormuz, Samson), stars (Ciobanul, Tereziile), etc. were borrowed from the Turkish language. Other names have been formed in Romanian on the basis of common terms of Turkish origin.

5. Word-formation was the linguistic field having had the greatest profit following the lexical borrowing from Turkish. The Romanian language re-used the borrowed lexical material in two manners:

– on the one hand, several suffixes (-iu, -giu, -liu, -lâc) and one composition element (baș) were detached from the structure of the loanwords and became functional, that is, productive in Romanian, being attached to words of other origins than Turkish (e.g. argintiu < argint < Lat.; bragagiu < bragă < Rus.; duelgiu < duel < Fr., Lat.; savantlâc < savant < Fr.; baș-râzeș < râzeș < Hung.);

– on the other hand, new words and variants were created on the basis of the loanwords, either with the own formative means (by derivation, composition or conversion), or by reinterpreting the Turkish etymons or the borrowed forms through derivative analogy, popular etymology, contamination, etc.

Without having borrowed a great number of Turkish words, it wouldn’t have been possible to form in Romanian, on their basis, more than 2,000 new words, as well as many locutions and expressions.

6. Our statistic researches, undergone on a great amount of texts and lexicographic sources, and aimed at revealing the frequency and functional value of the lexical borrowings, lead us to the conclusion that in the present-day Romanian language there are about 1,250 words of Turkish origin, of which 1,000–1,010 are loanwords, and 240–250 are formed in Romanian by derivation or composition. The most important is, of course, a stratum of 81 loanwords and 102 Romanian
creations belonging to the essential vocabulary of modern Romanian. This stratum comprises an even more valuable layer, that of the fundamental vocabulary, including 39 loanwords (cafea, cafenea, capacit, caraghios, catifea, cântar, ceașaf, chef, chel, chibrit, chair, cioban, ciorap, cutie, dulap, dușman, farfurie, geam, geantă, habar, hai(de), haz, mardar, musafir, odaie, palavragiu, papuc, para, perdea, raft, săc, sârmă, sobă, soi, tacâm, tavă, turc, tutun) and 67 terms formed in Romanian (e.g. degeaba, pălăvrăgi, săcâi, sufragerie), with a core of six terms having the highest values and belonging to the principal lexical fund of today’s Romanian, namely cafea “coffee”, chef “desire, caprice; feast”, dușman “enemy”, geam “pane, glass”, hai(de) “come on!; come along!; let’s (go)!”, and mardar “dirty”; at their turn, these most important loanwords have developed 18 new Romanian formations (e.g. dușmăni, gemuleț, mardărie). Of some importance are also the 485–520 words (370–400 borrowings and 115–120 formed in Romanian) belonging to the outer layer of the bulk of the vocabulary, which includes literary and popular, occasionally and rarely used terms. The rest of the Turkish loanwords revolve with centrifugal tendencies at the periphery of the vocabulary (regionalisms, slang words, historical terms).

7. Those particularly interested in this subject could consult the second volume of my mentioned work, Dictionary of the Romanian Words of Turkish Origin, a historical and etymological dictionary of the Turkish loanwords, presented with lexicographic means, including the first dates and attestations of their different meanings and formal variants borrowed or created in Romanian, as well as of their Romanian derivatives and compounds. The etymological explanations include the Turkish etymons and their eventual formal or semantic alterations, as well as their correspondents of other Balkan languages. The abbreviation system, comprehensible for anyone, and the French translation of the meanings allow the dictionary to be used also by researchers and public who do not speak Romanian.
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Ana Mihaela Istrate*

And tell the beloved women to reduce (some) of their vision
and guard their private parts and not expose their
adornment except that which (necessarily) appears thereof
and to wrap (a portion of) their headcovers over their chests
and not expose their adornment except to their husbands, their
fathers, (…) that which their right hands possess, or those
male attendants having no physical desire, or children who
are not yet aware of the private aspects of women.

_Surat An-Nūr (The Light)_  - سورة النور [24:31]

For the Romantics, the East represented a new challenge for bringing to the
front scene, pieces of life that seemed _different_, a new geographical space where
the individual was dressed in unusual attire, characterized as exotic, while the
woman was dressed in long and vaporous gowns, with the face covered in veils,
producing an aura of mystery over her personality.

Either if we talk about the Far East, or the Mediterranean region, the trip
towards those realms meant for the Europeans, a new lifestyle, a process of agglu-
tination of specific traditions and rituals, which will be further away adapted to
the local specific, restructuring and revalorizing the old behavioral models.

The present paper starts from the establishment of the limits of the appear-
ance and development of exoticism, in the European culture, making appeal to
the complex system of connections between the literary text and the imagistic
discourse, and will continue, in its middle part, to bring into discussion the topic
of the feminine prototype, that is outlined on the background of the important
differences between the Western and Muslim societies.

The reading and rereading of Edward Said’s _Orientalism_ (1978) represented
the spring that drove the entire gear of the study, helping first at drawing a clear
comparison between the two terms – _orientalism and exoticism_ – and offering, at
the same time, an answer to the “multiple identity problem”¹ which is supported

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by the complex system of oriental clichés: harems, princesses, princes, slaves, veils, dancers, sorbets, oils, etc².

The paper places the research of the exotic world between Said’s theory on orientalism, perceived as a complex relationship “of power, domination and hegemony, in different degrees of complexity”³ and that of J.J. Clarke, referring to the debt of honor of the Western man, to the East⁴. The study does not mention the “monstrous mysticism of the East”, which Charles Sanders Peirce referred to, in his study, or the “cobweb of solemn absurdities” of the Arab world.

In my opinion, we can talk about a transfer of cultural values from the East to the Western world, intermediated both by the development of tourism and travel literature, but mostly as a result of a development of the visual component (painting, at Thomas Gainsborough, William James Müller or Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres, graphics with Eugène Delacroix, and photography, as in the case of Carol Popp de Szathmáry). All these components bring to the forefront, an unusual world, virgin here and there, a real source of inspiration for the artistic generations, starting with the 18th century.

The paper studies the exoticism interdisciplinary, with a focus especially on the problem of the representation of femininity, and less on the philosophical systems on which the analysis of orientalism was built along the years. It does not refer to man as a “manifestation of the exotic extravagance, filled with the mysticism and inconsequence of the New Age generation”, but offers supplementary arguments, in the attempt to change a mentality, still present in the modern society, referring to the fascination exerted by the exotic world upon the Western man.

Paintings do not explicitly refer to the literary texts chosen, but suggestively illustrate scenes, or even fragments from the literary texts selected. I have tried to underline the resemblance between the text and painting, not only from the thematic point of view, but highlighting the narrative component of the picture, which plays an important part in action completion, based on the theory of transposing the atmosphere of specific literary texts into the plastic language.

The study is completely endowed to the parables of the Quran, with regard to the duties of the Arab woman, as well as her social status. The present research makes use of a large number of artistic representations of the exotic woman, from

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the beauty dressed in traditional clothing, to the stylized representations of Western women dressed in Oriental clothing. Among the most important paintings we could mention Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres's *Le Bain turc*, the portrait of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu by Charles Jervas, Jean Léon Gérôme's female portraits entitled, *Almeh* and *Femme circassienne voilée*, or Charles Zacharie Landelle with *Femme arménienne*.

Along the centuries, Turkish harem meant *a sacred space for the segregation of the exotic beauty*. The error, still present in the late 19th century western world, was the inability to understand the harem, as a space of segregation, where the woman does not have any access to information, education, culture, and last but not least, civilization. The term *private space*, which belongs only to the family, had been misinterpreted by the European traveler, who had seen the harem only as a closed circle, where the access is forbidden, a space for the Arab woman's victimization. This theory is supported by a large number of ethnographic studies which highlight the fact that the harem belonged to a society in an early stage of evolution, in point of culture, religion and especially morale.

We can observe the discrepancy between the real representation of the Arab woman, as she appears in long, vaporous clothing, and the entire literary and artistic representation of the Arab world, where the woman appears scantily clad, leaning over the edge of the bath tub, in a provocative position, sending an encoded message of a dominating mentality, with symbolic implications.

Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres's *Le Bain turc* (Figure I) combines meditation with the oriental theme, being accomplished through a superposition of many layers, where women are presented in different settings, lying on the sofas, touching one another, around the coffee table, accompanied by musical instruments. Finished in 1862, the painting is a sublime composition, the result of many years of experimentation, when the artists changes the rectangular frame into a round one, with the puropose of reinforcing the differentiating element, the so called *otherness*, but also for a flattering of the Western traveler ⁵.

The painting makes use of the distancing technique, specific for 19th century art, the twenty feminine characters appearing as if they interact with each other, although the belong to distinctive cadres of the painting, creating in the end a *unified, coherent image* ⁶.

From a technical point of view, the composition combines drawing with oil painting, taking over certain elements of the previous works of art, as is the case

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⁶ Alyce Mahon, *Eroticism and Art*, p. 46.
of the young lady with the guitar, at the forefront of the painting, who is the focal point of the composition, inspired by an older painting of Ingres, *La Baigneuse* (1808), better known for its owner, Valpinçon (Figure II).

In his study upon the iconological representation of the harem, Malek Alloula interprets images, such as that of Ingres, as scenes of an inaccessible world. But this feminine inaccessibility is related more to the inner structure of the Oriental woman, whom Ingres turns into an erotic representation of the Western woman.

The two important texts covered by the present study are Gérard Nerval’s *Voyage en Orient* (1851) and *The Letters and Works of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu* (1763). Nerval speaks about four female prototypes, which he places in the Levantine region: the Circassian woman, the Armenian woman, the Jewish woman and the Greek woman. He offers detailed portraits of these four types, which are very similar to the four feminine models discovered in the 1830’s Istanbul.

The literary representations of the Romantic period reveal the differences between the Arab and the Western woman. Nerval, as well as Lamartine concluded that the Arab woman is lacking a certain level of civilization; she is unable to compete with the Western woman for a position in the society. When Nerval purchases a slave woman, whom he wants to bring back home he questions himself: *How can she become my equal?*, a statement which simply proves the Western man’s inability to perceive Eastern woman as a possible partner with equal rights. Even if she benefited from a very good education, Eastern woman is perceived as a model of debauchery: she smokes pipe, she lances on sofas, with the head immersed in soft pillows, but a prisoner behind the harem walls, while the Western woman spends her time reading, comfortably seated in an armchair, with a cup of tea on the small coffee table in front of her, in a dignified position, or simply walking freely, with a specific degree of freedom.

Veil, as a symbol of morality in Arab world is invested with multiple functions: on the one hand we can talk about its decorative function, an extremely important component of the fashion ritual, function which is also supported by the American psychologist and anthropologist Granville Stanley Hall, who considers adornment a simple hypothesis of the world around. The protective function refers to the physical need of suiting clothing to the geographical area and regional climate. The third function, which for the present study is the most important, the concealment function, starts from the pre-requisites of a degree of involution in

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the society, from a specific barbarism which has as a direct result the conversion of Arab woman into man’s property: “(...) clothing appears as a physical protection against any attack directed towards man’s property”. Invested with this meaning, the woman becomes an inviolable property of the Muslim man.

On the other hand, the masking purposes, which the Arab clothing carry with it, brings an aura of mystery, which create a connection with the playful function of secrecy and concealment of the Western mask. We can even say that the Arab woman interprets a character in a play. Sometimes she covers her face in veils so that she couldn’t be recognized, and sometimes she can even smile when her companion cannot guess her identity. Some other times the Arab woman hides behind her veils to shroud her identity, as in the case of Cynthia, Byron’s heroine, the harem fugitive.

By definition, the harem is considered a sacred, inviolable space, where access is limited, or even forbidden to those who do not belong to the limited social group. Along the centuries, the meaning of the harem was extended, from that of the Sultan’s residence, to that of an environment, destined exclusively to the Arab women.

During the 16th century, in the Ottoman Empire, the harem represented a place full of sacredness. As Leslie Peirce supports in his study, Mecca and Medina were considered the most venerated harems of the Islamic world. “After 1517, the Ottoman sultan, like the sultans of preceeding dynasties before him was the servant of the two noble sanctuaries, (hadun ul-haremeyn ûl-şerifeyn), a title proudly used today by the rulers of Saudi Arabia. The central Muslim religious compound in Jerusalem, Islam’s third most holy city, was also known as the noble sanctuary (harem-i şerif). In ottoman usage, the inner courtyard of the mosque - its sanctuary – was also a harem”9.

Initially the harem was the exclusive residence of the sultan, but at the end of the 16th century he organizes a second sacred harem, in the inner court of the Imperial palace, destined to the women and children, the royal heirs, which is called the Imperial harem (harem-i hûmayun), because the only man who had access to this part of the palace was the Sultan himself.

During the second half of the 17th century, the harem is attributed a negative connotation, very often people putting an equal sign between the harem and the promiscuity of the Arab world. Obviously it was a false meaning, and this is due to a misunderstanding related to the inequalities between sexes in the Arab world,

because of the more and more acute inadequacies in the relationship between the East and the West, on matters such as: sexual differences, social space, or political matters. In the Arab world, is less distinct the masculine-feminine diagonal, or the public-private one. "Bernard Lewis has pointed out that power relationships in Islamic society are represented by spatial division more horizontal than vertical, in contrast to western metaphors: instead of moving up, one moves in, toward greater authority"\textsuperscript{10}.

There are two categories of words, one set in Turkish, the other one in Persian language, used to define the division: içliçeri in Turkish, and endurun in Persian, for the inner space, while for the outer space taşra and birun. The provinces of the empire were considered the taşra, while the government of Istanbul was the iç / içeri, so we can simply understand why along the centuries the concepts of harem and iç / içeri became very similar. Both suggested the idea of social status and power, honor and domination.

The second half of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century is the moment of the appearance of the so called harem literature, which naturally resulted from the constant need of expression, problem resolution and error correction, due to the Western travelers’ misinterpretations, during their travels into the Balkan or Magrebian region. Either because of a lack of knowledge or on purpose, westerners were almost unable to understand local customs and traditions.

\begin{quote}
[33:32] O wives of the Prophet, you are not like anyone among women. If you fear Allah, then do not be soft in speech (to men), lest he in whose heart is disease should covet, but speak with appropriate speech”.

[33:33] And abide in your houses and do not display yourselves as (was) the display of the former times of ignorance. And establish prayer and give zakah (charity) and obey Allah and His Messenger. Allah intends only to remove from you the impurity (of sin), O people of the (Prophet’s) household and to purify you with (extensive) purification”\textsuperscript{11}.
\end{quote}

The quotes from the Quran are extremely suggestive, highlighting the status of the Arab woman, who is merciful and compassionate, her only function being that of listening to her man’s words, as well as those of Allah’s and his messenger’s.

In his study, Art and Exoticism, Paul van der Grijp speaks about the per-

\textsuperscript{10} Leslie Peirce, The Imperial Harem, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{11} www.Quran.com/33/32-33_9/24/2014.
ception of the Romantic society upon the colonization process, supporting the idea that the political discourse of the epoch presents the colonized regions as if they were “metaphoric representations of the woman”. This cliché, regarding colonization as a penetration of the virgin lands, belongs to what is called colonial exoticism. At this point it is worth mentioning the huge discrepancy between the real image of the Arab woman, as she appears in her daily life, covered in veils, and the entire Western representation, both literary and artistic, where the woman appears scantily clad, on the bath tub, in a provocative position, sending a codified message, of a dominating mentality, with symbolic connotations.

[33:59] O Prophet, tell your wives and your daughters and the women of the believers to bring down over themselves (part) of their outer garments. That is more suitable that they will be known and not be abused. And ever is Allah Forgiving and Merciful.

Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres (1780–1867) is the perfect example of a western artist who never travelled to the East, but felt the need to present on the canvas his own erotic ideals, with regard to Oriental beauty. For his Oriental works, his main source of inspiration was the volume of engravings published in 1714, entitled Recueil de cent estampes représentant différentes nations du Levant. On the other hand, researchers consider that he might have read Lady Mary Wortley Montagu’s letters, from the period 1716-1718, in a French translation, dating form 1805, where the author talks about her visit to public bath in Istanbul. Ingres had constantly searched for a plausible element that could be transposed on canvas, thus the painting could render a possible world. On the other hand, his works are dominated by sensuality, which is the original print of the French artist. This characteristic comes in contrast with the real world of the Arab women, a world characterized by decency, and a total lack of sensual suggestions. Still, in 1717, Lady Mary Montagu (Figure III) is the first supporter of the idea that the Muslim woman is not subject to a strict code, her status being one of respect and decency. Here is a fragment from her letter, dated April 1, 1717, where Mary Montagu speaks about the Turkish bath:

"It was full of women (...) without any distinction of rank by their dress, all being in the state of nature, that is, in plain English, stark naked, without any beauty or defect concealed. Yet there was not the least wantom smile or immodest gesture amongst them. They walked and moved with (...) majestic grace, which Milton describes our general mother with. There were many amongst them, as exactly proportioned as ever any goddess was drawn by the pencil of a Guido or Titian – and most of their skins shiningly white, only adorned by their beautiful hair divided into many tresses, hanging on, their shoulders, braided either with pearl or ribbon, perfectly representing the figures of the Graces. (...) to see so many fine women naked, in different postures, some in conversation, some working, others drinking coffee or sherbet, and many negligently lying on their cushions, while their slaves (generally tretty girls of seventeen or eighteen) were employed in braiding their hair in several pretty fancies, in short, it is the women’s coffee house, where all the news of the town is told, scandal invented, etc”  

As it will later happen with the photography, exotic painting, having as a central subject the representation of the Arab woman, behind the closed doors of the harem, represents, from an aesthetic point of view, a category that answers the needs of the western public opinion, so eager to listen to the inciting exotic love stories, able to stimulate the receiver’s imagination.

Paul van der Grijp speaks about three different ways of interpreting the image of the exotic woman, as she appears beginning with the Romantic period:

• “an ethnographic novelty;
• a tacit colonial ideology;
• a repressed phantasy”  

We can also speak about a set of western clichés, which are visible in the pictorial representations, but more in the literary representations, where we cope with the same paradigm: the relationship of the colonizer, man, sailor, soldier, with the indigenous woman, whose beauty is able to allure and shock the mind of the western man.

"Le Caire est la ville du Levant où les femmes sont encore le plus hermétiquement voiles. A Constantinople, à Smyrne, une gaze blanche ou noire laisse quelquefois deviner les traits des belles musulmanes, et les edits les plus rigoureux parviennent rarement à leur faire épaisir ce frêle tissu. Ce sont des nonnes gracieuses et coquettes qui, se consacrant à un seul époux, ne sont pas fâchées toutfois de donner des regrets au monde. Mais l’Égypte, grave et pieuse, est toujours le pays des énigmes et des mystères; la beauté s’y entoure, comme autrefois, de voiles et de bandelettes, et cette morne attitude décourage aisément l’Européen frivole”\textsuperscript{16}.

The Arab woman seems opulent in her \textit{habbara}, when she belongs to the higher classes, or in her \textit{khamiss}, if we speak about a simple woman. She is always beautiful, wears gold jeweleries on her hands and feet, she walks barefoot, here and there unveiling her ankles, and sometimes one can see her arms coming out of the wide sleeves of her clothes.

Professor Jeniffer Yee argues the difference between exoticism and alterity, starting from the four feminine types, existent in the French colonial literature:

\begin{itemize}
  \item la \textit{nègresse}
  \item the Oriental woman
  \item the woman from Indochina
  \item the noble woman of the Pacific islands\textsuperscript{17}
\end{itemize}

For professor Yee \textit{exoticism} is a concept encapsulating not only literary and artistic tradition, but also the interior design and architecture, while \textit{alterity} is a philosophical term, belonging to anthropology, used to explain the way in which the theory of cultural differences influenced the understanding of the so called \textit{otherness}.

In the specific case of Nerval, he speaks about four different feminine types, whom he places in the Levantine region: \textit{the Circassian, the Armenian, the Jewish woman and the Greek one}. He offers a detailed portrayal of each and every type, a delimitation of the feminine beauty that is very similar to what Julia Pardoe found in the Istanbul of the 1830s.

There was the Turkes with her yashmac folded closely over her face, and her dark feridjhe falling to the pavement; the Greek woman, with her large turban, and braided hair, covered loosely with a scarf of white muslinm her gay-coloured dress, and large shawl; the Armenian, with her dark bright eyes flashing from under the jealous screen of her carefully-arranged veil, and her red slipper peeping out under the long wrapping cloak; the Jewess, muffled in a coarse linen cloth, and standing a little apart, as though she feared to offend by more immediate contact: and among the crowd some of the loveliest girls imaginable.

For Nerval, Circassian woman is extremely beautiful, has black eyes, matt complexion; she is slim and tall, with delicate extremities, specific for the population of Circassian origin. The eyes are highlighted with surmeh, a black makeup, and the hands are colored with henna (Figure IV).

Circassian and Georgian women are frequently represented in the Oriental harem. This is due mainly to the color of their skin, extremely pale, almost pearl like; they were considered the perfect slaves, who could even become Sultan’s wives. Very often they were confused with Christian women, even if this was not completely false, because Georgia and Circassia provinces, from Northern Caucasus, adopted the Muslim religion only in the 17th century. After that moment these provinces are a blend of Christian traditions and Muslim religious doctrine, which is due to the vague status of these territories, both under the Ottoman Empire and Russian domination.

The young Georgian and Abkhaz women were sent to the Sultan court as a gift from the local governors. They were bought from the slave markets, after they had been kidnapped or even sold by their poor families. Many families form the Northern Caucasus region used to encourage their young girls to become slaves, so that they could hope for a better life, at the luxurious court of the Ottoman Sultan. The slaves, who were accepted in the Imperial harem and had the chance to become the Sultan’s favourites, acquired the names of odalisques. They were now educated, initiated in the secters of the belly dance, as well as traditional musical instruments.

Armenian women, very rarely appears in the Romantic literary texts or painting, and this is due to the political context, after the Crimean War. “Most Armenians were Christians – some orthodox, others Roman-Catholic – and the Armenian woman in a Muslim harem may have arrived there as a captured pris-

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oner of war”. Nerval describes her in the following terms: with a barbarian suit, less decorated, with a slightly acquiline profile but an incredible serenity.

Alphonse de Lamartine, in his *Voyage en Orient*, reaffirms the beauty of the pale Armenian woman, with her pure and delicate aspect: eyes in which the serene light of the soul turns into a gloomy azure, a softness of expression, never seen before - such a gracious color of the skin, surpassing the most perfect tones of the rose leaf – while the teeth, the smile, the elegance of shapes and movements, clear voice – are all incredible.

Extremely suggestive for Lamartine’s description is the painting by the French artist Charles Landelle (Figure V), who specialized in Oriental themes, where the beauty of the character’s face is emphasized by a traditional clothing line, highlighting the finery that she wears. The work of art applies the technique of chiaroscuro, specific for the Renaissance Flemish painters, the profile of the young woman being cut on the dark background. The face is extremely bright but severe, with a majestic posture, completed by the gracious sensitivity of the hands. The features are specific for the Northern Caucasus women, with thick eyebrows, straight nose and full, sensual mouth. The attire is completed by the pellucid, transparent veil, which allows a glimpse of the red turban, in tune with the clothing.

What the western traveler never understood about the harem was its role of a domestic space, hidden behind the high walls, which is inviolable and full of discretion. At the moment of the French occupation in Algeria there were only a few traditional harems, where polygamy was still practiced. Thus, the Western man felt the need to render this unusual space, even if he never saw it, because it was strictly forbidden. It is the case of Eugene Delacroix, who manages to enter a harem in Alger, but his painting, *Femmes d’Alger dans leur Appartement* (1834) can never accurately render the image acquired during the field research.

Eastern woman is not vulgar, has access to information, and is powerful; having the right to a political decision she is able to influence the Sultan’s decisions. This period of the imperial harem is known as *Kadinlar Sultanati* (Women’s domination). The involvement of the queen mother at the highest political level had the effect of diminishing the Sultan’s position of power, so that in the end it led to the fall of the Ottoman Empire.

The harem represents for Joan del Plato an intercultural aberration, such as the pygmies or cannibals, indicating a diversity which is superior for the Western man.\textsuperscript{22}

The perception upon the harem is influenced by demographic elements such as: age, gender, social affiliation, religion, education, but it is also the direct result of the travel experiences of the receiver.

Lady Mary Wortley Montagu’s travel stories, that make reference to the Arab woman, are probably the most truthful/veracious, because she was the only one to have access into the women’s harem in Istanbul, before the year 1800. The accuracy of the stories, as well as the interest of the author is reflected in the amount of texts making reference to this topic. Mohammed Sharafuddin considers that Mary Montagu’s stories are a combination of exotic elements, vague, sometimes naïve, trying to shock in a way the conventional society of her times.\textsuperscript{23}

Lady Mary Montagu is the first one to introduce the Turkish attire into the English environment. Lynne Thornton is a researcher who enumerates an entire series of British high class ladies who, following Lady Mary Montagu’s tradition, order portraits where they appear dressed in exotic clothing. It is the case of Philippa Elizabeth Dorothea Rooper, Lady Sunderlin, whose portrait is accomplished by Sir Joshua Reynolds.

Even if after the year 1770 the Turkish fashion fades away, the Orient still represents one of the main sources of inspiration: mamelouk caftans, turbans, cashmere shawls, feathered clothes à la levantine, oriental design textiles, etc.\textsuperscript{24}

In the case of Lady Sunderlin the portrait by Joshua Reynolds (Figure VI), the depth of the landscape is far deeper than the flat character of the canvas, and this is due mainly to the observer’s gaze: “Because the vector of look is perpendicular on the painting’s plane, it tries to continue, in the same line, in order to create a deeper cadre”.

Lady Sunderlin suggests the feeling of nature, a painful sensation of melancholia, bonding both with the landscape, and with the face of the central character, whose pathos is indefinite. Without exaggeration, we can talk about an element of sublime that becomes apparent in the painting predicting in a way the Romantics’ taste for nature and restlessness.

This maturity painting proves a refined awareness of the feminine sensibil-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Joan del Plato, \textit{Multiple Wives, Multiple Pleasures – Representing the Harem, 1800-1875}, p. 22
\item \textsuperscript{24} Lynne Thornton, \textit{Women as portrayed in orientalist painting}, ACR Edition 1994, p.10.
\end{itemize}
ity. The painter carefully studies the states of mind of his character, which seems tormented by the feeling of love. Her chest seems as if it painfully struggles, the veil on her chest vibrating together with the whole body, under the autumnal breeze. The tones of ochre and pearl of the character’s dress are in accordance with the decomposing nature surrounding her, as well as with the falling sunset.

Besides the symbolism of color, an important part is played by other symbols, such as that of the tree. The tree is a symbol denoting cosmic life: consistency and evolution, perceived as regenerating process, turns it into a symbol of inexhaustibility, understood as eternal life.

We are now faced with a balanced image where the space is proportionally harmonized, where “emptiness is counterbalanced by fullness”\(^\text{25}\).

We can easily observe in the painting an abundance of the *chiaroscuro*, of insecure tones, of the contrast between dusk and dawn, all those humanly inciting effects, offering the object of contemplation a sense of restlessness.

Lynne Thornton, in her studies, mentions two types of representations of the harem: on the one hand she speaks about a voluptuous fantasy\(^\text{26}\), which involves field research and then representation on the canvas of the experienced and seen world, and on the other hand we can talk about representations of the western world, adapted to the eastern canon. It is the case of the artificial portraits, where western women get dressed in exotic attire, miming traditions, rituals and even gestures, belonging to a Mediterranean mentality. Both literary and artistic representations highlight the differences between the Eastern and Western women. Eastern women play musical instruments, they smoke pipe, lying on the sofas, while Western women spend their time reading, drinking a cup of tea, in a posture full of dignity. This is the apparent difference between the two characters.

Western society developed a set of frameworks according to which the harem is a space of segregation, of the Arab woman victimization, the theory being supported by a set of ethnographic studies, which support the idea that the harem belongs to a culturally, religiously and morally underdeveloped society.

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(Figure I)

Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres *Le Bain turc* (1862)
Figure II
Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres *La Baigneuse dite Baigneuse de Valpinçon*, 1808
Figure III
Charles Jervas, *Lady Mary Wortley Montagu*, after 1716
Figure IV
Jean Léon Gérôme, *An Almeh* (1882)
Figure V
Charles Zacharie Landelle, *Femme arménienne* (1866)
Figure VI

Sir Joshua Reynolds *Portrait of Lady Sunderlin wearing a “Turkish” attire* (1786)
One of the oldest published Romanian travel diaries was the *Travels within Asia Minor* written by Dimitrie Bolintineanu’s *Travels within Asia Minor* was one of the earliest Romanian travel diaries to be published. The Romanian traveler has tried to keep a diary during his trip offering some very interesting images on the Western parts of the Ottoman Empire in the middle of the XIX’th century:

“Ten minutes were enough for our ship to reach Scala –New-Neapole marina which is situated on the bottom of the golf and there is also the Kushadassi (Bird island) where we stayed during the night. All the houses are placed round the natural island amphitheater looking to the sea […] Greeks are placed on the upper side and Turks on the lower side, the third side of the city was inhabited by Jews and it was very dirty. We have spent our night within a coffee shop, sleeping on a wooden board. What a great transformation, because only with several years ago here near Smyrna, those who dare to walk away alone never know if they will reach their final destination. Today we have a railroad which start from Smyrna and penetrate like a civilization genius loci these beautiful regions but of frightful savagely”¹.

Bolintineanu describes his travel by train from Smyrna to Brussa. In fact, he didn’t know that the railroad ran only along the Asia Minor shore, so he had to change his itinerary and for that he needed a travel comrade since the region he wanted to travel had a very bad reputation:

”Travelling on the railroad from Smyrna you can see a lot of ancient fortress. I’m sure that civilization itself will be back in one day over these ancient cradles surrounded by a mild climate. Turkish people will be forced to subdue all these progress ideas, or to leave these shore to other civilized nations². Despite of these realities life began to appear here and there within Oriental regions, because four modern railways are ready and functional here in Turkey. We haven’t got only

² Bolintineanu, Dimitrie, *Călătorii*, 1862: 67, 68.

* University of Bucharest, (aeliuariort274@gmail.com).
single one yet! Smyrna has 150,000 inhabitants from all nations, Turks being in majority. I tried to find a comrade for my shore travel to Brussa. I’ve found a Greek monk who wants to travel towards a small city near Kintaya. For the moment all the journeys are under interdiction because of the fear of a famous highwayman called Catargian. He didn’t kill anybody and he release poor people, but he arrested all wealthy travelers forcing them to write redeem letters to home sometimes asking enormous amount of money in exchange for their life. This kind of ransom (marafet) isn’t yet known by our robbers from the United Principalities. We can say that our scoundrels have remained back concerning these methods. I didn’t have any fear to get arrested and redeemed, because I’m a bachelor and even my relatives didn’t have any money. The road is passing through Burnaba, the village where rich people from Smyrna have the most beautiful gardens, houses and parks”[3][…]

“The road everywhere around us we saw rich fields full of crops. Next to the road there is a village called Cassaba, and that is the place from where the tasteful and well known yellow melons of Smyrna, tomatoes and other vegetables are. Couple hours later we passed through Derbrent which is not far is just only two hours walking from Kassaba, then comes Ahmedji which is a very picturesque place. From this point we met the Yurukii a nomad population but kind one. We spent our night in this village under a kind of shadier and we ate milk and fresh cheese”[4].

Bolintineanu offers the reader a brief history of the region from the ancient times to the middle of the XIX’th century:

”From ancient times, an important road passed through entire Lydia from East to West, from the Aegean Sea till far away in Susa (Iran). At every station along the road there were big royal houses with relaxation places for travelers where they can have free meal. This custom to offer a free meal is nowadays in use in many places in Asia Minor. Lydia’s land is very fertile especially across the Meander’s low laying area where we can see figs, sultana, cotton, olive oil and sesame well known over the Europe and the world”[…]

Bolintineanu completes his notice with an ad hoc ethnic and demography study:

”Let’s talk something about Aiden, when you can take the train, the first railroad station is Philadelphia. The fortress had received the right to take part

3] Bolintineanu, 73.
4] Bolintineanu, 75.
5] Bolintinean, 76.
from the seven Asian Today almost the city houses are made from wood and clay but population is very rich because of the soil particularities, and it has 10,000 inhabitants and there are almost 2000 Christians. Turkish name is Ala-cherer. Further Aydin Guzel-hissarnu was one of the most important and rich city in Lydia. Today’s Aydin Guzel-hissarnu is placed over the ancient Greek city and it has 12,000 houses and about 400 Christian homes. During the afternoon we left Sarda, and passed through Marmara, spent the night in an Inn where travelers receive free meal. I was very pleased of the variety of the inhabitant costumes. We could see Zeibeci that were very different from surrounding population. They were wearing a big and tall turban on their head, white shalvars made from cotton or aba till the knees. Their shalvars weren’t large rather there were very tight. A large belt surrounding their waist and it was full of pistols, yatagan, daggers, pipe, kiseaoa (kase) and a wallet. They live in all hamlets and villages from Tmolus to the Messogis Mountains. It seems that they were not of Turk origin, because their ancestors were the ancient Thracian population, and from ancient times they were mercenaries. Nowadays they are robbing caravans. They are not so good Muslims so, several years ago Tahir Pasha had tried to change their way of life ordering to change their costumes and customs because the manner in which they wear and they behave has a deep frightening impact and cause terror on the surrounding population. They began a powerful revolt against these rules and Pasha from Aydin sent the army against them and many of them were slaughtered, but finally they accepted Pasha’s authority. We spent our evening together with five dervish travelers who made several prophecies. At the supper we ate a good pilaf and as desert a very sweet cataif...

After that Bolintineanu offers us very interesting and particular information about a surprising intercultural encounter:

"Next day early in the morning we went forward to visit the ancient Pergamum. Even today the tanner workers from Pergamum are well known and appreciated for their craftsmanship concerning the leathers tannery. Without these artists that live on the both sides of the Sellin river we wouldn’t have the possibility to learn ancient Greek philosophical ideas originated from ancient Pergamum. When we have reached the Troad (Troya) ancient Illion region there we met some English people, several families: men, women and children riding on their horses, followed by a Greek Dragoman, and Turkish servants who transport tents, iron beds and, of course, food supplies. They came from the port of Adramitthyum and travelled to see the ancient ruins on the Assos Mountain. The climbing was hard..."
because of the heat and we stopped for a while on the mountain cliff, when one
of the Englishmen approached to me, he seemed to be the expedition leader and
started to talk with me: «He asks me: - Where are you from? ; I answered calmly:
- I'm from Walachia! ; -What kind of country is it? ; - It is Romania. You can reach
Romania in almost four days travelling by ship; -What kind of people are you? ;
–You are Greeks? ; – Or maybe Armenians?;- Bulgarian? - Montenegrin? -Serbs? -
Not at all! We are a people of almost 14 million, having Latin and Thracian roots,
and we are living on the both sides of Danube River up to Tisa and stretching as
far as the Black Sea; - Yes, of course [...] - I remember he says. I have an office in
Liverpool, on Stock Exchange where sometimes talk about Romania, that there
you can find a very quality wheat. It's very good that in Romania, he says, you can
produce something! ».”

Dimitrie Bolintineanu reproduces his dialogue explaining the English-
man's behavior underlining the principal Occidental prejudice and stereotype
concerning Balkan nations:

“The Englishman was ironic. He hated the Turks, but in the same time he
despised all Christian nations that were under Turkish domination, thinking that
these nations weren't worthy of a better destiny. He said to me: because the con-
querrors have great virtues and the Balkan population have a great viciousness
it's the only reason for how Ottomans succeeded to conquer them easy. It is a
false opinion he says, that European Powers didn't know what sort of imaginary
equilibrium are Turks maintaining the in Balkan Peninsula even by the nations
which subdued them. From all the Christin nations in Turkey only Greeks were
first to refuse and revolted against the Ottoman yoke together with other nations
that became slaves many years ago and ashamed by their political status and they
sacrificed whatever it took. But the Turks made this sacrifice but not here or there
from a half century to another half of century they made this everywhere, every
day, died continuously in endless battles. What do the other nations have to say?
Weapons made the Turks powerful. I don't know you as a nation, but I bet that you
Wallach or Romanians hate Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, more than you hate Turks.
Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs must hate you more than they hate Turks. It is a natural
and ancient law to be invidious on your equal than on your master. This kind of
sentiment has always served for the conquerors. Oriental Question hangs over
the Europe like the Damocles sword. Europe looks to nations under the Turkish
rule: They hold everything in their hands because Turks and Christians live there,
together in which is their home or country. What Christians should ask isn't the

7]  Bolintineanu, 92.
throne of Byzantium Caesars but the equality of civil and politic rights. A constitution and single Chamber composing from Muslims and Christians, and might have on the Constantinople throne a respectable European royal family”

Dimitrie Bolintineanu relates in his second travel journal a diplomatic and official travel made by Prince Cuza and Romanian at Constantinople:

“On Thursday morning at 8 o’clock, we embarked at Galatz on the French steamboat called Taurus. The Bayrut corvette, sent by the the Ottoman government to take our Prince was already in Sulina. In the evening we reached the mouth of the Danube. Here the ship stopped and the local governor came in a kayak in company of two other officials. Our prince welcomed them with amiability but even with proper dignity befitting to a Romanian independent sovereign”.

“At Sulina we were welcomed with canons volley from the Ottoman ships anchored at the harbour. We went forward following the Ottoman corvette to Varna. We had a three hours stop in Varna. The steamship captain took almost twelve Tatar emigrants on board despite he hasn’t that right after our stipulated conditions that we had already discuss before the embarkment. The previous corvette on which the Romanian Prince travelled reached Bospor port two hours before us and had already anchored on the Bospor strait. On Sunday at 9 o’clock we received the authorization to go on board of the Bayrut corvette which was a very fancy ship. The captain was an black Abisinian. They said that he was one of the most famous Ottoman sea commanders. At 10 o’clock our ship sailed through the Bospor strait to Ermigian where a palace for the accommodation of the prince and his entourage was arranged. After 30 minutes we stopped in front of the Palace. Many kayaks from the Sultan fleet were assigned for use by our Prince and his diplomatic mission. The Romanian Prince together with the Presidents of the Legislative Assemblies, descended into one of these kayaks. Everyone followed his Royal Highness. Then fired the Turkish cannons as a diplomatic jesture which was only done at very special occasions? Ottomans soldiers were arranged on two rows and then they spread away leaving enough space for our Prince, saluting with their weapons. As soon as we entered the palace all the servants were aligned one by one in front of our guest room which was on the ground floor. The upstairs apartments were special reserved for our Prince. This palace was the property of the famous Cosref Pasha. After his death it was taken over by Reschid Pasha.

After Reschid’s death the Palace became the Sultan’s property. It is said that the Baltalimani peace treaty was signed in one of the palace’s reception rooms. I didn’t stay there, but I asked the Prince permission to sleep in D. K. Negri houses in Bujukdere" 10.

“We just arrived to the Emirgian palace on the time the Turks had prepared a buffet for all Romanian guests. It was a luxurious Oriental buffet. The Ottoman government took responsibility to cover all the expenditure, no matter how substantial it may be, for our accommodation during our visit. The daily expenses made for us were fabulous. Turkish administration spent more than one million piaster for our diplomatic visit in Bospor”11.

On Monday at 2 p.m. all Romanian officials were gathered at the Prince Palace and went together to the Sultan’s serai. A little steamship sent by the government was waiting for us at the Palace stairs. The steamship sailed toward the Dolma-Bahcce Serail. After 40 minutes we reached the stairs that guide straight ahead to the serai. Here we all made we all disembarked and made our way through the palace outhouses. At the end of the gallery we were welcomed by the Foreign Minister Safeti-Efendi. Outside was a company of soldiers, all dressed in red uniforms, from the imperial guard of honor who presented us the weapons salute together with their greetings. We pass through the Serail court along a luxurious garden walking straight to the serai entrance. There were many other guards wearing ancient Ottoman costumes. The Grand Vezir Ali Pasha welcomed here our Prince, and then we climbed a stair under a red glass roof. Here we passed through another gallery guarded by several columns, and then we entered into a big hall. His Royal Highness the Sultan appeared in the middle of the hall, standing and walking towards us with little and slower steps. Sultan wore a short black mantel with diamond sewed collar, his sword has its hilt adorned with hundred tiny diamonds and of course respecting tradition the Emperor cover his head with a fez. Sultan looks much older than his age”12[...]

“He had an interesting physical appearance, his face was pale and here and there he had little slight wrinkles. A smile appears on his lips, which grants his face a nice expression between the Prince Cuza and the Sultan there Grand Vezir Ali Pasa. Our Prince gave a short speech in French. Although the Sultan knew French very well, because of the court protocol the Grand vezir served as an intermediary. So, Ali Pasha translated what our prince addressed to the Sultan from

11]  Bolintineanu, Călătoria, 10.
12]  Bolintineanu, Călătoria, 11.
French into Turkish"\textsuperscript{13} [...] .

“Prince Cuza spoke loudly, but the Sultan answered with such a tender voice and lower tone that we barely heard his words. But, the thin and slim Vezir Ali Pasha talked with even a lower voice than the Sultan\textsuperscript{14}. After that, the Emperor expressed his desire to talk with our Prince on a private meeting. Hearing these noble words our Prince saluted the Sultan bowing his head twice, and after that we, led by the Prince, retreated silently from the presence of the Sultan in such a manner that we kept our faces towards the Sultan until we stepped out of the hall. The Grand Vezir along with the Foreign Affairs Minister walked before us descending on a stair entering in a chamber that had sea view. Here we sat on chairs. Prince Cuza and the Grand Vezir briefly exchanged words of courtesy. In the meantime came into the chamber several servants one for each guest, each servant carrying a sorbet and a towel. Each servant presented a cup of sorbet to his guest and urged him to drink, but all guests drank cautiously the content of the cups because they were very distrustfully concerning the treaty and servants insistence\textsuperscript{15}.

Bolintineanu then provides us with a couple of details about Kiamil Pasha followed by a short dialog:

“Kiamil Bey is brother-in-law of Fuad Pasha and the imperial master of ceremonies for the foreign ambassadors in Constantinople. He was a Zelfist Turk, a person who wore ultimate ottoman fashion clothes. Yesterday during a short conversation he told us: I travelled in Danubian Principalities for nine times, and when I die I think that I probably will be thrown into Black Sea having a diplomatic mission for the Principalities. – I asked him: When will it come to an end with all these firmans and the vassality of our country? – I would like to finish it in this moment! Answered he quickly, then I will be sure that I won’t be drown in the Black Sea. Kiamil Bey was in Galați when the Prince Cuza was (Pârcălab) governor there. – You see how the world is nowadays: In the past I was addressed his Highness: Monsenieur Kuza, s’il vous plât asseyez-vous. Today his Royal Highness calls me: - Kiamil bey asseyez”\textsuperscript{16} [...] ”Next day we had an official meeting at Ars-odasi, and the Grand vezir Ali-Pasa welcomed us at the door. We all were invited into the most famous Ars-odasi where Sultan himself comes from time to time to preside at the State Council. The hall was huge and very

\textsuperscript{13} Bolintineanu, Călătoria, 12.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibidem, 12.
\textsuperscript{15} Bolintineanu, Călătoria, 13.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibidem, 13.
elegant. There were several servants expecting us with many trays full of coffee cups. Some of us had only few drops of coffee into their colorful cups. One of the servants showed me only an empty cup. I took from his hands the empty cup and I feigned that I sipped and gave it back. [... ] The Ottoman music was playing under the windows on a romantic atmosphere. From the hall we descended to our carriages returning on the steamship on the same road that we came. As soon as we arrived at our Palace the Sultan sent his personal secretary with presents for the Prince Cuza: the big Girdle (Kordonlu) and a sword adorned with diamonds. The Ottoman secretary addressed our Prince with full ceremony in accordance with his rank: «His Imperial Highness granted me the great honor and pleasure of coming to your Highness with these gifts and requested you to accept these objects as a souvenir concerning your visit to Constantinople». The sword cost almost 3300 golden coins. Next day in the morning the Grand vezir made a visit which was later returned by Prince Cuza\textsuperscript{17}. [...] In the same afternoon, Prince Cuza went to the Sultan’s serai to thank for the presents. Sultan agreed to see him immediately showing his desire that Mr. Negri stayed and assist on this particular discussion between two sovereigns. It was an intimate talk that lasted three hours. The Ottoman sovereign spoke French very well and during the visit showed his special guests all his art collections and other serai treasures. Except for those of the harem (haremlik) he guided them through all the serai rooms and chambers, displaying them his most precious pieces, rare gifts and presents received from other sovereigns all over the world, among other objects, he showed a vase made from malahit, sent from Siberia. ‘It is a tough country, this Siberia!’ said the Sultan. ‘It is very cold in the region; cold climate isn’t good!’ ”\textsuperscript{18}.

Later Romanian officials were invited to an opera concert in the Sultan’s serail where were the Turk officials explained the reasons and custom concerning granted gifts.

“On Wednesday afternoon we were invited to spend our evening at the private theatre in the Sultan’s serai. This theater surpasses in its richness all the theatres in the world. The Italian company actually came to Constantinople to put a show in the Pera theater to sing for the Sultan before its debut. In that way we finished our official visit in Bospor that lasted 12 days. On the last day of their diplomatic visit Prince Cuza together with all Romanian officials visited the Sultan for a farewell audience. All these decorations the Romanian officials received from the Sultan weren’t for the services rendered for the Turks, neither because of

\textsuperscript{17} Bolintineanu, \textit{Călătoria}, 20.
\textsuperscript{18} Bolintineanu, \textit{Călătoria}, 24.
treason, just because it is the diplomatic custom at Constantinople”19.

The Romanian folklorist and musicologist Teodor Burada made between 1883 and 1899 numerous travels into several regions from Central Europe, Crimea, Caucasus, Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor in hope of finding ancient Romanian communities or communities with ancient Romanic origins. Among these one should mention the travel he made in 1894 in Bithynia- Brusa region in the Asia Minor where he had searched the villages inhabited by shepherds that had an ancient Aromanian origin named by the surrounding Turkish population Pisticos from the Greek language (belivers):

“Local Turkish population maintained that they were shepherds living in the region between Brusa and Muhalici and not long before 10 or 15 years in addition to shepherding they also produced Vlah-peinir (sheep cheese), selling it in all markets in Brusa. According to Burada, they inhabited nine villages in the region: Baschoi (Vurlati), Eksisge (Ainati), Huruda (Caragioba), Ceatalaghi (Constantinati), Caracogia (Idia), Camartati (Aghia Kiriaki), Subaşaghîl (Piladaci), Serian, Kirmikir which altogether made a total of 5000 people”.

Burada also describes in his journal the itinerary he took to trace the well-known Vlach cheese.

“Firstly I went to the Peinir-han to see if these shepherds still came from the Kesis-dag (Olimp) mountain with cheese, but I learned that they ceased to come and sell their products ten or fifteen years ago. One (bacal) grocer, his name was Haralamb has a shop in Muradie neighborhood, told me about that shepherds from the surrounding mountain but one day they cease descending in the city and sell him their cheese as they used to before, but he knows very well that on that mountain still live many of these shepherds, and the cheese they produce was renowned with the name Vlah-Peinir (and nowadays it is known as Muhalici peinir)”20.

Before starting with his travel through a dangerous region Theodor Burada had to ask help and specific information from the Romanian Diplomatic Legation:

“Mr. Alphone Lahaille, the first interpreter of the Romanian legation to Constantinople, after I told him my motifs for why I came in Turkey and revealed my purposes he advised me to change my European clothes and to wear a fes on my head, to wrap up my waist with a wide leather belt holding a yatagan, knives and pistols. Before leaving this ancient town of Brusa I think that it would be fine to tell you my impressions about it and its surroundings: it has wonderful

thermal baths from Cekirge and Kyukyurli surrounded by a large and wonderful garden Bunar bashi. Then you must visit the ancient mosque Ishil Giami with its porcelain walls and near it is the Ullu Giami, after that renowned Mevlehan Giami with its beautiful garden where your senses are affected by a strong smell coming from thousands of roses and other flowers. There on Fridays at 12 o’clock the whirling dervish bow to Allah in the company of a special music played by panpipes, tumblechiuri, cymbals and kemane, each of the dervish spinning fast around his body. The Biulbiulmahalesi Giami, is also a place where on Fridays, but in the evenings around 11o’clock, they pray to Allah, they hold each other’s hands, staying in circle as our hora, spinning very fast as they twist, yell and shout Hau! Hau! (The Shouting Dervish), striking on the breast with their fist and iron clubs till they fell down dizzy and exhausted because of the pain and fatigue, which is awful to see from my point of view”.

Then Burada describe his cultural and gastronomic exploration through the Brusa bazaar giving many and interesting information about its commodities and food:

“The Bazaar, a huge space with its curious architecture, where we can find thousands things of rare beauty made in filigree with golden and silver filaments and of course the most famous perfumes with different scents as: Ghiursuyu (rose water), ghiulye (rose oil), odogaci, and other thousand combinations of these scents with the most beautiful fragrances. We can find hundred types of confectionery among which one can have the most marvellous candies with the most delicious could satisfy every desire: cheten halvasi, sutlaci, corabiye, baclava, cataif, muhalebi etc., on these desserts they strew cinnamon and nutmeg and rose water; over the muhalebiu sweet during the summer, beside these spices they strew fresh snow that they bring during the night on mule back from the Olimp mountain, where the snow never melts. Even here in several coffee shops, the (cafgii) coffee makers and their servants are also barbers, so, you can see ordinary men drinking their coffee and some others shaving their beard or moustache, others cutting their hair at the same time, which is not a so pleasant view for the European custom and sanitary point of view. Beautiful restaurants, where we can have the most tasting meals and the unsurpassed Turkish pilaf made from rice and chickpea, and of course sish kebab and tash kebab made from sheep meat which is good to eat in these place. They use their hands while eating except the Turkish soup and pilaf which they eat with a spoon. In Turkish restaurants you can’t find any wine, it is strongly prohibited by the Coran to drink alcohol, and for this reason you

21] Burada, 11, 12.
can't find any Turkish wineries. Christian pubs are at a proper distance from the mosque, also is it not allowed to walk in the mosque vicinity followed by a singing fiddler band”\(^\text{22}\).

In the end of his travel journal Burada describes a Turkish wedding cortege like a curious show when he visited Alîbat, a very curious village:

“The curious show offered by a big Turkish wedding cortege, that I saw walking along the street: in front of the weeding entourage walks Kiucec Kavazi a group of artists that made several and most interesting grimace that I have ever seen in my life. The Kiucec Kavazi was followed by the Suitars group and each of them had a fox tail on the head, doing in the same time obscene gesture. After them walk slowly the music band (mehterhaneaua) composed of two huge drums (daule), many bugles, short flutes, which made sharp and deafening sounds, and cymbals. At last a closed carriage rides carrying the bride. If the bride is the daughter of a Guild man (Isnafgi), then she has both cheeks and eyes gold-plated, and if she is the daughter of some rich men then she has on her entire face covered with gold butterflies in the shape of flowers\(^\text{23}\). In Alîbat village, inhabited by Turks, Cerchess and Greeks, they all speak Turkish language, even the Greeks have forgotten their mother language, but what’s very curious with these people is that the Christians hold their sermons in Turkish language. I decided to spend a night in an inn, where I ate an ordinary meal consisting bred, olives and fried ram head; after the meal I drank a cup of coffee and I passing along the Hîrsîz-han (thief meeting), traveled further to the small town of Muhalici a dangerous road because of the bandits, from several races: Kurds, Lazs, Arab slaves, marked on their faces with two cuts, at each cheek, I arrived in the small town of Muhalici, near the town is passing the Susighirli river, which flows into the Marmara Sea (Mermer Denizi), and there I spent my night at Mehane Bogazî Inn, owned by the Armenian Ovanes, the inner keeper, seriously thinking that early in the morning I had to return to Brusa”\(^\text{24}\).

The fourth journal that we found in Romanian Academic Library was written by dr. Preda Gheorghe which is a fine political, economic and cultural analyze of the Ottoman Empire made between 1925 and 1926 when the author had a diplomatic mission on the Romanian embassy:

“Many scientists or learned persons, artists, tourists or traders had been

\(^{22}\) Burada , 12, 13.

\(^{23}\) Burada, 12, 13.

\(^{24}\) Burada, 19
and even nowadays still have an inevitable attraction to the Oriental atmosphere. Generally speaking, we can tell, about the Greeks and Turkish they have to change their mentalities after the First World War and both countries tried to modernize. Concerning the socio-politic situation about Turkey modernization or Occidentalized Turkey the socio-politic situation can’t be clarified yet. For the time being this Turkey seems have ceased its expansion policy that it practiced for centuries until today.

“Focusing its rage in itself, Turkey has decided to canalize its energy for the inner democratic reforms. The last war showed Turkey how to react if she wanted to resist the Western democratic siege. A so called Westernization can be seen like a process to modernize Turkey through fashion combining tradition and modernity against the overwhelming Occidental fashion influences at people’s cloths, shoes and the way the dress their hair. Kemal Pasha offers some very interesting motifs when he declared:

«The standards of the so called western states – says Kemal – it is good for us, so concerning these we will wear: shoes and boots, trousers, vests, jackets, ties or tuxedo. We will cover our heads with hats or caps. If there are people still hesitating I shall tell them, that they are stupid and ignorant. Maybe Muslims people are struggling seeing that their ideas do not correspond with today’s demands, is it because of us, we have procrastination for too much time. If we are really free to do whatever we want for a couple of years is it because we had changed our mentalities. No need to stop now but we have to progress constantly. Turkish nation has to know that we have a big power that burns and destroy all those remaining stagnant and ignorant in the face of the future».

Kemal’s brilliant initiative was followed by severe punishments, and hanging of the people that were against his reforms: ”It was not only salwar and fes, seen as the symbols of religious community, that vanished in the Turkish public life even yashmak and women’s scarves had the same destiny and Turkish women began to imitate their Western sisters, wearing hats, costumes and fashioned coats. Adopting all the advancements in the modern world (electricity, telephone, airplanes and communications) the new Turkish citizen wants to show us that they have already accepted European fashion breaking down forever the relation between the faith and hairdressing customs. In the same time with these reforms

25] Preda Gheorghe, dr., Impresii dintr-o calatorie in Occident. Cateva consideratii de ordin politic si economic, Bucuresti, 1926, 1 [Impressions from a Journey in the Orient. Some Politic and Economic Considerations], Bucharest.

26] Preda, 3.
made by Kemal Pasha lead Turkish nationalism throughout rewriting its national idioms, changing foreign words into ancient ones and renaming old localities, cities and towns, or even denomination of some old trades companies because all of these had Greek or Armenian names”

Dr. Preda Gheorghe explains the ethnonational and administrative measures taken by the Turkish government to reinforce its political position and to awake the national pride:

“French vocabulary was not only erased from the State Railways but also from the signboards on restaurants and hotels so that the Turkey modernization seem be apparent one. Angora’s (Ankara) political hostility against the Christianity (the local Muslim population approves the the insecure atmosphere in Anatolia doesn’t help much in gaining European’s trust. By the way, as in other less civilized countries, Turkish democracy consists of a group of politicians who rest upon military force in their government (under the label of Republicans) over a population of ignorant farmers, totally indifferent to political matters a nation which has been in a deep sleep for centuries and is very easy to govern unless being imposed huge taxes or other fiscal burdens and is it easy to lead, with a single condition you don’t have to impose huge taxes and other fiscal measures. If, till now, Turkish people had managed to show a sort of modern secularization excepting the great rivalry between Greeks and Armenians churches After the Armenians had been deported and expelled from Adana (Cilicia), their church remained empty and was handed over to the Armenian Protestants. The local government legislated that both Armenian Protestants and Gregorian communities celebrate their religious sermons together in the same church. Elders of the Gregorian community ask for several times to light candles in the church but Protestants were against this practice and they began to argue and fight each other on the matter. At the end of these endless religious struggles, the Turkish local government decided to revoke the Christian privileges between other religious sects, because the image of Christianity in the eyes of the Muslim believers had change a lot and succeed to convince them once again about these interreligious quarries seems to be a political disagreement than a religious ones”

“Travel by ship from Constanta to Alexandria began at night and you can only have the pleasure of a real sea travel (except those that are suffering of seasick) in the second day near Istanbul. So, Istanbul is the Oriental capital, you really want to see it again and again because of several types of emotions and pleasures

27] Preda, 4, 5.
28] Preda, 6.
that begin from the moment when the steam ship enters through the Bosporus strait. On both sides of the strait you can see high walls and massive fortresses; many of these buildings are made of wood and are surrounded by orchards and gardens, so everywhere you can see their rich and verdant Mediterranean vegetation. Some of these buildings are isolated on the shore and we can figure out about their size and massive walls that they were castles and palaces inhabited by some local potentates. Some of them are clustered in little village ports where you can see several floating boats, wooden ships or steam boats. The view of Bosporus became even as the traveler is full of love and awareness because he can see on the European shore of the capital enchanted summer resorts like: Bojikdere and Therapy, with their beautiful villas belonging to the foreigner German, English and Italian diplomats. On the Asiatic shore we can see: Anadol Kavak with its historic ruins and former artillery base that is the most advanced port in the Black Sea; then Anadoli Hisar where it opens to the Sweet Water valley of Asia, other (mahala) or suburbs and villages and from place to place some villages and little fishing ports. And at last the Haidar Pasha, the terminus point of Anatolian Railway System, nearby we can find Medical School and Military Barracks in Scutari… From nowadays Istanbul, ancient Constantinople, disappeared together with its dirty streets especially wild wandering dog packs as a visible completion of the transformation Turkish mentalities, clothes and hair style. We nevertheless can see many of the well know mosques with their minarets rising up in the sky representing the ancient almighty Caliphs, then ancient Istanbul houses and also the twisted and narrowed streets and bad stone pavement and which every day damage tourist shoes. Galata neighborhood with its principal street, where all Turkish traders exhibit their commodities has numerous and narrower alleys where Oriental life style can be seen in its complete splendor. The Pera neighborhood has always been and remained an European one, with wider streets and large boulevards, high buildings, rich shops with huge gardens and nice parks like Taxim, numerous trams, buses, cars and taxis, elements which give birth to modern life style as in other European capitals. If you want to visit Stambul, the ancient inner city, you have to pay 1 piaster and cross the new and mobile bridge and it is a difficult task because of the high frequencies of its elevating and descending whenever ships passing by Golden Horn. But, the main feature of this neighborhood is the Bazaar, because the tourists are very impressed about the Egyptian Bazaar, named in Turkish Bojuk-tscharschi, (in Turkish language Bazaar means trade shop and if you do not say that word your Turkish guide will show
you another type of shops)”29.[…]

“The Great Bazaar consists of a huge hall, with hundreds of walls forming hundreds of little shops. Even if the Sultan was expelled from Istanbul the well-known Selamlık (the Sultan entrance to the mosque) especially on Fridays still remained for the tourist the main Oriental attraction the dervish dances. They gather in their mosque Tekke near the gallery piazza from Pera, on each Friday at 2 p.m. They are grouping together around their master who plays at the flute. At a particular sign everyone stands up and begins with a whirl, balancing their arms in the air, in the same direction, until one or two of them fall to the ground without consciousness. After a short break the dance begins again and dervish perform once again the same whirling dance encouraged by the audience and their brotherhood through several yelling or shouting. They sometimes gather on Thursday afternoons in their mosque in Scutari. They also yell or shout while dancing, and mutilate their bodies by inserting big needles or hooks deep into the skin or muscles”30.

Teodor Cristureanu, a Romanian economist, provided in his book ”Our Neighborhoods” a brief political and economic analyze concerning the contemporary Turkey:

“We think that Black Sea waves maintain Romania for a long time in closing proximity to Turkey so once again our history textbooks became useless, especially the books that blame Turkey. Because Turkish image reflected in these textbooks isn’t what Turkey really is. Although it is two and a half times larger than Romania, Turkey has only 15 million inhabitants. And we don’t worry about the Turkish Empire because it has the will to be a modern state and to join in the new and civilized countries over the world. It seems that Turkey had already reached its goals because everywhere we can see: new cities, new schools and new letters, new railways and a brand new life. Romania would be the best friend of this new Turkey. We consider it is wise to respect Turkish people desire for gathering together all his sons scattered everywhere under the sun, so that Turkey had liberate Dobrudja from Turkish and Altaic medieval colonists so he offer space for the Romanian colonization. On the other hand he intended to reinforce properly his new state through the repatriated sons. Turkey is building an active and powerful economy with each passing year. If we only watch its evolution from an old political and religious hybridization political regime to the new laicized state we ascertained the truth that Turkey become a politic and military factor of peace,

29] Preda, 10.
30] Preda, 11.
here in Black Sea, here in Levant, here in Balkans, right in our neighborhood. Without any hesitation, Romania was and it is side by side to Turkey.\(^{31}\)

The last travel journal to be discussed in this paper is a political analyze made by Jitianu, a Romanian army general officer, who believes that the modern Turkey is not an European country:

“Even if we though its political and economic ties with Europe, Turkey doesn’t belong to this part of the world, it has remained an Oriental force. Napoleon once said about Constantinople: «It was the capital city of a powerful and multi-continental empire but in bygone days. From the political point of view (the sick man agony), maybe its greatness would still endure even today if Turkey wouldn’t have participated in the Great War”\(^{32}\).

Later in the first chapter Jitianu, expresses his personal opinion on the Turkish military and political decadence:

“So that I decided to present my personal opinions or ideas about the Islam decadence: 1. Its geographic configuration was complicate more than the government and administration mechanism, because it has an intricate and mixed population from ethnic and religious point of view. 2. Turks had the idea of assimilation or extermination for everybody or everything which is not of Turkish origin. Turkey is not so well concerning culture and progress. Turkish administration never put great emphasis on civilization benefits, and of course to the necessary conditions to govern: because its backward, lazy and partial courts work very slowly. Turkey had many difficulties that appeared in the Modern Age because of the systematic and powerful oppression exerted on minorities […]. Everybody was aware of the consequences of the First World War and of course the conditions of the treaty signed after the war that were very harsh and it was only one step further to provoke a real disaster for Turkey. The sick man agony ended […]. During the war in Turkey, only a superior spirit like Mustafa Kemal rose and after a careful thought Turkey adopted a strong political will against Germany military aggression […]. Only Kemal had the courage to rise against the Versailles treaty”\(^{33}\).

In the end of his study, Jitianu decides to express his personal opinion about Kemal Atatürk’s democratic reforms:

“We ascertained the truth at the end of the war, when everybody wanted to see the end of a great empire, but we are aware of the arrival of the new prophet,


\(^{32}\) Ion, Jitianu, G-ral de divizie, Europa actuală, Politică – social – economică, București, 1938, [Nowadays Europe. Politic-Social-Economy Analyze], 148, 149.

\(^{33}\) Jitianu, 151, 153.
Allah’s messenger Mustafa Kemal. Kemal is the symbol of a race which had begun to stagnate. A delayed nation lost through its long and complicate process of civilization and democracy. This nation lived many centuries only for heavens promises but under the fatal conviction on all men have written destiny on their forefronts. “Turkey proclaims itself as a Republic on 29 October 1922, and later Mustafa Kemal was elected President of the Turkish Republic. Kemal understood that imperial Turkey was an obsolete state between Europe and Asia, and the Republic has to embrace the modernization progress. Attaturk had to find another way to increase the geopolitical role of his new laicized state especially in Central Asia. Some political analyses claim that Kemal’s mistake was that he made these Occidental reforms too quickly! With this kind of people like Turks, he should use different methods and the modernization process must be more widely applied and extended to a much longer period of time.”

In one of his discourses Kemal said: «We have to throw away all Sophisms and all prejudices of our life coming from the past. Our existence depends on such a necessity of change. Kemal banned the use of all ancient symbols, for example, the yashmak a veil covering the face except for the eyes worn by Muslim women in the last fourteen centuries. Even today there are people who think that such measures is nothing more than pure profanation but Kemal said: an honest person is in no need to hide his face. Kemal points to himself showing what he is wearing and saying: I wear a simple hat just like the European fashion. Kemal enforces the women’s emancipation; polygamy is cancelled and of course the harem institution was banned. Then he change the weekly holiday from Friday to Sunday.”

“In my opinion from economic point of view, wrote Jitianu - Turkey is in a very difficult situation. Turkish peasants are among the laziest peasants in the Balkans and of course they are illiterate. All that he produces on his field is only sufficient to nourish himself. There is almost nothing to be called as a Turkish industry field is only sufficient to nourish himself. Turkish foreign trade is dominated by the Greeks, Armenians, Jews and other foreign trade companies. The great port of Constantinople draws much more import goods than it exports. Ottoman debts hinder for a long time the new Republic economy. The ruinous wars constantly increased the national debt.”

The army general officer Jitianu appreciates the Turkish political and eco-

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34] Jitianu, 155.
35] Jitianu, 156.
36] Jitianu, 158.
37] Jitianu, 159.
nomic efforts to find again its place between European modern democratic states, but in the same time he expresses his anxiety about the danger of an European politic refusal concerning the geo-politic role that Turkey can play in East Europe in the face of the growing Russian military and political claims in the region:

“Turkish people try with full energy to keep abreast of Europe. I believe that it is in Europe's interest to approach to this emerging state. Because if Europe constantly rejections Turkey it might be drive it straight into Russian arms, maybe Persian influence or worse into the Arabic world. From this point of view it seems of great importance to support Turkey, and give her a place within the European Confederation. Assuming that Bosporus and Dardanelles were ruled by an other European power thinking especially of Russia, everything will be changed within the European Orient and political and military situation of Romania and Bulgaria will become critic. Europe has to think seriously and take serious political measures on these acute problems”38.

This short paper presented a reasoned argument on a particular issue. We hope that our study has succeeded to emphasize some genuine opinions about Turkey and Turkish people history and mentalities and how Romanian travelers analyses these facts within their studies. Some authors underline, directly or indirectly, only the negative aspects of the Turkish society. If in the first analyzed travel journal the author describes without mercy social and economic realities from an Oriental Empire stuck in acute economic and politic crises, within the second travel diary we saw a quite critic tone concerning the political relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the new rising Danubian Principalities. Here the Empire is presented as an obsolete state having a week and sick Sultan who is just a survivor and continuator of a long Oriental historical, political and cultural tradition which hasn't too much to offer to modern Europe. In the third travel journal which is a short ethnologic study on Asia Minor in Brussa region we can find the diary of well-known Romanian folklorist, Teodor Burada. The fourth journal is written by a Romanian diplomat who knew the Turkish political and economic realities in the third decade of the XX'th century very well. The fifth and the sixth journals are a mixture of historical, geographical, cultural and economic datas edited with the aim of presenting the importance of the political and military role played by Turkey within the European modern states.

In conclusion, it is clear that there are huge benefits to be gained from reading between the lines of several modern and contemporary travel documents. We would even go as far as to say that it should be compulsory for all scholars to re-

38] Jitianu, 286.
think more profoundly on the issue, because the reinterpretation of old diaries or travel journals is, generally speaking, too important to be ignored.
Store of archive files is organized by Federal, National and municipal archives and other offices in accordance with laws of Russian Federation.

15 Federal Archives keep documents about history of statehood and foreign affairs of Russia. Most important accumulators of documents on history of Romania are Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (RGADA), Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA), State Archive of Russian Federation (GARF), Russian State Archive of Social and Political History (RGASPI), Russian State Archive of Navy (RGAVMF), Russian State Archive of Military history (RGVIA) and Foreign Policy Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

RGADA contains materials of top controls, central and municipal legislative bodies of Russian state since XI'th century till administrative reforms of the late of XVIII'th – beginning of XIX'th century, collections of foreign manuscripts, incunabula and rare books of XV – XIX'th ca. There are charters of Gospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, boyars and clerics to tsars and patriarchs of Russia (1624 – 1714), and among them files about acquisition of Moldavia and Wallachia by Russia as her subjects and about military aid against Turkey (1654 – 1684), about duty journey of icon-painters and sending of typographic tools (1679), about situation in Turkey and intercession of Moldavia between Russia and Turkey (1690).

Documents of legislative and executive bodies of USSR since the October Revolution of 1917 to 1991, except materials conserved in specialized archives of Federal importance and archives of different departments are stored in GARF. For example, funds can display materials of the Special Commission of the Central Committee of RCP(b) about systematization of treasuries of Romania (1923 – 1924), which were evacuated in Russia in 1917, documents about participation of Socialist Republic of Romania in the work of International Conference of prosecution of Nazi criminals (1969).

One can classify materials of RGASPI, containing resources about history of Romania, in three main thematic complexes: documents on social and political
history of the Western Europe (XVII’th – early XX’th ca.), about Russia and USSR in the New and Modern Age (end of XIX’th – early XXI’th century) and on history of International labour socialist and communist movement (1860 – 1980-s).

RGVIA possesses documentation about activity of higher military authorities, central and local military bodies and departments of Russia since late of XVII’th century till March of 1918. One can find among them materials about political and military situation of Balkans (1798 – 1812), about recruitment of Cossacks living on the shores of the Black Sea to forces of Russia, papers of Governor and military police of Bucharest and many other materials, which can be interesting to researchers of Romania.

RGAVMF conserves materials of the Navy of Russia since the end of XVII’th century till 1940-s, and in their number there are resources on history of political and economical links of Romania with Russia, USSR. Funds of the Archive contain papers about arrival of gospodar Cantemir to Russia, about military aid of Russia to Romania in the World War I, about Russian vessels staying in ports of Romania, activities of naval commands and groups, about production of minefield on the Danube and strengthening of defense of mouths of the river, record-book of telegrams of commander of flotilla about characteristics and activities of his flotilla. There are interesting documents about improvement of relations of two states, about work of joint commissions for treaties on shipping and fishing, cartographic materials of Romania in different periods.

Archive of Foreign policy consists of documents of special political and national importance, original treaties and agreements. For example, there are letters of Ministry of foreign affairs to Russian diplomatic missions and embassies in Romania (1878 – 1917), collection of acts of treaties of Russia and Romania, information about domestic and economical situation of Romania in 1916, materials on the problem of the Danube in 1940 – 1941.

Thus, archives of Russian Federation store plenty of materials about history of Romania. While there are many federal archives, the most enumerable collection on the history of Romania is situated in Russian Historical Archive (RGIA) in Saint-Petersburg.

Russian State Historical Archive is one of the largest archives in Europe. There are more than 6,5 millions of archive files stored on shelves of 220 km of total length. History of Russia, history of foreign affairs, wars, economy, science, culture, education, art, literature – almost all aspects of history are mirrored in resources of the Archive.

Funds of RGIA concentrate materials of power authorities, administration,
legislative bodies of Russian Empire since XVIII'th century till 1917, social organizations, offices and individuals in prerevolutionary Russia.

This Archive has conserved materials, reflecting main stages and factors of development of State of Romania, sources on Russian-Turkish wars, and Eastern (Crimean) Campaign, revolutionary struggle for freedom on Balkans and in Austria-Hungary Empire, foreign affairs of European countries, Russia and Turkey, international conferences and meetings on problems and creation of state of the Romania. Documents displayed in the Archive also include questions on the World War I, disintegration of Austria-Hungary Empire, and join of Transylvania with Romania, affairs of the Russian Empire and Romania in the XIX'th – the very beginning of XX'th century.

The earliest materials dated 1711, for example, newsletter about coming General Field marshal Sheremetev to Iasi, papers on meeting and sign of the treaty against the Ottoman Empire and the decree of Russian Tsar on 28-th of September of the same year about search of two houses in Moscow and suburb for Dmitry Cantemir.

One can note that there are many decrees of the Russian emperors in the Russian State Historical Archive. They are as follows: Order of Peter I, graduating Duke Dmitry Cantemir as Senator and secret council, one of the highest ranks by the Table of Ranks in 1721, decrees by Empress Catherine II (1765, 1770) about analysis of request “from Moldavian people” of Iasi in the Chancellery of trusteeship for the foreign subjects and about honoring of sent Moldavian deputies by golden medals and sponsoring their travelling losses, decrees to the Cabinet of His Imperial Majesty to pay money of presents for Gospodars, about study of sons of Gospodar G.A. Ghica and Moldavian boyar Milo in the Cadet Corps sponsoring by The Cabinet, about counting of wages to living in the Capital nobility of Gospodar of Wallachia and to doctor in medicine Lukas being with him – pension.

Further orders of the Russian Emperors were aimed on organizing of ambassadorial and diplomatic affairs in Moldavia, Wallachia, Bessarabia and appointment of the General Ambassadors, about Russian mission in Bucharest and other relations. Decrees of Alexander I (1812) during the War against Napoleon proclaimed organization of governing of the lands.

Notes and letters to plenipotentiary chairman of divans of Moldavia and Wallachia general-lieutenant Count P.D. Kiselev sent by vice-chairmen, consul general, priests and people, who had participated in administrative service in the principalities, for example, Wakarsko, Mirkovich, Ghica, Sturdza, Horesko, are of great interest because of arrangement of Russian protectorate of these lands.
There are projects of treaties and agreements of Russia and Ottoman Turkey on the question of the Russian protectorate of Moldavia and Wallachia, about commitment of election of the Gospodars in 1828 – 1830 conserved in the repositories of the RGIA. Materials about organizing of the Russian governmental committees for prescription of new state law – Organic Statute, main constitutional law for long time, defined an order of election of Gospodars, financial and judicial governance are key points, appealing to researchers.

One can note among materials on the Crimean (Eastern) War and Russian-Turkish war of 1877 – 1878 a letter of the Ministry of foreign affairs about financial characteristics of the Moldavia and Wallachia, documents on stages of transfer of the part of Bessarabia by the government of the Romanians to Russian Empire on the treaty, signed in Berlin (1878 – 1879), and about agreements between Russia and Romania.

Collections of resources of the Ministry of imperial courtyard include materials on audiences of Emperor to the appointed Romanian Ambassadors E. Ghi ca, Cathargi, Rosetti Solescu, Nanu, Diamandy (1899 – 1915), order of Nicholas II about appointment as real state council Poklevskiy-Koziell to Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador to the Court of the King of Romania (30.10.1913), about visits of King of Romania with crown successor to the Russian Empire (1898), on gift of baton of Field marshal to the King of Romania (1912) and to present it – travelling of Grand Prince Nicholas Michailovich to Bucharest.

Reports of the Ambassadors (1909 – 1916) and agents of the Ministries of finance, trade and industry in Dobrogea, Iasi, Bucharest, Sulina testify foreign and home affairs of Romania in the beginning of XX century.

There are materials of the Council of Ministers and the Ministries in the Archive depicting involvement of Romania in the World War I accented on measures, would have sprung by possible “evacuation of Romania” (1916), also there are documents of Provisional Government about centering of functions of trusteeship and evacuation of the Romans refugees in an executive body (July, 1917).

Special complex of documents makes the problem of boundaries evident, as it arouse between Russia and Romania in 1736. Funds are conserving materials about refuge of Russian peasants to Moldavia and Wallachia, about adjustment of Romanian-Russian border, establishment of Customs outposts and quarantine, management of borders of Moldavia and Bessarabia according with the Paris peace treaty (1856), Berlin treaty of 1878. Resources of RGIA witness domestic policy, legislature for lands joint to Bessarabia, about agrarian reforms and laws, and other moments of history of Romania.
Funds of the archive contain materials about economical and financial situation of Romania. One can pay attention to documents of financial revisions in Moldavia and Wallachia, papers about rate of exchange of Russian ruble, currency of Turkey, budget of Romania, export and import of capital, Romanian accounts in banks of Russia and regulations of money-transfer Romanian lei, as well as economical essay about Dobrogea in 1911.

One can speak about characteristics of industry and research of deposits of raw materials in particular, basing on prospect of report of chief-gitten fervalter Eyhveld to emperor Alexander II: Eyhveld found deposits of gold, lead and mercury in Moldavia and Wallachia and asked a permission to establish here mining (1812). Two mine-foremen from the Ural mines were officially adjusted to Partnership of Gold mining in Wallachia (1845). Statistical data about oil production in Romania in 1897 – 1906 and export of burning oil, geological maps are of special interest.

Few papers reflect data on agriculture, for example, about development of sheep-breeding and recommendations to Russian private farms and breeders to buy sheeps of “tsigai” breed in Moldavia and Wallachia, about toll-free admission of cattle of immigrating people from Moldavia to Russia (Record-book of Committee of Ministers in 1835), about development and arrangement of fishery on Lower Danube, Prut, Black Sea (1896 – 1907), about forests and arboriculture in Romania.

The Russian State Historical Archive is representing wide range of sources about trade: to begin with the law of Alexander I (1808) to simplify transit of goods in Moldavia and Walachia in the seaport of Odessa, and material of register-book of the Committee of Ministers by 6-th of September, 1811 about customs on grain imported to Moldavia and Wallachia from Russia and other papers on grain trade in Romania till 1917.

There are papers about organization of post-offices and roads, sending of mail, introducing of new postal tax in Bucharest (1828), about end of work of foreign posts in Moldavia and Wallachia (1868 – 1870), about telegraph links and participation of Romania in Roman telegraph convention of 1872, on transfer of telegraph office in Sulina to Romania (1878 – 1879), about postal-telegraph link of Russia with Romania in 1916 – 1918.

There are interesting documents about shipping in the waters of Black Sea and rivers Danube, Prut, about building of roads, bridges and ferries, about linkage of railways of Romania, Russia and Austria (1870 – 1876), about Romania-Germany-Russia (1880 – 1886) and Romania-Galicia-Konigsberg (1880) rail-
ways and tariffs.

About development of national education and cultural exchange witness materials on publishing of Grammar of Moldavian language (1825), text-books and vocabularies of languages of Moldavia and Wallachia (1830), about study of Romanian language in Saint-Petersburg University, publication of books of Romanian authors, periodicals, (first issue of Romanian magazine “Bessarabia” (1879), about work of Slavonic Committee in Bucharest (1876), about congress of Association of literature and art in Bucharest (1906), on congratulating of Romanian composer G. Musicescu in Iaşi in 1904, about custom of monument to A.V. Suvorov in Râmnic to sculptor B. Edwards (1909 – 1915), about presents to music players of Romanian orchestra Ochii-Albi for music during official dinner on the Third of October 1909 in apartments of Life-Guard Hussars in presence of emperor Nicholas II, and about gifts to director of this orchestra for his piece of music in honour of emperor in 1910.

Papers about building of churches of different confessions in Romania, about church and monastery landowning, publication of religious books in Moldavian and Romanian (in their number – on establishment of typography for printing of spiritual works in Kishinev in 1813), on mail of clergy and papers about life of sectarians here (necrasovtsi, skoptsi and others) reflect activity of priesthood.

Rather specific and unknown materials are notes, requests, letters, projects of administration, manuscripts of studies of history of Moldavia and Wallachia and their people, with topographic descriptions of this region and its parts, administrative-military data (mainly, in French). Among them are “Short historical essay of Moldavia and Wallachia since early times till 1872” with copies of charters of Commanders of Moldavia and Wallachia and data on history of relations with Russia (1808), records of D.V. Dashkov, counselor of embassy in Constantinople about Wallachia, rulers and influence of Turkey on domestic policy (1820), reports about prospect of introducing of constitutional law in Moldavia and Wallachia (1828), historical notes about principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia (1829), letter of A. Sturdza to D. Dashkov about project of joining of Moldavia and Wallachia in one (1828), records of prince D. Cantemir on history of Moldavia and Dacia (1823), of Rock Fuchs – about causes of rebellion of peasants in Moldavia in 1830 (1831), by Batianov – about economy, history, policy and population of lands of Danube, description of towns (1847), manuscript humorous “newspaper” of unknown author with note about fashionable and political news of Bucharest and verses about political affairs in Moldavia (1830).
One can pay attention to studies of Balkans and Romania by Russian researchers, among which are works “Romanian Principalities Moldavia and Wallachia” by S.N. Palausov (1859) and “Russian interests in Romania and domestic and foreign policy of Romania in 1900 - 1916” by D. N. Vergoon, conserved in personal funds.

To make a conclusion, these represented materials, while not complete at all, are proving points of view of historians on formation of Romania, not by revolutions, armed conflict or other shock, but by diplomatic affairs of rulers of Moldavia, Wallachia, Romania and country as a whole, had attended with contradictions of leading states and international situation promoted this process.

Resources of State Archives of Russian Federation give possibility to study whole tendency of economical and political development as well as events, facts, phenomena and personalities of Romania.
In the last decade of our century the post-communist countries, especially in the South Europe and the Balkan region entered again a period of deep transformations the consequences of which seem hardly to be predicted in nearest future. Progressive crisis of the economy and the real possibility of the loss of the natural and human resources cannot be compensated by official declarations claiming to historical optimism. The character of such assurances is on the whole reduced to problem of price which these countries ought to pay to expiate the sins of the communist past and join the world civilized community. The experience of the post-war history of these states demonstrated that “economic development and political stability are two independent goals and progress toward one has no necessary connection with progress toward the other. In some instances programs of economic development may promote political stability; in other instances they may seriously undermine such stability”1.

In the report I shall try to elucidate some controversial problems of the formation of both civic and national self-consciousness within the framework of the analysis of the politics of identity and citizenship which has assumed increasing importance in Western and Eastern European countries. It is widely recognized now that effective citizenship rests on a rigorous and viable system of civic and political education which informs the individual of his civil rights and obligations. Therefore, the problem of national and civic identities as well as the criteria for their definition have become crucial in the discussion of the concept of citizenship.

Citizenship can be defined as a set of civil, political and social rights forming the foundation for civilized life in a political community. Citizenship is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that has produced differing views of the concept. In this respect the notion and the idea itself of citizenship very often overlap with the notions of nationality and Nation-State. For example, T.H. Marshall’s notion of citizenship was dependent upon a firm link existing between the nation

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and the state: the state provides and guarantees rights, whilst the nation is the focus of identity. Certainly, in the West citizenship can be characterized by an interiorized process of identification in the nation due to the deep-rooted democratic values, reflecting the ‘inner orientations’ of both individuals and groups. Even in the majority of post-communist states, which remained authoritarian at the early stage of their formation, “the chief motives for state exploitation consisted of both short-term survival and long-term commitments to democracy”\(^2\).

Today, the modern conception of citizenship is also being discussed because of the decline in reference to the nation. “Globalization has further dissipated political community. States become weaker and less able to deliver collective goods, increasing consumerist and privatized political action. National political cultures are similarly weakened by global market pressures to greater mobility and the enhanced ability to defect from collaborative arrangements”\(^3\). The new notions of citizenship or identity based, for example, on the new Europe are distinctly different from the more traditional concept of nation-state citizenship: it is more diverse, less ethnocentric, more inclusive etc. The outcomes of the discussions depend, as a rule, on the level of subjectivity of perception of real political processes by scholars. In order to overcome various lopsided and subjective approaches, one should reconsider the controversial aspects of the modern theory of citizenship, especially in the period when rapprochement of positions between some Eastern and the Western European countries are becoming more and more clear cut.

It is quite natural that the problem of civic and political education has become crucial in the discussions. In a civilized society, citizenship, political culture and political education are not only inseparable from each other, but are also, in a definite sense, equivalent. If one adheres to the definition of political culture suggested by G.A. Almond and G.B. Powell, one can regard political education as a complex system integrating directly those elements of culture which define the character of political socialization in the process of formation of a definite type of political conduct and consciousness, which form the property of a given society and state organization.

In some academic circles the investigation of the influence of cultural factors on the changes in political systems is often vehemently criticized. As Samuel Huntington once wrote:


The concept of culture is a tricky one in social science because it is both easy and unsatisfying to use. It is easy (and also dangerous) to use because it is, in some sense, a residual category. If no other causes can plausibly explain significant differences between societies, it is inviting to attribute them to culture. Just exactly how culture is responsible for the political and economic differences one is attempting to explain is often left extraordinarily vague. Cultural explanations are thus often imprecise or tautological or both, at the extreme coming down to a more sophisticated rendering of “the French are like that!” On the other hand, cultural explanations are also unsatisfying for a social scientist because they run counter to the social scientist’s proclivity to generalize. They do not explain consequences in terms of relationships among universal variables such as rates of economic growth, social mobilization, political participation, and civil violence. They tend, instead, to speak in particulars peculiar to specific cultural entities

It is evident, however, that no phenomenon in modern political life (the phenomenon of post-totalitarianism, for example) can be properly understood without taking into consideration not only the cultural traditions, but also the peculiarity of national characters of the European nations whose formation was the result of a long historical evolution.

The role of historical conditions in the formation of national character was especially noted by Erich Fromm:

*It is argued that every nation demonstrates a typical “character-matrix” with corresponding positive and negative consequences, so that every nation develops in different historical conditions certain basic character traits, which though not eternal, can, however, be preserved for many generations due to the influence and change of various...factors. It is also supposed that this relatively constant character-matrix is value-neutral and can lead, under certain conditions, to the development of positive character features, under other conditions - to negative ones.*

This observation of E. Fromm is well confirmed by the fact of the different ways of overcoming the totalitarian legacy in the post-communist Eastern Central Europe. The countries in which autonomous social structures - influential intel-

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lectuals and students, the Roman Catholic Church, independent trade unions etc. had not completely degenerated, were found to be in the forefront of ‘anti-totalitarian wave’. This fact testifies to the thesis on the conservation of traditions of political culture which were formed in these countries during the capitalist period.

It is important that political development in Eastern and Central Europe, should primarily be investigated with the help of the concepts of anti-politics. The notion of anti-politics was introduced for better understanding of the ways of legitimation of new political structures in post-communist countries. It implied that in the process of transition from totalitarian structures to democratic ones the state remains the decisive factor compensating for the absence of the appropriate premises for the creation of a market economy and the successful realization of political reforms. In practice, during this transition, many complicated economic and social problems were solved, from the very beginning, within the framework of a specific bureaucratic policy.

Anti-politics has therefore become the main way of providing freedom of action for a new bureaucracy which proved capable of profiting from Pareto’s advice to all rulers, transforming radical anticommunist moods and energy into such a type of leadership where the institutionalization of market and democracy was completely mediated by a tendency to general state guardianship. In such transitional conditions, the unity of power and the overwhelming majority of citizens is not secured with the real results of democratization but rather with the help of ‘symbolic integration’ which has to “support a joint realization of democratic participation’ and help to overcome the contradictions by enforcing a mechanism of reconciling the conflicts ‘in process of symbolic identification of citizens with basic democratic consensus”.

I think this is true, of course, but only in part. The analysis of the evolution of the idea of citizenship on the basis of West/East opposition would be too abstract, especially when American democratic citizenship is accepted as an ideal model. There are far more similarities between the Western and Eastern experience than one could imagine. Until the end of the nineteenth century, only a small minority of the European population could be classified as citizens. The great majority identified themselves rather as subjects. The real democratic rev-

olution which drastically transformed human and political relations took place during the first half of the twentieth century. It should be noted that the Russian October revolution also made a big contribution to the development of the conception of citizenship in the same way as the French Revolution had contributed to its origins. I share M. Janowitz's position when he writes: “Citizenship is not a formal and abstract conception. To the contrary, it is an idea loaded with concrete, specific meaning which reflect the changing content of political conflict”. In this sense “the elements of citizenship are found in all nation-states, even in the most repressive, totalitarian ones. There is a crucial threshold, however, between democratic and nondemocratic citizenship”.

The formation of the character and principles of citizenship is the immediate task of every modern political system. That is why the concept of political education often possesses a number of other equivalents (and expressions) – ‘civic education’, ‘citizenship education’ etc.

It is surprising that political education had never been considered a priority till the 1980s in spite of a most evident fact that its various conceptions had been developed in different systems of political philosophy, starting from the time of classical antiquity. Therefore, it is quite important to cite a definition suggested by Morris Janowitz, which appears to be most appropriate to the topic of this article: By civic education we mean (a) exposing students to central and enduring political traditions of the nation, (b) teaching essential knowledge about the organization and operation of contemporary governmental institutions, and (c) fashioning essential identifications and moral sentiments required for performance as effective citizens. Effective civic education would result in increased understanding and meaningful national identifications. It would strengthen civic consciousness.

So, in its narrow form, civic education focuses mainly on the attitudes of the student to the central agencies of government. In this connection, it is also important to note that the very concept of political education is often discussed in the context of citizen (or civic) rights and obligations. If by rights one means the legal, political and socio-economic prerogatives that the person enjoys because of the collective action of the political system and by obligations - the contributions and sacrifices a citizen makes to keep the political system effective, it

10] Ibid., p. 2.
also becomes evident that up to the present day the right-oriented conception of citizenship has been predominant both in western and totalitarian democracies.

Thus, the right to be educated or informed has always been rated higher than the duty to be literate and educated. I use the term ‘informed’ in Jeffersonian sense, which includes thoughtfulness, ethical soundness, and good judgment as well as factual information. Naturally, we should not confuse the compulsory laws which make parents send their children to school with the obligation to give them education. When liberally minded thinkers and scholars such as Robert Dahl and Isaiah Berlin declare accordingly “We do not grant children the right to decide whether or not they shall go to school” or “We compel children to be educated”, they do not mean the obligation as a sphere of autonomous decisions but a mere collective demand which is dependent on the necessity for every society to survive\textsuperscript{11}.

This contradiction in the conception of the rights and their benefits sometimes had a positive effect on the elaboration of the theory of liberal education. The main principles of this theory were brilliantly formulated by William Morris, a pioneer of British socialism, in his essay \textit{How we live and how we might live}:

\textit{Now the next thing I claim is education. And you must not say that every English child is educated now; that sort of education will not answer my claim, though I cheerfully admit it is something: something, and yet after all only class education. What I claim is liberal education; opportunity, that is, to have my share of whatever knowledge there is in the world according to my capacity or bent of mind, historical or scientific, and also to have my share of skill of hand which is about in the world, either in the industrial handicrafts or in the fine arts...; I claim to be taught, if I can be taught, more than one craft to exercise for the benefit of the community\textsuperscript{12}.}

Nevertheless, in the modern world all models of political education are widespread. Any state aspires, independently of its distinctive features and general perception of politics, to control this process by means of taking centralized decisions, i.e. to carry out a definite educational policy. In a democracy with developed civil consciousness, the existence of independent public opinion is a sufficient guarantee for orientation towards the model of political education within the framework of which the mechanism of civil society’s control over the state is


\textsuperscript{12} William Morris, \textit{Selections}, Moscow 1959, p. 440.
supported and intensified. G. Sartory calls the system based on pluralism of interests with such attributes as autonomy and freedom ‘education’, opposing it to ‘indoctrination’, i.e. inculcation of a single model of political conduct. M. Oakshott divides political education into ‘universal’ and ‘ideological’ based on learning a strictly defined set of ‘ideological texts’.

Only when it is free (relatively free, of course) from state control, can a specifically Western model be called pluralist. It developed during a long evolution of both the institutes of state and the different systems of political philosophy. There are two main institutes in which the educational processes of this type have crystallized: 1) the system of universal (free) education in state and private schools; 2) the modern university system. In both systems the three main aspects of political education are realized on different levels: a) formulating, securing, and transmitting the general principles of political mentality; b) mastering a wide circle of political sciences (the scientific level of understanding politics and the phenomenon itself of the political); c) preparing for both participation in elections and professional political activity.

By exercising control over these institutes, the political elite is practically capable of influencing the mode of political socialization, and consequently all other spheres of social conduct. The scope of such control depends on the relation between education and indoctrination in educational programs, i.e. on the degree of development of civil liberties. Certain single elements of political education can be found under authoritarian regimes as well, but they quickly disappear after such regimes have been taken to their extremes and turn into one or another type of totalitarian state.

In Western Europe and the USA, the modern character of political education has formed under the great influence of the optimistic conviction of intellectuals that it is possible to implement an educational reform through which the democratic system will reveal all of its advantages. As J. Dewey put it, “we may produce in schools a projection in type of the society we would like to realize”. Such orientation can already be discovered in J. St. Mill’s Considerations on representative government, who regards the very notions of ‘democratic government’ and ‘education’ as identical.

By further developing J. St. Mill’s ideas about the advantages and infirmities of democracy, M. Adler notes:

No other form of government is to be preferred to democracy because of these infirmities, for all other forms of government are subject to the same infirmities, and they are not remediable in other forms of government, whereas remedies can be found for them in political democracy. The remedy for the incompetence of the rulers in a political democracy is the education of the people for their duties as citizens and as public officials.17.

In the works of M. Adler and his adherents, modern liberals, an optimistic conviction that a consolidation of the rationalistic base of democratic politics and its transformation into the main instrument of political education and socialization are possible with the help of appropriate school programs and didactic methods, is expressed in a concentrated form. It is not accidental that partisans of such an approach reject unanimously the propagation of vocational education and defend the introduction of various programs of liberal education in all schools. As M. Adler affirms, “vocational education is training for a specific job in the economic machine. It aims at earning a good living, not living a good life. It is servile both in its aim and in its methods. It defeats democracy in the same way that economic servitude does.”18

In the modern conception of political education the liberal position is manifested also in the opposition of the notion of ‘civic consciousness’ to the traditional comprehension of nationalism and patriotism. As M. Janowitz affirms:

Civic education limited to inculcation of traditional patriotism or conventional nationalist ideology is obviously inadequate for an advanced industrial society and a highly interdependent world. I find the words national and patriotic limiting, and offer the term civic consciousness. It refers to positive and meaningful attachments a person develops to the nation-state. Civic consciousness is compatible with and required for both national and international responsibilities and obligations. It involves elements of reason and self-criticism as well as personal commitment. In particular, civic consciousness is the process by which national attachments and obligations are molded into the search for supranational citizenship19.

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18] Ibid., p. 126.
However this opposition cannot be regarded as the universal and even comprehensive one. For example, in the very interesting book *The myth of the military nation: militarism, gender, and education in Turkey* the Turkish political scientist Ayse Gül Altınay demonstrated a quite different approach to the problem of relation of civic consciousness and education:

In August 1999, Turkey’s Minister of Culture İstemihan Talay called a press conference. His purpose was to introduce a new book titled Türk Ordusu (The Turkish Military). “Turks have been known as a military-nation throughout history”, the minister proclaimed. “The Turkish military is synonymous with Turkish national identity. Our military has won great victories, glory and honor for our nation” (Hiirriyet, 11 August 1999). The use of the term “military-nation” by a state official in 1999 was hardly out of the ordinary, and, indeed, Talay was not the first Minister of Culture to invoke the idea of the military as a key and sacred institution in Turkish society and the idea that every (male) Turk is born a soldier.

The author continues:

What brings together “the military” and “culture” in Turkey’s social and political life? Why would the Ministry of Culture, and not the Ministry of Defense or the General Staff, see it as its task to publish a 500-page book on the Turkish military? Suat İlhan, the director of The Atatürk High Council for Culture, Language and History, offers one answer: “Characteristics related to the military are bound to make a great contribution to the shaping of the culture of a society so unified with its military as ours. The fact that the military has all the cultural characteristics of the society, that it manifests these characteristics, and that it serves as a center of education for most of these cultural values is an inevitable, in fact, necessary, consequence”… İlhan ominously warns: “if we think of military culture, with its historical achievements as well as its contemporary impact, as separate from the cultural whole, then our national culture will lose its unity and identity”. This book offers a different view. I show that “military culture” and “military-nation” are products of history, artifacts of a century of practices and discourses. My goal is to chart the intricate links between the ideas about the nation, the military, the state, and culture, and make intelligible the specific forms of militarism prevalent in Turkey at the turn of the twenty-first century. I hope to begin to look at “the mask” that “the state” and “the military” have been in the Turkish context.


In the epilogue of the book the author proposes the following interpretation of the phenomenon itself ‘military education’:

Turkey’s recent history has been characterized as a “revolution from above”… with the military at center stage. This view rests on the assumption that states in the West have been formed through revolutions from below. Modernization, in many such accounts, is treated as an authentic feature of First World development, whereas the Third World has had to “imitate” the Western structures and culture of modernity… The Turkish nation has been invented as a “military-nation”.

Compulsory conscription and compulsory militarized education have helped this invention and its reinforcement. Yet it is not a seamless discourse. In fact, its current interpretations rest on contradictory assumptions that have to do with the tension between the understanding of nationalism as a force “from below” and modernization as one “from above”. On the one hand, Turks are commended for having been a military-nation throughout history, with the national War of Independence being one of the most recent and best manifestations of this characteristic. On the other hand, it is suggested that it was the “Turkish military” that fought the war and established the state. The first assumption is based on a notion of “revolution from below” and on a narrative of national awakening, while the second one downplays “national” participation and singles out an institution (“the military”) represented by its decision-makers (i.e., the officer cadre) for having carried out the revolution from above, both during and after the War of Independence. How do these two seemingly contradictory views coexist? The call made to high school students in the 1960s National Security Knowledge textbook to realize and recognize their responsibility to their military-nation embodies this contradiction: You, the heroic young SOLDIERS of our sacred homeland, which the Turkish Armed Forces have defended and will continue to defend with success, make-up a real ARMY/OF EDUCATION. The responsibility of the future has been placed on your shoulders, minds, and wrists. (National Security Knowledge II1965, 3, original emphasis)

In such transitional situation the inconsistency of governmental policy with expectations of intellectuals is quite explicable and regular because of the conflict type of political culture. The unity of power and the overwhelming majority of citizens is secured not with real results of democratization but with the help of ‘symbolic integration’ which has to support a joint realization of democratic participation and help to overcome the contradictions by enforcing a mechanism

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22] Ibid. p. 161-162.
of reconciling the conflicts in process of symbolic identification of citizens with basic democratic consensus.

In the changing conditions determined by the advent of new forms of political culture, intensified development of the democratic tradition of political and civic education become inevitable. The issue of new aspects of political education and its objectives has been an ongoing debate in politics since the early 1990s. It remains to be seen whether a purely theoretical model of political education alone, i.e. without active citizens’ involvement and support, can have the potential not only to transform a political culture, but also influence the whole system of both school and university education?
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The first half of the 20th century – which is, according to a famous historian\(^1\), one of the shortest periods of our history – represents also the most important, happiest but in the same time sad episode of the Romanian history. It comprises three wars - counting the two great wars –, the very emotional moment of the making of Greater Romania but also its disaster of 1940.

In this dynamic and contradictory context, I’ve chosen as a subject of my presentation one of the most debated aspects - especially in the fields of history and security analyses: the Romania’s policy of defense and national security. Within this chronological period, I’ve chosen also to approach the issue of the bilateral Romanian-Turkish relations, meaning more specifically their foreign policy and security options according to the historical conditions of the epoch.

For the Romania of the first half of the XXth century, these options were limited to the membership in or association with one of the two great politico-military alliances of the time – Central Powers or Entente. Being, since 1883, a member of the Triple Alliance, due to its major lack of security and to a consistent threat addressing his national security represented by its tensioned relations with the Russian Empire, Romania was in the delicate situation to have territorial and political claims against both above-mentioned camps.\(^2\) On one side, were concerned territories pertaining to the Russian Empire. On the other side, Romania had direct national interests in territories pertaining to the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy – Transylvania, Banat, Bukovina. This dilemma was solved by pursuing a pragmatic approach of the situation and by taking the decision – for long negotiated during the first two years of the Great War (1914-1916) – to go to war on the Entente’s side. That decision, essential in terms of national security and defense, was determined by the conviction that it was meant to be the most fruitful for the


Romanian national project. During those two decades of the XXth century, Romania’s relations with Turkey did not play a major role in the conception and implementation of the country’s foreign and national defense policies. Following the Romanian–Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 and the Congress of Berlin (1878), the Romanian-Turkish relations had a positive evolution in which an important part was played by the positive treatment of the Turkish-Tatar minority from Dobrogea, but also by the manner in which were solved the important bilateral problems concerning the property and economic exchange issues by the Romanian governments in the end of the XIXth and beginning of the XXth centuries. Supported by their allies – mainly by Austro-Hungary who tried to impose to the Romanian national project a Balkan course – the Romanian Governments of this period negotiated and obtained important regulations from the Sublime Porte concerning the religious and civil status of Romanians and Aromanians living within the borders of the Ottoman Empire. The evolutions of the Balkan Wars, in which both the two states were involved, on same side, only accentuated this trend of their bilateral relations.

In this context, their participation to the Great War in opposite camps was only an unhappy moment, due – as the experts considered – to the particular circumstances but not to any political conflict or to other type of claims between the two states. Otherwise, both during the war and after it, the participation of the Turkish army in battles on the side of the Central Powers on Romanian territory was far to be perceived as hostile as that of the Bulgarian or of the Austrian-Hungarian ones.

Marking the end of the Great War and the beginning of a new system of international relations, based on new political circumstances and conceptual conditions, the Paris Treaties represented for Romania, before anything else, the recognition of its national union. It was the happy-end of a nation-building effort starting half a century before. During the 20’s, following the Great War,

4] We are referring to the Mai 9/22, 1905 Decree by which the Sultan has recognized and give rights to religious autonomy and to ethnic schools to the Aromanians living within the Borders of the Ottoman Empire. See Nicolae Ciachir, Istoria popoarelor din sud-estul Europei în Epoca Modernă. 1789-1923, București: Editura Academiei Române 1983, pp. 289-290; See also Constantin Paraschiv, „Incidentul de la Ianina (1906) – un episod al relațiilor româno-turce”, in Revista de Istorie, tom. 39, nr. 10, 1986, pp. 947-962.
the basic principles of Romania’s foreign and security policies were structured around the security system of the Versailles Treaties. The Romanian State was one of the initiators and between the most committed supporters of the League of Nations especially of its new concept of collective security. Confronting from the very beginning the separatist actions of its enemies, the threats to its national union menacing the very existence of its new state, Romania tried to develop a system of security alliances meant to minimize its conventional security risks in a difficult regional context. The same type of menaces against their security was equally resented by some of its neighbor states. Against this type of menaces worked also the security policy promoted by France, one of the hegemons of the interwar international relations system. Three security structures were born from this new political reality and the Romanian state was an active part of all of them: the Little Entente (1921), The Balkan Entente (1934) and the Romanian-Polish alliance (1921).

Countering those security risks in discussion and establishing an hierarchy of them - depending on their military potential and with a very special attention to the Soviet menace - developing military and economic tools able to support a relevant defense effort, defending the international order established by the Paris Treaties system, supporting the League of Nations as a forum of political debate and as a conflicts solver, promoting and defending its own political, military and economic interests, these were the main poles of the interwar Romania’s foreign and security policies.

In this particular context, its relations with the new Turkey - born on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire following a national revolution and a liberation war, having as decisive ferment Kemal Ataturk’s huge personality - was an important scope for Romania, in connection with its security policy. The main factors of the development of bilateral relations were:

- A common vision on the international politics, both states being interested in the stability of their security environment and in the survival of the international political system; they both adhered to the same principles of the collective security;
- Common interests in establishing and imposing a navigation system in the Black Sea and through Straits;
- A common conception on the potential risks to the regional security as

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well as on the means to counter them.

Highly preoccupied by the regulation of the navigation system through the Straits, Romania actively supported during the Lausanne negotiations (1922-1923) its interests but, in the same time, proved its sympathy for those of the Turkish state.\textsuperscript{8} This attitude was positively appreciated by Ankara's authorities who emphasized a year later, through the voice of one of its diplomats, that “among all the Oriental powers, we are persuaded that the only one with which we will be able to maintain sincere and close relations is Romania”\textsuperscript{9}

Yet, the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations in the end of 1923 and the nomination of a diplomatic representative in Ankara (in April 1924) weren't followed by a significant improvement of bilateral relations in the next years. This situation had multiple causes. Beyond the different patrimonial interests at the end of the war, the main cause was, especially on the Romanian side, the closed relation of the Turkish state with the Soviet Union, confirmed by a bilateral treaty concluded in 1921.\textsuperscript{10}

The international evolutions and especially the significant deterioration of the political climate as well as the increased revisionist risk determined a new alignment of the two states political interests and of their foreign policy actions in the third decade of the XXth century. The Turkish project, supported by Romania, to create a Balkan Pact following the Locarno model\textsuperscript{11} became dominant on the regional political agenda during 1925-1927. The improvement of the bilateral relations became visible in 1932 when Romania supported, through Nicolae Titulescu's voice, the Turkey's accession in the League of Nations.\textsuperscript{12} A year later, Romania and Turkey promoted together with other states the Convention for Defining the Aggression (July 1933) and few months later, during a visit of the Ro-

manian Foreign Affairs minister in Ankara, the two states signed a bilateral Treaty of friendship, non-aggression, arbitration and conciliation (October 1933). This positive course of the bilateral relations, based on a community of interests, but also on an obvious improvement of Romania’s political dialogue with the Soviet Union lead in 1934 to signing the Balkan Pact, grouping four of the Balkan states: Romania, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia.

Concluding the regional alliances system built by the Romanian state in interwar years, the Balkan Entente was meant to neutralize the last of its three areas of major military risks - the Southern one. Following the model of the Little Entente, two years later, the Balkan Pact was completed by a military alliance.

The climax of the bilateral Romanian-Turkish relation was represented by the preparation of the Montreaux Conference meant to restart the discussion on the Straits Regime. Even though marked by some tensioned moments, this good bilateral relation played an essential part in the positive developments of the conference and in the adoption of a new Straits regulation, re-establishing the Turkish sovereignty on this important part of its own territory.

Following the conference, the international context, the ascent of the revisionism and the conciliatory attitude of France and Great Britain towards Nazi Germany and its allies determined the failure of the regional alliances system built in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe around the security guaranties provided by the two above mentioned powers. After the dissolution of the Little Entente - determined by the disappearance of the Czechoslovak state - the Romanian-Polish alliance became empty of content at the very first weeks of the war. Romania’s proclaimed neutrality could not to avoid its involvement in the conflict, in spite of

13] See on the subject Ionuț Cojocaru, România și Turcia actori importanți în sistemul de relații interbelice (1918-1940), Târgoviște: Cetatea de Scaun 2014.
14] Mihai Retegan, În balanța forțelor.
18] The Munich Agreements (1938), the establishment of Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in the same time with the proclamation of the independent slovak state (March 1939) has ealed the fate of the Czechoslovakia. On the subject see Hugh Ragsdale, The Soviets, the Munich Crisis and the Coming of World War II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004.
19] Viorica Moisiuc, Premisele izolării politice.
the desperate efforts made by the Romanian government. Turkey played a major role in Bucharest’s effort to avoid the war during 1939-1940. As a mediator of a non-aggression pact projected to be signed with the Soviet Union by the Romanian State, or as main actor in forming a “Neutrals Block” (an initiative supported also by Italy, but only for a while, during the autumn of 1939), Turkey became an important partner in Romania’s security strategy during this short period.

Romania’s entering in the war dramatically changed the political and economic relations with Turkey who was very careful to observe its neutral policy, a very fragile and volatile one in the new international context. In spite of those circumstances, the bilateral relations had been preserved, the Turkish state being, during the war, one of the main communications and commercial channels for Romania outside the Axe’s controlled space. Even more, Turkey was one of the poles of negotiation of Romania’s exit from the Axe, during 1943-1944.

A balance of the bilateral relations and a conclusion on Turkey’s role for Romania’s national security strategy shows a rather ambivalent picture.

Turkey was important in Romania’s international security and strategic system mainly due to its major geopolitical position and importance in the Black Sea region. The control over the Straits and implicitly over the Romanian maritime commerce (also, as the world war largely proved, on the Romania’s military furniture) entitled Turkey to a very important position in Romania’s interwar political and strategic context. Also, the Turkish relationship with Soviet Union influenced Romania’s own security strategy. For our analyses it won’t be wise to forget a last attempt to mediate the Romanian-Soviet conflict made by the Turkish diplomacy in the first year of the war.

The potential for a common action and for friendly bilateral relations was properly sized and exploited by both states. The political evolutions in the ‘30s prove this assertion. Unfortunately, the different strategic and political postures, those concerning the definition of the risk and menace vectors for the national security were the most influent in the evolution of the bilateral relations. The end of the Second World War and the Iron Curtain separated, since 1948, the European continent putting a half a century end of this chapter of Romanian-Turkish relations. A recovery had to wait for fifty years and for the end of the Cold War.
For almost 90 years, the Turkish-Romanian relations have been depicted as nothing less than excellent, a real example for the whole area. And even from the beginning: “among all Eastern powers, we are fully confided that Romania is the only country with which we will have sincere relations, which would lead to further approaching. Romania is the only strong state and in its honesty and loyalty we put all our trust. The Bucharest Governments always kept their promises. Romania is the most permissive, most welcoming and most non-chauvinist country”. These were the words of a “Turkish personality”, used in a conversation with a Romanian diplomat, in Sofia, in February 1924, which, in turn, sent them to Constantin Langa-Răşcanu, extraordinary and plenipotentiary envoy to our Southern neighbour capital\(^1\).

Indeed, there were not any important political matters which could lead to tensions between those two countries, after 1923. Consequently, the mutual relations could be defined through the words stability, understanding, good neighbourhood and common views, at least for the Interwar period. In addition, neither the Second World War nor the post-war period broke that pattern. However, for our analyses, we must mentioned instances in which, Romania and Turkey find itself on different positions. Unfortunately, the Romanian historiography (and we will mention only partially the works dedicated to Romanian-Turkish relations, after World War I) was more focused on the major points of common views (as Balkan Entente or Montreux Convention) than on the fields of discontent from the Interwar period.

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\(^{1}\) According to a report from February 1\(^{st}\), sent to I. Gh. Duca, the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and quoted in România-Turcia. Relații diplomatice, vol. I, 1923-1938, Dumitru Preda (coord.), București: Editura Cavallioti 2011, p. 7. The last assertion is also found at Mircea N. Popa, “Quelques aspects des relations roumano-turques durant la période comprise entre les deux guerres mondiales”, in “Revue Roumaine d’Historie”, XX, 4, p. 758.
We could bring into discussion an attempt of synthesis, belonging to Mehmet Ali Ekrem\(^2\). The author, a well-known researcher of Turkish-Romanian relations\(^3\), but also of post-imperial Turkey and of Mustafa Kemal personality\(^4\), makes an overview of the relations between these countries during the Interwar period, focusing, however, on the Balkan Entente collaboration and on political evolutions from the fourth decade, until the first months of the Ion Antonescu’s regime. Even those pages dedicated to bilateral relations are presented in a very positive manner, with few remarks regarding the weak points of these relations.

We could also mention a large study signed by Eliza Campus\(^5\), covering – only through title, not through content – the topic of bilateral relations. Instead, the theme of regional collaboration is widespread throughout the article, the accent being on *ideas, positions and strategies* concerning either the Balkan Entente or the Straits regime. We find the same difference between title and content in a study of Mircea N. Popa, focused on the third decade (the fourth being very little mentioned, at the end of the paper). However, in this case, the mutual friendship is highlighted, the Lausanne arrangement is mentioned, but not quite favourable details come to the surface (the author mentions some frictions between Romanian and the Turkish delegates, especially on the Straits’ internationalisation, demilitarisation of an area between Black Sea and Aegean Sea, the Ada-Kaleh regime, concluding of some commercial agreements). Moreover, it is stated that the acceptance of the presence of Ismet Pasha, in Bucharest, on his way to Lausanne, actually means a *de facto* recognising of diplomatic relations before a peace treaty signing. However, by comparison with Eliza Campus research, that of Mircea N. Popa is more nuanced, bringing into the light the not so positive aspects from those two countries relations as well (as, for example, the idea of a Turkish distanced position to Romania, during 1926-1927). In this sense, we could also note a study of Constantin Iordan\(^6\), a vision more balanced


about Turkish-Romanian first decade of coexistence. For Romanian scholar, “the principles of Romanian diplomacy are identical with general orientations of Mustafa Kemal foreign policy. This similarity represented a favourable basis for a convergent evolution of those two countries diplomatic actions but [...] through a meandering way”7. However, the Romanian historians tried to establish, in his work, the points of convergence and departure between these two countries, in the period which is also of interest for us.

More critical is Florin Anghel’s study8, which was focused on the problems raised in the actual development of the diplomatic relations. As documents used by the author showed, it was extremely difficult for Romania to open a diplomatic office in Ankara, taking into consideration the lack of almost any facilities. But the delay appeared represented a source of discontent for the Turkish Government, clearly expressed to the Romanian diplomats, which travelled from Istanbul to Ankara.

The beginning of the diplomatic relations is cautious. Although the Romanian public opinion is highly favourable to the Turkish nationalists’ project, within the Bucharest political circles many worries are shared, as to the fact that the flames of the Greek-Turkish war could spread wider into Balkans9.

We could list some other topics which marked Turkish-Romanian relations in the 20’s; the mutual perceptions about these topics show us a complex picture with ups and downs. Focusing on the second ones we could number a series of divergent points on basic topics as: relation with Russia/Soviet Union, the project of Balkan alliance, the behaviour in the International Commission of the Straits, the topic of representation, already mentioned, the topics of Romanian goods looted by Ottoman authorities in the war and still present in the Turkish Republic, some quarrels regarding bilateral trade conventions or even the issue of pride, for being or not being mentioned in official statements, along with other countries (for example the discontent of Gheorghe Filality, extraordinary and plenipotentiary

1994, pp. 2523-2533.
9] Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale (National Archives of Romania), fund Casa Regală, Carol al II-lea, file 19/1922.
envoy to Constantinople, regarding the speech delivered within the Great National Assembly by Mustafa Kemal, on November 3rd, 1924. And we quote from the Romanian diplomat’s report: „I am surprised to find [...] that the President of the Republic did not consider important to utter two phrases about Romania. I would have expected that, after all the signs of friendship showed and that we are still showing, after the extraordinary welcome of the Turkish students, who went home from us only a few days ago, the most elementary common sense requested that we do not be absolutely forgotten”\textsuperscript{10}, or protocol mistakes (as in 1929, when Romanian Minister Filality reported, in May 11, that Turkish Foreign Ministry “forgot” to send someone or at least a note of greeting, about Romanian National Day. However, the problem was solved in no more then 24 hours, by sincere apologies presented in written by the Chief of the Protocol from the Turkish Foreign Minister\textsuperscript{11}).

The main theme of “Russia” was fully present in the Romanian-Turkish diplomats exchange of views even from the beginning. At the end of 1921, some negotiations had been held in Ankara between Soviets and Turks in which the project of an alliance between Russia, Turkey, Bulgaria and Hungary emerged. According this project, Turkey, Bulgaria and Hungary will support Russia and Germany in case of an attack from the Little Entente states\textsuperscript{12}. Even if such scheme was not serious enough, Turkish side believing that such attacks never happened the project itself was a major point of departure between Turkey and Romania. Romanian diplomats from now on were strongly convinced that Turkey was too close to Soviet Union and could not approach to Balkan loving peace states Romania. In several cases Romanian diplomats accused that Turkey was spokesman for the Russian interests\textsuperscript{13}. On the other hand, Turkish side did not hesitate to picture Russia in the most positive colours in regard of conflictual topics between Bucharest and Moscow. For example, in the opinion of Tevfik Rüstü, expressed to Romanian envoy, Gheorghe Filality, in a series of talks which took place in the late October, 1925, Turkish Foreign Ministry stated: “We have with Russians the most closest relations, not only because their representative, mister Souritz, is a man of first hand but also because we, Turks, find in this friendship uncontested advantages. […] we live, therefore, in the best harmony and we are aiming to establish also our economical relations on the most mutual productive bases. Also,

\textsuperscript{10} România-Turcia, vol. I, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{12} Constantin Iordan, “La Roumanie”, p. 2525.
\textsuperscript{13} Report of Constantin Langa Răşcanu, Romanian extraordinary envoy to Athens to Ion M. Mitilineu, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, regarding his meeting with Djevad-bey, Turkish extraordinary envoy in Athens, January 5\textsuperscript{th} 1927, in Romania-Turcia, vol. I, p. 37.
Tevfik Rüstü argued that Russia, with its 40 millions Muslims, could not make any Bolshevik propaganda in Turkey, being aware that, on its turn, Turkey could instigate them, if it is necessary.

Tevfik Rüstü didn’t hesitate to express his views also about the stage of Soviet-Romanian relations. In his opinion, „Russians did not have any aggressive intentions against anybody, neither against you. Through our Minister in Bucharest we inform mister Duca to have not any unrest regard Bessarabia because the Russians don’t have the least desire to make a war for it. I truly believe that sooner or later you will end to conclude an agreement, through good understanding and mutual setbacks. And he explained, at large, the true problem of Soviet Union: the hostility with Great Britain, the feeling of being left aside (and even betrayed by the Germany) through Locarno Agreements and so on.

However, this talks, resumed by Romanian diplomat in a single report, and, in this report, two lines of the Turkish Foreign Ministry are quite spectacular; he said that his days as a Foreign Ministry are on the edge, because its well-known pro-Russian attitude.

The Straits, their regime and the application of Lausanne provisions are the second main theme which provoked interesting and intense discussion.

According to these new documents, the tones of discussions are quite different, which gives us the feeling that, despite all international arrangements, before Montreux, things were much more favourable for Turkey. An example: at the meeting between Theodor Scortzescu, Romania’s ad-interim in Ankara, and Tevfik Rüştü, Turkish Foreign Minister, from November 12th, the last one was firm and even not as formal as he should have been. He declared himself “offended” by the Romanian stand on the Straits International Commission. And he went on saying:

“I did not understand why Romania tried so badly to upset us. I believe that, for Romania, our friendship is not negligible. You know very well that Europe did not assume the guard of the Straits; if such a guarantee against a possible crossing by force existed, we would be very pleased. But, for now, the Straits’ security is incumbent on us. I believe that you have no doubt that, in exceptional times, [...] as in the case of a war, for example, the masters of the Straits will be us, the Turks. We proved enough that no one can take the Straits from us. That is why it is understandable that, in some circumstances, we could bring some advantages to those with which we will have friendly relations. However, who could be

against such relations, between Romania and Turkey? Undoubtedly, nothing can oppose the improvement of the relations between the two countries”15.

Although he concluded in the friendliest manner, the speech of the Turkish diplomat contains a high level of discontent with the Romanian attitude, the confidence in the fact that, beyond all international agreements, Turkey will take the ultimate decision regarding the exploitation of the Straits. As easily as anyone can observe, the warning was clear and unveiled: only friends could benefit from Turkey’s benevolence, on that issue.

Turkey’s complaints were revealed in the same meeting, and we are aware of them from a letter, this time signed by Gheorghe C. Ionescu, General Consul of Romania in Istanbul. This intended to deliver to Bucharest supplementary details, not included in Scortzescu’s report. According to Ionescu’s report, Tevfik Rüştü asked „why Romania was so firm at times and tried to put Turkey into difficulty, as, for example, in the issue of establishing a flag for the Commission”16 (not stipulated in the Treaty of Lausanne) which, in the Turkish diplomat’s opinion, infringed upon Turkey’s sovereignty and reminded of the old capitulations regime17. Touching a responsive chord, Rüştü highlighted that this geographical reality, with Turkey absolute master of the Straits, could be very much useful to Romania, „in a potentially exceptional situation”18. The „incident” was closed after the Romanian Consul’s assurances that there were not any “bad intentions regarding the Republic of Turkey” and all misunderstandings are “only discussions” between members of the International Commission, on the occasion of procedural organization, according to the Lausanne Treaty19.

Six months later, in April 1930, in a new conversation Rüştü – Scortzescu, the Straits issue was again on the agenda. The Turkish diplomat stated that there was a strong connection between the closing of the Straits and the Black Sea demilitarization. Without the second, practically, Turkey and all riparian states were at the will of the most powerful military fleet, of course, the Soviet one. Consequently, freedom of navigation is to be preferred to the former possibility, due to the fact that it leads to a balance between naval forces stationed in the Black Sea and in the Mediterranean Sea. In this context, the head of the Turkish diplomacy was more trenchant then half year before:

15] Ibidem, p. 82-83.
16] Not mentioned in Scortzescu’s report.
18] Ibidem, p. 84.
19] Ibidem, p. 84.
“ [...] actually, the freedom of the Straits stands in our will and not in the signed Convention. We proved in the past that no one could take the Straits from us. We could anytime organize the closing of the Straits without spending any money because the Soviets will assume this [...]. It will be better, however, that the Straits Commission’s activity does not harm our sovereignty. Anyhow, a hostile attitude of a certain Power’s representative, in the Straits Commission, would not be useful because I will find other representatives disposed to put him in minority”\textsuperscript{20}.

As we could easily observe, the speech of Tevfik Rüştü, with the frequently stated actual Turkish supremacy over the Straits lying at its core, even beyond the international agreement, brings a new element: the menace and, we dare to use this word, the blackmail.

The use of the “Soviet factor”, as element of pressure, was constantly reported by Romanian diplomats, even at the beginning of the fourth decade, when the two countries found themselves in more close relationships. For example, in a report from January 1932, Ion P. Carp, Romanian extraordinary envoy to Ankara, highlighted the Turkish military preparations in the Straits’ defence area (movements of troops, improvement of railroads and roads) but, also, the close relations with the Soviet Union. The flood of Soviet arms and ammunition, without a formal military convention, was an example in this respect\textsuperscript{21}.

These preparations came into conflict with the obligations regarding free passage, as they are laid down in the Lausanne treaty, but the explanation for this is quite simple: the rule of unanimity regarding decisions concerning the defence of the freedom of crossing and the possibility of using the veto, by one of the powers in charge of the security of the Straits. The two issues combined represented the greatest lack in the international agreement established in the Swiss town. Consequently, in a potential state of anarchy, Turkey „would regain all freedom of action and could close the Dardanelles, for avoiding that its territorial waters are transformed in a battleground and for escaping from a war with Russia”\textsuperscript{22}. Politically, Carp asserted that Turkey will find itself on the side of the Soviet Union, in case of a conflict with its neighbours or Great Powers\textsuperscript{23}.

We could easily note that, in the 20’s, the most important matter, in the bilateral relations, was that of knowing and understanding one another. Romania

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} Ibidem, p. 88.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Ibidem, p. 115-116.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Ibidem.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Ibidem, p. 117.
\end{itemize}
was in front of a young state, willing to assert its new vision, energy and power, even if the sound of words become, sometimes, very high. In this way we must understand the series of complaints, more or less important, of the Romanian diplomats, regarding the behavior of the Republican authorities, toward foreign (and friendly) states. We enlist some of them, from a variety, including countless aspects of bilateral relations from that period. However, the obstacles in the path for an easier communications were more and more insignificant and, at the beginning of the fourth decade, the juridical solution, mutual and regional, emerged.
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Studies
THE INFLUENCE OF ATATÜRK’S REFORMS ON THE TURKISH COMMUNITY OF DOBRUDJA

1. The Turks of Dobrudja in the spectrum of Turkish and Romanian influence

In 1923, around the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, a Turkish delegation of Dobrudja Turks formed out of four muftis, a senator and a member of the Romanian Parliament planned a trip into Turkey to give homage to the Caliph and the Grand National Assembly of Ankara. This visit which eventually happened in 1923 after obtaining the acceptance and support of the Romanian authorities, showed very well the situation that the Turks found themselves in Dobrudja: a community which had not broken ties with the state that they were a part of until 1878 and yet simultaneously was trying to integrate itself into the very country that they became subjects of.

Part of the Ottoman Empire since the fifteenth century, Dobrudja, gathered over time a significant population of Turks. We must however point out from the beginning that our text refers to the Oguz Turks, the Tatars and the Gagauz, Turkish populations found on Romanian territory. According to figures offered by Kemal Karpat, in 1878, after the Treaty of Berlin, when Dobrudja stopped being an Ottoman territory and became part of the United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, there were 71,146 (31.5%) Tatars, 48,783 (21.6%) Turks and 46,504 (21%) Romanians out of 225,692 inhabitants. Becoming part of a state with laws, traditions, and culture totally different from those of the Ottoman Empire, this important community made a point of maintaining their identity at all times. The two solutions that the Turkish and Tatar leaders saw to resolve these problems were emigration to the state that they had been subjects of the Ottoman Empire until 1878 or defending their own rights and adapting to the country which promised to respect their customs and traditions. Starting even from 1877,

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1) Arhivele Ministerului Afacerilor Externe (from now on AMAE), fond 71/Turcia 1920-194, vol. 58, f. 25.
a large part of the Turkish population had begun to migrate to Anatolia. Because of this there was registered a demographic drop. According to the estimations of M. Ionescu Dobrogeanu, in 1890 in Dobrudja there were 13,044 Turks and 29,668 Tatars. This drop continued, so that the same source shows a population of 12,459 Turks and 28,450 Tatars in 1900. In 1913, after the end of the Second Balkan War the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest, Romania got the south Dobrudja with the counties of Călăcra and Durostor, which determined a sudden rise in the Turkish population of Romania. In the two newly incorporated counties to the Romanian state alone, were over 100,000 Turks and Tatars. Taking into consideration the 1913’s Southern Dobrudja’s incorporation to Romania, in 1930, we reach 173,000 Turks and Tatars in Dobrudja, a large community, which continued to preserve close cultural and political ties with Istanbul and, after 1923, with Ankara.

Until the first few years of the interwar period, the principal reason of emigration was the question for a Muslim to live in a Christian state. After the formation of the Turkish Republic, the motivation became diverse and complex. Those who promoted emigration believed that the state founded by Atatürk as the only land where they can maintain their identity, and would be allowed to prosper. The formation of this image of the young Republic was also facilitated by a series of objective factors, such as the poor state of Turkish schools in Dobrudja, financing issues of the Muslim cult or aspects referencing the poor financial situation of the Turkish-Tatar community’s members.

In our study we try to identify the main mechanism that allowed the adoption of Atatürk’s reforms among the Turks from Dobrudja and to analyze the impact of these reforms on the main events that marked the community such as the process of emigration.

First of all there is the issue of understanding the importance of the Turkish community in Romania for the officials from Ankara. Since the first years of its existence, The Republic of Turkey was concerned about the Turkish communities

3) Grégoire Danesco, Dobrogea. Étude de géographie phisique et ethnographique, Bucureşti 1907, p. 141.

4) The census carried out in January 1913, before the incorporation of the southern Dobrudja gave the following figures: 21,350 Tatars and 20,092 Turks (See Nicolina Ursu, Turco – tătării dobrogeni în recensăminte şi statistici româneşti (1878 – 1916), in Tahsin Gemil (coordinator), Tătarii în istorie şi în lume, Bucureşti 2003, p. 235). According to 1930 census, in Dobrogea lived 150,773 Turks and 22,092 Tatars. Among them, 38,430 Turks and 4,661 Tatars were registered in Călăcra and 90,595 Turks and 2,085 Tatars in Durostor, counties under Romanian administration since 1913 (See Dr. Sabin Manuilă, Recensământul General al Populației României din 20 Decembrie 1930, Volumul II: Neam, Limbă maternă, Religie, Bucureşti 1938, p. 33).
outside its borders. Officials from Ankara viewed these communities like Turkish diaspora. This concern was not based just on sentimental considerations. There was also a practical reason. Besides the importance that a minority could have in bilateral relations, in the case of Turkey and the Turkish community from Romania we can also take into consideration another aspect. During the existence of the Ottoman Empire, Dobrudja (Romanian) was a territory where opposition to the regime found shelter and adherents. The best example is Ibrahim Themo, who was member of the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti). In 1895, he was condemned to forced labor for life because of his activities against the Sultan. He managed to escape from Istanbul and took refuge in Constanta embarking on the vessel “Meteor” with the help of some Romanian students. Once in a place of refuge, Ibrahim Temo and his associates conducted numerous activities against the regime of Istanbul.

During the Republic, there also appeared news about various opponents of the regime from Ankara that took refuge in Dobrudja. The best known case is that of Çerkez Reşid, brother of Ethem Çerkez. On August 8, 1936, in the La République, a newspaper printed in Istanbul, there was a report published about him taking refuge in Pazarcık, an important town in Dobrudja, where he supposedly was trying to create an opposition movement to Ankara. Romanian diplomats requested the Bucharest authorities to immediately verify this information and, should it prove to be true, to take the following actions: the expulsion of Çerkez Reşid and the surveillance of his followers. The information was reviewed and refuted, ascertaining that neither of the Ethem brothers was in Romania. In actuality a pamphlet had been smuggled and distributed in Constanta with the help of Aslan, Çerkez Reşid’s son living in Varna. Even if the news proved to be false, it is a good example to illustrate the potential of an opposition to Ankara, based in Dobrudja.

2. Atatürk’s professors, diplomats and newspapers

To prevent such an evolution and to gain the support of the Turkish community in Romania, officials from Ankara have promoted the Atatürk’s reforms in various ways. One of the ways Kemalist reforms came to be known and adopted

by the Turkish community in Romania, was the efforts conducted by officials sent by Ankara. They met several times with representatives of the local Turkish elites and spurred them to publish articles presenting reforms that have been taken, took the necessary steps to assure that Turkish schools in Romania used textbooks sent from Turkey and encouraged the modification of school programs. As a result of these efforts, the major reforms that have been implemented by the Turkish community from Romania were changing the alphabet and abandoning of the religious courts.

The one who stood out most in his efforts to present reforms adopted in the Ankara among the Turkish Dobrudja community was Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver. A consummate intellectual, advocate of reform and parliamentary position before becoming minister and then Turkey’s ambassador to Bucharest, Tanrıöver distinguished himself through his unrelenting activity and diverse methods of promoting the Kemalist movement: personal visits among the community, encouraging newspapers to publish favorable articles, bringing Turkish teachers to teach reformed Turkish language in Romanian schools, donating books. The efforts of Turkish diplomat Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver in promoting and sustaining the Ataturk’s reforms had important consequences and were appreciated by the community.9

Tanrıöver was not the only Turkish diplomat to directly involve himself in the implementation of Kemalist reforms in Dobrudja. The Romanian authorities who were carefully watching the evolution of the Romanian Muslim community, reported several times such actions undertook by Turkish diplomats or politicians. In a report from the Regional Inspectorate of the Constanta police department, it was stated that on the 18th of June 1935, Talat Bey, sub director of the Turkish colonization office, Ulyse Bey president of the emigration committee of Romanian Turks, Apti Bey, former secretary general of the Turkish Legacy of Constanta, accompanied by members of the local Turkish elite such as Sali Zandali and teacher Mustafa Emin, organized a meeting in the latter’s house. At the meeting which was held in secret during the night were invited influential Turkish leaders: the counties mufti, Efraim Geamil, the president of the Muslim community of Caliacra, Mustafa Riza, former member of Romanian Parliament, Aptula Hoaredin, Rusit Amet, county councilor, Memet Amet, communal councilor, Sali Hagi Cara Ibraim, director of the Bazargic Turkish schools and several Bazargic Turkish teachers. During the meeting the representatives of Turkey asked those present to use only the Latin alphabet in schools and to facilitate the spread of

Turkish history and geography textbooks sent from Ankara.\textsuperscript{10}

The representatives of Turkish diplomats also used official methods in the use of promoting Ankara reforms. An important objective of theirs was reviving Turkish education by adapting the curriculum in according with the new changes. In this regard, in addition to donations of books, Turkish diplomats were also interested in curriculum and subjects taught at the most important Turkish educational institutes in Dobrudja: The Medgidia Muslim Seminary and the Silistra Muslim Seminary\textsuperscript{11}. New curricula needed to be refocused from religious teachings to secular teachings and to shine a favorable light on the new Republican regime. In short time all Turkish schools in Romania conformed to these demands.

Also part of the educational reform strategy and promotion of Kemalist reforms was the policy of bringing Turkish language teachers from Ankara. The work of these teachers especially among the Gagauz Turks, supported in particular by Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver who also promoted their massive emigration in Turkey, caught the attention of Romanian authorities who were disturbed by their “propaganda activity which makes the Bulgarian and Moldovan population to feel persecuted by the Romanian state”\textsuperscript{12}. Through these teachers, many young people went to study in Turkey and when they returned presented an idyllic image of Turkey to the local population.\textsuperscript{13}

All the work of Turkish representatives and diplomats had considerable effects. The most important tool in promoting Kemalist reforms was the Dobrudja Turkish community’s newspapers and magazines. Growing during the interwar period, it was the primary means through which news and ideas circulated. Diplomats such as Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver used newspapers like \textit{Hak Söz, Türk Birliği, Romanya, Dobrudja}\textsuperscript{14} to facilitate the implementation of policies set by Turkish politicians. These newspapers were published by leaders of the local communities, teachers, professors or politicians close to Turkish diplomatic circles.

To illustrate the importance of the press in promoting the Kemalist reforms we can give the example of \textit{Türk Birliği}, a newspaper published by the “Young Turks Association”. This association was one of the many associations of Turks in Dobrudja which organized cultural or humanitarian activities.

\textsuperscript{10} Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale (from now on ANIC), fond Inspectoratul General al Jandarmeriei, vol. 18/1933, f. 196.
\textsuperscript{11} ANIC, fond Ministerul Cultelor și Artelor, 112/1933, f. 1.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibidem, f. 25.
\textsuperscript{14} These newspapers were presented as Kemalist in a report by the Romanian authorities. See ANIC, fond Inspectoratele Regionale de Politie, vol. 630, f. 36-37.
The purpose of the paper is stated in the first edition: “To wake-up Turks from their ignorance”\textsuperscript{15} and explained exactly in the fifth edition when it is made the clarification that: “the purpose of the newspaper is to defend the right of the Turks from Romania respecting the laws of the country of residence and to guide them through the sunshine’s of the Gazi’s revolution in Turkey”\textsuperscript{16}. The newspaper was published irregularly during 1930 (February 18 to May 19) and 1934-1940 (6 September 1934 - 16 December, 1939).\textsuperscript{17}

In the first part of its existence the newspaper was printed in Ottoman Turkish. In Latin characters were written just technical data (address, printing, and cost) and the third page of the first edition of the newspaper. In this page appeared an article dedicated to Mustafa Kemal, an article that exposes editorial purposes, a poem by Izzet Ulvi and a section of sayings. After 1934, all articles were written in Latin characters. Romanian language is only used in some commercials and some articles for Romanian speaking readers as is the case of an article appeared in the edition dedicated to the death of Atatürk, in order to show its importance.

Between the First and the Second World War almost all newspapers gradually adopted Latin characters.

However this transition had not been so rapid. In the pages of the Türk Birliği newspaper, a supporter of the transition to the Latin alphabet, the quickening of the process was requested several times. In such an article, it was outlined that: “one of the most important problems that those who are concerned with the issues of the Turkish minority living in Romania have to deal with is the shortage of books. In Dobrudja, especially Kaliakra and Durostor counties, the alphabet reform was adopted from the beginning but because students and teachers do not have the necessary books, they are facing some difficulties”\textsuperscript{18}.

Although there were groups that opposed the application of the Kemalist reforms in Romania, the members of the “Association of Young Turks”, considered that: “the great Turkish Revolution enlightened the people and now everybody is thirsty for knowledge”\textsuperscript{19}.

The newspapers that promoted the Atatürk’s reforms, criticized the lack of Turkish language classes at the school. In Pazarcik, Siliстра and Constanta, Ro-

\textsuperscript{15} Salih Zekki, “Müjde Ey Türk Genci”, Türk Birliği, no. 1, 18 February 1930, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{16} Türk Birliği, no. 5, 6 September 1934, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{17} For a detailed presentation of this newspaper see Metin Omer, “Romanya’ da Çıkan Türk Bir Gazete: Türk Birliği”, Cumhuriyet Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi, no. 17, 2013, p. 171-186.
\textsuperscript{19} “Maarifimiz”, Türk Birliği, no. 18, 15 Birincikânun 1937, p. 1.
manian Turks had several schools that were financed by the local communities. At these schools Romanian states appointed Romanian teachers and the Turkish community appointed Turkish teachers. The Turkish professor had the right to teach just Turkish language and religion two hours per day. This was considered to not be enough by the local Turkish elites.

Starting with 1930, at the Muslim Seminar from Medgidia and at the other Turkish schools from Dobrudja, Turkish language, literature and religion classes used books from Turkey.

Also as a method of promoting the adoption of Kemalist reforms through the elite and Dobrudja Turkish community press, the transformation of the Republic of Turkey was presented in an idyllic manner. The Romanian Turkish community followed Turkey’s transformations with great interest. As for Turkey’s internal evolutions, local Turkish elites expressed positive remarks in the community’s press. Moreover, this appreciation was frequently quoted from the Turkish national press. For example, in the elites point of view, Turkish industry had a great evolution and Turkish railways developed in a very spectacular way.\(^{20}\) For the leaders of the Romanian Turkish community Atatürk was the central figure of all these changes, being considered “the Great Turk that saved the Turks and Turkishness from a great tragedy”\(^{21}\).

The transformations of the Turkish Republic caused an important shift for the Turkish community in Romania: the emigration to Turkey. The Turkish territory was considered as the sole space in which the community from Dobrudja could preserve its “ethnical identity”\(^ {22}\) and the emigration was seen as an opportunity offered by Turkey for “cultural and social awakening”\(^ {23}\). The Turkish community regarded the emigration process as a duty to the country (Turkey). Subsequently it was emphasized the importance of Turkey’s “demographic increase” policy and Turks of Dobrudja were asked to help in this process, choosing to head towards Anatolia.\(^ {24}\) The same vision was also shared in an article form *Tuna* newspaper. Emigration was seen as a “necessity”, part of the “defense policy of the nation” (Turkish). Furthermore it specified the positive effects for Turkey: “the growth of the army”, “economic growth”, “and growth of labor force”\(^ {25}\).


\(^{21}\) Türk Birliği, no. 1, 12 February 1930, p. 3.

\(^{22}\) “Göç Aleyhdarları”, Türk Birliği, no. 54, 28 July 1937, p. 1.

\(^{23}\) “Göç ve Aksi Propagandacılar”, Delorman, no. 5, 18 September, 1937, s. 1.


\(^{25}\) “Münakaşa ediyoruz. Göç politikası memlekete neler kazandıracaktır?”, Tuna, no. 12, 27
3. Kemalism in Romania

The community of Turks living in Romania never cut ties with the Ottoman Empire and later the Republic of Turkey, watching and being influenced by political developments in Anatolia. Even when in 1878, as a result of the Treaty of Berlin, Dobrudja became Romanian, an event which for the Turkish community it represented a shock, many choosing to leave the territory between the Danube and the Sea, taking advantage of the resumption of diplomatic ties between Bucharest and Istanbul, Romanian Turks continued to keep in touch with the country that they identified with. Simultaneous with this continuous contact with the Ottoman Empire and later with the Republic of Turkey, they also tried to adapt to their adoptive country, bowing to Romanian laws and customs. This synthesis was evidenced very well by regulating some aspects pertaining to the community’s religion.

After Dobrudja joined Romanian borders as result of the Treaty of Berlin, on the 9th of March 1880, a law was promulgated for the organization of Dobrudja. This law affected aspects pertaining to the territory, administration, judicial power, finances and military of Dobrudja. In this territory there were also certain legislative features, inherited from the Ottoman Empire, features which, from the beginning, the Romanian state agreed to uphold. Thusly Muslim courts had to be instituted to deal with the issues of marriage and succession, as they had the right to judge themselves in conformity with Islamic laws and regulations. The operation of these courts was, however, delayed because of the appointment of the mufﬁ. The Romanian authorities never having encountered such a problem before, the handling of a Muslim minority, deferred to the help of the state that they had been subjects of until very recently, the Ottoman Empire. In the year 1880, Hagi Mustafa Şerif was named mufti in Constanța, and Enis Efendi mufti of the county of Tulcea, both recommended to the Romanian Government by the Legation of the Ottoman Empire and sent directly from Constantinople.

Although the Romanian authorities sought to provide a framework for the Turkish population conservation and development of customs and traditions trying to maintain as much of the Ottoman legislation and organization, there were

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October, 1936, p. 1.


still some issues. Thus, even if, under Article 31 of the “Rules of Public Administration in Dobrogea” “all Muslim affairs related to family, parental and marital power, weddings and divorce, tutelage and minority and all general family matters and all the rights therein” were going to be judged in special courts by the communities imam and two members chosen from the Muslim community, those dissatisfied with their sentences, could make an appeal at the Court of Appeal which although had Muslims among its members, decided according to Romanian laws and regulations.29 Also, the Mufti Office was not in any way subordinated to the Sheikh of Islam it was directly related to the Romanian Ministry of Cults and Public Instructions, which was similar to Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Presidency of Religious Affairs), created in 1924. The minister who held this office was the one to name mufties, the opinion of the Sheikh of Islam from Istanbul being purely formal affair.

All these transformations which were taking place in Dobrudja, were accelerated by the Ankara reforms. The Civil Code promulgated in Turkey on October 4, 1926 had effects on the Turkish community in Romania. Abolishing courts, which were based on Sharia (Islamic law), had spurred the abolition of Islamic courts from Romania.

According to a request addressed to the government and the Ministry of Justice in 1928, the Turkish Senator from Romanian parliament, Kurdali Mehmet, demanded the abolition of Islamic courts. In the request was outlined that the reason for this were the changes in Turkey and was stated that “harems, polygamy, marriage with a woman against her will, separation from her just by saying the words” I want to break up with you “denial of social and political rights of women are practices that are outdated, inappropriate for the century we live”.30 This legal system was abolished in 1935 by law. This decision of Romanian authorities was widely welcomed, Türk Birliği newspaper stating that: “all the bad things were caused by these Islamic courts”31.

This spectrum of Turkish-Romanian ambivalent influence was felt not only in the continuation and adaptation of aspects relating to cults. It was also present in the domain of education. After 1878, the school system for the Romanian Turkish community was not changed. Dobrudja Turks continued to attend schools remaining from the time of the Ottoman administration, students gradually attend-

ing courses such as mektebi subyan, rusṭiye and medrese. Within these educational institutions there was special emphasis on religion and the reading of the Quran, in some cases also adding the history and geography of the Ottoman Empire and the history of Islam.\textsuperscript{32} Although the Turkish education system continued to exist, Turkish students gradually began to be integrated within the Romanian educational system. A first step in this direction was the introduction of Romanian language as a compulsory subject in the curriculum of the Muslim Seminary in Medgidia in 1889\textsuperscript{33}. In time, the Romanian language would become compulsory for all levels of education. Moreover, a good knowledge of the official language could ensure professional ascendance. This way, the Turks in Romania learned the Latin alphabet long before it was introduced in the Republic of Turkey albeit in everyday life and in publications continued to use the old system of writing.

Promulgated on November 1, 1928 by the Parliament in Ankara, the law adopting the Latin alphabet, had brought changes to the school and the Turks press in Romania. This influence was not immediate but gradual over time. For example, the newspaper \textit{Hak Sö\c{z}} which was printed in Silistra since May 22, 1929, appeared in Latin characters only in July 1938. Since June 8, 1934 until 1938 the first two pages of the newspaper were printed using Arabic letters, and the last two pages in Latin characters. And even in this period, some editions were printed only in Arabic.\textsuperscript{34}

At the same time, another important newspaper of the community, \textit{Tuna} has begun to be printed in Latin characters only on 2 February 1936. Cessation of using Arabic characters and starting the use of Latin ones in this newspaper, which was led by the teacher and former Mufti of Silistra, Ibrahim Kadri, was influenced by the intervention of the Turkish diplomatic representative in Romania. In the pages of this newspaper, which was printed since 1925, the first article in Latin characters was published on August 23, 1929. These lines formed a letter or rather an address of the Turkish ambassador in Bucharest, M. Sabri. By this letter, the diplomatic representative of Turkey was congratulating Ibrahim Kadri for an article published in the newspaper and was notifying him about a donation of 25 volumes which were meant to be used in preparing sermons by imams in Dobrudja.\textsuperscript{35}

In the same year, on the 6\textsuperscript{th} of September, the newspaper \textit{Tuna} published an

\textsuperscript{32} M"ustecip "Ulk"usal, \textit{Dobruca ve Türkler} (second edition), Ankara 1987, p. 120-125.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibidem, p. 125.
\textsuperscript{34} Mehmet Ali Ekrem, op. cit., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibidem.
article in Latin characters. Also, in 1929, in the October edition of the newspaper, the headlines of the sections “Internal News” and “Foreign News” were published in Latin characters. A year later, on July 4, 1930, we can read an article published in both Arabic and Latin characters: “Buna da şükür” (We are thankful to this also). In the same year, on November 6, a poem was published signed by Necat Rüştü in Arabic and Latin characters: “Manzum hikaye” (Story in Verse). Tuna newspaper would be printed using Latin characters only after the teacher Sami Davut Ergun becomes director.36

We have to mention that the adoption of the Latin alphabet and the language reform by the Turkish community from Romania followed the official discourse of Ankara. All this was perceived as was “a new victory of Turkish changing”, the elites sustaining that “from now on we will speak our own language, mother of all languages”. From a historical perspective, the language reform was considered normalization because “during the Ottoman Sultans, the language was strongly influenced by the Arab and Persian languages”.37

It is also interesting that in some articles published in 1934 for some words the synonym was also mentioned: “Türk değişimi bir utku (zafer) daha kazanıyor. Artık atalarımızın ünlü (şanlı) ulusumuzu (millet) miras bıraktığı bütün dillerin anası olan öz dilimizi konuşacağız. Osmanlı Sultanlarını hüküm sürdüğü çağarlar da (devir) Türkün özbenliğini yok etmek için, temiz Türk diline, Arap, Acem dillerinin karıştırılması yüzünden ulusal (milli) bir dil olmaktan çıkmıştı. İşte bundan ötürüdür ki, yazılan nesnelerden bir şey anlamaymış budunumuz (halk) bilgi yaltırıklardan (ışık) cibil (mahrum) kalmıştı.”38 In order to convince the population to use the words recommended by Dil Araştırma Kurumu, predecessor of Türk Dil Kurumu, in some local newspapers a section called “original Turkish word” appeared, in which some words were recommended to be used.

Conclusions

In conclusion we can say that Ataturk’s reforms had a serious impact on the Turkish community from Romania. These reforms were promoted by Ankara’s diplomats through the local elites and Turkish press. Even though this was not a quick process, in a few years all the members of the community accepted and adopted the changes. Of course it will be wrong to state that the penetration of the Kemalist reforms was facilitated just by some external factors. The adoption of

38] Ibidem.
these reforms was undoubtedly a step in the process of modernization that local Turkish community was trying to achieve.

Thus, the Romanian Turks were affected by the Occidental penal and civil codes and Latin alphabet long before their introduction in Turkey. Contact with Romanian society which was heavily influenced by the west, began to change the Romanian Muslim community. In other words, in 1923, Dobrudja Turks were already integrated in a secular society, pro-west, strongly influenced by modern ideas which had transformed the European civilization.

Certainly an important factor that facilitated the ease of establishing these reforms was the cooperation of Romanian authorities. They did not oppose the promotion and adoption of the Atatürk`s ideas. In addition to very good relations between Romania and Turkey, an important factor for Romanian good will was the character of these reforms. They had a modern, European nature close to the Romanian values of the time. For example, the adoption of the Latin alphabet in Turkish schools in Romania could not have been more welcomed by Romanian officials, who as such, were relieved because using the Latin alphabet meant that learning Romanian was easier as it used the same alphabet.

Officials in Ankara pursued a pragmatic purpose by supporting these reforms. In the process of supporting the current emigration of the Turkish community from the Balkans to Anatolia, they wished that future Turkish citizens be loyal to the regime, not wishing to risk the formation of a center of internal opposition.
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TURKEY VISIT OF MARIA TĂNASE, THE QUEEN OF ROMANIAN TANGO (MARCH 29, 1941)

Hayrûnîsa Alp*

I - A brief overview to Her life

Maria Tănase (25 September 1913 - 22 June 1963)

She was born in September 1913 as the third child of Ana Munteana and Ion Coanda Tănase in the Bucharest suburb of Cărămidari. The father, Coanda, was a passionate gardener and the family lived on the outskirts of Bucharest. It so happened that in her father’s garden she learned not only how to walk, but also how to sing. Maria Tănase studied at the primary school making her first stage debut in Caramidarii de Jos, then on the stage of Ion Heliade Râdulescu High School.1

The Tănase’s employed women from all parts of Romania to work in their garden and she spent her life among these women who sang Romanian folk songs. These women brought the local traditions of the regions from where they came. The little Maria was immediately fascinated by the magic of these folk songs, and later many of them became a part of her impressive repertoire. She met with Turkish song during her Dobruca and Balçık Voyage by means of Turkish villagers.2

II - Musical Career

Her music career starts in 1934, when she joined the Cărăbuş Theatre of Constantin Tănase by the advice of newspaper writer Sandu Eliad. She, had her debut at “Carabus” musical theater (1934) and, in the same year, she recorded “The attic”, a romantic song by Nello Manzatti at “Life Record” House. Two years later, she recorded two other popular songs titled as “The one who loves and leaves” and “I swore a thousand times”, under the supervision of ethno-musicologists Constantin Brailoiu Harry Brauner.

Her debut took place on June 2, 1937 on the stage name of Mary Atanasiu

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in the musical hall theatres, *Alhambra* and *Gioconda*.

On February 20, 1937 she made her radio debut. And fame came shortly after in 1938, when she made her first recordings for Romanian Society of Radio. On 24<sup>th</sup> September 1938, the stage of *Alhambra Theatre of Varieties* presented the debut of Maria Tănase as an actress - *with artistic and musical talents* – in *Alhambra’s Constellation*. These recordings were destroyed in 1940 by the anti-Semitic Iron Guard.

The radiophonic debut in the radio show *Ora Satului (The Village Hour)* (20<sup>th</sup> February 1938), accompanied by *Ion Matache* folk band, represented the beginning of a brilliant artistic career both in the country and abroad.

In December 1943, she sang at the Christmas festivities at the Royal Cavalry Regiment, where King Michael I of Romania, Ion Antonescu, Mihai Antonescu and all the members of the government were present as guests. After World War II, she performed in the *Review Ensemble* and the *Satirical and Musical Theatre Constantin Tănase*.

As an exceptional singer and extremely natural actress, Maria Tănase has remained inimitable. The diplomat and writer Valentin Lipatti wrote about her fascinating figure: “she had big hypnotizing eyes and a youthful slim body. Her entire appearance resembled a mythological salamander, emerged from a half-pagan Romanian fairy tale”.

### III-Her Concert tours in Europe

Naturally the remarkable fame which she had gained caused lots of concert tours in different corners of the world.

She represented Romania at the International Exhibition in Paris in 1937, and had a well deserved international success as representative of the Romanian song at the Paris World’s Fair. She was appointed to represent the Romanian folk song at the Universal Exhibition in New York (May 1939).

Also she had tours many times in the last 15 years of her life, including over forty trips to New York City.

### IV-Turkey Visit of Maria Tănase

After she had toured Italy, and visited in Rome and Milan, then, in March 1941, she went on tours to Turkey. Her first performance in an Oriental artistic tour was in Turkey where she performed in *Melody Revue* and *Cocktail Revue* on the stage of the *Taksim Gazinosu Summer Theatre* in Istanbul and Ankara. After two months of shows, the Mayor of Istanbul recognized Maria Tănase as “an hon-
She learned songs in Turkish and returned from Turkey with the promise of receiving a job as a researcher at the Ethnographic Institute in Istanbul.  

Maria Tănase appeared in Maksim in the evening of March 28, 1941. Turkish people knew the singer from her records and the Bucharest Radio. Therefore her appearance in Maksim made such a great sensation as that of Safiye and Mualla who were famous Turkish singers of the time. On the night of her performance, Faruk Yenik, a reporter of Vatan Newspaper made an interview with the singer. This interview was published in March 29, 1941 dated issue of Vatan Newspaper under the title “Gece Hayatımdan Röportajlar” (Interviews from our Nightlife) and the subtitle “Türkçe Şarkılar Söylenen Romanyalı sanatçı; “Altı” yı “Altı” Deren Deme İnsan Yabancı Olduğunu Anlamayacak...” (The Romanian Singer Singing Turkish Songs; Hard to Tell She is Not Turkish If She Did Not Say “Altı” for “Altı”...”). Yenik introduced her as an admirer of Turkish songs and Turkish music and a jest master who will be a model for Turkish singers. In the interview, Maria Tănase states that

“I am enamored of Turkish music. It is rich in the melody found in the Balkan music. The harmony of old Turkish songs builds up the harmony of today’s Balkan music.

I wish I could listen to the Turkish songs from the folks, especially old folk songs I have been listening on my radio for years now.

I can give an example to show my interest in Turkish folk music.

In my hometown, I used to go to Dobrudja at old times and listen to the Turkish songs especially of those living in Balçık town.

As the time passed by, I could sing those songs with them; I am very fond of all folk music. Every country folk are a poet at the same time, and not even the greatest poets and composers can compete with their compositions and lyrics.

I used to search for 100-150 year old Romanian folk songs and sing them on the radio. I searched for similar songs in Istanbul too.

Tănase who stated that she listens to the Turkish singers such as Safiye and Mualla expressed that “it is my first time in Turkey. You have a very nice country. I cannot help singing here.”

Maria Tănase was taught Turkish songs by Şevket Bey in Turkey. And at her night performance she sang a Rumelian song “Şahane Gözler Şahane” and

an Ankara- Şerefli Koç Hisar song “Dağda Davar Güderim”. According to Şevket Bey, Tănase had an aptitude for learning Turkish language.\(^5\)

**Contribution to World and Romanian Music**

Her deep, rich voice has become immortalized in the distinguished contribution she has made to the Romanian folk tradition. Tănase’s powerful performing style, with its unique vocal timbre and sense of melodrama, enabled her to reflect the urban cosmopolitan culture of a Bucharest, in which the 30s and 40s people called the “Paris of the East”.

In her life’s work, Tănase gave the Romanian folk tradition an extended and more contemporary lease of life. This, together with her enormous personal appeal, lead to her becoming a revered idol of the Romanian people.

Throughout her career, Maria Tănase was dubbed as the “Nightingale”, “Skylark”, “Evening star”, “Ambassador of our folk song”, “Queen of the Romanian Tango”, “Star”, “Princess of the Romanian lyrical feelings and of the Romanian song” or “Maria of songs” and “Magic Bird”.

Because of the Second World War, the iron curtain, her early death, and for much more reasons there are many reasons to account for the fact that only insiders on the other side of the Balkans were not aware of Maria Tănase until the end of the Nineties.

But Maria Tănase is by no means an inexplicable phenomenon. Her voice undoubtedly has got the depth and emotional power of an Edith Piaf, of an Amalia Rodrigues, of an Om Kalsoum (Ümmü Gülsüm), and also she has the ability distinguishing great singers from good singers: to share her emotions with her audience.

Especially at the hard and unbearable times of second world war, her music had great and positive effect on people who endeavoured to live.

**V-Death of Maria Tănase**

For her artistic merits, Maria Tănase was awarded the *State Prize* (1955), the title of *Emeritus Artist* (1957) and the *Grand Prix du Disque* given by “Charles Cros” Academy of Paris (post-mortem, 1965). The radio, television, electrecord and the cinematography sustained the fulminant artistic career of Maria Tănase by recording more than 120 folk songs, adaptations of the folk music, love songs, variety couplets and compositions of Romanian pop music, interviews, shows and filmed scenes. And, the musical repertoire of Maria Tănase was much wider to-

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5] Vatan Newspaper, 29-03-1941 -Reporter Faruk Yenik, p.3.
talizing almost 400 songs from all Romanian regions, to which we can add the songs in French and Turkish and the variety of couplets and the compositions dedicated to the great artist by the famous Romanian folk music composers.

In 1963 she was hospitalized to the Hospital in Bucharest with a diagnosis of lung cancer. She made her will for the posterity under the title of “The woman, if” verse immortalized in the manuscript page. She had her last concert at Hunedoara, on 1st May 1963. She died on 22 June 1963 in Bucharest at the age of 50.

Thousands of people participated to her funeral. Thousands of workers left their factories all of them wanted to accompany the singer to her final resting place. In “Frica mi-e ca mor a moina”, Tănase sings about the fear of being forgotten by one’s lover after death. This was not something that has come true: her fellow Romanians never forgot her courageous commitment to the persecuted.

Since Maria Tănase’s birth, a complex and representative artist of the Romanian musical culture and spirituality, she is a genius singer of the Romanian genuine folk music, according to some musicologists. Between 1953 and 1961 she recorded 24 albums, 4 of them were in French. Her repertoire was consisted of 400 songs from all the regions of the country: “Sour grapes”, “I have a lover in Mizil”, “I loved and I will further love”, “ Last night I got you a scarf”, “Last night the wind was blowing”, “I would sigh to let the fire out”, “I dreamed of you last night”, “Dear, from our love”, “Old age , heavy clothes”, “Rosy wine is good”, “My wine flask”, “World, world”.

I wish that number of people, who try to discover the inner beauty of human beings like Maria Tănase, would increase and also I hope that in coming centuries countries will make investments not for war industry but for music instruments for belonging different cultures. “Especially Turkish and Romanian music”

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6] For detailed information; Maria Roșca, Maria Tănase, București 1988.
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Romen singer Maria Tănase who sings Turkish songs
THE CRIMEAN TATARS THAT MIGRATED TO TURKEY FROM ROMANIA

Arzu Kılınç*

Introduction

Romania, located in the north of the Balkan Peninsula, had a strategic and economic significance throughout the history due to ports she had along the Black Sea and the Danubian River forming part of its borders. Towards the end of 14th century, the region, following the establishment of Ottoman domination was named Eflak and awarded relative sovereignty. Independent Romania was established with the Berlin Treaty (1878) signed after the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War. According to the articles of the treaty, Bucak (Bessarabia) was left to the Russians in return for keeping a part of Dobrudja (Dobrogea). In 1913, with the Bucharest Treaty signed after the Balkan War II, Silistra and the entire Dobrudja came under Romanian sovereignty.

North Dobrudja consists of provinces and towns of Mecidiye (Megidia), Köstence (Constanta), Boğazköy (Cernavoda), Mangalya, Karaömer (Negru Voda), Tulça (Tulcea), Babadağ (Babadag)1 and Maçin (Macin)2. Large settlements with a high amount of population in South Dobrudja, which is located along the Bulgarian borders, are Hacıoğlu, Pazarcık (Dobrich), Silistre, Tutrakan, Balçık and Kavarna. Since this region forms the shortest route from the Russian and Ukranian steppes to Istanbul and to the Aegean region, it has become the passing ground of many tribes. The Ottomans, for this reason, have also made use of Dobrudja as a military base and passageway. 3

Turkish and Tatar Elements Inhabited in Dobrudja

Aside from the dominant Romanian population, Tatars and Turks also lived in Romania as Muslim minorities who owed their existence in the country

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1] Babadağ is the location where the Ottoman army and Crimean forces spent the winter during the Ottoman-Russian Wars between 1768-1774. Yaşar Yücel-Ali Sevim, Türkiye Tarihi IV Osmanlı Dönemi (1730-1861), Ankara, 1992, p. 48-50.
to the Turkish armies coming to Dobrudja during 14th and 15th centuries. However, a Muslim religious life in its maturity only emerged after the 16th century when the Ottomans brought and inhabited certain communities in Dobrudja. As a consequence of Ottoman inhabiting policy, majority of Dobrudjan population consisted of Muslims. Still, in northern Dobrudja, there were cities like Maçin, Karaharmanlık, Esterbend of which majority of the population were Christians. Also there were people of Bulgarian, Romanian, German, Greek and Italian origin. Turks and Tatars lived also in Bulgarian inhabited regions. Muslim gypsies and Circassian people who were settled here after the Russian occupation North Caucasus, also lived here.

The growth of Russian military and navy during the reign of Peter I and Russian military enterprises towards the south caused a military confrontation with the Ottomans. Ensuing battles compelled the local populace to leave their native countries, of which Crimea was an example. With the Küçük Kaynarca Treaty (1774), signed after 1768-1774 Ottoman-Russian War, Crimean Peninsula was disannexed from the Ottoman sovereignty and together with Tarman Peninsula and Kuban region came under the Russian rule. Crimean Tatars who lost their lands began to leave their countries.

A group of the immigrants moved as far as Dobrudja via Bucak and some disembarked at Turkish ports such as Istanbul, Sinop, and Zonguldak.

During the Ottoman-Russian war of 1828-1829, some Rumelian tribute-paying people were also moved to Eflak-Bogdan (Moldovia-Wallachia), Kâlas, İsmail (İzmail), Bucak and Hocabey (Odessa). In 1829, the Nogays in Bessarabia immigrated to Dobrudja as well.

According to the archival documents from 1846, Tatars were living and paying their taxes to the Ottoman State in 58 villages in Babadağ, Maçin, Hirsova (Hârşova) and Köstence townships which were within the Silistra province.

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Muslim and 2762 Non-Muslim households. It is also known that during the 1890s, the names of more than 200 villages in Dobrudja were Turkish.

The Crimean War (1853-1856) caused the native people of Crimea to emigrate from their countries once again. After the war, the Crimean Tatars were densely living in the Dobrudja region in the cities of Köstence and Mecidiye and also in Silistre and Varna in modern Bulgaria.

It is argued that during the years of 1856-1860, nearly 100,000 of the Crimean Tatars that immigrated from the Tavrida province which included Crimea peninsula moved to Dobrudja. This region was even called “Tatarian Dobrudja” at that time and in 1866 the population of Dobrudja increased to approximately 240,000.

The documents in the Ottoman Archives of the Prime Ministry confirms the numbers given by the researchers, the immigrant convoys were indeed very crowded. The government inhabited the Crimean immigrants in the Balkans, Thrace and Anatolia. Still, the preferences of the immigrants were not overlooked and they were also inhabited where they wished to go. For instance, 92 people who were originally sent to İstanbul stated that they wished to live with their countrymen who settled at Balçık and were shipped to the destinations they had chosen. In another document we can see 313 persons who had immigrated to İstanbul together and were sent to Batıova in Dobrudja via Varna and were inhabited there.

For this reason, it was decided that Crimean immigrants should not be brought to Istanbul but should be taken directly to the ports of Varna, Köstence and Balçık. Around the same time, Silistre governorship wrote to Köstence that 774 people from 205 households of Taman region were transported to be inhabited in Dobrudja and then after communicating with the government, 701 people were sent to Pazarcık near their relatives.

In the second half of the 19th century, there were people as well who didn’t want to relocate to Bursa where immigrants from Rumelia and Caucasia were

14 Müstecib Ülküsal, Dobruca’dan, p. 38.
abundant. 42 people from 8 households of Nogay immigrants petitioned that they wished to settle in Köstence and Dobrudja and the Immigration Office was informed to fund their transportation.19

**Supporting the Immigrants**

The Ottoman government, taking into consideration the needs of the immigrants, housed and supported them in finding accommodation. Ottoman officials had applied for 500 tents for the use of the immigrants. In order to supply the immigrants with tents as soon as possible, the Ottoman central administration preferred to raise freight allowance and send the tents with an English ship. It was also decided that immigrants should be supplied with clothing.20 The Ottomans also began with the construction of a public bath in Mecidiye and that six craftsmen were to the town sent for this purpose.21 Some parts of the Said Pasha Farm was allocated for accommodating the immigrants.22 It was also planned to supply clothing for the immigrants in the province.23

After the Crimean War (1853-1856), railway construction was started in Köstence.24 The transportation and other expenses of immigrants were undertaken by the Ottoman government and waterways were also used for transportation.25

The immigrants were compelled to leave behind or undersell their properties. In addition, they stated in their memories that they already lost their welfare due to obligatory charges such as passport fees, porters, ship fees, etc. There was also a quite significant number of people who, stating their imperious conditions, requested financial support from the Ottoman State. For example, in 1859, nine people from Bahçesaray who were to be settled in Mecidiye expressed that they had no money because they had to abandon their belongings and appealed to the government to take care of their travel expenses.26 Kurt Polat, Seyyid Halil, İbrahim and Abdülkerim Efendi, apparently Muslim scholars who travelled to İs-

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22] BOA, A. MKT. MHM 384/57, 10. S. 1284/ 13.06.1867 .
23] BOA, A. }MKT. MHM 301 / 16, 18. Z. 1280 / 24. 05. 1864.
26] BOA, A.MKT. MHM 161 / 51, 02. m. 1276 / 01. 08. 1859; A. MKT. DV, 145/19, 06. R. 1276/ 02.11. 1859.
tanbul from the city of Akmescid (Simferopol) earlier, asked for travel allowances and shipping fares to reach Mecidiye.  

Immigrants were inhabited in the recently or newly built Turkish or Tatar villages. The town Mecidiye was an important commercial center established in the era of Sultan Abdülmecid (1839-1861) for housing of Crimean immigrants in Dobrudja. The Sultan closely examined the Danubian and the surrounding provinces in his Rumelian trip in 1846. The fair in Mecidiye was different from the fairs of Europa in that here not only local products but also goods brought via Danube river were also sold and bought. In order to enlarge the fair which opened twice yearly and to build a number of shops, the Ottoman government decided to sell some land in the area. Throughout this period the district of Mecidiye was under the jurisdiction of the local government in Köstence. After the war some immigrant groups, although transported to Istanbul originally, petitioned to be located in Mecidiye after arriving in Istanbul. For instance, in 1860, 1332 people from 338 households from Akmescid (Simferopol) were sent to Mecidiye. These people, who had related in the city, petitioned to be located within the same district of the town. From a reminder written to the governor of Silistre, one can deduct that 953 people from 250 households of Crimean immigrants have been sent to Mecidiye to be inhabited along with their relatives who were sent there earlier. The abundance of such petitions might have stemmed from the desire of immigrants to live together with their fellow citizens. Also the geographical position of Romania was very suitable for the immigrants to reach their abandoned homes by land travel. Some might be thinking as well of reaching and communicating with their relatives and to bring together separated families via land.

However, the epidemics following the war emerged here as well and made the already poor conditions worse. Malaria and fever diseases broke out in Mecidiye; the Ottoman government sent doctors to Köstence and Tulça as a precaution to prevent the spreading of cholera. Because of the epidemic in Köstence,
governor’s quarters were evacuated and people were moved to tents.35

In a time when public insurance was not yet developed and damages were not being indemnified, the government helped and took care of the civilians. For instance, when a ship carrying the Crimean immigrants ran aground in Hızır İlyas (Sfântu Gheorge) straits and all belongings of the immigrants were lost, all government employees in Tulça and the public tried to help.36

When the number of immigrants coming to Varna and Köstençe vicinities surpassed 60.000, these were sent in groups to and housed in Vidin, Niş (Nis), Sofya (Sofia), Kosova, İştip (Shtip) and Rahova. Since next incomers were to be housed in Niğbolu (Nikopol), Ziştovi (Sistov), Rusçuk (Ruse), Silistre, Derince, Tulça and İslimye (Sliven) Balkans, a letter was written for the Ministry of Education in order to have the situation declared in newspapers.37

While the western borders of the Ottoman Empire was swarming with immigrants, Caucasia in the east of Anatolia was invaded by the Russians. From then onwards, Circassians and other Caucasian people were forced to leave their countries. Some of the Circassians who were able to reach Ottoman lands were inhabited in the Balkans.

**Ottoman works of art in Dobrudja**

The Ottoman government continued its investments in the Balkans in the second half of the 19th century even though it suffered from economic difficulties. During the reign of Sultan Abdülmecid while immigrations continued, a number of religious institutions were renovated. For instance, the ruined mosque in Köstençe was decided to be renovated.38 The Hünkar Mosque in central Köstençe was built by his brother Sultan Abdülaziz (1861-1876).38 These efforts continued from 1861 to 1870 with some religious buildings such as the small mosques of Anadolköy (Ana Dolchoi) and Babadağ.

The small mosque built in Tulça region, Esmahan Sultan Mosque built in Mangalia in 1590, Hamzaça (Amzacea) Mosque (1673) were already in use. Also in 108 Muslim graveyards, there are tombstones that have historical and artistic values.39

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Religious structures such as the masjid constructed in Tulça in 1522, Esmahan Sultan Mosque constructed in Mangalia in 1590 and Amzacea Mosque (1673) were already in service. In addition, there are grave stones of historical and artistic value in 108 graveyards owned by Muslims.40

When Romania was free of Ottoman rule, Roman architect Stephanieu built a new mosque instead of Sultan Mahmud I Mosque in Köstence, since Muslims were still residing in the region. Sultan Mecid Mosque is one of the largest two mosques in Dobrudja, the other being Tulça Aziziye Mosque. 41

**Education Institutions for Muslims in Romania**

In 1864, Dobrudja was affiliated here by Tuna province42 commission. A letter dated 1875, addressing the Tuna province, shows that certain children coming from Kazgan sub-district and Köstence were educated in the Galatasaray High School in İstanbul. Expenses of these students were undertaken by the Ottoman treasury and five Ottoman golds were posted in exchange for annual school and clothing expenses of four students.43

Between 1879 and 1913 there were three types of Muslim education institutions in Dobrudja. These were primary schools, middle schools and madrasahs. The Muslim community in Romania grew larger until Romania granted Dobrudja, which it had acquired in 1913, to Bulgaria in line with the Craiova agreement in 1940.44

Families of good economic standing sent their children to İstanbul in the era of Abdülhamid II for education in privileged madrasahs or high schools. Hoca Numan Efendi, who was of Crimean descendant and carried duties of teaching and directorship in Davud Paşa High School, registered most children incoming from Dobrudja to his school. Some of these children did not return after graduation and settled in Turkey. Therefore, education in Turkey became a reason for immigration.45

During the Ottoman era, Romanian Turks were trained in madrasahs in Köstence, Mecidiye, Babadağ and Tulça and even in high schools and kid schools in smaller residences, in Turkish. However, due to later restrictions imposed by

the Romanian state and immigrations, all but one of these schools closed down during the years of WWI. The only school still functioning was the Muslim Seminar which was ordered for construction by Mahmud II in Babadağ and transferred to Mecidiye in 1901. When Hamdullah Subhi was appointed as an ambassador to Romania in 1935, he spent considerable effort to transform this institution into an important educational center. This school, with its graduates, fulfilled the religious officer and teacher requirements of the Turkish minority for long years. Mecidiye Madrasah, which can be regarded as a high education institution, was decommissioned in 1965.

**Immigrants inhabited in Thrace**

The Ottoman government decided to settle down a part of the Crimean immigrants within Thrace peninsula. The Crimean immigrants incoming during those years were placed in Gallipoli along with Edirne, and Biga, Karasi and İzmit in Anatolia.

A document explaining that the community, which migrated from Dobrudja to Edirne, was in need of support exhibits the difficult conditions in these journeys. 785 people from 85 households were sent to Tekfurdağı.

With the foundation of independent Romania with the Berlin Treaty (1878) signed after the 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian War, also known as 93 War, immigration wave towards Turkey continued.

After the evacuation of Dobrudja, funds were allocated to cover the rents of the immigrants. For the small populated families this was 30 kuruş and for bigger families it was 40 kuruş.

İzzettin Village, which is affiliated to Çatalca today, was established by the Crimean Tatars who migrated in 1860. While traditions are mostly forgotten in the village today, Crimean Tatar Turkish is spoken in daily life.

Filifoz Farm, which was owned by Sultan Abdülhamid II, in Çatalca, was

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49] BOA, MVL 298/64, 21.Ş.1272/ 27.04.1856.


51] BOA, İ. MMS, 57/2654, 07. N. 1297/10.05.1880.

spared for housing immigrants. 40 households of Dobrudja immigrants were placed in this farm.\textsuperscript{53}

\textbf{Migrations After Romanian Independency}

Kemal Karpat reports that after 1877-78 War, and especially in 1883, approximately 90,000 Turkish and Tatar people immigrated to Turkey and Bulgaria.\textsuperscript{54} Population of Dobrudja, which was approximately 250,000 before joining Romania, decreased to 107,000 in 1886, and decreasing population due to the Muslim immigration could not be replaced.\textsuperscript{55} In this period, Turkish people living in urban areas moved to villages in order to evade census and vaccination procedures. The agricultural laws in 1882 and legal regulations in 1885 resulted in Turkish people leaving Dobrudja.\textsuperscript{56}

This time the problem was the real estate that the immigrants owned in Dobruca. There are many petition letters submitted to the Foreign Affairs concerning this situation.\textsuperscript{57} Certain attempts were made due to complaints that the Romanian government was raising difficulties in sales of fields that are under Muslim possession.\textsuperscript{58} Around the same period, 70 houses were constructed with assistance of benevolent Turkish citizens in Antalya, for Tuna immigrants coming to Turkey. This newly established quarter was called “Kırımli” (Crimean).\textsuperscript{59}

In addition, the starvation which emerged due to the famine affecting Romania in 1899 was also a reason of immigration.\textsuperscript{60}

In the 19th century, railway connection to Eskişehir\textsuperscript{61} made it easier to transfer and house Rumelian and Russian immigrants into this location. Romanian immigrants were also settled in Eskişehir. The out-of-town neighborhood consisting of immigrants was named “Mamure”.\textsuperscript{62} Another evidence of mass migrations in the period is a will dated 1893, showing that ships incoming from

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{53} BOA, Y. MTV 3/103, 08. C. 1297 / 10. 05. 1880.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Kemal Karpat, \textit{ibidem}, p. 484.
\item \textsuperscript{56} Mehmet Naci Önal, “Romanya Türklerine Bakış”, \textit{Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları}, Nr. 93, 1996, p. 181.
\item \textsuperscript{57} BOA, HR. HMŞ. İŞO 164/43, 08. Ca.1299 /28. 03. 1882.
\item \textsuperscript{58} BOA, HR. HMŞ. İŞO 163/30, 28. Ş.1296/ 17.08. 1879
\item \textsuperscript{59} BOA, DH. MKT. 1385/103, 22. Ra. 1304 / 19. 12. 1886.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Müstecib Ülküsal, \textit{Dobruca ve Türkler}, Ankara, 1966, p. 27.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Immigrants from Russia were also placed in Eskişehir beside Balkan immigrants.
\item \textsuperscript{62} BOA, İ. DAH. 1209/ 13, 17. Ca.1310/07.12.1892.
\end{itemize}
Romania were to be taken under quarantine against the possibility of cholera. A group of Kazan immigrants, who first settled in Romania and then migrated to Turkey, were placed at the vicinity of Manyas Lake in Bandırma. Consisting of approximately 61 households, these immigrants requested State assistance, stating that they were not able to pay taxes for the reed and canes they were to use for the construction of their cottages. Another convoy consisting of Kazan and Romanian immigrants were transferred to Ankara province in 1900.

Sakarya (Tırnaksız), a village affiliated to Polatlı in Ankara, was established in 1908 by Crimean Tatars who first migrated from Kerch, Crimea, to Romania and Bulgaria, and then to Turkey. Due to recent partial immigration of villagers to Polatlı, Ankara and Eskişehir, 90 households of Crimean Tatars are left in this village.

Adakale immigrants were placed at the centrum of Teke district, which was affiliated to Konya province. Their newly established quarter was named “Süleymaniyе”.

The Wallachians, who came to Istanbul from Romania over Köstence were not allowed to settle and ordered to return to their original locations.

After the Turks were defeated in the Balkan War during 1912-1913, the Turkish and Muslim population living in this land was compelled to migrate to Turkey. The Crimean Tatars in the Balkans had to migrate twice in order to find themselves a homeland. The number of Turks and Tatars living in Dobruca in 1913 was 208,666. Romania stayed neutral at the beginning of the World War I (1914-1918), but then engaged in 1916. There were many people intending to acquire Ottoman citizenship in these years of hardship. A research was made on Numan b. Mustafa, who was of Crimean descent and residing in Romania, and escaped to Istanbul declaration of war. During the period, although Romania did not engage in the war, north vicinity of the Black Sea was a war zone due to Russian participation in the war.

65] Nevzat Özkan, ibidem., p. 546.
66] BOA, İ. HUS. 126, 29. Ş. 1325/07.11.1907.
67] Referred to as “Wallach Coptic People” in the documents, these people might be gypsies.
Crimean immigrants were largely housed in Anatolia, at the vicinity of Eskişehir. A document, which shows that 51 households from Hoca Murad Efendi group were to be placed in a quarter named “Kalkanlar” in Eskişehir, or to another suitable location, proves this matter.\(^{71}\) Emigration of Romanian immigrants to Eskişehir continued during the first quarter of 20th century. Haliloğlu Tahir and his wife, who were immigrants of Cobadin village in Köstence and resided in Hamidiye quarter, Eskişehir, were trying to change their nationalities. They were waiting for acceptance of Hacı Ahmet b. Emrullah, who immigrated from Mecidiye and resided in the same location, for Ottoman nationality.\(^{72}\) Again, no misconduct was found on Mehmed b. Ahmed, who came to Eskişehir for housing.\(^{73}\) It was reported that Feyzullah, son of Halil, who resided in Yenimahalle quarter, Eskişehir, was registered in the civil register of Hüdavendigâr province.\(^{74}\)

**Immigrations from Romania in the Republic Era**

In 1918, it was decided in Romania that owned lands over the size of 100,000 hectares be expropriated and distributed to villagers in need. The law being made effective as of 17 July 1921 and another expropriation law enacted in Dobrudja in 1924 would cause the Turkish population to immigrate from the country.\(^{75}\)

There is certain evidence that immigrations continued from the vicinity of Romania during the National War of Independence (1919-1922) when Turkey was under attacks. These are related to the precautions taken against contagious diseases, because cholera was encountered in Bucharest and some towns in Romania. The decision was that the Romanian immigrants who came by sea be vaccinated in Kavak quarantine station, immigrants who came overland be vaccinated in Sirkeci station by cholera vaccine by quarantine doctors and that people suspected of disease to be kept under custody.\(^{76}\)

After the Turkish Republic was established in 1923, it started to join the World’s common security organizations and signed a certain string of treaties with its Western and Eastern neighbors. One of these treaties was the Balkan Entente, which was signed between Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania on

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9 February 1934. In this period, Balkan countries were going through domestic turbulences due to their weak economies and authoritarian regimes established between the two wars.\textsuperscript{77} Since Romania was the most-expanded country after WWI, its relations with its land-losing neighbors became tense. In this period the Villagers’ Party was ruling and after a land reform, the villagers were distributed lands. Between the years 1922-1928 the country was ruled by the Liberal Party, but then again the Villagers’ Party re-ruled between 1928-1930. Romania was left in political instability and economic turbulence between 1930 and 1933.\textsuperscript{78} The effects of the American economic crisis, which started in 1929, had already unsettled Europe.

A Turkish-Romanian immigration agreement was signed in Bucharest on 4 September 1936 in order to regulate the mass migrations from Romania to Turkey. The agreement was approved by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on 25 January 1937 and made effective on 2 February 1937 by publication in the Official Gazette.\textsuperscript{79}

After this immigration agreement, Turks had to suffer losses since they had to sell their properties in very short time and were taken advantage of by buyers, resulting in very low sale prices for their large and productive, private-registered lands. Few people were able to collect certain amounts of money but most of them were compelled to migrate, their lands in Romania (now in Bulgaria) being seized without any payment. Under these circumstances, Turkish immigration was inevitable.\textsuperscript{80}

A total of 113,720 people migrated from Romania to Turkey between the years 1923-1938, during Atatürk’s era. 20,692 people migrated after the agreement was signed. These immigrants were placed in the provinces Tokat, Çorum, Bilecik, Içel, Aydın, Muğla, Isparta, Burdur, Manisa, Denizli, Antalya, Balıkesir, İzmir, Elazığ, Van, Muş, Diyarbakır, Ağrı, Kars and Sivas. The Turkish government commissioned representatives consisting of congressmen and legal experts in 1937 and 1938 in Romania in order to enforce and follow-up the immigration agreement and fill in duties in immigration commissions. Immigrations of Ro-


\textsuperscript{79} Ömer Metin, “Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver’in Romanya Türklerinin Göçüne Dair Faaliyetleri (1931-1938)”, Karadeniz Araştırmaları, Fall 2012, Nr. 35, p. 139.

Romanian Turks were meticulously followed up and in 1937 13,110 immigrant Romanian Turks, and in 1938 8,832 were housed in various places within Turkey.\textsuperscript{81}

Another study expresses that between 1930 and 1938, 46,305 Turks and 5,554 Tatars left Romania. According to official census in 1930, the population in Romania with Turkish mother tongue totaled 287,000. The ratio of this population to country population was 1.6%. Ethnically the number 280,000 was reached and the ratio to general population was 1.7%.\textsuperscript{82}

In his details, Kemal Karpat expresses that majority of the population residing in the villages around İşakça consists of Anatolian-descendant Qizilbash people, and that these people migrated to Turkey between the years 1932 and 1937.\textsuperscript{83}

Between 1934-1935 a total of 81,000 emigrants entered Turkey from the Balkans (namely Romania and Yugoslavia). Majority of Romanian emigrants migrated to Bulgaria, which was within Romanian borders at the time. Approximately 67,000 emigrants, which constituted more than 80% of the total, were placed in Thracian provinces and Çanakkale and the remaining, in Anatolian locations.\textsuperscript{84}

When Romania left South Dobrudja to Bulgaria in 1939, approximately 10,000 of the Turks remaining here immigrated to Turkey.\textsuperscript{85} According to data acquired from Romanian census in 1948, it was determined that 52,000 Turks immigrated to Turkey from north Dobrudja between 1936-1941.\textsuperscript{86}

Romania signed another agreement, with Germany, on 22 October 1940 for the purpose of discharging the Germanic population living in its land.\textsuperscript{87}

According to data from the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, it is estimated that a total of 870,000 immigrants, of which 400,000 was from Greece, 225,000 from Bulgaria, 120,000 from Yugoslavia, 120,000 from Romania and 10,000 from other countries, entered Turkey during the republic era.\textsuperscript{88}

According to Cevat Geray, the number of people who ‘took refuge’ in Tur-

\begin{itemize}
\item [*] Ömer Metin, \textit{ibidem}, p. 139.
\item [*] Kemal Karpat, \textit{ibidem}, p. 484.
\item [*] İlhan Oğuz Akdemir -Bekir Yüksek Hoş, \textit{ibidem}, p. 339.
\item [*] Akile Gürsoy, “Göç”, \textit{Üç Kuşak Cumhuriyet}, İstanbul, 1998, p. 64.
\end{itemize}
key as ‘immigrants’ and ‘refugees’ between 1923-1960 was 1,204,205. The number of Romanian immigrants was 121,035 and they constitute 10% of the total immigrants. It is understood from this information, that approximately 120,000 people, known as Romanian immigrants, immigrated to Turkey during the republic era. Part of these people lived in the Bulgarian land where belonged to Romania at the time.

**Conclusion**

1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War resulted in establishment of nation-states in the Balkans, such as Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, etc. Grandchildren of these people, who were placed here as part of the Ottoman housing policy, had to leave their homelands and all their properties and emigrate, after this war and the Balkan War.

It is certain that a human tragedy happened at the north of the Black Sea, in the Balkans and in Caucasus in the second half of the 19th century, after the Czarist Russia reached south.

Good relations were re-formed with the Western world after establishment of Republic of Turkey. In this framework, Turkey warmly welcomed immigration of Muslims living in Romania, and even encouraged them to move. It should be expressed that in this choice, unity of religion was just as determinant as unity of lineage. Because, the Christian Gagauz people did not take place among the immigrant. Though much lesser in number, today there are still Tatars and Turks in Romania.

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“THE METROPOLITAN OF THE GAGAUZ”:
AMBASSADOR TANRİÖVER AND THE PROBLEM OF
ROMANIA’S CHRISTIAN ORTHODOX TURKS

Dimitris Michalopoulos*

In March, 1943, Zeki Kuneralp, a young Turkish diplomat, reached Bucharest. Romania was then in war in the ranks of the Axis Powers; and she had recovered Bessarabia, that she had been forced, under pressure from Germany, to yield to the Soviet Union in 1940. It was the time of the Antonescu regime; and the Romanian Army was fighting in Russia under very harsh conditions. The Romanians, nonetheless, “not cruel by nature” were still easy going “as their history witnesses”.¹

The Turkish legation at Bucharest was headed by Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver (1885-1966) at that time.² He was one of the most important figures of the Turkish National Revolution, and accordingly he had the personal title of Ambassador.³ He was a personality respected in Bucharest: everything he used to say was weighed attentively and registered.⁴ Further, he was a great orator, and even his telegrams to the Foreign Ministry of Turkey were couched in a literary, lively and colourful wording; as a result, the telegraph costs were considerably increased and enciphering was time-consuming.⁵

Still, that was not the unique characteristic of Tanrıöver; for he was so interested in the Gagauz as to be nicknamed by the staff of the Bucharest Turkish legation “the Metropolitan of the Gagauz”. In point of fact, he speedily emerged as the protector of the Gagauz, who under his patronizing umbrella literally “invaded” the Turkish legation.⁶ All the servants of the legation were Gagauz. They proved to be a “harmless and amiable” people.⁷ Tanrıöver, therefore, sent a number of them

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2] Ibidem, p. 22.
to Turkey; for he wished them to settle there. Yet his efforts at their putting down roots in Asia Minor were more or less fruitless. Yet the merit of Tanrıöver (who was the Turkish minister at Bucharest during the years 1931-1944) has been that he went a long way towards having the Gagauz issue emerged on the international scene. The time is ripe therefore to have an attentive look to this important and attractive question.

Gagauz are the Turks of the Balkans who are not Muslims but Christian Orthodox. Their traditional homeland are the regions of Dobruja and Bessarabia, i.e. a considerable segment of Black Sea’s western seashore. In 1939, there were 44,000 Gagauz in Dobruja and 90,000 in Bessarabia. Nowadays, the Republic of Moldova is dwelled by 180,000 Gagauz, viz. the 4% of her total population, whilst 40,000 more are to be found in the south-western edge of the Republic of the Ukraine (that is the 0.08% of latter’s inhabitants). Further, it is some tens of thousands that dwell these days in Bulgarian territory, along the coastline of the Black Sea of course, and some thousands in Macedonia’s Greek part, mainly in the Serres regional unit, around the small market towns of Zihne and Küpköy. Several Gagauz families were located in the eastern part of Thrace, too; yet following the 1923 Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey, they were compelled to emigrate into Greece and nowadays they live in the northern part of the Evros prefecture - mostly in the area of Yeni Karağaç (Nea Orestias). They number several thousands people and constitute the most important Gagauz centre in the Southern Balkans. Yet they are submitted to an accelerated process of “grecization” conducted by the Orthodox Bishopric of Salonica and the university of that same city, as well.

Considering in retrospect the historical events, it is more or less clear that from the eighteenth century onwards the Gagauz were inclined to move from Balkans’ southern regions northwards. No later than the beginning of the twen-

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9] Historikon Archeion tou Hypourgeiou Exōterikōn (= Historical Archive of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs [hereafter: AYE]), 1939-1940, A/7/7, the head-priest Kōnstantinos Mōraitakēs to the Patriarch of Constantinople (copy), Bucharest, October 12, 1939.
12] Ibidem; also local investigation by the author (late in the 1980s and early in the 1990s).
tieth century, one of their major spiritual authorities was the Varna Orthodox Metropolitan;\textsuperscript{15} today, nonetheless, they are subordinated to the jurisdiction either of the Metropolitan of Chişinău in Moldova or of the one of Kiev in Ukraine. Still all of them are very devoted to the Russian Patriarch of Moscow.\textsuperscript{16} In other words, they were inclined to accept the religious influence of Russia; and this very Russian ecclesiastical domination explains their migrations, spanning the three last centuries. For they used to follow the Russian armies and, as a result, they tried to live under the political aegis of the Orthodox Tsar and the spiritual one of the Russian Church.

In order to sum up, it should be stressed that an autonomous status was conceded by the Moldovan Government to the Gagauz in 1994; as a result, the Autonomous Territory of Gagauzia was founded by then.\textsuperscript{17} Gagauzia consists of 3 towns and 23 villages, covers 1,800 km\textsuperscript{2}, and as aforementioned has a population of about 180,000 souls.\textsuperscript{18} Three tongues are spoken there, namely Russian, Gagauzian, i.e. Turkish and Romanian. Unlike the Moldovan Gagauz, nevertheless, the Ukrainian ones have not asked for a special cultural and political status, and so they are not a so to speak “official minority”.

It is noteworthy that the Gagauz unveiled their ethnic self-consciousness thanks to an Orthodox priest among them, namely the reverend Mihail (Mihailovici) Ciachir (1861-1938), who published in 1933, in Chişinău his famous work, \textit{Istoria Găgăuzilor din Basarabia}.\textsuperscript{19} He wrote this very book in the Gagauz Turkish as well: \textit{Besarabilă Gagauzlarân Istorieasă}, and published it, also in Chişinău in 1934.\textsuperscript{20} Still, it was not his unique literary work. For he translated into the Gagauz Turkish the Gospels and the Book of Psalms; and further he wrote an “Ecclesiastical History”, a “History of the Old and New Testament, and some missal “Hymns”.\textsuperscript{21} The “Histories” he compiled are still unpublished – as far as I know, of course. In point of fact (and though the Gagauz are my scientific passion), I could not locate them in any great national library. If they are not actually published, it is a pity, because the literary work of the head-priest Mihail Mihailovici Ciachir

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{15} E. G. Papandreou, entry “Varna” in \textit{Megalē Hellēnikē Enkyklopaideia (= The Great Greek Encyclopaedia)}, vol. VI, Athens 1932, p. 717.
\bibitem{16} N. Louka, « The Gagauz of Moldova and Ukraine », p. 290.
\bibitem{17} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 289.
\bibitem{18} \textit{Ibidem}.
\bibitem{19} AYE, 1939-1940, A/7/7, Kônstantinos Môraitakês to the Patriarch of Constantinople, Bucharest, October 12, 1939.
\bibitem{20} \textit{Ibidem}.
\bibitem{21} \textit{Ibidem}.
\end{thebibliography}
used to be compared to the one achieved by Cyril and Methodius among the Slavs in the Middle Ages.\textsuperscript{22} It is very important, therefore, to have in view the opinion of the head-priest Mihail Mihailovici Ciachir. For, obviously, the most important question concerning this “peaceful, hardworking people”\textsuperscript{23} is the concerning their national/ethnic identity.

First of all, the key point is their tongue. They speak Turkish but with a Russian accent.\textsuperscript{24} Some examples can be actually given: for “grapes” they do not say \emph{üzüm} but \emph{yüzüm};\textsuperscript{25} and for “apple” they say not \emph{elma} but \emph{yelma}.\textsuperscript{26} Yet, “as is to atone for these faults”, they pronounce the Turkish word for lightening, i.e. \emph{yıldırım}, as \emph{ıldırım}.\textsuperscript{27} Perhaps they use the so to speak stereotypic, old Turkic term.

As Zeki Kuneralp had explained, such a spelling is the evidence, in my mind at least, that the sound –\textit{y}- they introduce as a rule before vowels is an acquired linguistic character, legated to them by the Russians, whom they actually regarded from the eighteenth century on as their protectors. For, as aforementioned, one should have always in mind that the Orthodox people of the Sublime Porte used to see in the Russian Emperors their “defenders” against either the Roman Catholics and the Moslems as well.

Another characteristic of the Gagauzian variety of the Turkish tongue is the lack of relative subordinate clauses. Zeki Kuneralp, too, had pointed in the 1940s, they do not say \emph{dün gelen adam} (= the man who came yesterday) but \emph{herif hani dün geldi} (= the guy, you know, he came yesterday).\textsuperscript{28} As far as I can see, this is an impact of their rural situation;\textsuperscript{29} for they avoid the subordinate syntax, i.e. a sophisticated one that suits mainly to highly educated people.

So, what they are? Remnants of the first Turkish tribes that reached Europe or Christian populations that have been assimilated linguistically by the Turks? Needless to say that the second thesis is advanced chiefly by Greek authors.\textsuperscript{30} It is noteworthy, nevertheless, that Mihail Mihailovici Ciachir, notwithstanding his Christian Orthodox priesthood, had whole heartedly sided with the scholars that

\begin{itemize}
\item 22\textsuperscript{[Ibidem. ]}
\item 23\textsuperscript{[Ibidem. ]}
\item 24\textsuperscript{Zeki Kuneralp, \textit{Just a Diplomat}, p. 23.}
\item 25\textsuperscript{Ibidem.}
\item 26\textsuperscript{Ibidem.}
\item 27\textsuperscript{Ibidem.}
\item 28\textsuperscript{Ibidem}
\item 29\textsuperscript{N. Louka, « The Gagauz of Moldova and Ukraine », p. 289.}
\item 30\textsuperscript{See D. N. Alexandrou, \textit{Gkankaouzois…}, passim.}
\end{itemize}
defend the Turkic origin of the Gagauz. According to Ciachir, in fact, the Guzz, the Oghuz and the Turks constitute “one people, one nation”; and this very people is relative, of course, with the Pechenegs and the Cumans (i.e. the well-known Polovtsy).

There are two positive proofs of the above thesis’ correctness:

1. The manners and customs of the Gagauz are mostly Turkish; and it is remarkable that until the late 1930s at least they practised the kurban, according the Turkish way.
2. They actually consider themselves to be Turks from Anatolia (Türk Karamanlı), whilst they regard the Turks dwelling in Anatolia as “Ottoman Turks”.

In short, the opinion of Zeki Kuneralp proves to be true: “When this particular branch of the Turks left Central Asia and migrated towards the West, they encountered on the way not the world of Islam but Christianity, which they accepted and never renounced. They remained [nonetheless] faithful to their language, though under the influence of the surrounding languages they had given it a special colour.”

Summing up all of these, what our conclusions are?

To my mind, the Turkish ethnicity of the Gagauz is irrefutable. Merely the fact that they used to consider themselves as Karamanlılar is the proof. For the Karamanlılar were Turks who, from the sixth century onwards, were reaching the Byzantine territory as mercenaries and were converted to the Greek variety of the Christianity. After the Seljuk Turks conquered Anatolia, they did not embrace Islam, thanks to the tolerance of the Seljuk sovereigns. It is well known that the Karamanlılar deserted their ancestral Anatolia because of the 1923 Compulsory Greco-Turkish Exchange of Populations.

In brief, the histories of the Gagauz and the one of the Karamanlis

31] AYE, 1939-1940, A/7/7, Kōnstantinos Mōraitakēs to the Patriarch of Constantinople, Bucharest, October 12, 1939.
33] Ibidem.
35] Zeki Kuneralp, Just a Diplomat, p. 23.
(Karamanlılar) are parallel to each other. Nonetheless, there is a dissimilarity: unlike the Karamanlis, eager, as a rule, to live among heterodox people, the Gagauz were always stuck to their religion and above all to their Church. They avoided intercourse with the Bulgarians, for instance, and they did not embrace the Bulgarian Exarchate. Historically speaking, they were faithful subjects of the Byzantine Emperors until the fall of the Christian Empire, and after Russia emerged as the successor of the latter, a lot of them abandoned their ancestral lands and emigrated into territories ruled by the Russian Tsars. All of these constitute the evidence of a discrepancy between the Gagauz and the Karamanlis in spite of their religious and ethnic similarity. What is the cause of such a difference?

In my view, the key of the question is to be found in the term “autochthonous” used by Greek diplomats as far as the Gagauz were concerned. Needless to say that the Gagauz are not autochthonous people of the western seashore of the Black Sea. In point of fact, “autochthonous” in Modern Greek has the meaning of “ancient”, “very old”. Since, therefore, the Gagauz were considered by the Greeks to be autochthonous of the Balkans, that means that they migrated in today’s Bulgaria and Romania during the early Middle Ages – likely prior to the foundation of the first Bulgarian statehood in 681 AD. Migrations of this kind were usual in the framework of the Byzantine Empire. Even in the Peloponnese still exist nowadays places named after Turkish chieftains converted to Christianity.

Considered all of these, the Gagauz may be regarded as one of the very first Turkish people who settled in Europe permanently. But this is another question to be approached and studied…

38] Ibidem.
40] Cf. Dion. A. Zakythēnos, Η Ἐποχὴ Ὕπειρας (The Byzantine Empire, 324-1071), Athens 1969, p. 112.
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ADA-KALEH TURKS FRAGMENTS OF HISTORY, CULTURE AND DESTINY

Iulia Cheşcă*

An Argument. Why Ada-Kaleh?
First of all, because when it comes to the small island at the border between East and West, the stories and history (both mythical or real) seem to never end. The strategic importance that the Ada-Kaleh island had over time, because of its location on the Danube, as well as the different forms of cultural manifestation of the Turkish community, further remain in the attention of the historical, sociological, cultural and linguistic researches and so on. In other words, everything written about Ada-Kaleh was never quite enough and therefore, its legend continues1. Secondly, because I was drawn to the subject thanks to my interest on the Romanian-Ottoman/Turkish relations and the cultural interference between Turks and Romanians. Thirdly, because I intend to display some aspects regarding the importance of the island and the daily life of the islanders, based on archive documents and testimonies of the islanders' descendants.

Let’s meet Ada-Kaleh
Geographical position: The island was located right where the Danube River exits its gorge, 3 km below Orsova and 5 km above the Iron Gates (picture no. I). It had a length of 1750 m and a width of 400-500 m2. Although Ada Kale covered a relatively small area and a small population, through its strategic geographical position the island managed to capture the attention of the great empires, which struggled to conquer this strategic point: "Kara Ormandan Balkan ile Bahr-ı Sıyahı muarekeb olan Tuna nehrinin aşağılarından vaki şark ve garb Demir Kapular ve nam-ı diğerler kerdaklar gibi istihkâm-ı tabiyye ve vaziyyet-i mühimme-i kadime ve müdafiyesi evail asarda büyük ve kayi cenk ve masdar olmuşdur."3

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About the name of the island: The geographical position of the island had an important impact on its several name changes, depending on the historical source and the time period: Erythia (on a bas-relief discovered in Cyprus), which translates as “red”, hence deriving the Slavic name later given to the island: Rusova, at first, then Orsova; Pirna/Pirena, as it was mentioned in Latin sources; Carolina, as stated in an Austrian map from 1716; Cinghense Adasi (The Gypsy’s Island) in the “Subhi Tarihi” chronicle (Istanbul, 1793), ascribed to Ahmed Vasif.

Orșova Nouă (Yeni Orsova), as it was mentioned in documents between 1739 and 1788; Ada-Kaleh (The City of the Island), given at the time of first Turkish occupation (1521). This name had a much wider usage after 1788 and since 1878 it became official4.

Archival Sources

The National Archives of Romania: Documents from the ”Ada-Kaleh” archive fund; Craiova County National Archives Service: Documents from the “Manuscripts” collection5.

Documents from Ada-Kaleh Archive Funds: The Archives contain about 4,700 documents, mostly written in Turkish. A small part is written in Hungarian, German, Romanian, French, Serbian or Bulgarian. Most of the documents are dated between 1890-1923, a historical period during which the island was mainly under Turkish occupation6. In their majority, the documents represent the correspondence between the Müdür of Ada Kaleh and the Ottoman consulates in Turnu Severin, Calafat, Craiova, Galati etc, and are mostly travel permits and official paperwork on procurement. Typically, the header of these documents included the title of Müdür-i Aday-ı Kebir (The Governor of the Great Island)7. These documents were usually written in black and shiny ink, similar to that used in drawing, but brown, slightly faded, and violet ink were also quite customary. The Ada-Kaleh Archive describes various social, economic, legal, cultural and lin-


5] The documents issued by the institutions from that time about Ada Kaleh, as well as the Turkish or Western authorities, reveal an ample official correspondence, while the images with the island and its surroundings, and the testimonials of the islanders, highlight the island as a place to express the own cultural identity of the Turks that lived there, namely a place of cultural interference.


guistic features, and also depicts different aspects of the relationship between the islanders and the Balkan populations.

Documents from the “Manuscripts” collection: Three manuscripts written in Turkish, using the Arabic alphabet, with the Rika type writing; Although not explicitly mentioned in the text, it appears that the three manuscripts were written between 1896 and 1902; The manuscripts contain information about on the role played by the island in the Turkish-Austrian wars, concerning the administrative and social matters of the islanders and, likewise, about their cultural life.

About the Political, Administrative and Social Organization of the Islanders

Over the course of time, Ada-Kaleh fell both under Turkish and Austrian administration; The Austrians were ahead in launching a military campaign towards the island, and after defeating the Hungarians at Mohacs (1526), the Ottomans spread their domination over the Iron Gates region for a century and a half. This explains the Turkish origin of the local institutions, although after the fall of Belgrade (1688), the island was once more occupied by the Austrians:

"1718 tarihinde akd edilen ahd-name istihkaminde dahi dahil olduğu halde Eski Orşova'dan Aluta’ya kadar muhted olan arazi Avusturya”8. By the Treaty of Karlowitz, it became, in turn, subject of the Austrian and Turkish occupation, the latter subsequently prevailing. Until the Berlin Treaty in 1878, the island continued to be under dispute between the Turks and the Austrians. From that moment on, Turkey would only bring here civil population, accompanied by civil authorities. Meanwhile, the Austro-Hungarian Empire would keep a permanent garrison on the island.

The Authorities:

Political and Administrative Authorities: The Governor of the Island; the Administrative Council: The City Mayor; The Public Notary. As a specific feature of the Political Administration in Ada Kaleh, the Governor of the island was under Turkish authority, but reported directly to the Turkish Ambassador in Vienna;

Religious Authorities: The Imam (there was a Mosque on the island);

Legal Authorities: The Kadi;

Education Authorities: The School Committee; The Hodja (The School Teacher);

Military Authorities; a gendarmerie post under the authority of the Min-

8] Craiova County National Archives Service, The “Manuscripts” collection, nr. 43, f.3.
istry of War of the Ottoman Empire; at the same time, an Austrian garrison was based on the island (after 1878);

Medical Authorities: a doctor, working in a dispensary.

The Lifestyle of the Islanders
As the residents of Ada-Kaleh were descendants of former Muslim communities, their traditions, customs and folk costume were specific to the Turkish world (picture no. III).

The Household Items: The wealthiest Turks built modern houses on places that were available or located on the city heights, so they would be safe from flood. For instance, the Governor’s house distinguished as more spacious, built of planks, with two levels and several compartments; it was also very clean, with neat, whitewashed walls. Generally, common houses had a floor covered with colorful carpets, and the walls were decorated with rather old paintings that praised the warrior ancestors. In some rooms there were also cages with songbirds, brought from the old Ottoman Empire. In most cases, the houses consisted of two rooms called Selâmlık- for men and Haremlik, where the women of the house found their place, and where, except for the householder, no man could ever enter (the doctor being the only, rare, exception).

The Folk Costume: The Traditional wardrobe of the Ada-Kaleh Turks was similar to that of the other Turkish citizens: women wore a fermene (short fur coat), with an entari (a long coat, a kind of cloak) on top, and also some large, loose, ankle-long Shalvar trousers and slippers decorated with brightly-colored tassels; the old women still covered their faces with the ‘ferâce’ veil, according to the Muslim tradition. At the beginning, men wore military uniforms, then switched to Turkish traditional costume: fezzes in garnet color with black tassels, the “Abava” (a kind of sweater) covered with the Entari, Shalvar trousers fastened with belts and çakşır (a kind of Turkish trousers) and also slippers that they removed whenever entering the house or the Mosque. The clothes were brought from either Bursa, Mosul and Izmir, or made in Ada-Kaleh, from various materials, imported from these areas: aba, cit, bezea, satin, taffeta, cotton, silk. The clothes were woven wider, to ease body movement and were adorned with embroidery or tassels, representing various floral and vegetal patterns or Muslim motifs (the crescent, the lyre or the coffee pot).

Cuisine and Culinary Customs: The islanders’ diet consisted of both vegetables - such as peas, cabbage, rice, and meat – whether cow, goat, sheep, poultry or fish. They were great consumers of cow milk, sheep milk or goat milk, and their favorite fats were oil or fresh butter. The main meals were Turkish-style dishes:
Pilav – traditional rice, pasta, lamb kebabs, meatballs, musakka, eggplant and zucchini casseroles, fried zucchini and eggplants, with a traditional çullama dressing (made of boiled yoghurt and crushed garlic) etc. Great fishermen, like Papa Ilie, had special recipes for preparing fish. Sweet delicacies: baklava, sarailie, pide, halva, Turkish delight, or mixed-berry compote (raisins, nuts, nut kernels, Baclea - a kind of bean, or wheat berries), with sweet and savory taste.

The Population

According to the 1930 census, 455 people lived on the island. In 1937, the number of inhabitants reached 685, of which 365 were men and 320 were women. The flooding of the island, in 1969, displaced about 680 people (living in 168 households).

The Inhabitants’ Professions and Occupations: Being a boatman (kayikçi) was the main occupation on the island. At first, this was coupled with small-scale trade. Timber and other goods were purchased from Transylvania and Hungary and then transported to Tulcea and Sulina. Subsequently, trading became a separate profession, undertaken by people who weren’t boatmen as well. Fisher families were also common on the island, as catching fish ensured subsistence and even a small trade. In 1925 a carpet workshop was established, and later on, in 1927, a workshop for making cigarettes and cigars. There was also a candy shop on the island, a kind of cooperative business, where the ‘Sultan’s Favorite’ Turkish delight was produced (picture no. IV).

Education: In 1909, a modern school was established in Ada-Kaleh, employing three teachers. Studies were both in Turkish and Romanian language; after 1923, 100 students were registered. In 1913 the first library was established on the island, and then demolished during the First World War. In 1939 the library was reestablished in the place of Mehmet Chess Hotel, under the name Demir Kapi.

Traditions around the Major Life Event:

Christening: It was held by the Muslim tradition population and the circumcision practice was part of the custom: the mandatory age of the baptized child was 7 years old and, according to the tradition, the Hodja came to the child’s home, accompanied by a group of elders; the relatives brought gifts, including a ritually-embellished lamb, which was carried through the village by musicians.

Wedding: The Marriage Proposal (evlenmek) was made by a group of older women, and carried on afterwards by three or four men; The religious wedding was

9] Historical National Archives of Romania, Ada-Kaleh archive fund, pachet VI, f. 189: “Nominal table with all Ada-Kaleh residents who have the right to vote” (picture no. V).
held in bride’s house, officiated by a priest (imam kadi) which was accompanied by two vekil (delegates), one of the groom and one of the bride, along with two witnesses; the ritual was held in the presence of all the wedding’s guests. The wedding lasted an entire week, during which, either on Thursday or on Sunday morning, before sunrise, the mother-in-law came to the bride’s home, along with a few women, and covered her head with a towel (veil); wrapped in this scarf, the bride will go to the groom’s house. Later on, the bride’s mother throws a bucket of water behind the bride, in order to bless the marriage. The wedding ended with a small service, held at the gate of the groom’s yard, as he kissed the hand of all the elders, and in the morning after the wedding the “Nigihin mestine” was sang. The official document of marriage was issued by the Hodja, outlining the date, time, place, the names of the newlyweds, their place of origin and the names of the witnesses.

Traditional Celebrations: The Great feasts were Ramazan bairamı and Kurban bairamı. During the month before the Ramazan, the Believers did not eat, drink, smoke and sin until the sunset, as a celebration of ‘fulfilling their duty to Allah’. At times they sang folk melodies like “Ramazan Geldi”. Every year during the Kurban bairamı, islanders accomplished the sheep-sacrificing ritual, and afterwards the meat was offered to the poor, in a celebration accompanied by folk songs such as ‘Bairam gelsin’.

Memories from the island in the testimonies of local populace: In 1967 the construction of a dam at Iron Gate I was announced. At the time, the exodus of 600 inhabitants began and continued up until to the island’s sinking in 1969. Some of the inhabitants left to Turkey, others have settled in Turnu Severin, Constanța and other places in Romania:

- “I am happy and I thank heaven that I’ve lived my childhood and youth in that piece of heaven and I got to know those special people. Ada-Kaleh island was a gift of the Danube whose beauty only few of us still keep in their hearts...” (Gheorghe Bob, Bucharest);

- “Everyone in this world has a home, even if they live far away, they can visit their birthplace whenever they want. We do not have this chance...” (Cafer Ismailoglu, Herculane);

- “The place where the island raised is still quite obvious. I saw a floating willow. And then I understood where it was and I started to cry.“ (Neriman Mehmet, Constanța)11.


Conclusions

The historical significance of Ada-Kaleh faded in face of the economic interests of Romania and Yugoslavia, so that in 1969 the island was evacuated, to make way for the Iron Gate reservoir. At the time, approx. 680 people (168 households) were displaced. The cultural heritage of the island’s inhabitants fell apart. Today only the descendants of the islands’ inhabitants continue to exist, as history and memory-bearers of what once was the Ada-Kaleh.
TURKEY AND ROMANIA

Picture no. I
Image of Ada-Kaleh island

Picture no. II
Craiova County National Archives Service, The “Manuscripts” collection,
Picture no. III
Image of islander Mustafa Bey
Picture no. IV
Image of cooperative business

Picture no. V
Nominal table with all Ada-Kaleh residents who held voting right
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A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON CONSUMER ETHNOCENTRISM IN TURKEY, BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND SANDŽAK

İrfan Akyüz*, Ahmet Tuzcuoğlu**, Emrah Cengiz***

Introduction

The global changes changed consumption habits. As consumption habits changed people had difficulties in accessing the products city people consume in the past because of the developmentss products became limitless. Consumer can access the products easily in stores and products are easily delivered to consumers. As consumers can access foreign made products easily the choices between foreign-made products and domestic products may be different. Consumer choices in choosing domestic products vary from country to country.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the ethnocentrism levels of the consumers in Bosnia&Herzegovina, Sandzak and Turkey, to define the relationships between their ethnocentrism levels and to analyze the demographic variables between them. In this perspective, in order to measure Consumer Ethnocentrism levels CETSCALE (Consumer Ethnocentrism Tendencies Scale) is used which is developed in 1987 by Shimp and Sharma.

In this research, the scale is translated into native languages of each country from English and distributed to the participants. The reason why these countries are included in the survey is that they have historical ties, close geographical position and commercial activities which still exists today. This paper also gives important clues to academics and businesses.

Literature Review

Ethnocentrism as a concept of consumption has been originally used by Terence A. Shimp. “The concept is used here to represent consumers’ beliefs in the superiority of their own country’s products. This perception is postulated to transcend mere economic and functional considerations, and, instead, to have a more noble foundation rooted in morality. That is, consumer ethnocentrism is intended to capture the notion that some consumers believe it is somehow wrong to purchase foreign-made products, because it will hurt the domestic economy,

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cause the loss of jobs, and, in short, because, from their point of view, it is plainly unpatriotic” (Shimp, 1984). Ethnocentric people see the ethnic group as a center of the universe evaluate other social groups with their point of view and reject people from different ethnic groups but adopt people from the same ethnic group culturally.

Consumer ethnocentrism is used in researching the consumer attitudes toward foreign products. Shimp and Sharma defines the concept with these words in 1987. “We use the term “consumer ethnocentrism” to represent the beliefs held by American consumers about the appropriateness, indeed morality, of purchasing foreign-made products”(Shimp and Sharma, 1987).

This concept has become valid with the easy accession of consumers to products and affected consumer choices. So, the academic data on ethnocentrism increased with these developments. Shimp and Sharma started ethnocentrism research in the U.S.A and developed CETSCALE scale. The validity of the CETSCALE gained international recognition in 1991 with the study Netemeyer, Durvasula and Lichtenstein did in U.S.A, Germany, Japan and France (Netemeyer, Durvasula and Lichtenstein, 1991). Later the validity and one-dimensional quality of the scale is further tested with the studies made in France, Japan, West Germany, Malta, Russia, England, Greece, Belgium, China, Hungary, Poland, the Netherlands and Canada.”(Aysuna and Altuna 2008).

In this study, the relationship between consumer ethnocentrism and demographic characteristics is analyzed. The findings related to recent studies are shown in Table-1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORS</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>FINDINGS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Robert SCHOOLER</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Age: Negative relationship</td>
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<td>Marjorie WALL</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Gender: Women more ethnocentric</td>
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<td>Louise A. HESLOP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chin Tiong TAN</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Income: Positive relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John U. FARLEY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Min HAN</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Age: Positive relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gender: Women more ethnocentric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education: No relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Income: No relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subhash SHARMA</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Age: No relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terence A. SHIMP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gender: Women more ethnocentric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeongshin SHIN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education: Negative relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Income: Negative relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linda K. GOOD</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Age: Positive relationship   \ Age: Positive relationship   \ Gender: Women more ethnocentric (for Poland) \ Gender: No relationship (for Russia) \ Education: Negative relationship \ Income: Negative relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patricia HUDDLESTON</td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert CARUANA</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>Age: Positive relationship   \ Gender: No relationship   \ Education: Negative relationship \ Income: No relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James A. NIELSEN</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Age: Positive relationship   \ Gender: Women more ethnocentric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark T. SPENCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.R. Bruning</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Gender: Women more ethnocentric   \ Income: Negative relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrence H. WITKOWSKI</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Age: Positive relationship   \ Education: Negative relationship (Only Mexican) \ Income: No relationship \ Living foreign country: No relationship \ Foreign Language: Negative relationship (Only Mexican)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hungry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jill Gabrielle KLEIN</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Age: Positive relationship   \ Gender: Women more ethnocentric   \ Education: Negative relationship \ Income: Negative relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard ETTENSON</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irena VIDA</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Age: Positive relationship   \ Gender: Women more ethnocentric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ann FAIRHURST</td>
<td></td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John J. WATSON</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Gender: Women more ethnocentric   \ Age: Positive relationship \ Education: Negative relationship \ Income: Negative relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katrina WRIGHT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researcher(s)</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Location 1</td>
<td>Location 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| George BALBANIS et al.                            | 2001 | Turkey     | Czech Republic | Age: Positive relationship (for Turkey)  
Gender: Women more ethnocentric (for Turkey)  
Education: Negative relationship (for Turkey)  
Income: Negative relationship (for Turkey) |
| Kojo SAFFU and John Hugh WALKER                   | 2005 | Canada     | Russia     | Gender: “Women more ethnocentric” is rejected  
Education: “Negative relationship” is rejected |
| Marija CUTURA                                     | 2012 | Bosnia & Herzegovina |          | Income: Negative relationship |
| Charles W. RICHARDSON, Jr.                        | 2012 | USA        |            | Age: Positive relationship  
Education: Negative relationship  
Income: Negative relationship  
Gender: Men more ethnocentric |
| Khairul Anuar Mohammad SHAH and Hazril Izwar IBRAHIM | 2012 | Malaysia    |            | Age: Positive relationship  
Education: Negative relationship  
Gender: Women more ethnocentric  
Income: Negative relationship |
| R. Nicholas GERLICH et al.                        | 2012 | USA        |            | Gender: Men more ethnocentric  
Residence: Rural more ethnocentric |
| Hilal ASIL and İsmail KAYA                        | 2013 | Turkey     |            | Age: Positive relationship  
Size of Family: Positive relationship  
Income: Negative relationship  
Education: Negative relationship  
Gender: Women more ethnocentric  
Marital Status: Married more ethnocentric |

As seen in Table-1 the studies defining the relationship between consumer ethnocentrism and demography have different results. Especially, Balbanis and et.al. show that there are differences in two countries in 2001. The findings show differences between in the studies above.

CETSCALE scale is very important to define marketing perspectives because it gives data for the marketing purposes. According to Nielsen and Spence
CETSSCALE results in countries that have higher scores show tendency to domestic products compared to foreign products (Nielsen and Spence, 1997). As a result, different strategies are adopted by businesses due to target marketing, market positioning and market segmentation processes.

The quality and the characteristics of the product is on the foreground for countries with high ethnocentrism levels. For companies which want to enter foreign markets the countries high ethnocentrism levels are risky for them.

In market segmentation processes demographic qualities of the consumers are significant. In this study, the relationship between the demographic qualities and ethnocentrism levels of the consumers are analyzed and consumers in Bosnia&Herzegovina, Sandžak and in Turkey. As a result, suggestions are also made for companies that want to be active in Bosnia, Sandžak and Turkey.

**Research Methodology**

The aim of this paper is to define the ethnocentrism levels of Bosnian consumers in different areas and to compare it with the consumers’ demographic data. Two- part survey is conducted between Turkish and Bosnian consumers. This survey is conducted simultaneously in Turkey, Bosnia&Herzegovina and Sandžak in August 2013. All the samples, convenience sampling method is used and 158 samples from Turkey, 144 samples from Bosnia&Herzegovina and 132 samples from Sandžak are obtained ready for data processing. (sample’s characteristics can be seen on Table 2) Due to limitations of money and time, can not reached more participant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table-2</th>
<th>Sample’s Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>18-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32-38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39 above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education Level</strong></td>
<td>Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Master&amp;pH.d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Profession</strong></td>
<td>Worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shopkeeper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Housewife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public Servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private Sector Employee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Living abroad country experience</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Language</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-Economic Status</strong></td>
<td>Low-income level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle income level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High income level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Income (monthly)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Less than 500</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>54</th>
<th>91</th>
<th>7,0</th>
<th>37,5</th>
<th>68,9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>501-1000</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17,7</td>
<td>19,4</td>
<td>22,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001-1500</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15,8</td>
<td>13,9</td>
<td>4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1501-2000</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17,1</td>
<td>11,1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2500</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12,7</td>
<td>4,2</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2501-3000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,7</td>
<td>5,6</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3001-3500</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8,9</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3501-4000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4001 above</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,7</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>0,8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In Turkey, TL was used as the unit of currency. In Bosnia and Sandžak, Euro was used as the unit of currency. €1 was equal to approximately 2,8 TL.

Research Design

In the first part of the survey, CETSCALE is used developed by Shimp and Sharma in 1987. In that scale, 17 scale variables (between 1= I strongly disagree, 5= I strongly agree scale) are used. In the second part, there are 9 questions for demography of the consumers. These questions show age, (only this variable was measured by an open-ended question), income, gender, socio-economic status, educational background, marital status, foreign language background, living in abroad experience and profession.

In accordance with the aim of the survey, the differences between the ethnocentrism levels of the three research areas are measured with one-way ANOVA and relationships between demographic data and ethnocentrism is analyzed with “correlation analysis”.

Findings

To test the internal consistency of the data, reliability analysis was conducted for all research areas separately. The Cronbach’s Alpha score achieved for the CETSCALE for Turkey was α=0.881, for Bosnia&Herzegovina was α=0.933, and for Sandžak was α=0.862. Findings of the reliability analysis is similar to previous studies. For example, the study that Shimp and Sharma did in 1989 the Cronbach’s alpha was 0,94, is compared with Good and Huddleston’s study in 1995, where reliability was 0,95; Caruana’s study in 1996 where reliability was 0,96, Witkowski’s in 1998 where reliability was 0,92, Balbanis et.al. in 2001 where reliability was 0,90, and Cutura’s in 2012 where reliability was 0,96.
### Table-3

**Distribution of CETSCALE Items**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>TURKEY</th>
<th>BOSNIA &amp; HERZEGOVINA</th>
<th>SANDŽAK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Always buy Bosnian-made products instead of imports.</td>
<td>Mean 3.0949</td>
<td>Mean 4.4861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Standard Deviation 1.21973</td>
<td>Standard Deviation 1.00339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Only those products that are unavailable in the Bosnian should be imported.</td>
<td>Mean 3.6026</td>
<td>Mean 3.9437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Standard Deviation 1.09944</td>
<td>Standard Deviation 1.30343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Buy Bosnian-made products. Keep working.</td>
<td>Mean 3.5924</td>
<td>Mean 4.5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Standard Deviation 1.15999</td>
<td>Standard Deviation 1.00349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bosnian products, first, last and foremost.</td>
<td>Mean 3.2102</td>
<td>Mean 3.8194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Standard Deviation 1.11535</td>
<td>Standard Deviation 1.23273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Purchasing foreign-made products is unwise.</td>
<td>Mean 2.2662</td>
<td>Mean 3.1268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Standard Deviation 0.96367</td>
<td>Standard Deviation 1.36760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>It is not right to purchase foreign products.</td>
<td>Mean 2.3567</td>
<td>Mean 3.3662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Standard Deviation 0.99365</td>
<td>Standard Deviation 1.22896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>A real Bosnian should always buy Bosnian-made products.</td>
<td>Mean 2.5686</td>
<td>Mean 3.4857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Standard Deviation 1.09283</td>
<td>Standard Deviation 1.31119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>We should purchase Bosnian products manufactured in Bosnian instead of letting other countries get rich off us.</td>
<td>Mean 3.2342</td>
<td>Mean 4.2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Standard Deviation 1.03547</td>
<td>Standard Deviation 1.13125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>It is always best to purchase Bosnian products.</td>
<td>Mean 2.8854</td>
<td>Mean 3.6338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Standard Deviation 0.99336</td>
<td>Standard Deviation 1.28537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>There should be very little trading purchasing of goods from other countries unless out of necessity.</td>
<td>Mean 3.4051</td>
<td>Mean 3.9444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Standard Deviation 1.10031</td>
<td>Standard Deviation 1.08246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Bosnians should not buy foreign products, because this hurts Bosnian business and causes unemployment.</td>
<td>Mean 2.9557</td>
<td>Mean 3.7083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Standard Deviation 0.97317</td>
<td>Standard Deviation 1.19950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Curbs should be put on all imports.</td>
<td>Mean 2.5414</td>
<td>Mean 2.1111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Standard Deviation 1.10645</td>
<td>Standard Deviation 1.16542</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
13. It may cost me in the long run but I prefer to support .......... products.

|          | 3,376 | 1,02253 | 3,1408  | 1,26374 | 3,8692  | 4,55524 |

14. Foreigners should be allowed to put their products on our markets.

|          | 2,6194 | 1,04615 | 2,7361  | 1,15865 | 2,4154  | 1,04016 |

15. Foreign products should be taxed heavily to reduce their entry into the ............

|          | 2,9494 | 1,09891 | 3,9861  | 1,15260 | 3,4729  | 1,14617 |

16. We should buy from foreign countries only those products that we cannot obtain within our own country.

|          | 3,5443 | 1,0422  | 3,7500  | 1,20314 | 3,5682  | 1,04985 |

17. ............. consumers who purchase products made in other countries are responsible for putting their fellow .............s out of work.

|          | 2,4494 | 1,07991 | 3,1408  | 1,31867 | 3,3664  | 1,17804 |

Mean for CETSCALE 2,970 3,558 3,378

The distribution of the responses that consumers in Turkey, Bosnia, and Sandžak give to CETSCALE questions are shown in Table-3. When Table-3 is analyzed, it is seen that respondents in Bosnia and Sandžak give parallel answers with each other. In other words, consumers in Bosnia and Sandžak have similar approaches to foreign made products. Ethnocentrism levels (Bosnia: 3,558 - Sandžak: 3,378) are above 3 which is mid-level, which means consumers don’t want to buy foreign products. The average of the responses from the Turkish consumers are 2,970 which is close to the 3 the median level. It can’t be said of Turkish consumers have a distinct ethnosentric tendency.

Table-4
One Way ANOVA Result (Ethnocentrism)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>25,092</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12,546</td>
<td>22,891</td>
<td>000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>207,172</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>548</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>232,265</td>
<td>380</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In accordance with the aim of the survey, the differences between the ethnocentrism levels of the three areas are measured with “One-Way ANOVA”, and re-
relationships between demographic data and ethnocentrism is analyzed with “correlation analysis”.

Table 5
Correlations Between CETSCALE and Demographics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GENDER</th>
<th>MARITAL STATUS</th>
<th>EDUCATION LEVEL</th>
<th>SOCIO ECONOMIC STATUS</th>
<th>LIVING FOREIGN COUNTRY</th>
<th>FOREIGN LANGUAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TURKEY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Correlation Coefficient</td>
<td>,110</td>
<td>,090</td>
<td>-,126</td>
<td>,070</td>
<td>,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>,111</td>
<td>,187</td>
<td>,049</td>
<td>,291</td>
<td>,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOSNIA &amp; HERZEGOVINA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Correlation Coefficient</td>
<td>,091</td>
<td>,139</td>
<td>,011</td>
<td>,028</td>
<td>,210**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>,209</td>
<td>,053</td>
<td>,873</td>
<td>,681</td>
<td>,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANDŽAK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Correlation Coefficient</td>
<td>,048</td>
<td>,053</td>
<td>,090</td>
<td>,261**</td>
<td>,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>,554</td>
<td>,516</td>
<td>,235</td>
<td>,001</td>
<td>,820</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At this table, Kendall’s Tau-b Correlation was conducted at 0.05 significance level.

As seen in Table 4, when Turkish and Bosnian consumers’ ethnocentrism levels are compared there is a meaningful difference statistically between three. The neutral point of the scale gives results near to 3 which means that approaches to foreign made products and domestic products are different. Ethnocentrism levels is high in Bosnia and Sandžak, in Turkey it is close to the median level.

As seen in Table 5, when consumers’ ethnocentrism levels and demographic variables are compared, it can be said that there are different forms of consumption in all research areas. In Turkish consumers, demographic variables and ethnocentrism levels gave only statistically meaningful results in terms of education levels. There is no significant relationship at 0.05 level between gender, marital status, living abroad, foreign language background, and socio-economic level. The relationship between educational background and ethnocentrism levels
are negative. As a result, Turkish consumers ethnocentrism levels decrease when they are more educated.

When Bosnian findings are considered, there is a significant relationship between foreign country experience and ethnocentrism levels. In other words, there is not a significant relationship at 0.05 level between ethnocentrism levels and gender, marital status, education level, foreign language background, and socio-economic level. Bosnian consumers who have foreign country experience have high ethnocentrism levels.

When findings from Sandžak data are considered, there is a significant relationship between socio-economic status and ethnocentrism levels. In other words, there is not a significant relationship at 0.05 level between ethnocentrism levels and gender, marital status, education level, foreign language background, and foreign country experience. Consumers live in Sandžak with high socio-economic status have low ethnocentrism levels.

As seen in Table 1, there are different results in different studies. Also, it can be seen relevant results related to negative correlation between educational background and consumer ethnocentrism also in Sharma et al. in 1995, Good and Huddleston in 1995, Caruana in 1996, Witkowski in 1998, Klein and Ettenson in 1999, Watson and Wright in 2000 and Balbanis et al. in 2001.

The relationship between foreign country experience and consumer ethnocentrism levels are not analyzed thoroughly in former studies. There is no correlation in Witkowski’s article (1998-Mexico). According to this study, Bosnian consumers who have foreign country experience have high ethnocentrism levels.

Table-6
Correlations Between CETSCALE and Age-Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>INCOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TURKEY</td>
<td>Mean of CETSCALE</td>
<td>-.170*</td>
<td>-.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOSNIA &amp;</td>
<td>Mean of CETSCALE</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HERZEGOVINA</td>
<td></td>
<td>.957</td>
<td>.583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.957</td>
<td>.583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In CETSCALE surveys one of the most analyzed data are age and income. The findings about age and income are shown in Table-6. According to this, there is a positive correlation between Turkish consumers age and ethnocentrism levels. But there is no correlation in the other two areas. As Turkish consumers are older, they have high ethnocentrism levels. As also seen in Table-1 Schoole (1971) found a negative correlation between age and ethnocentrism levels. Sharma, Shimp and Shin (1995) and Balbanis et.al. (2001) in Czech Republic found no correlation between them.

According to Table-6, there is a negative correlation between consumers, live in Sandžak, their age and ethnocentrism levels. But there is no correlation in the other two areas. As consumers, live in Sandžak, have higher income, they have low ethnocentrism levels. As also seen in Table-1, Tan and Farley (1987) and Balbanis et.al. (2001-for Czech Republic) found a positive correlation between income and ethnocentrism levels. Good and Huddleston (1995) and Sharma, Shimp and Shin (1995) found a negative correlation between income and ethnocentrism levels. Han (1988) and Caruana (1996) found no correlation between them.

Conclusion

When data is considered in this research, what international companies should invest on Turkish and Bosnian consumers is analyzed. The perceptions that Turkish consumers have for foreign products differ when they get older with a high level of ethnocentrism. Therefore; they prefer domestic products more when compared to young generation. With higher education levels, the lower is ethnocentrism levels which means a positive perception of foreign made products.

When the Bosnian data is analyzed, there is a correlation between demographic data and ethnocentrism level. In this case, people who have foreign country experience have high ethnocentrism levels when compared to people who do not have. In other words, people who living abroad have negative perceptions of foreign made products.

When the Sandžak data is analyzed, there is a correlation between demographic data and ethnocentrism level. In this case, people who have high income level and socio-economic status have low ethnocentrism levels when compared to people who do not have low income level and socio-economic status. In other words, people who have high income level and socio-economic status have posi-
tive perceptions of foreign made products.

Companies in their international marketing strategy, try to develop successful market segmentation and positioning strategies. When international businesses want to trade in Turkey, Bosnia or Sandžak they should consider the ethnocentrism levels of the consumers. In this paper, the findings can be helpful to develop their strategies.

When market segmentation strategies are considered, international firms can make segmentation according to age and educational backgrounds in Turkey for Bosnians. The positioning can be done according to young people and for people who have high levels of education. Foregrounding the characteristics of the product can bring businesses success in that market. On the other hand, for the older and low-educated consumers positioning can be done by putting the country of origin in the background.

For companies to invest in Bosnia, market segmentation can be done according to foreign country experience. In positioning the characteristics of the product can be foregrounded to address people with foreign country experience, for those who do not have that background the emphasis can be on the origin of the product.

The segmentation that will be in Sandžak for Bosnians, income levels are an important criteria. The positioning can be done according to people who have higher income level. Foregrounding the characteristics of the product can bring businesses success in that market. On the other hand, for consumers, who have low income level, positioning can be done by putting the country of origin in the background.

When generally evaluating for three research areas, the consumers in that areas approach to domestic products and foreign products equally. In this case, the successful marketing for international companies is due to characteristics of the product and its competitiveness. According to consumer oriented marketing mix communication is indispensable between consumers and companies for marketing. Companies when deciding on advertising, promotion, personal selling, public relations issues should take into consideration the consumer attitudes toward foreign products. It will affect their marketing success on international grounds.

In this paper, Bosnians living in different research areas are analyzed. When research carried out on ethnic groups living in these areas, different results can be obtained.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


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